^Ttbrar^ IN THE CUSTODY OF THE BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY. SHELE N° THE PRINCIPLES O F Moral Philosophy* A N ENQUIRY Into the Wise and Good GOVERNMENT O F T H E MORAL WORLD. IN WHICH The Continuance of Good Administra- tion, and of Due Care about Virtue, for ever, is inferred from prefent Order in all Things, in that Part chiefly where Virtue is concerned. By George Turnbull, LL.D. And //Natural Philosophy, in all its Paris , by purfu'ng this Method, jhall at length be perfected, the Bounds o/Moral Philosophy will alfo be enlarged* Newton's Opt. B. III. Account for Moral9 as for Natural Things. Eflay on Man, Ep. I. ' I I I— — — ■ I II ■ II I I I !■■!■ I I II HI i - ■■ ' » LONDON: Printed for John Noon, at the White Hart ; near Mercers Chapel, in Cheapfde. MDCCXL. MM MS 2* I, (o TOT Right Hon 6 PHILIP, Earl of STANHOPE, &c This Treatise is moft humbly Dedicated By His LORD SHIP 's Mofl devoted i Humble Servant, George Turnbull.. THE Epistle Dedicatory, M tf Lord, I A M very fure, that to one of Your truly liberal and virtuous call of mind, the fcope of this Treatife will be very agreeable : Which, to give the fhorteft view of it I can, is, by endeavouring to account for Moral, as the great Newton has taught us to explain Na- tural Appearances, (that is, by reducing them to good general laws) to Ihew, that from what We fee of perfectly wife and good adminiftra- tion at prefent with regard to man, as well as all other things conftituting the fame fyftem, there is fufficient reafon to conclude, that the fame admirable order fhall prevail for ever, and confequently that due care will be taken of vir- tue, in all its different ftages, to all eternity. No The Epistle Dedicatory* No man, by having the higheft opinion of virtue, and of the happinefs accruing from ra- tional exercifes, and virtuous confcioufnefs, was ever the lefs inclined to believe a future exift- ence. On the contrary, it will ever be found, that as they who are entirely immerfed in grofs voluptuoufnefs, and quite ftrangers to the pure joys virtue alone can give, are the leaft willing to think of a fucceeding life -, fo they who ha- ving a ftrong fenfe of the fupreme excellence of virtue, highly prefer to what is vulgarly called plea/are, the folid, unchanging blifs, with which they feel a well-regulated mind and conform- able conduct, fo unfpeakably to exhilirate the foul even in fevere outward diftrefs, are the readied to embrace and indulge that comfort- able opinion and hope, which renders the caufe of virtue completely triumphant. The ineffa- ble fatisfadtion redounding from the exercifes of virtuous affections, and the confeience of merit, is a truly divine reward : it comes from our Maker : it is of his appointment : and he who hath fo conftituted things, mutt love virtue ; and that which he delights in, he will certainly promote to perfect happinefs by the propereft fteps and methods. We are well authorifed to fay, that a virtu- cm man is the Image of God ; that he partakes of the divine nature. And the fubftantial, un- fading The Epistle Dedicatory. ii* Fading happinefs, which virtue creates, and that augments as it advances and improves, is to us a faint fhadow of the divine all-perfed: felicity refulting from no other fource, but his abfolute moral perfection, being of a kind with it : and it is a fure prognoftick of that fulnefs of blifs, which ttiuft arife from virtue, when being by- due culture brought to great perfection, it fhall be placed in circumftances for exerting all its power and excellence fuited to fuch an impro- ved ftate of it. Now, My Lord, being convinced of the acceptablenefs of this Defign to Your Lbrdfhip, when I offer the work to You, with a heart full of efteem, love and gratitude, as the beft pledge of my fificere attachment I can prefent You with, fuffer me but to fay one truth : which is, that I never had the pleafure of con- verling with Your Lordfhip, without not only being inftrudted, but, which is better, without feeling ah acceffion of frefh vigor to that love of truth, liberty, mankind • virtue and religion } Your opinion of my fincere regard to which, procured and preferves me that place in Your friendfhip, which all who know You, pro- claim merit : a friendfhip which is one of the greateft joys, as well as honours of my life, and to which I am deeply indebted on many The Epistle Dedicatory. • many accounts, which I am not at liberty to declare. Tho' no good man can defpife merited praife, yet You fhun it even from thofe whom You know to be incapable of flattering, through a jealoufy and watchfulnefs almoft peculiar to Yourfelf ; left Your mind, whofe fupreme de- light is in doing good, fhould ever ftand in need, in the fmalleft degree, of any other mo- tive toad: the beft, the worthieft, the moft ge- nerous part, befides a thorough-feeling of the excellence of fo doing. 1 am, My Lord, Tour Lordfilp's Moft obedient Humble Servant, December, 19- 1739- George Turnbull. PREFACE. THO9 not a few who are really lovers of, and great proficients in Natural Philofophy, be not afhamed of the deepeft ignorance of the parts and proportions of the human mind, and their mutual relation, connexion and dependency •, but rejetl all fuch enquiries with an opprobrious fneer as meta- phyfick, meaning by that term of contempt, fomething quite remote from true philofophy, and all ufeful or po- lite learning, to be abandoned by men of genius and tafte to Pedants and Sophifts. Tet it is certain, that the order and fymmetry of this inward part is in itfelf no lefs real and exacl than that of the body. And that this moral anatomy is not only a part, but the moft ufe- ful part of Natural Philofophy, rightly underftood, is too evident to need any proof to thofe who will but take the trouble to confider what Natural Philofophy, in its full extent, muft mean. FO R, in the firft place, it is an enquiry into a real part of nature, which muft be carried on in the fame way with our refearches into our own bodily con- texture, or into any other, whether vegetable or animal fabrick. Secondly, 'Tis only by an acurate infpeclion of this whole, and its conftituent parts, that we can come at the knowledge of the means and caufes, by which our inward conftitution may be rendered or pre- ferved found and entire -, or contrariwife, maimed* diftorted, impaired and injured. And yet, in the third place 'y *Ihat it is upon our inward ft ate or temper, our well-being PREFACE. 'Well-being and happinefs, or our uneafinefs and mifery chiefly depend, muft be immediately acknowledged by all who can think ; or are in the leaft acquainted with them/elves. To deny it is indeed to ajfert, that our perceiving or confcious part is not principal in us. Mo- ral Philofophy, or an enquiry into the frame and con- nexion of thofe various powers, appetites andaffeclions, which, by their coalefcence and joint-operation, conftitute the foul, and its temper, or difpofition, may indeed de- generate into a very idle, fophiftical, quibling, contenti- ous logomachy : It hath too often had that mifer able fate, thro9 the fault of thofe to whom unhappily people of a more liberal and polite, as well as more ufeful and Jo lid turn, have principally left it to handle thefe fubjecls. But hath not Phifiology likewife fuffered no lefs cruelly in the fame manner ? And what other remedy is there in either cafe, but to treat them both as they ought to be : i. e. as aueftions of faH or natural hi(loryi in which hypothefes afjumed at random, and by caprice, or not fuffi- tiently confirmed by experience, are never to be built up- on ; and in which no words ought to be admitted, till they have had a clear and determinate meaning affixed to them -, and withal, in that free, elegant and pleafing way, which we may know from fame few examples a- mong the moderns i and from very many among the an- cients, not to be incompatible with the profoundeft fub- jecls in Philoibphy : inftead of handling them in that infipid, tedious ungainful manner, which having of late more generally prevailed in the fchools, far from doing fcrvice to Philofophy, hath indeed brought it into con- tempt, and as it were quite banifJoed it from amongft the polite and fafloionablc part of the world, whofe fludies are by that means become very trifling, fuperflcial and unmanly — Mere virtuofofhip. T HE PREFACE. i THE great Mafter, to whofe truly marvellous (1 hadalmofi [aid more than human) fagacity andacuracy, we are indebted for all the greater improvements that have been made in Natural Philofophy, after pointing cut in the cleareft manner , the only way by which we can acquire real knowledge of any fart of nature, cor- poreal or moral, plainly declares, that he looked upon the enlargement Moral Philofophy muft needs receive, fa foon as Natural Philofophy* in its full extent, being purfued in that only proper method of advancing it9 fhould be brought to any confiderable degree of perfection, to be the principal advantage mankind and human fociety would then reap from fuch fcience. 1 T was by this important, comprehenfive hint, I was led long ago to apply myfelf to the fiudy of the hu- man mind in the fame way as to that of the human body, or any other part of Natural Philofophy : that is, to try whether due enquiry into moral nature would not foon enable us to account for moral, as the beft of Philofophers teaches us to explain natural phenomena, NO W, no fooner had I conceived this idea of mo* ral refearches, than I began to look carefully into the better ancients, (into Plato9 j works in particular) to know their opinion of human nature, and of the order cf the world. And by this refearch I quickly found, thai they had a very firm perfuafton of an infinitely wift and good adminiftration, aclually prevailing at prefent throughout the whole of nature, and therefore very- likely to prevail for ever, founded, partly, upon what they were able to comprehend in general of order in the government of the fenfible world -, but chiefly (for they had made no very great advances in what is now com* monly called Natural Philofophy^ upon the great in? fight i* PREFACE. fight they had acquired into the moral conftitution of manb by applying them/elves to moral enquiries. They were able to difcern clearly from thence, that man is very well fitted and qualified for attaining to a very high degree of moral perfection even here ; and being fatisfied, that fuch care is taken of virtue, and fuch provijion made for her in this life, as is moft proper and beft fuited to her firft ft ate of formation and difci- pline, they could not entertain any doubts of the kind concern of Heaven about her to be carried on, as may beft ferve the purpofe of general good, by proper ft eps, for ever. AND accordingly what I now publifh, is an at- tempt [in confequence of fuch obfervations as I have been able to make, or have been led to by others) to vin- dicate human nature, and the ways of God to man, by reducing the more remarkable appearances in the human fyftem to excellent general laws : i. e. to powers and laws of powers, admirably adapted to pro- duce a very noble [pedes of being in the rifing fcale of life and perfeclion. AND what I think I have proved, by thus endea- vouring to account for moral as for natural things, a- raounts briefly to this^ " That order is kept in ?nan, as well as in the other parts of nature within our obfervation, con- ftituting the fame fyftem : And that from what we clear^ lyfec of perfeclly wife and good government in all pre- fent things, in that part chiefly where virtue is con- cerned, there is fujficient reafon to infer the univerfal, never -ceafing fuperintendency of a divine providence, and a future ft ate of complete happinefs to the virtuous-, or the continuance of perfeclly wife and good order in all things, PREFACE. things, and, which is chief, of due concern about virtue,, in all its different ft ages, for ever and ever" IN order to conclude a providence, (in the belief of which the chief happinefs of thinking perfons is abfo* lutely bound up) it is plain, we muft firft. have accurate- ly conjidered the condition of virtue and vice with refpetl to this life merely, fo as to be able to determine, when, and how far, or in what degrees, and how circumftan- tiated the one or the other is our prefent greater good or ill. Now it is only by ftr icily examining the JlrucJure and fa- brick of the mind, the frame and connexion of all its powers and affetlions, and the manner of their operation, that we can after tain the end and pur po ft of our being *, find out how our moral part either improves or fuffers \ know what its force is when naturally preftrved and maintained in its found ft ate, and what happens to it in proportion as it is neglecled or proftituted, abufed or corrupted. Thus, alone, can we with any degree of certainty and affurance fay, what is the natural force and tendency of virtue, on the one hand, or the natural influence and refult of vice, on the other -, or in what manner either of theft may work toward our happinefs or miftry. BUT if 'we fet about fuch an enquiry in the fair im- partial way of experiment, and of reafoning from experi- ment alone, we jhall plainly perceive, that as many as the hard/hips and difficulties are, which virtue has to en- counter, ftruggle with, and fur mount in this ft ate \ far however, from being quite abandoned, fhe is not left without great fupport and comfort : Nay, that in reali- ty, fhe is only expoftd fo far as various trial necefjary to her culture and improvement requires ; and has a real happimfs belonging to her exercifts, fufficient to render Vi PREFACE. render her the left and wifeft choice even at prefent, in the opinion of all who make a fair and complete efti" mate of human life : juft fo much as leaves room for further hopes in her behalf \ by clearly (hewing providence to be already moft ferioujly concerned about her, and thoroughly interefted on her fide in her firft probationary ft ate. And therefore the argument for a future life in this treatifer runs in this channel, " There is fuch provifion made for virtue, there is fuch happi- nefs, fuch advantages belonging to her, even here in her firft ft ate, or at her firft fetting out in life, as render it highly probable, nay, abfolutely certain, that a perfectly kind providential care of her inter efts begun here, is to be extended to a fucceeding life, andperfecled hereafter?* There is fuch a foundation laid, nay, fuch an advance- ment made here, as plainly points out the nature and fcope of that moral building intended to be carried on to its completion in another ftate. For that work or fcheme muft be advanced gradually, becaufe virtue muft be gradually formed to ripenefs and vigour, by means of proper exercifes and trials : And virtue cannot poffibly in the nature of things have thehappinefs refulting from its exercifes, but in -proportion as it advances and improves. Education muft precede perfeclion in the moral, as fpring muft go before harveft in the natural world. And moral perfection muft be arrived to full maturity by proper cultivation, before the excellent fruits it can then, and then only produce, can be reap- ed and enjoyed. Virtue muft befit to be placed in the circumftances which alone can render it fully happy, by affording it proper means and occafions of exerting its complete force and excellence, before it can be placed in fuch circumftances $ or being fo placed^ could reap to Ik PREFACE. vii the fully all the advantages of fuch afituation : but be- ing well provided for, and duly attended to andfupprted in its firft ft ate of education and difcipline, what rea- finable ground of doubt or fear can there be with regard to its future condition, or its fucceeding circumftances in mother ftate, after it is brought by due culture, ftep by ftep, to confiderable ftrength, beauty and perfeclion, as virtue muft : Gradual improvement to perfeclion by pro- per diligence to cultivate it, being involved in the very notion of virtue and merit. I think I need fay no more of the dejign in a Preface. The variety of materials contained in this Effay, and the order in which it proceeds, may be foon feen by caft- ing one's eye on the Contents, as they are digefted inta a regular fummary of the whole. And therefore all that remains to be faid here is, in the firft place, that the margine is filled with quotations from ancient authors, not to make a fhew of reading •, but be~ caufe, in reality \ the beft ohfervations in this enquiry are taken from fome ancient moralift ; and it feem'd to me fo much the more neceffary to do juftice to them on this oc- cafion by fuch references, that it hath been fo lately af- ferted, the wifeft ancients had not juft notions of God, or of a future ftate \ or, at leaft, were not able to produce any conclufive arguments on.thefe important fub- jecls. But of this opinion I have faid enough in my Conclufion. And therefore I (hall juft fay a word of the modern authors from whom I have received the greateft affiftances in this work. I think all of them from whom I have borrowed any thing are referred to in the notes. But the pleafure and advantage I have reaped from them, render it but juftice in me to make more particular mention of them in this place. SOME viii PREFACE. SOME few very good and ufeful remarks are taken from Dr. John Clark's excellent Sermons at Boyle's lecture. / have quoted feme very beautiful pajf ages relating to the neceffity of general laws, and to the wife order of nature appearing in the eftablifoed connexions between cur Jenfible ideas of different fenfcs, from the philofo- phical writings of Dr. Berkley ( Bifhop of Cloyd) a writer highly efteemed by all perfons of good tqfte. I have ufed feme of Dr. Butler'j (Bi/hop of Bri- ftolj phrafes in his difcourfe on the analogy, &c. be- eaufe I thought them very proper ', and well chofenfor the purpofe to which they are employed: and this I take to be a liberty that does not fe much as border on plagiarifm. Bejide that, I am obliged to the fame treatife for feve- ralvery ufeful and truly philofophical cbfervations on hu- man nature. But every intelligent reader ; who is ac* quainied with his excellent fermons, will quickly per- ceive, that throughout the whole I am yet more indebted to them . And, indeed, that true method of enquiring into human nature, which is delineated with fpxb force and perfpicuity of argument in the admirable preface to thefe divine difcourfes, being ftriclly kept to in themr they make a full vindication of human nature, and of the ways of God to man. There the natural dignity of human nature, the real excellence of virtue, the f olid happinefs it creates, and it alone can give, and the hide- feqfible, unalienable right of moral confeience to maintain the fuperiority, and govern in the human breaft, are fet forth in the moft forcible convincive manner, with evi- dence truly irrcjiftible. I cannot exprefs the vaft fatis faction, and equal benefit, with which 1 have often read the Earl of Shaftfbury'^ Charaft- PREFACE. ix Chara&erifticks : a work that muft live for ever in the ejieem of all who delight in moral enquiries. There is in his Effay on virtue and merit, and his moral Rapfody, a complete fyjlem of Moral Philofophy de- monftrated in the ftricleft manner, which fully fecures that firft ftep to revelation, the belief of a Deity and providence. And I cannot pofftbly account to myfelf, how it could come about, that a perfon of great candor and integrity, well acquainted with thefe writings, and who hath on other occqfions Jhewn fuch a laudable readinefs to dojuftice to miftaken or wilfully mifreprefented authors, Jhould fay, This writer aimed at giving a fcheme of virtue without religion, fine e he hath on purpofe at great length demonftrated the relation which virtue has to pie- ty -, and hath there fully proved, the firft not to be complete but in the later •, becaufe where the later is wanting, there can neither be the feme benignity, firmnefs or conftancy ; the fame good com pof Lire of the affections or uniformity of mind. And thus the perfection and height of virtue muft be owing to the Belief of a Go d . Thcfe are that incomparable author's o.vn words. 'Tis true, indeed, he hath let fall fome things concerning revelation, which have rendered, hjs fatisfaclicn with regard to the evidences of if very- doubtful to many. But even with regard to fuch fur mi-. fes in his writings^ may I not refer it to any candid perfon, who acts the better part f He, who for the fake of them, thro* the warmth of his zeal, (tho^ it be for the beft caufes) condemns the whole work in the* lump -, or he who hath been at pains to find- out fome ak I via t ions and excufesfor them? Such a perfon I know- whofe fine ere belief of chriftianity would net be called in-. to queftion, were 1 at liberty to name him : A;:>dfure if b there. PREFACE. there be any virtue peculiarly recommended by the chriftl- an religion, it is, The charity which is not eafily provoked to think evil, but beareth all things, and hopeth all things, i. e. is difpofed to put the moft fa- vourable conftruclion upon every thing. THE writer from whom I have borrowed moft, is Mr. Hutchefon, profefjor of Moral Philofophy in the Univerfity of Glafgow, a teacher and writer who hath done eminent fervice to virtue and religion in both ways, and flill continues indefatigably fo to do. But that none of my faults may be imputed to him, it is fit Ifhould apprife my Readers, that in quoting from him I have fcmetimes taken the liberty, not only to change feme of his phrafes, but to join places together which lye at fome diftance in the original \ and which is yet a greater freedom, to intermix fome things of my own with his reafonings. This his native candor and ingenuity will 9io t only very readily forgive, but immediately attribute to its true caufe, which was not any affetlation of amend- ing or correcling one whom I think not inferior to any modern writer on morals in accuracy and per fpicuity, but rather fuperior to almoft all ; but purely, becaufe fuch changes and additions appeared to me not unnecefjary to ferve the purpofe of my argument. THE only other author I have to name is Mr. Pope, in his EfTay on Man, which hath been lately defended againfl the objections of Mr. Croulliz, with fo much judgment, and fuch goodtafte of poetry as well as phi- lofophy, by the very learned, ingenious and worthy author of the divine legation of Moles. Never did any poeti- cal work afford me fuch delight, becaufe none ever gave me fuch deep and ufeful inftruclion. As much as I have hadoccqfion ly d long courfe of Jludy in that way to be acquainted PREFACE. acquainted with the fubjecl, yet that truly philofophkal poem is always new to me : the oftner I read it , the more I am charmed with jt9 and benefited by it. "THIS author hath Jhewn us, that the feemingly moft abftrufe matters in philofophy, maybe rendered, inftead of dry and tedious, exceeding pleajing and agreeable. Hp hath given to this very profound fubj eel, all the charms of poetry, without facrificing perfpicuity to ornament, without wandering from the precifion, or breaking the chain of reafon. And t ho9 I am far from thinking writing in profe upon fuch philofophical matters, not to be abfolutely necejjary on many accounts, (other wife 1 had not attempted what I have now done) yet I could not chufe but conclude my abflracl reafonings with a quo- tation from him, as far as he goes -, which is indeed to the bottom of his fubjecl : becaufe I have often felt, that principles, precepts or maxims, written in fuch har- monious verfe, hoth ftrike the reafon more ftrongly at firft, and are more eafily retained by it after- wards. And it is impoffible for any one to exprefs fuch profound abflracl truths in profe, fo fhortly as he has done in verfe : Yet nothing is more certain, than that much of the force, as well as grace of arguments or inftruc- tions, depends on their concifenefs. What a blef fing to fociety is fuch a genius ! who hath turn'd the tuneful art, From founds to things, from fancy to the heart; For Wit's falfe mirror, held up nature's light ; Shew'd erring pride, whatever is, is right. That reafon, paflion, anfwer one great aim ; That true felf-love, and fecial are the fame ;. That virtue only makes our blifs below ; And all our knowledge is, ourfelves to know* b 2 Suck PREFACE. Such a poet, indeed, deferves the ancient venerable name fo juftly appropriated to poets who employed their mufe to truly divine purpefes, ( divinus, functus ) * and all the honours due to that (acred, highly beneficial cbai*a%er. But as is the heart , fo will one's works always be. BUT new that I am /peaking of poetry, and its genuine noble ends, I cannot forbear expreffing my moft ardent wifhes, that fome genius fit for the glorious tafk, would give us a Counter-lucrerius ; and fing ihofe wonderful harmonies and beauties of nature which have been late- ly difcovered by fearching into her order and adminiftra- tion; and the praifes of that Divine man to whom we are principally beholden for all thefe momentous difcove- nes \ who may indeed be faid, by unraveling the deep eft myfteries of nature, and felting her excellent laws in their true light, to have effectually difcomfited Atheifm and Superftition, and all the gloomy horrors which naturally fprout from the frightful notion of a father lefs world and blind chance, or, which is yet more terrible, the opinion of a malignant adminiftra- tion. A certain poet, who is univerfally confeffed to have fj)cwn u moft extraordinary genius for defcriptive poetry in fome of his works, and in all of them a heart deeply impregnated with the war weft love of virtue and man- kind, if he chances to caft his eye on this Preface, as his friend/hip to me will naturally induce him to do upon * Poetam natura ipfa valere, & mentis viribus excitari, Sc qua- fi divino quodam fptritu inflari. Qaare fuo jure nofter illc En- ft iiis fanSoi appcllat f3:tasy quod quafi Dcorum aliquo doi;o at- que muncre commendati nobi- ■ cfle \idcanur. Sit igitur fanctum IX tie II omen quod nulh 'inqium barbara violavit. Cicero pro Arcbia poe/a. whatever PREFACE. Kii •whatever bears my name, I defire he would confider this, as a call upon him from one who highly eft ems and ^merely loves m, to fet about a work Jo greatly want- ing, and which muft gain him immortal honour, by do- ing vaft fervice to the caufe he has moft fincerely at heart. AND what is fufceptible of poetical charms, if the beautiful order, and the immenfe magnificence of nature in all her works be not ? There is a perfcn of very uncommon abilities, and equal virtue, from whom, in fre- quent converfations upon this fubjetl, I have had many very ufeful hints, but 1 am not at liberty to name him : Let me^ however, abjure him of my warm fenfe and high value of a friendfhip fo ufeful to me on many cccafions. Let me jufi add, that tho* this enquiry hath not been very long by me in the fhape it now appears, yet it is {a few things taken from late writers except- ed) the fubftance of fever al pneumatological difcourfes, (as they are called in the fchool language) read above a dozen years ago to Jludents of Moral Philofophy, by way of preparative to a courfe ofleclures, on the rights and duties of mankind ; at which time were publifh- ed two Thefes, in the Univerfity way, indicating the importance of this philofophy ; one upon the connexion be- natural and moral philofophy *, and the other, upon the manifeft evidences and figns of wifdom and good order appearing in the moral as well as the natural world. The Corolaries fubjoined to the loft part ( in which I hope the Reader will excufe feme repetitions hardly a- voidable, fince it will appear, that upon the whole I have taken no [mall pains to diverfify things I was often of neceffity obliged to repeat) welldeferve the attention of all who are ferioufly concerned about the improvement of true philofophy^ xiv PREFACE. phihfophy, and right education. To feme part of the work carved out in them, floall my Jludies ever be de- voted, in proportion as providence gives me healthy lei- Jure and opportunity for carrying them on to advantage ; JK'Iany who have great abiltics for fuch employments. 3 His to be regreted, are not in the eafy circumftances ne- cfjary to the purfuit of fuchferious, profound enquiries. But are there not feverals, who have both abilities and excellent opportunities , and whofe profeffwn loudly calls upon them indefatigably to dedicate themfelves to the fervice of virtue and religion \ who wholly neglett thefe noble ends ? Let me therefore addrefs fuch, together with thofe, who fiiit ably to their char a tier, very earneftly employ their time, their talents, and all the ad- vantages providence affords them, in recommending and promoting truth, piety, or ufeful learnings in the words of Cicero, who was ever engaged, either in ufeful action, or in teaching virtue and true phi- lofophy. Quod enim munus reip. afferre, majus, me- Hufve poflumus, quam fi docemus atque erudimus juventutem ? His pnefertim moribus atque tempori- bus : quibus ita prolapfa eft, ut omnium opibus re^ frenanda,ac coercenda fit. T H E THE PRINCIPLES O F Moral Philosophy. PART I. Human Nature and the ways of God to man vindicated, by delineating the general laws to which the principal phenomena in the human fy- Item are reducible, and ihewing them to be wife and good. — Nairn fie habetote nullo in genere difputandi magis honeftc patefieri, quid fit homini tributum natura, quan- tam vim rerum optimarum mens humana contineat j cu- jus muneris colendi, efficiendique caufa nati, & in lucem editi fimus, qua? fit conjunclio hominum, quae naturalis focietas inter lpibs. His enim explicatis fons legum & ju- ris inveniri poteft. M. T. Cicero de leg. I. r. Remember man, the univerfal caufe, Acls not by partial but by general laws ; And makes what happinefs we jujlly call, Subjijl, not in the good of one, but all. There's not a blejfing individuals find, But fomc way leans and hearken to the kind. ElTay on man, Ep. 4,. THE PRINCIPLES O F MORAL PHILOSOPHY. - i m ■ ■ ,. ■ . , ., i , , . PART I. INTRODUCTION. VERY one who knows what natural Introd. philofophy is, or how it proceeds in its Jr^"*">C"T"J ? . .r J . ' r1 K , Natural phi- enquiries will eafily conceive what mo- i0fophy <&- ral philofophy muft mean ; and how ftmguiih*d it likewife ought to be purfued : for from moral, all enquiries into fact, reality, or any part of nature muft be fet about, and carried on in the fame way ; and an enquiry into human nature is as much an en- quiry into fact, as any queftion about the frame and texture (for inftance) of any plant, or of the human body, B The Introd. But both are enquiries into fact or nature. Natural phi- lofophy de- scribed. The princi- ples it prefup- pofes and pro- ceeds upon in its enquiries. Firft princi- ple. The PRINCIPLES The objects of fcience are juftly divided into cor- poreal, or fenfible ones •, and thofe which not being perceived by the outward fenfes, but by reflexion on the mind itfctf and its inward operations, are therefore called intellectual or moral objects. Hence the confideration of the former is ftiled Phyfiology, or Natural philofophy ; and that of the other is called Rational, or Moral philofophy. But however philofophy may be divided ; nothing can be more evident, than, that the ftudy of nature, whether in the confutation and oeconomy of the fenfible world, or in the frame and government of the moral, muft fet out from the fame firft principles, and be car- ried on in the lame method of inveftigation, induc- tion, and reafoning ; fince both are enquiries into facts or real con ft i tut ions. What is natural philofophy, how is it defined ? or, how are its refearches carried on ? By it is under- flood an enquiry into the fenfible world : that is " into the general laws, according to which its ap- " pearances are produced •, and into the beauty, or- " der, and good which thefe general laws produce.'* And therefore in fiich an enquiry the following ma- xims are juftly laid down as the foundations on which all its reafonings are built; or as the firft prin- ciples from which all its conclufions are inferred; and without fuppofing which it cannot proceed one ftep. I. That if the corporeal world be not governed by general laws, it cannot be the object of enquiry or icience ; and far lefs of imitation by arts, fince imitation necefTarily prefuppofes knowledge of the object imitated ; and Icience prefuppofes a certain determinate object •, or fixed afcertainable relations and connexions of things. Upon the contrary fup- pofition the corporeal world muft be abfblutely un- intelligible. Nature, Hi order to be underftood by us, muft always fpeak the lame langurc^e to us : it muft cfMoRAL Philosophy. mufl: therefore fteadily obferve the fame general laws in its operations, or work uniformly and according to flated, invariable methods and rules. Thole terms, order, beauty, general good, and a whole, which are too familiar to philofophers* to need any definition, or explication, plainly include in their meaning, analogy and conilancy *, uniformity amidit variety •, or in other words, the regular obiervance. of general, fettled laws in the make and oeconomy, production and operations, or effects of any object to which they are afcribed. Wherever order, fixed connexions, or general laws and unity of defign take place, there is certainty in the nature of fuch ob- jects •, and fo far therefore knowledge may be ac- quired. But where thefe do not obtain, there can be nothing but unconnected independent parts; all mufl be confufion and diforder -, and confequently fuch a loofe disjointed heap of things mufl be an in- explicable chaos. In one word, fcience, prudence, government, imitation, and art, necefTarily fuppofe the prevalence of general laws throughout all the ob- jects in nature to which they reach. No being can know itfelf^ project or purfue any fcheme, or lay down any maxims for its conduct •, but fo far as its own conftitution is certain ; and the connexion of things relative to it are fixed and conftant ; for fo far only, are things afcertainable •, and therefore fo far only, can rules be drawn from them. " Nature's (a) operating according to general " laws (fays a very ingenious philoibpher) is fo ne- " ceffary for letting us into the fecret of nature, " and for our guidance in the affairs of life, that " without it, all reach and compafs of thought, all " human fagacity could lerve to no manner of " purpofe : it were even impoffible there mould be any fuch faculties or powers in the mind. It is (a) Principles of human knowledge, B z " this We may then very juftly conclude in general, that Such effects as all effects or appearances in the natural world, are are reduced fufficiently explained and accounted for in natural \^cn^ philofophy, which are reduced to good general counted for Jaws, as fb many particular inftances of their uni- phyfically. form operation •, and that both phyfically and mo- rally. They are fufficiently explained and accounted for in the phyfical fenfe, by being reduced to ge- neral laws : for what elfe is the phyfical knowledge of a fact in the fenfible world, but the knowledge of an effect itfelf, in its progrefs, qualities, and influences : or in other words, the knowledge of the manner or order in which it is produced, and in which it operates on other things relating to it \ the knowledge of the laws according to which it is produced, works, and is worked upon ? " All philofophers acknowledge (fays an excellent They are ac- " one) that the lirft caufe, or producer of the counted for *' fenfible world, muft be a mind, whofe will gives jnoraI|y>lf tne 11 fubfiftence and efficacy to all its laws and con- reducible to"6 " nexions. The difference there is between natural be good. philofophers and other men with regard to their knowledge of natural phenomena, confifts not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient caufe, that produces them ; for that can be no other " than the will of a fpirit : but only in a greater *c largenefs of comprehenfion whereby analogies, " harmonies, and agreements are difcovered in " the works of nature and the particular effects " are explained, that is, reduced to general laws.'5 But it is needlefs to dwell longer on this conclu-. fion, fince in the language of all natural philofophers, (d) thofe effects are reckoned to be fully explained in the phyfical way, which are mown to be particu- {d) See Sir Jfaac Newon's principia. Dr. John Clark's fermons on the origin of evil. The chara&erifUcks, &c* B 4 lar " ct 8 The PRINCIPLES In trod, Jar inftances of a general law that had been already *-*• — v ' inferred from a fufRcient variety of fair and unex- ceptionable experiments : and thole effects only are laid to be unexplained, which are not yet reduced to any known law, or the law of which is not yet un- der flood and afcertained. Such effects are fufficiently explained, and account- ed for morally, when they are reduced to general laws which are proved to be good in the whole *, be- caufe they are thus fhown to proceed from laws that are morally good and juft. Natural phi- Tho' phifiology be diftinguifhed from moral lofophy in ac- philofophy, yet it was needlefs to fuggeft to any fiSaufe C^~s °^ reac^ers' before we ufed the words, beauty, coincides ' order, . good and perfection, that thefe are terms re- with moral lative to beings capable of pleafure and pain, and of philofophy. perceiving good order and beauty •, or that laws can- not be faid to be good or bad, right or wrong, beautiful or imperfect, but with refpect to minds or perceiving beings : for pain or pleafure, good or ill, convenience or inconvenience, beauty or deformity, evidently prefuppofe perceptive faculties. On the one hand, an unperceiveable world cannot be the object of knowledge, or enjoyment of any kind -, and, on the other, 'tis perceiving beings alone that can enjoy, or to whom exiftence can be happinefs. But from this, it follows, that thos natural philofo- phy be commonly diftinguifhed from moral •, all the conclufions in natural philofophy, concerning the or- der, beauty, and perfection of the material world, belong properly to moral philofophy ; being infe- rences that refpect the contriver, maker, and go- vernor of the world, and other moral beings capa- ble of underftanding its wife, good and beautiful admin titration, and of being varioufly affected oy its laws and connexions. In reality, when natural philofophy is carried fo far as to reduce phenomena to good general laws, jt becomes moral philofophy -, and when it flops fhort c/Moral Philosophy. fhort of this chief end of all enquiries into the fen- fible or material world, which is, to be fetisffed with regard to the wifdom of its ftructure and oeconomy •, it hardly defer ves the name of philofophy in the fenfe of Socrates, Plato, Lord Verulam, Boyle, New- ton, and the other beft moral or natural philoib- phers. (e) Having thus briefly mown what natural philofo- Moral philo- phy propofes to do, and upon what foundations it fophy defcrila- proceeds in eftablifhing any conclufions ; let us now e fee what moral philofophy muft be. It isdiftinguifh- ed from phifiology, ( as has been obferved ) becaufe it enquires chiefly about objects not perceiveable by means of our outward organs of fenfe, but by in- ternal feeling or experience •, fuch as are all our mo- ral powers and faculties, difpofitions and affections, the power of comparing ideas, of reafoning or in- ferring confequences, the power of contracting ha- bits, our fenfe of beauty and harmony, natural or moral, the defire of fociety, &V. Even thefe, how- ever, may very properly be called parts of nature ; and by whatever name, they, or the knowledge of them be called, 'tis obvious, that an enquiry about any of them, and the laws and connexions eftablifh- ed by the author of nature, with regard to any of them, is as much a queftion of natural hiflory or of fact, as an enquiry about any of our organs of fenfe, or about the conftitution of any material object whatfoever, and the laws relating to it. And there- it muft pre- fore the fame principles juft mentioned as the foun- fuppofe and dation of all enquiries and reafonings in natural Pro^eed uPon philofophy, mult like wife take place, and be ad- c{t\^e pnn" mitted in moral philofophy 5 that is, in all enqui- ries and reafonings concerning the human mind, its (e) See Sir Ifaac Newton's Opiicks, I. 3. p. 345. and Plato's Pb&£hy pf ^jfoje&gormm powers,, io tte PRINCIPLES In trod, powers, faculties, difpofitions and affedtions, and ^-^v — ' the laws relative to them, as well as in all enquiries into the properties of a body. Forthefeprin- In truth, thefe principles muft necefTarily take aples are of an place in the explication of any piece of nature that umverial na- can be underftood or explained. They are princi- ples of a general nature, which, if they be true in any cafe, muft be univerfally true ; and therefore they muft be univerfally admitted, with regard to every conftitution, fyftem or whole, corporeal or incorporeal, natural or moral, that is, body or mind. Whence it refuks, that with refpect to the human mind-, to the frame of any mind whatsoever, or in general with refpecl to any moral fyftem it muft be true. (/) firil princi- j That unlefs it be fo conftituted and governed, phUofoSvv™ tnat a^ tne e^e(^s an^ appearances belonging to it, are the effects of general laws, it muft be abfolutely unintelligible •, it muft be complete confufion, irre- gularity and diforder ; it cannot have a certain and determinate nature, but muft be made up of analc- (f) How an enquiry into human nature or natural philofo- phy ought to be carried on, we learn from Cicero de Finibus. for tho' in that treatife, different fyftems are reprefented and defended, yet it is unanimoufly agreed amongfr. all the interlocu- tors in thefe dialogues, that the natural end for which man is made, can only be inferred from the confideration of his natural faculties and difpofitions as they make one whole ; even as we can only know the nature of any animate or inanimate whole ; of a vine, for inflance, by enquiring into its ftrudture or con- Hitution. This point is argued in all thefe books at great length. a fine defcription of moral philofophy in Perfius, Sat. j. Difcite, O miferi, & caufas cognofcite rerum Quid fumus & quidnam vi&uri gignimur, ordo Quis datus, aut metu qua mollis flexus & unde : Quis modus argento, qtiid fas optare, quid afpec Utile minimus habet ; patriar Carifque propinquis intum elargiri deeeat : ouun te uoqp effe Juffit, & humana qua parte locates «i in gous, t/'MoRAL Philosophy. ii gous, feparate, incoherent parts, and operate in a In trod, defultory, inconftant manner : that is, it is not a i — —y~*+*J whole ; and cannot be the object of government or art, becaufe it cannot be the object of knowledge : for all that can be known of it in fuch a cafe, is, that nothing can be afcertained about it -, or that it is a Proteus, whofe changes are without rule, and therefore are abfolutely unafcertainable. II. Thofe muft be received as general laws or Second prin, principles in a moral frame or conftitution, which clPle* are found by experience to operate uniformly or in- variably in that fyftem. Thus, for inftance, that ha- bits are contracted by repeated acts, may be juftly faid to be a general law in our frame, becaufe this law has its effects uniformly and invariably in our na- tures j or many effects do evidently fhow a relation to that law as their common fource and principle ; and not one effect in human nature is repugnant to it ; for, in like manner, is gravitation concluded to be a general law in the fenfible world. III. Thofe muft be good principles or laws in the Third princL conftitution, of a mind, or in any moral whole, which P e* are conducive by their fteady and uniform operation and prevalency to the greater good, beauty, and perfection of that whole in the fum of things. And therefore no effects which flow from fuch laws can be evils abfolutely confidered, or with refpect to the whole. Thus the above-mentioned law of habits, muft be a good general law in the conftitution of the human mind, if its general tendency or in- fluence be contributive to the greater good of the human mind in the fum of things ; and no effects of that principle can be abfolutely evil ; becaufe it is fit and good, that general laws mould take place ; and thofe muft be good general laws, which are good in the whole, or conducive to the greater order, beau- ty, and perfection of a whole, From 12 Tie PRINCIPLES Introd. From all which it muft necefTarily follow, that w-~y— ^ all thofe effects, with regard to any moral conftku- ^efuffirirat! tic!n, are fully exPlained and accounted for phyfi- \y explained ca% and morally, which are reduced to fuch gene- and accounted ral laws as have been mentioned, as fo many parti- for phyfically cu]ar inftances of their uniform and general preva- bfbeT re-' ^^ duced to good To know any moral object phyfically, can be no- general laws, thing elfe but to know what it is, and how it is conftituted ; or to know its parts, and thofe refe- rences of parts to one another, which make it a cer- tain determinate whole, that works and is operated upon in certain determinable ways. And to know the final caufe, or moral fitnefs of any conftitution, can be nothing elfe, but to know what good end in the fum of things, all its parts, and all their mutual refpects, with all the laws and connexions relative to it, tend to produce. In fine, as different beings as a man and a tree are, yet the knowledge of man and the knowledge of a tree muff mean the fame kind of knowledge -, in either cafe it is to know what the being is, and to what end it is adapted by its make and texture, and in confoquence of the laws and connexions upon which it any wile depends. Hence we fee All this is too evident to be longer infilled upon, how moral And what is the refult of all that has been laid ? Is Pil,15>foPny it not, that fuch moral appearances as are reducible purfued° and t0 S00^ general laws, will ftand upon the lame foot- how it ii ill ing in moral philofophy, that thofe appearances in ftand on the the natural world do in natural philofophy, which fame fooling reducible to good general laws? And that in with natural . . . ° , P., r , . , philofophy. » to bring moral philolophy, or the know- ledge of the moral world, upon the fame footing with natural philofophy, or the knowledge of the iterial world, as it now (lands •, we muft enquire into moral phenomena, in the lame manner as we *io into phyfical ones : that is, we muft endeavour to Hnd out by experience the good general laws to which of Moral Philosophy. which they are reducible. For this mud hold good in general, that fo far as we are able to reduce ap- pearances to a good general law, fo far are we able to explain them or account for them. As pheno- mena which are not the effects of general laws, are in the nature of things abfolutely unexplicable ; fo thofe which are, can only be explained by reducing them to the general laws of which they are the ef- fects. " Explaining or accounting for phenomena " can mean nothing elfe ; it is not indeed now " pretended by any philofopher to mean any thing " elfe." This conclufion manifeftly enfues from what has A prejudice been faid. But left anyone mould be ftartled at that may a~ an attempt to treat effects in the fame manner, treltim^na- which are evidently of fo different natures, as cor- turai phiiofo- poreal and moral effects certainly are ; or left any phy in this one mould have imagined that general laws can mann^r re- only take place with regard to matter and motion, moV( and confequently, that an effay to explain moral appearances by general laws, muft involve in it all the abfurdity of an attempt to handle effects, which are not mechanical or material, as if they were fuch : to prevent all fuch objections, and to proceed more diftinctly and furely in this effay, let us juft obferve here, that though no two things can be more different than a thinking being and a corpo- real one ; ' or than moral powers and operations are from paffive un perceiving objects, and their quali- Moral powers lies and effects •, yet the exercifes of all the moral and the exer" powers, difpofitions and affections of minds, as ne- p0^e°s ™°™ ceflarily prefuppofe an eftablifhed order of nature, cefTarily fup- or general laws fettled by the Author of nature with pofe and re- refpect to them •, as the exercifes of our bodily fenfes Jluire §eneral about qualities and effects of corporeal beings, do with regard to them. As we could neither procure nor avoid, by our will and choice, any fenfation of our fight, touch, or any other of our fenfes, had not nature eftablifhed a certain order, with- refpect to We are not more certain that we have fenfations, than we are certain that we have power, or a fphere of ac- tivity. It Is not dif- puted. the PRINCIPLES to the fuccelTion or conveyance of our fenfations, or the methods in which they are produced in us ; fo in like manner, we could neither acquire know- ledge of any kind, contract habits, or attain to any moral perfection whatfoever ; unle(s the Author of our nature had fixed and appointed certain laws re- lating to our moral powers, and their exercifes and acquifitions. Being able to attain to fcience, to arts, to vertues, as necellarily prefuppofes a fixed and ap- pointed road to virtue, &c. as being able to move our hands or limbs, does an eftablifhed order of na- ture, with refpect to thefe motions, and the fenfa- tions refulting from them, or attainable by them. We are not more certain, that fenfations arc conveyed into or imprefTed upon our minds, by means of certain organs of fenfation in a certain or- der, than we are fure that we have a certain ex- tent of dominion, or a certain fphere of activity and power allotted to us by nature : that is to fay, that certain effects, both in the corporeal and mo- ral world, are made to depend, as to their exi- ftence or non-exiftence, upon our will, that they mould exift or not exift. That we have fuch a power, both with regard to feveral actions of our body and of our mind, is plain matter of expe- rience. There is indeed no difpute about this kind of liberty or dominion belonging to man : but how far it extends, is another queftion, to be confidered afterwards. Now wherever this liberty or dominion obtains, or whatever are its bounds, however wide, or however narrow and flinted it may be, this is certain, that fo far as it extends, it necefTarily pre- fuppofes certain laws of nature relating to it ; or to (bleak more properly, conftituting it. For this is no more than faying, that did not fire gently warm and cruelly burn, according to certain fixed laws afcertainable by us, we could not know how to warm OUrfclves without burning j and by parity of realon, ^Moral Philosophy. i£ reafon, were not knowledge, habits, and moral In trod. improvements, acquirable in a certain fixed way, l^v*"^ we could not acquire them or attain to them. That Buj Povv£r» is, we could have no liberty, no dominion, no *£ activity"6 fphere of activity or power, neither in the natural cannot take nor moral world : or in other words, either with re- PIace but gard to objects of fenfe, or moral objects, but upon Jvhere Seneral fuppofition, that the natural and moral world are governed by general laws •, or fo far as they are fo governed. If it could be proved that we have no dominion, no power properly fo called, afligned to us by na- ture, that would not prove us to be mere flocks, mere pieces of mechanifm ; fince even upon that fuppofition, this erTential difference would flill re- main between material objects and us, that we are confcious, whereas the latter are quite void of per- ception. But on the other hand, if we really have a certain iphere of activity, in the fmk above de- fined (as we moft certainly have to a very confidera- ble extent) this fphere of activity mull be allotted to us by our Maker ; and it necefTarily fuppofes, fo far as it extends, a certain fixed dependance of ob- jects upon our wills as to their exiftence or non-ex- iftence, conformably to which, and not otherwife, we may exercife that dominion. The queftion about liberty and neceffity has been Some remarks violently agitated among metaphyficians almofl in on tne con~ all ages ; but ' it no ways concerns this prefent en- bouUibert" quiry, that I mould enter any further into it than and neceffity. juil to obferve, i. That whatever way it may be determined in abfiracl metaphyfical /peculation^ this fact remains indifputable, that many objects depend upon our will, as to their exiftence or non-exiftence, many objects without the mine! as well as in it. And all fuch objects are e

by thus exerting ourfelves, we ob- tain and enjoy thofe objects in which our natural good confifts. In like manner, our progrefs in With refpeft knowledge, in any art, or in any virtue, all moral to moral at- improvements depend upon ourfelves: they, with the goods refulting from them, can only be acquired by our own application, or by letting ourfelves to. acquire them according to the natural methods of acquiring them. This is really our Hate;, fuch real- Whv it is fo. ty *s tne general law of our natures. Now, if it is asked, why the author of nature docs not give to mankindpromifcuoudy fuch and fuch perceptions without regard to their actions, or inde- pendently of themfelves, as nature feems to do with inferior creatures ? The anfwer is obvious/ Tisbecaufe he has made moral agents as well as lower animals. For it is feif-evident, that nothing can be called a moral attainment or perfection, but what is acquired by one's own cxercife or application to attain to it. There mult be a very high and noble pleafurc in confidering any quality n.s one's own acquifition., which. of Moral Philosophy. 27 which no Beings can have but thofe who are capable Ch A P. I. of making improvements and advancements by u**->T"— -4 their own application, or who have a certain power and dominion in nature by which they can make purchafes. Such Beings alone can have the fatisfa- ction of looking upon any thing as their own ; the pleafure of adding to their own happinefs, or to that of others; and of approving themfelves for the right ufe of their own powers in fo doing ; which are the higheft of all enjoyments. In fine, without fuppofing the capacity of forefeeing confequences, and of willing and chufing to act in fuch and fuch manners, in order to attain to certain ends ; virtue, merit, good and ill defert have no meaning at all. The capacity of attaining to certain goods, by our own powers duly exercifed and applied, is the very Our natural bafis of moral perfection. It is in confequence of perfeaion our having power to make confiderable acquifitions confifts in our by our induftry ; or by duly exercifing our natural fa- ftituSd° culties, that manrifes in the fcaleof life and perfecti- on, as a moral agent capable of virtue and merit, praife, or blame, above merely perceptive beings, who never act or acquire, but are in all cafes pafiive and acted upon. This is too evident to be longer infifted upon. " It is therefore a perfection to have a certain fphere of activity, power, liberty ? or dominion." II. " But a fphere of power or activity, fuppo- g , fes the prevalence of general laws, as far as that fupp0L*na- fphere of power or activity ( k ) extends." This ture to be go- is as plain, as it is, that goods cannot be obtained, verned by ge- nor pains be avoided by us, unlefs there is a fixed neraI laws' way of getting the one, and fhuning the other, which may be forefeen and purfued. What is at- tainable, fuppofes a capacity and a certain way of at- taining it, and what is evitable, fuppofes a capacity { k ) Some thing hath been faid on this fubjeft already in the Introduction* and s8 The PRINCIPLES Chap. L and a certain way of efcaping it. Bat a capacity V— -v— — ' and a way of attaining to •, and a capacity and way of efcaping certain ends and confequences, fuppoie general fixed uniform connexions in nature between certain manners of acting and certain confequences : that is, they fuppofe fixed, uniform and general Jaws with regard to the exercifes of powers or acti- ons. Were there not a certain fixed way of having or avoiding certain fenfations, we could nof have them nor avoid them as we will. And, in like man- ner, were there not a fixed way of attaining to knowledge, we could not poffibly acquire it : were there not a fixed way of moving the paflions, there could be no art of moving them : were there not a fixed way of conquering appetites and defires, we could not obtain the command and mafterlhip oij them : and fo on with regard to all our powers, dif- pofitions and affections, and their exercifes and attain- ments. The fame Author of nature, who hafh conferred certain faculties upon us, mult have efta- blifhed certain laws and connexions with regard to the exercifes cf them, and their effects and confe- qnences ; otherwife we could not know how to. turn them to any account, how to employ them, o* make any ufe of them. Conclufion. The refult of all this is in general, " That we can have no liberty, no dominion, no fphere of acti- vity and power, natural or moral, unlefs the na- tural and moral world are governed by general laws : or fo far only as they are fo governed can any created beings have power or efficiency : fo far only can effects be dependent on their will as to their exiftence or non-exiftence." We are now Now, it being fit that we fhould have a fphere rome^tiu-fe of a(^ivity conftituted by general laws regulating general laws tne dependence of certain effects on our will, it which confti- only remains to be enquired what Jiefc general laws> tutc our that make our fphere of activity, ye.* and what their Fcwcr- confequences Of Mo It A L P H 1 1 O S O +% 29 rxes are with refped to good fi nefs or mhery. *■* v~ — f III. The £: remark., ^gird to our FirS general fphereof activity is, " that our power and dominion |**- encreafa with our knowledge." Our power in the pJJ^2i natural world encreales with our knowledge of the depend oa natural world. Thus, by the angmer.:i: knowledge of the connexions that make the materi- J^e?acafc al or fenfible world ; or, in other words, of the properties of bodies, how much is oar empire over lea, air, fire, and every element encreakd ? when any property of matter becomes known to cs, then are we able to render it fubfervie.it to feme ufe in And therefore in proportion to our advances die knowledge and imitation of nature, have arts been invented, that are really lb many additions to our power and dominion in the ienfible world. Ir is ^ ^ naj^j the lame with regard to the moral workt All true World. obfervations relative to the human mind, its pow- and operations, and the connexions of moral ob- jects do in like manner add toour moral dominion ; to our empire over ourfelves . ers, Thus the knowledge of the pafiions, and their natural bear- ings and depend ar power and sk in governing the : w they may be ftrengthned or dirninifhed •, directed to proper ob- jects, or taken off from the purfji: of improper ones; in fhort, how they may be varioufry regulated fc> is to anfwer certain ends. No connexion belonging to the human mind, no law relative to intelligence, or the affections has been discovered, which has nc\ or may not be made conducive either to the d rection of our conduct, or to the improvement of e pleaiant and uteful art. It is not moral philo- ^ - . fophy only, or the fcience of the conduct of life m^i world, that depends upon the knowledge of the human : :ry, poetry, and all the fine arts which ;:~e :; :. heir: The PRINCIPLES heart agreeably, do no lefs depend than morality and politics, upon the fcience of the human affec- tions, and their natural dependence and ballance. In general therefore, the increafe of knowledge is neceflary to the encreafe of dominion •, or rather, it is really an enlargement of power and property. Power not guided and directed by knowledge is not It is becaufe properly power, it is brute or blind force. But in- knowledge telligent power can only augment with knowledge, thatwe have or intelligence. It is therefore becaufe knowledge is or can acquire dependent on us, or may be acquired by us, that we power. can nave anv power, any fphere of activity •, were not the acquisition of knowledge dependent upon us to a certain degree, we could not have any power at all, nothing could be dependent upon us. if knowledge IV. But the encreafe of our power depends upon be progreflive, t]ie encreafe of our knowledge ; and therefore, if "x>w ' r rnuf* our knowledge nuift be fucceflive or progreflive, fo likewifcbe fo. muft our power be. Now, " that knowledge muft be progreflive is evident beyond all doubt." Be- ing gradually acquired by our application to ftudy nature, take in ideas and compare them, it not on- ly gives us a fucceflion of growing pleafures ; but it cannot but be progreflive. For, i . Nature itfelf, the fole object of all real knowledge, is fucceflive or progreflive. What elfe can direct our conduct, ena- ble us to imitate nature, or to perform any operati- on in order to attain to any end, but the knowledge of nature's laws ? But nature is progreflive in all its Knowledge productions : and general rules or canons can only ^"relHvT bC be inferred °y Eduction, from the obfervation of many individuals, or from many experiments about particular objects. Creatures cannot poflibly attain to the knowledge of analogies, harmonies and ge- neral laws, any other way, than by going over many particular effects which do not all exift at once, but are fucceflive •, and by comparing them one with another. 2, And as for abftract or theoretic know- ledge, pf Moral Philosophy. 31 ledge, ( as mathematics for inftance ) which is col- Chap. L lected from the comparifon of ideas and their relati- u^-~/— —^ ons amongft themfelves ; that mult likewife be pro- grefTive •, becaufe difcoveries made this way are no- thing but the different appearances, ideas and rheir re- lations offer to the mind in different views or juxta- pofitions. When the immediate juxta-pofition of known relations is not fufHcient to give the mind the view it defires, but intermediate ideas muff be em- ployed in order to make the agreement or difagree- ment in queftion appear •, then it is plain, however faft the mind may mount, yet it muff, mount by fteps. And even where the immediate juxta-pofi- tion of ideas, without any intermediate mean of comparifon, is fufflcient, yet one and the fame juxta- pofition can produce but one view, or one truth. In order to every difcovery, there muft be a diffe- rent pofition of objects ; for perceiving truth, is no- thing but perceiving the agreement or difagreement of ideas in confequence of fome one or other way of placing or difpofing them in refpect to one another. It is perceiving the relations of ideas by comparing them •, and no pofition can be any other pofition but that one which it is. In fine, all real knowledge muft be progrefTive, becaufe nature is fuccefiive -, and the laws of nature can only be gathered from par- ticular effects by induction. And all theoretic know- ledge muft be progrefTive, becaufe the mind cannot poflibly fee ideas in different fituations or juxta-pofi- tions to one another at one and the fame time. That is abfolutely impoffible with regard to created minds. " Our knowledge therefore is progrefTive." V. " This knowledge, which is in its nature pro- Knowledge greflive, muft depend upon our fituations to take in muft depend ideas or views." It muft be different as thefe are on ourfnuati- different, narrow if thefe be narrow,, and proportio- ?ns f°r takinS nably large as thefe are large and extenfive. 1. It ™JJ^* °r is certain, that the knowledge of no being can pof- ' fibly 32 The PRINCIPLES Chap. I. fibly exceed or go beyond its ideas. Ideas are the materials of knowledge. It cannot therefore extend further than our ideas ; and confequently it cannot reach beyond experience, the only fource of all our ideas. 2. Now, if it is afked, why men are placed in different fituations ? it may be anfwered, i. It is uecaufe men are made for fociety, which, as fhall be proved in its place, requires that men mould be placed in different fituations for many wife reafons * and with refpect to knowledge, and focial intercourfe in that way, (for that is all that belongs to the prefent queftion ) there is this obvious good end for it, even that being placed as it were in various points of fight with regard to nature the common object of our con- templation and imitation, men might thus have dif- ferent profpects or views of the fame object to com- pare one with another* and only be able to make out a tolerably adequate idea of any object by mutual affifbnce. 2, In whatever fituation any man is pla- ced, he may take in ideas that will afford him an ex- hauftlefs fund of pleafing contemplation. For what object does not as it were defy our intellect to ex~ hauft it ? however far we advance in any enquiry, there will ftill remain a furpluiage of refearch with regard to its object, that can never be wholly gone through. Every field of (peculation widens and en- larges to our view in proportion as we make progrefs /e different in lta **ut' ?" ^et us conn*der well what ls demand- fituations and ed> when it is aiked, why all men are not in the views. fame fituations, or precifely equal, or like ones for taking in 'ideas ? For, in reality, it amounts to afking, why all different places in nature are not the fame : fince every different one muft be a different point of fight. Now, whatever may be the cafe with re- fpedt to fpirits without bodies •, corporeal beings can not penetrate one another and occupy the lame Ipace ; different bodies mult have each its own proper place peculiar to it •, and confequently, every embodied being muft have its own point of fight, or place of obfer-- Men muft of MokAL Philosophy. obfervation, which no other can poffefs at the fame time. 4. Nor is this all, every embody'd being muft have its own particular organization diftinguifh- ed by peculiar differences from that of every other of the fame fpecies, tho' fimilar to them all, in fuch a manner, that they all are of the fame fpeciric fort. And mud it not neceffirily follow from this, that the fenfibie world to each individual of the fame fpe- cies, will be juit as fimilar to the fenfibie world of any other, as their organizations are fimilar, and juft as different as their organizations are different ? The external, material world, whether it be called the ex- ternal caufe, or occafion of thofe fenfibie ideas and their connexions, which make to each of us what we call the fenfibie world, is entirely out of the que- flion, when we fpeak of fenfations excited by it in each individual mind according to certain fixed laws. It may be the fame, immutable thing in itfclf. But as for the fenfations produced in us from without by means of a material organization, thefe muft be as different as the organizations are, by which they are produced. And it is not more certain, that the or- ganizations of men being fo like, that they may be juftly faid to be fpecirlcally the fame \ our fenfations w. , - conveyed from without, muft likewife be fo like, t0 \^e ^^^ that they may be faid to be fpecirlcally the fame ; world, than it is certain, that our organizations, notwith- ftanding their fpeciflcal agreement, being really fo different, that every one is juftly faid to have a pecu- liar organization, our fenfations conveyed from with- out muft likewife befo different, that every one of us may be faid to have different fenfations* So that, in rea- lity, there are not only as many different fenfibie worlds in fpecies, as there are various fpecies of fenfitive beings ; but there are as many different fenfibie worlds, as there are different or particular organizations of fenfitive beings of any one fpecies. It is fimilarity amidft vaft variety with refpecl to fenfations, and the orders in which they are conveyed, in confequence of fimi- D larky TBi PRINCIPLES I. larky amidft variety of organizations, that is the foundation of clofe and intimate intercourfe among individuals of the lame fenfitive fpecies. And the realbn why there can only be a remote and very ge- neral intercourfe among feniitive beings of a dif- ferent fpecies is, becaufe there can only be a general fimilarity between their fenfations. In like man- V. But which is yet more, every individual of ner with re- anv fpeciesof rational beings, howfoever like it may gard to men- ^ fpecjfica]jy to t]ie others of the fame fpecies, mult tal frame and , l . J . r. . K .. ' . . the moral however have its own particular labnck or mind, world. and peculiar call of understanding ; and confequent- ly, every one mud take in views in a manner fome- what different from every other. The views of eve- ry one of the lame fpecies will be fimilar, their fa- brick of mind being fimilar ; but their views will likewife be different, every man's complexion, or call of underilanding being different. Similarity of views in confequence of fimilarity of constitution is all that can conftitute the fame fpecies of minds; and it will be a sufficient foundation for a clofe and intimate commerce among beings, that cannot pof- fibiy take place among minds differing from one another in fpecies. But if every body mud have its particular organi- zation, and every mind its particular fabrick, and confequently the fenfations, perceptions, ideas, and views of every individual embodied mind mult be peculiar -, not precifely the fame, but different ; the only queftion with regard to our fabrick and fituati* ons for receiving or forming ideas, or for taking in and forming views, muft be, "Whether there is not fuch a fimilarity and agreement amongft i thefe, as makes our fpecies capable of very much hap- pinefs in the way of focial correfpondcncc and in- tercourfe ? " Now, that we are fo constituted, is ve- ry plain -, finee we are ib made, that, notwirh- fltaftding all the variety amongft mankind, whether in c/'Moral Philosophy, 35 in mental ftructure or bodily organization, it is hard- Chap. I. Iy poflible for us to miftake one another in our cor- V***-~V -*4 refpondence with regard to our fenfations conveyed from without ; and it is very poflible for us to come to a right underftanding with one another about all the other objects of our contemplation, enquiry and mutual commerce. But this reafoning will be better underftood when we come to confider the effects of our relation to a fenfible World by means of our bodies. Thus then we have feen, that " our knowledge, without which we can have no power, muft be pro- greffive, and muft depend upon our fituation for taking in views or ideas." VI. But " it muft likewife depend upon our ap- Knowledge " plication to make progrefs in it.*' For, as it muft depend hath been fhewn, this is the general law with re- uPon Jnduftry gard to our nature ; that the greater part of our t0 ,lC(luirv happinefs, mall be our own purchafe. And what depends upon a being's own purchafe, muft neceffa- rily depend upon its exerting itfelf with more or lefs vigour and activity to make that purchafe. It is therefore needlefs to dwell upon this head. VII. But there are yet two other remarkable c:r- cumftances, with regard to our capacity of making progrefs in knowledge, lft. The difference amongft men in point of powers and abilities. 2dly, The depen- dence of our progrefs in knowledge upon our flota- tions for receiving afiiftances by focial communication. Now as to the firft, it will be eafily granted It muft depend that a difference in powers muft make a diffe- uPon dl^r" rence with reipe£t to progrefs in knowledge. And Jpea tonatu- that all men have not equal abilities, for making ral abilities* proficiency in knowledge, is a fact beyond diipute. Wherefore the only remaining queftion on this head is with regard to the fitnefs of inequalities among mankind, in refpect of powers ; but this cannot be called into doubt, without denying the D 2 fitnefs Frogrefs in knowledge rouft depend on focial af- fiftances. The PRINCIPLES fi'tnels of making man a focial creature, or of intend- ing him for ibciety and focial happinefs : fince the interchange of good offices, in which fociety con- lifts, necefTarily foppofes mutual dependence in con- fequence of mutual wants-, and not only variety of talents, as well as of taftes, and tempers ; but like- wife fuperiority and inferiority, in refpect of powers. Without fuch differences and inequalities, mankind would be, in a great meafure, a number of inde- pendent individuals : or at lead there would be no place for the greater pait of thofe various employ- ments and reciprocal obligations, without which, or ibme others analogous to them, there can be no community. This is as certain and obvious, as that giving fuppofcs a receiver, as well as a giver -, and that giving can only be neceflary, where there is fomething wanted : One cannot be- llow, or give what he has not ; and he who is fupplied or redreffed, muft have been in want or diftrefs, previoufly to the relief received. As for the other, it is beyond all doubt. For in converfation, how does fancy warm and fprout ! It is then that invention is mod fer- tile, and that imagination is moft vigorous and fprightly. The beft way of getting to the bot- tom of any fubjed is by canvaffing and founding it in company : then is an object prefented to us by turns in all its various lights, io that one is able, as it were, to fee round it. As iron fharpens iron, fo docs converfation whet wit and invention. Ideas flow fafter into the mind, and marfhal them- felves more eafily and naturally into good order in fociety, than in lblitary ftudy. In fine, to be con- vinced of the happy effects of fociety in this refpect, we need only compare a peafant confined to his hut and herd in the country, with a mechanic of the lowed order in a great city (;?). And when ( ■) Air. Locke on the conduSl of (be undofandl »?. we ^Moral Philosophy. 37 we look into the hiflory of arts and fciences or of Chap. L mankind in general, nothing is more evident, than <~-*"v*^ that learning of whatever fort, and arts and fciences, never made any great progrefs but in places of large and extenfive commerce. There always was and always will be fiich a connexion ; becaufe men were intended by nature to arrive at perfection in a focial way ; or by united endeavours. Now as for that fitnefs, it cannot be called into queftion no more than the other juft mentioned, unlefs it be faid, it is not fit that men mould be made for partnerfhip, or for focial happinefs. For, how can beings be made for .fociety without being fo formed as to (land in need of one another ; fo made as to have pleafure in focial communication ; and to receive mutual benefits and affiftances, or fuccours from one another in the exercifes of their powers -, or, unlefs their perfection and happinefs be fuch a one as can only be acquired by focial union and united force ? But .what relates to fociety mail be more fully confidered in another place. From what hath been faid, it is clear, 1. "That it is the general law of our natures with regard to our dominion, power or liberty, that it mall depend *, ... upon our progrefs in knowledge. 2. I hat it is the on> general lav/ of our natures with regard to know- ledge, " That being in the nature of things progrefs live, it can only be acquired by experience in pro- portion to our application, and to our fituation for taking in ideas and views, and to our fituation for receiving afiiftances by focial communication.** So that if men's natural abilities be equal,, their pro- grefs in knowledge will be in proportion to their fitua- tion for receiving ideas, and for receiving affiftances by focial communication :^nd if their fituations are equal in both thefe refpects, their progrefs in knowledge will be in proportion to their natural abilities, or their in- duftry and application. But as one's knowledge is, fo will his capacity orfkill be of employing all his other D 3 powers* The PRINCIPLES powers. Intelligent power fuppofes intelligence of knowledge. The laws with New ail thefe laws or circumftances relative to refpeft to our knowledge and intelligent action, having been prov- "w^and ec* to ^e e^^ier necefTary or fit 5 it mull follow, that pro^refs in all tne phenomena which are reducible to thefe laws knowledge of nature are good, being the effects of good general are good. jaws# p0r without general laws there can be no power or fphere of activity •, and all the interefts of intelligent beings require, that the laws relative to them be general, that they may be afcertainable by them. But we mall have yet a clearer view of our make and conftitution with refpect to knowledge, if we confider a little the faculties and difpofitions with which we are provided and furnifhed for making progrefs in knowledge. Inilancesof Let us, however, before we go further, obferve; the care and that tho' knowledge be progreffive and dependent concern of na- on our diligence and application to improve in it, with regard ' yet ^ie care or~ nature about us with regard to know- to knowledge ledge is very remarkable in feveral inftances. confiftently with the pre- j The wifdom and goodnefs of nature appears ^ftmilance. w^tn great evidence, in making a part of knowledge, which it is necefTary for us to have in our infant ftate, and before we can think, meditate, compare and reafon, as it were unavoidable, or impoftible not to be acquired by us infenfibly *, while, at the lame time, knowledge is in the main progreffive, and can only be acquired gradually in proportion to our dili- gence to improve in it. For how foon, how ex- ceeding quickly do we learn by experience to form very ready judgments concerning fuch laws and con- nexions in the ienfible world, as it is absolutely necel- fary to our well-being, that we mould early know, or hz able to judge of betimes with great readinefs, or almoft inftantaneoufly ? How foon do we learn to judge of magnitudes^ diitanccs and forms, and of the {/"Moral Philosophy. 39 the connexions between the ideas of fight and touch, as Ch a p. I. far, at leafr,as the common purpofes and conveniencies v^^-v^^ of life require ; in fo much, that when we are grown up and begin to reflect, we have quite forgot, how we learned thefe connexions, and became able to judge of them fo readily. Nay, when we come to play the philofopher about them, it is very difficult for us nor to confound thofe ideas, which are however totally diftinct from one another, and only connected toge- ther by the inftitution of the Author of nature. Ir is indeed with wonderful facility that we learn any language in our tender years: but this mod ufeful of all languages for us to know, the language of nature, as it may very properly be called, is what we learn fooneft, and as it were neceflanly and infallibly. (0) II. The wifdom and goodnefs of nature does no Second in- left evidently appear in directing and admomihing Lance- us by uneafy fenfations to provide necefiary fupplies for our bodies, and to defend them againft what is hurtful to them. For thus, nature teaches and in- ftructs us in the knowledge of what is prejudicial to us, or neceflary for our preservation j and how high- ly inconvenient it would have been, not to be thus admonifhed by nature, fince knowledge mud be progreflive, and can only be acquired gradually from experience and obfervation in proportion to our appli- cation to advance in it, is too manifeft to need any proof? But of this afterwards in its proper place. III. The wifdom and goodnefs of nature li Third m- difcovers itfelf, in giving us a rule to guide us in our moral conduct, diftinct from and antecedent to all our knowledge acquired by reafoning, which is a moral ienfe of beauty and deformity in affections, (0) See a;: tffay en vi/ion, and a tn pits of bu;nan ..... '" Cloyd. D \ actions The PRINCIPLES I. actions and characters, by means of which, an af- — J feet ion, action or character, no fooner prefents it- felf to our mind, than it is neceffarily approved or difapproved by us. Human nature is not left quite indifferent in the affair of virtue to form itfelf, ob- fervations concerning the advantages and diiadvan- tages of actions, and accordingly to regulate its conduct. Realbn mud be grown up to very great maturity, and be very confiderably improved by ex- ercife and culture, before men can be able to go through thofe long deductions, which fhew fome acti- ons to be in the whole advantageous to the agent, and their contraries pernicious. But the Author of na- ture has much better farniftied us for a virtuous con- duct than many philofophers feem to imagine, 01% at leaft are willing to grant, by almoft as quick and powerful inflections as we have for the prefervation of our bodies. He has given us ftrong affections to be the fprings of each virtuous action, and made virtue a lovely form that we might eafiiy diftinguifh it from its contrary, and be made happy by the pur- fuit of it. As the Author of nature has determin- ed us to receive by our outward fenfes, pleafant or difagreeabJe ideas of objects, according as they are uieful or hurtful to our bodies, and to receive from uniform objects the pleafures of beauty and harmo- ny, to excite us to the purfuit of knowledge, and to reward us for it ; in the fame manner, he has given us a moral fenfe to direct our actions, and to give us dill nobler pleafures-, fo that while we are only in- tending the good of others, we undefigncdly pro- mote our own greater! private good. ( q ) Fourth in- jy ^]1C wifdom and goodnefs of nature mews Itfelf very clearly, in wonderfully adapting our minds to be fatished with evidence fuited to our ex- ternal condition and circumftances. We are made ( q ) See an Enquiry into the origine of our i / h , by Hutcbinfon, whole words J have here copied. for of Moral Philosophy. 4t "or acquiring knowledge or information concerning Chap. I. :he frame of nature, and the connexions of things :rom experience •, but we mud in innumerable cafes ict upon probabi'ty, that is, upon preemptions bunded upon analogy or likenefs : and according- y, in tliis kind of evidence, we feel great fatishic- :ion and contentment of mind, That we mud, in enumerable cafes, act upon probable evidence, is a, ?act too evident to need any proof -9 and that acting jpon probable evidence, is acting upon preemptions founded upon analogy or likenefs, will likewife be readily acknowledged by all who will allow them- felves to confider whit probability means. That which :hiefly conditutes it, is expreded in the word likely ; that is, ( r) like fome known truth or true event •, like, in itfelf, in its evidence, in fome more or fewer of its circum dances. Now, it belongs to the fubject of logick to enquire into the nature, the foundation and meafure of probability, or to reduce the extent, compafs or force of analogical reafoning, to gene- ral obfervations and rules ; and thus to guard againd the errors to which reafoning from analogy is liable : but if we enquire from whence it proceeds, that likenefs mould beget that prefumption, opinion, or full conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it •, and which it does neceflarily pro- duce in every one proportionally to its various de- grees. This quedion contains its own proper and full anfwer. It is becaufe the mind is formed to re- ceive fatisfaction from it, and acqui efce in it pro- portionally to its feveral degrees. And the final caufe of this formation is no lefs evident ; fince our prefent date makes our acting upon fuch evidence {r ) See Dr. Butler a (Biiliop of Briftoiv) Jnalogy, &c. where probability is excellently difcourfed of. See Ciero de innjentione rbetorica, Lib. i. probabilis erit narraiio, Jt in ea but find our thoughts not a little agitated and relieved at the fight of fuch objects as are ever in motion, and Qiding away from beneath the eye of the be- holder." The final After this defcription of feveral effects of no- reafen or veltv, it will be eaiy to every one to run over ma- caufe why it ny more 0f tne feme clafs in his imagination •, and the reafon why we are fo made, is becaufe we are made for motion and progrefs : not to itand Hill, but to go forward and proceed •, we are made for encreafe, and gradual advancement ; and therefore variety is naturally fo agreeable, that we cannot be eafy without making feme new acquirements. How this But kv way of counterpoile in our frame to this hch of novel- ufeful defire of novelty, and delight in variety, left tv is checked it mould render us too fuperflcial in our attention and ballanccd tQ objgft^ anc| too rambling and defultory in our of habit!01* r 9ucft °f knowledge, it is fo ordered by our make, that by continuing a little while our attention to the fame objeft, a liking to it is contracted : an object, by being frequently preient to our view, be- comes c/ Moral Philosophy. 49 comes familiar to us, we form an intimacy with Chap. I. it (2). And thus, as the pleafure of friendfhip re- C-— V'*-^4 rains us from continually running about in fearch of new faces, fo the habitude of flu dying in the fame train, or of confidering the fame kind of ideas, by rendring them more agreeable to us, contributes to make us more fixed and Heady in our application to the confideratidn of an object, till we have fully examined it. It prevents our be- coming too changeable and unfettled in our pur- fuit of knowledge, ever to make great advances in any kind of it. Such is the power of habit, which fliall be more fully confidered afterwards: and hence the fage advice given by philofophers with regard to the choice of one's biifinefs or profeffion in life, cc To choofe the bed, that is, the mod ad- vantageous, and cuftom will make it agreeable." III. The mind naturally delights in comparing ^^ mtanl ideas, and in traceing their agreements and difagree- delight of the ments, their refemblances and differences ; and it is mind in beau- thus that knowledge is acquired. But which great- ^' ly contributes at once to give pleafure to the mind in the purfuit of knowledge, and to direct it to the proper objects and methods of inquiry, is the natu- ral delight of the mind in uniformity arriidft vari- ety ; or in other words, in unity of defign, and the Confent of parts to one end. The objects of con- templation that pleafe immediately, or at their firft appearance to the mind, are thofe that are found upon after-examination, to be regular, to have uni- In natural ty, or to make fyftems eafily taken in and compre- beauty, hended by the mind. Every fuch form naturally attracts the mind, and is wonderfully agreeable to It. It could not do fo, were we not fo formed as (*) Habit is more fully confidered afterwards in a particular chapter, E to Ike PRINCIPLES to receive a particular, diftinguifhing pleafure from filch objects: for whatever pleafes, neceflarily pre- iuppofes an aptitude or difpofition in our nature to be agreeably affected by it. Now being fo framed as to be naturally and neceflarily affected by fuch objects as have been defcribed, in an agreeable man- ner, we are thus prompted by nature to delight in the contemplation of fuch objects, and to feek after them. We are by this means led, impelled and di- rected to refolve every object into its conftituent parts, and to refer thele parts to one another, and to their common end •, or to confider a thing as a whole, and to look out for its principal meaning, fcope and intent, and to enquire how that is accom- plifned ; by which means, by the fimpleft, and thofe that are merely necefTary, or by too complex Thus we are a way and fuperfluous toil. It is thus we are led led to enquire t0 enqUU-e 'mt0 nature, trace its analogies and har- gies and gc- mon^es5 or general laws, and to admire its fimpli- neral laws in city and Frugality. And in like manner in abilract nature. feience, as in mathematics, for example, we are con- ducted by the fame principle, to aim at univerfal conclufions, or fuch general theorems and canons, as contain in them a great variety of particular cafes. It is the fame tafte that enables us to diftinguifh what we call eafe and grace, whether in external motion, or any compofition of wit and genius ; . namely, our knk of the beauty which confifts in the due medium between the nimium fc? parum, the too little and too much. ; for fo the decorum is defined by the antients ; and all beauty, whether in nature itfelf, or in the arts that imitate nature, ulti- mately rcfolves itfelf into the obfervance of this maxim, " Fruftra fit per plura quod per pauciora fieri potefty Nature is beautiful, becaufe nature " nihil fruftra facity Nature is fimple, and we are moft aptly contrived to delight in nature, to find out the proper way of Undying and imitating it, by our o/ Moral Philosophy. 51 our natural delight in the beauty which refults from Chap. L iimplicity and regularity (b). 1^— v- -J But befides our natural tenfe of beauty and liar- The natural mony in material objects, arifing from unity amidft delight of variety, we have analogous to it another fenfe, viz. ^^fe^tY' a fenfe of beauty in affections, actions and charac- ters. Beauty in merely corporeal forms is indeed exceeding entertaining to the mind. " There is no- thing that makes its way more directly to the foul than beauty, which immediately diffufes a fecret fa- tisfaction and complacency through the imagina- tion, and gives a finifhing to any thing that is great or uncommon. The firft difcovery of it ftrikes the mind with fecret joy, and fpreads a chearfulnels and delight through all its faculties." But does not every one feel that beauty of the moral kind is yet more charming and transporting than any corporeal beauty ! And what is that, but fuch a tendency of an action to publick good, as fhews generous in- tention, and benevolent affection in the agent. Now as by the former fenfe we are impelled and pointed to look out for unity of defign, Iimplicity and confent of parts, and therefore to trace analo- gies in nature, and to reduce like appearances to Thus we are general laws *, fo by the latter, we are prompted led to enquire and directed to enquire after the goodnefs and fit- after g°od fi- nefs of general laws, that is, their tendency to the na rea ons" good of the whole to which they belong, or which [b) This maxim is well explained by Sir Ifaac Newton, Na- tura fuperfluis caufis non luxurat. All beauty natural or moral confifts in this. See what Cicero fays of our natural and moral fenfe of beauty, in the beginning of his firft book of Offices ; and compare it with feveral other paffages, that in particular, Lib. 1 . Cap. 28. where he tp&rts of the Decorum at full length. See iikewife what he fays of the nimium £sf parum ad M. Bru* turn Orator N. 22. Ed. Schrivelii. See Iikewife Theages Py- tbagoreusy de ' knowledge. And here we may obferve, i. That the imagination is a faculty of wonderful ufe in our frame : it is by this faculty that we have memory, and are able to recal abfent objects to our mind, fet lovely pictures of them before us, and thus contemplate and examine them, as if they wrere actually prefent with us. 2. It is this faculty that renders us capable of many delightful imita- tive arts, which for that reafon are called arts of imagination. Both thefe facts are too obvious to need any proof. 3. But it is well worth while to re- mark how it comes about, that imagination is ca- pable of affording us fuch a vaft variety of pleafures, and of inventing fo many fine arts, as rhetoric, poe- try, painting, C5V. for it is evident, that without the imagination thefe arts would be abfolutely un- it is neceffary known to us. Now it has been often obferved on to render us that fubject, that fuch is the analogy between fenfi- focial com- ^le anc* mora^ objects, that there is none of the lat- merce by dif- ter fort that may not be cloatbed with a fenfible courfe. form or image, and reprefented to us as it were in a material fhape and hue. So true is this, that not only are wit and poetry owned to take place only in confequence of this analogy or refemblance of moral and natural ideas •, but even all language is confefied to be originally taken from fenfible objects, or their properties and effects. But the real truth We could rot of the matter perhaps is not very generally attended have mutual t0^ which is, " That moral ideas could not at all d^fcourfe0 y ^ exPrefiTed by words, if they could not be pic- were not\he turcd to us by means of analogous fenfible objects." moral w< rid Not only are thofe the bed words to exprefs moral analogous to objects in oratory or poetry, which fugged the live- world! Ufa ^eft? l^e ftrongeft, the cleared images or pictures of them of Moral Philosophy. them derived from fenfible forms : but in general, words cannot exprefs any moral objects, but by ex- citing pictures of them in our minds. But all words being originally expreflive of fenfible qualities, no words can exprefs moral ideas, but fo far as there is fuch an analogy betwixt the natural and moral world, that objects in the latter may be fha- dowed forth, pictured or imaged to us by fome re- femblances to them in the former. It is imagina- tion therefore that renders us capable of focial in- tercourfe and commerce, even about moral ideas, and their relations, by mutual difcourfe. And fo far as language can go in communicating fentiments, fo far have we an indifpu table proof of analogy be- tween the fenfible and the moral world ; and confe- quently of wonderful wifdom and goodnefs, in ad- jufting fenfible and moral relations and connexions one to another -, the fenfible world to our minds, and reciprocally the connexions of things relative to our moral powers to the connexions of things that con- flitute the fenfible world. It is this analogy that makes the beauty, propriety, and force of words, expreflive of moral ideas, by conveying pictures of them into the mind ; fo little attended to in teaching languages, whereby the ftudy of language is rendered fo jejune and infipid ; whereas, if rightly taught, by Theright me- lt great infight would early be gqt into one of the fhod °irteach~ moft entertaining and ufeful parts of knowledge y and would^each6 that clearly manifelts the wifdom and goodnels of us this analo- nature in our fabric; namely, the analogy or con- .gy. fent between the moral and natural world, in confe- quence of which, words primitively fignifying fen- fible ideas, may convey moral ones into the mind by analogy. But whatever may be thought of this afiertion,. It. is by fancy it it plain from the confideration of poetry, oratory, f.hat our Pa**- or any of the arts which are capable of touching or Jc°^/a,T*s" moving the heart agreeably, that nature has given us the imaginative faculty on purpofe to enable us to E 4 give The PRINCIPLES give warming as well as enlightening colours to truths; or to erribellifh, recommend and enforce them upon the mind. For tho' truths may be ren- dered evident and certain to the underflanding by reafoning about them, yet they cannot reach our heart, or beftir our paffionate part but by means of the imagination. The fine arts are, indeed, but fo many different languages by which truths may be re- prefented, illuflrated and recommended to us. And thck arts fhow us the power and ufe of fancy, by making us fee! its influence on the heart, or how di- rectly it makes its way to it. But the moral power of imagination, muft be evident to every one who reflects how it is, for inftance, that any ab.fent object is able to outweigh a prefent pleafure in our mind. For how elft is it that the remote one receives ftrength, but by the lively affecting manner in which imagination reprefents it, fo as to render it as it were prefent, or, at leaft, tho' abfent, fo effica- cious, that no interveening felf-denial, or fuffering is fufficient to retard the mind from purfuing it, with the utmoft intenfenefs ? 'Tis a lively picture drawn by the fancy that does all this. »v. Now, if it be asked, why we are fo conftituted ? fe constituted. Perhaps if we had a fuller knowledge of the human mind, we might be able to fee many reafons for it ; mean time, 'tis fufficient to vindicate nature for hav- ing {o framed us, that we plainly fee, how in confe- quence of fuch a conftitution, we are able to become Poets, in the proper fenfe of the word, that is, Crea- tors *, able to vie with nature and rival it ; and that to it we owe a vaft variety of very noble pleafures, far fuperior to thole of meer fenfe, even all thofe which genius, wit, refined fancy, and the fine arts that imitate or contend with nature afford us. ition With regard to imagination, let it be ob- ferved, that tho* it be thought by fuch as have not taken proper pains t^form and improve it, a meer rambler. o/Moral Philosophy. $j rambler, and utterly incapable of governance; yet Chap. I. ancient philofophers have aflfured us from their expe- rience, " That if habitual temperance be added to juft care to cultivate the imagination, and give it a right turn, fuch a command may be obtained over it, that its employments even in dreams fhall not only be pure and chafte, but very regular as well as highly entertaining.*' It is indeed not to be won- dered at, confidering how egregioufly the formation of fancy is neglected in education, that it fhould be fo irregular, defultory and turbulent a faculty, in- ftead of a pleafant, governable and ufeful one. Phi- lofophers fatisfy themfelves with railing at it, as a pernicious rather than an advantageous part of our frame ; as being inftead of an afliftant in the pur- fuit of fcience, an enemy to truth ; a mifleader, a fophift, and corrupter : but were it not capable of being not only regulated, but highly refined and improved by due care, mankind had been utter ftrangers to all the entertaining and embellifhing arts of fancy, which give fuch luftre, beauty and tafte to human life •, to all the ingenious productions of men of v/it and fine imagination : the advances that have been made towards its improvement, to which we owe fo many great genius's, and their de- lightful productions and compofitions, are a fufficient argument, that by timely care duly perfevered in, it might be habituated to order regularity and wholefome as well as pleafant exercife. Is it to be wondered, that thofe whofe waking thoughts are fo irregular and unprofitable, fhould have very idle and impertinent vifions in their fleep ? But fo true is ;he antient maxim about the correfpondence or ana- logy between our dreams and our employments throughout the day, that I believe no temperate man, much given to fludy, ( d) is not rather entertained :han [d) Jubet igitur Plato, fie ad fomnum profieifci corporibus ifie&is, ut nihil fit quod errorem animis/perturbaticmemque afl£= rat, The PRINCIPLES I. than molefted by his night reveries, provided he in a good habit of body. As for the dependence of body and mind, it fhall be confidered in anothei place. And the dependence of the imagination uj on culture, or our care to improve it, and exercii it rightly, hath been already accounted for, b] Ihewing, that according to the general law of oui nature in confequence of which we have domini- on, a fphere of activity, and are capable of making acquisitions, and by that means of virtue and merit ; the improvement of all our faculties depends on our- felves •, and it is the dependence of the improve- ment of the understanding, reafon, imagination, and all our faculties upon our care to improve them, that makes us a {pedes of beings fuperior to thofe who have no activity, but only receive fenfa- tions from without independently of their own will, choice or forefight. The other faculty of our minds, that remains to be confidered under this article of knowledge, and power, and the laws relative to them, is invention. Invention what it is and Now with refpect to it I would obferve,, how imprcve- I. That the phenomena of invention appear to us very irregular and whimfical, merely becaufe, for want of a hiftory of them, we cannot reduce them to general laws. Every thing mull appear to us ca- fual, anomalous, and as it were detached from na- ture, while we do not know the general laws on which it depends, or from which it refults. And rat. Ex quo etiam Pythagoricis interdiclum putatur, ne faba vefcerentur, quod habet inflationem magnam is cibus, tranquilita- i\ mentis, quxrer.ti vera, contrariam. Cicero de Divinat, Lib. I. No. 50. Omnia qua: fenfu volvuntur vota diurno, bore fopito reddit arnica quics ; Ale quoque mufarum Jludium Tub node filenti,1 foilicitare folct. there- ^Moral Philosophy. 59 therefore till we be at more pains, than hath yet Chap. L been taken, to collect a hiftory relating to invention, **— — / ^ j there can be no other reafon to call any of them ca- A hiftory of fual and irregular, than there was to call feveral o- n: the 11 & r r 1 i-i V • 1 phenomena ther phenomena or nature luch, while their laws relating to it, were not known, which now that they are found is much out, do no more appear to us to be fuch. On the wanted, contrary, there is good reafon to think, that the phenomena of invention may have their general laws -, fmce in whatever cafe almoft we have taken right methods of tracing effects to their general laws, fuch laws have been difcovered ; and then the effects which before appeared irregular, immediate- ly changed their face, andaffumed, as it were, ano- ther mein : they now no more feem uncouth and marvelous, but ordinary and according to rule. It is only in the way of experiment, that either the fcience of the human mind, or of any material fy- ftem can be acquired. And by the discoveries made in natural philofophv, we know, that no fooner are facts collected, and laid together in proper order, than the true theory of the phenomenon in queftion prefents itfelf. And hence, we have reafon to think, that knowledge of the qualities and operations of bodies, would quickly make very great and profi- table advances, far beyond what it has yet arrived to, by purfuing the fame method that has brought it to the prefent degree of perfection. Now when we confider that moral knowledge can only be carried on in the fame way, is it any wonder that the human mind is fo little known, fince men have not fiudied it with due care, but have rather been more mifled in this philofophy, than in natural, by fictitious hypothe- fes and romantic, vilionary theories ? For fuch are all theories that are not the refult of well ranged phe- nomena. II. But tho% without all doubt, it is highly reafon- what ?&*■ verv o r " truths is. able to expect very great affiftances for the promoti- V( on 6o The PRINCIPLES Ch a p. I. on and improvement of all fciences and arts from an *— -"V— —J acurate knowledge of our inventive powers, that is, from a full hiftory of their operations and producti- ons ; yet, in the mean time, 'tis plain, that inventi- on is nothing elfe but the habit acquired by practice of affembling ideas or truths, with facility and readi- nefs, in various pofitions and arrangements, in order to have new views of them. For no truths can be placed in any pofition or order with refpect to one another, but fome agreement or difagreement, fome relation or quality of thefe ideas mud appear to the mind. And difcovery of a new or unknown relati- on can be nothing elfe but the refult of placing truths, objects or ideas, in fome new or unobferved pofition. And how they But, if rn^s De the cafe, then the great bufmefs with are made. regard to invention and its improvement, muft be to accuftom ourfelves to look round every idea as it were, and to view it in all poflible fituations and po- fitions ; and to let no truth we know pafs, till we have compared it with many others in various re- flects •, not only with fuch, as are like or a kin to it, but with its feeming contraries, oppofites, or dis- parates. Every different juxtapofition of ideas, will give us a new view of them, that is, difcover fome unknown truth. And the mind by fuch exercife a- ione can attain to readinefs, quicknefs and diftinct- nefs, in comparing ideas in order to get knowledge. III. Now, this leads me to the laft remark I fhall make upon our natural furniture for knowledge, comes r . x o ' to nuke pic- which is, that knowledge being progreflive and de- grefs in pendent on ourfelves *, it, by that means, becomes knowledge by eafv to us t0 make advances in it, in the beft and pro- pereft: way that it can become fo, that is, in the way is qualified to give us the greateft pleafure. For it becomes eafier to improve in knowledge, in pro- portion to the improvements we have made in it. Our inventive, imaginative, comparing and reafon- ;iow;rs b more alert, and vigor- ous of Mc>kal Philosophy. 6i ous by proper exercife. The habit of reafoning Chap. L well* that is, readily and folidly, is acquired by v— ^V- -J practice in reafoning. And which is more, in con- fluence of having inured ourfelves to accurate thinking, and of having made feveral advances in fcience, we become able to form rules to ourfelves for our further progrefs in knowledge in the bed, that is, the cleared, quickeft, and iureft manner. In other words, knowledge may be made eafy to us by ourfelves, becaufe after we have made fome pro- And °y d***1 grefs in it, after we have exercifed our enquiring, {£™*™y^ comparing and reafoning powers, for fome time, a- art of reafon- bout different objects •, we can then make enquiring, ing. comparing, reafoning, inventing, and laying truths together in proper order, to bring out new conclufi- ons, the objects of our confideration , and thus we can form a fcience concerning fcience and making progrefs in it. A fcience, by the by, which ever fince Plato's time has been very much neglected in education ; and very little cultivated, notwithftand- ing all Lord Verulam has faid in his works of its na- ture and ufefulnefs. (e) Thus then we fee how excellently we are furnifh- General con- ed (/) by nature for the pleafures of knowledge, ciufion con- and for improving in fciences and arts , fo that we j:erninS tne may conclude, u That with regard to knowledge, jecjaej ancj_ ( the foundation of intelligent power, dominion and our natural activity ) we are very well conftituted ; or that all furniture for the moft important circumflances, or laws relative to lC* our underflanding, are very fitly chofen, being ne- cefTary to very great goods or perfections.5' (e ) See Cicero dejinibus, 1. 5. de legibus. 1. 1. Animal hoc providum, fagax, multiplex, acutum memor, plenum rationis, & confilii, quern vocamus hominem, prseclara quadam conditione a fupremo Deo natum efle, &c. {/) See my Lord Bacon's works, his "Ejfay on the advance- ment of learning ; and his Novum organum. Milton's Letter on education. Plato de republican Page 533, 34, 39.. Ed. Step. And my treatife on ancient painting, Chap, 1, . CHAP. The PRINCIPLES The laws re- lative to our embodied ftate, and our connexion tvith a mate- rial world. CHAP. II. E T us now confider oar relation to the ma- terial world, and the reciprocal dependence of our body and mind with the chief effects that refult from this fource. L I. Firft, it is evident, that relation to or connexi- on with a fenfible world, muft confift in a certain de- pendence on its laws, fo as to be varioufly affected by them with pleafure and pain •, or, a certain bodily orga- nization, by means of which, certain perceptions and affections are excited in the mind. Exiftence would be thrown away upon a material fyftem, if it were not perceived by minds or enjoyed by them. But the bodily fabric which is neceffary to our communi- m^teriahvorld cation with matter, muft neceffarily be fubject to the Communica tion with the neceffarily fuppofes de- pendence on its laws. Thefe laws are good. laws of that matter. Whatever the frame and ftruc- ture of it may be, or of whatever materials this body is compofed, it mult be liable to the common laws, to which the whole materi.il part of the cre- ation, to which it is related, is fubject. Now by the late difcoveries in natural philoibphy, it has been proved, that the centripedal and centrifugal forces which hold our mundan fyflem in that perfect or- der, which it is fo beautiful to behold and contem- plate, are the belt in every refpect that can be imagin- ed : infomuch that no alteration can be fuppofed with regard to them that would not be attended with much greater irregularities and inconveniencies, than all thole put together which refult from the prefent laws. In like manner, with refpefl to our earth, gravita- tion, cohefion, fermentation, to which general princi- ples almoft all its phenomena are reducible, have been fhewn to be excellent laws, and that no o- thers ^ Moral Philosophy. 63 thers could be fubftituted in their room, which would Chap. II. not be exceedingly for the worfe. In a word, it has <— - — / — -* been proved, that our mundan fyftem in all its parts This proved is governed by excellent general laws, in fo much by natural that all objections that have been made againft its PhilofoPhers- conftitution and oeconomy, have either taken their rife from ignorance of its real ftate and frame, . and of the laws by which it is actually governed ; and confequently only ferve to fhewthe abfurdity of (g) imaginary theories in natural philofophy ; or they really terminate in demanding fome change greatly to the worfe. But fuch conclufions quite deftroy all objections that can be made againft our being related to and connected with the fenfible world -, for to be related to it, and connected with it, without being fubject to its laws, is utterly impoflible. It is to de- pend without dependence : it is to be united without any connexion. But a dependence or a connexion that produces greater good in the whole, muft be a good dependence. Let us therefore fee what goods, advantages or pleafures arife from our hav- ing bodies, and being capable of commerce with a material world. II. But let it be obferved before we proceed, that A material as a material world cannot be faid to have order and world with - beauty -, or to be wifely contrived, but with refpect ou.c bf n2 ?T .1' v .y- , a* j 1 * • ceived could to beings, who perceive it, and are affected by it ; ^ 0f no u/-e or cannot indeed be created for any end, but fo far as perceptive beings have communication with it : fo were there not in nature fuch a kind of beings as we are, nature could not be full or coherent : there would be a chafm or void in nature which could not but render it deformed and imperfect to the view of any being capable of perceiving it % who hath, like us, any idea of richnefs, fulnefs, and perfection in nature. For fo are we made, that we cannot reprc ( g ) See Difcourfes on the origins of evil, natural an£ moral, by Dr. J*hn ClarL font 64 "The PRINCIPLES Chap. II. fent nature to ourfelves as perfect and beautiful, with- out conceiving it to be full and coherent : we cannot fuppofe any degree of perfection wanting in thefcale of life, that can exift, without being fhocked at the thought of fuch a deficiency, fuch incompletenefs, world, nature fucri a void and breach. would not be Without be- ings capable of enjoying a material fall and co- herent. By our com- merce with a material world we re- ceive a great many plea- sures of the fenfitive kind. Our fenfcsare admiiably ad- juitcd to one another, and to our whole frame. III. But not only is fuch a being as man neceffary to make the gradation in nature full and complete j but the fenfible pleafures we are fufceptible of by means of our bodily organization, or our fenfes, do well deferve their place in the fcale of life and be- ing. The more pleafures a creature is by nature made capable of, the larger provifion is certainly made for its happinefs : now the enjoyments we are made capable of receiving from a corporeal world, by means of our fenfitive organs, are not a few : the variety of them belonging to any of our fenfes, as for inftance, to the fight or ear, is almoft innume- rable. And all thefe fenfes, with all their appurte- nances, are admirably adjufted to one another, to our external condition, and to our whole bodily tex- ture, made up of them, and preferved entire by their equal nourishment and fuftentation. Thus, for example, our fight, at the fame time that it is capa- ble of receiving confiderable afilftances from artifi- cial inftruments, is wonderfully well adapted to judge of magnitudes, diftances, and other tangible qualities •, it being by contact and motion only, that the mechanifm of the body can fuffer any injury. In like manner, all our other fenfes are very well adjufted to one another, and to our fituation, as has been often obferved by leveral philofophers. This is delightfully told by our excellent poet alrea- dy quoted. Why has not man a mkrofcopic eye ? For this plain rcafon, wan is not a fly : Sayi of Moral Philosophy. Say, what the ufe\ were finer opticks giv'n ? T3 infpecl a mite, not comprehend the heav'n. Or touch, fo tremblingly alive all o'er? To [mart and agonize at ev'ry pore. Or quick effluvia darting thro9 the brain? Die of a rofe in aromatic pain. If nature thunder *d in his opening ehrs, And ftunn'd him with theynufic of the fpheres, How would he wi/h that heav'n had left him ftill The whifp'ring zephyr, and the purling rill ? Who finds not providence allgood and wife, Alike in what it gives, and what denies ? EfTay on man, Epift. u But though the pleafures our fenfes afford us be very many, and far from being defpicable in their kind; yet the chief advantages our fenfes bring us, are, as they are means and initruments of fciences and arts ; and the means, occaiions and fubje&s of ma- ny excellent virtues. I. Our communication with the fenfible world is Our fenfes not only the fource of very considerable enjoyments are inftra- to us, as fenfitiye beings •, but it is yet a fource of ^7cie°nceT more noble pleafures to us, as we are capable of an£j u[Q^i knowledge and imitation. arts. By our bodily fenfes, our minds' are rendered ca- pable of contemplating, and of imitating by inge- nious arts, many parts of a very wonderful fyftem •, many parts of a moil beautiful difpofition and ar- rangement of infinitely various objects. For how immenfe is the variety of the fenfible world ? Can there be a more delightful, or a more capacious field of ftudy and fpeculation, than what the riches, the fimplicity, the grandeur and perfect order of the natural world afford us ? What is greater, of natural or more elevating, than the contemplation of na- philofophy. ture, when we are able to take in large views of it, and comprehend its laws ? How agreeably do an- F cient 66 Tie PRINCIPLES Ch a p. II. cient philofophers expatiate upon this topic ! (b) The h-~~Y~~>~> ftudy of nature, according to them, is the natural food of the foul. And they indeed juftly placed a great part of man's bed happinefs in contempla- ting and imitating the regularity, wifdom, good- nefs and harmony of the fenfible world. They with good reafon concluded from the ftructure of our fenfes, confidered together with our intellectual powers j that we are made, " Ad mundum content- plnndum €sf imitandum" To contemplate* admire and imitate nature. What diftinguifhes our fenfes (/') from thofe of the brutes, is, (as thefe philofo- phers have obferved) that fenfe of beauty, order and harmony, with which they are united in our frame, by means of which they are not merely {hn- fitive, but rather rational faculties. For by thefe outward and inward fenfes, as they are conjoined in our. frame, we are capable of underftanding the And many regularity and wifdom of nature •, of inveftigating imitative its general laws, and admiring the wonderful con- arts. (/.>) So Cicero de ?iatura Deorum, Lib. 2. Jpfe autem homo natus eft ad mundum contemplandum &: imitandum. Idem de fe- neelute. Sed credo, Deos immortaleis fparfifle animos in corpora humana, ut client, qui terras tuerentur, quique caeleftium o:di- ncm contemplantes imitarentur eum vita?, medo ac confiantia. Academy ^uefi. Lib. 2. Eft enim animorum ingeniorumque naturale quodciam qu?.fi pabulum, confideratio, contemplatioque flat lira , erigimuT, latiores fieri videmur, humana deJpicimus, *c. (;) So Cicero de nat. Deorum, Lib. 2. Ad hanc providentiam naturae tarn diligentem tamque folertem adjungi multa poftunt, e quibus inteliigatur, quanta? res lioniinibus a Deo, quamque eximiae tributae fint, qui primum eos humo excitatos, cellos, & erectos conftituit, ut Dcorum cognitionem, ccelum intuentes, capere poilent. Sunt enim e terra homines non uc incolae, at- que habitatores, fed quafi fpcclatores fuperarum rerum, atque caeleftium, quarum fpjctaculum ad nullum aliud genus animan- tium pertinet. Senfus autem, interpretes, ac nuntii rerum, in ice ; tanquam in arcc, mirifice ad ufus ncceflarios & facli & collocati funt Omni (que fenfus hominum multo antecellit arum. Primum cnim oculi in lis artibus, quarum diciam eft oculorum, in pictis* fi&is, caslatifque formis, Sec. font of Moral Philosophy. 67 fent of all its various parts to make one beautiful Chap. II' whole. Nor is this all, for we are likewife qualified by them for divers imitative arts, as poetry, paint- ing, ftatuary, mufic, architecture, gardening, &c. from which arts do indeed arife pleafures very nearly allied to virtue, very affiflant to it; and vhich, next to its exercifes, are our nobleft and noil pleafing enjoyments. II. But our fenfes are yet of further and higher They are afe in our frame, as they afford us means, occa- jpeans and ions and materials for exerc.ifing many virtues ; ^aJne ^°tuod, nany kindly, benevolent and generous affections, exercifes. It is in confequence of our having a corporeal ofthefocial rame, or of being cloathed with bodies, that we are kind. -ifible, audible, and embraceable one to another -, .11 which are fources of pleafures of a very agreeable i :ind, as well as of a focial nature and tendency, low unembodied fpirits have intercourfe, is a que- rion we cannot poflibly folve ; but this is certain, hat our mutual correfpondence is by means of our •odies. And fcarcely will any one object againft ur frame, merely for our being thus made fit Dr commerce with one another, by the eyes and 3uch, and by the faculties of hearing and fpeech. But which is yet more, in confequence of our And 0f ra:1 Laving bodies, various occafions arife of our mu- tional domi- aally aiding, relieving, comforting, pleafing and nion pver the Ratifying one another, and of interchanging many ^|ig7e ap~ S ;ood and friendly offices, for which there could fiot otherwife in the nature of things be room. I Vnd not to add more on this head, is not the re- I ;ulation of our fenfes, and their appetites after the J gratifications fuited to them, a moft noble exercife [or our reafon and moral difcernment? By this Ineans, our guiding part hath fomething to guide jnd govern: fubjects committed to its truft, keep- ing and management 5 fubjects to provide for, and Io rule and maintain in decent and good order and F a difcipline 3 68 The PRINCIPLES Chap. II. difcipline. We have therefore, in confequence of our* having bodies, a moral dominion committed to us, in which to acquit ourfelves honourably, that is, wifely and prudently, or according to truth, reafon, and the fitnefs of things, is certainly the noblefl em- ployment we can form any notion of. The fpheres or employments of other beings cannot be higher in kind •, the difference can only be in fpecies, or rather in degree. For what can be conceived more great or excellent, than to have bufinefs of impor- tance to our own happinefs, and that of our kind, to manage by reafon •, fubjects to rule and conduct for the good of the whole ? And fuch are we our- felves to ourfelves by our make \ that is, fuch are the inferior parts of our conflitution, or our bodily appetites, to that which is principal in us, our rea- fon and moral confcience (k). Thus therefore, in confequence of our having bodies, we are not only capable of contemplating and imitating the fenfible world, and of various other pleafures *, but our reafon hath very proper practical employment. For thus is it that we are capable of all the virtues which are juftly divided by ancient moralifts into Sttjlencncc (/) and Abftinence -, or the power of being able to with-hold from the mod inviting pleafures, if they be either pernicious in their confluences, or unbecoming our dignity i and the power of fuffering any pain with magnani- mity, rather than forego our reafon, and contradict (;;;) So Cicero and all the ancient moralifts. See Plutarch, in particular, de virtute mora/:. Plato fenfit hominis animam non ilmplicem efTe, aut eodem per omnia modo affectam : fed aliam ejus partem intelligentem tfte ac rationatricem qua hominem regi natural fit conveniens; aliam qua; variis motibus obnoxia, bruta, vaga, & incompofua, & luapte natura gubernante opus habeat — quando autem bruta pars contra rationcm contendat— Staiim animus quafi in duas partes dividitur & manitefta fit difcordia. (/) See Epi8ttvst Adrian and Sirrf/niu;. our of Moral Philosophy. our moral confcience, by yielding to what thefe pro- nounce bafe and unworthy. All this, it is plain, fuppofes a moral fenfe in our conititution, of which fomething hath been already faid, and that fhall afterwards be confidered more fully. Mean time, if it be true, that our relation to the fenfible world is conducive, or rather necefc fary to the excellent purpofes above-mentioned, it plainly follows, that a reciprocal union between our body and mind, mud be morally fit and good. But this will be yet more evident, if we confider a little fome other effects, refulting from this reci- procal connexion, or from our dependence upon the laws of the fenfible world, from which we receive ; fo many pleafures, not merely of the fenfitive kind. I. It is plain from experience, that with refpect The genera! to every fenfitive being, within the reach of our ob- *aw with re- fervation, with refpect to ourfelves in particular, this ^ *°. sn^ is the general law of nature, " That the fimple productions of nature, which are ufeful to us, are alfo agreeable to us (;»); and the pernicious, or ufelefs, are made difagreeable, or give pain. Our external fenfations are, no doubt, often painful, when our bodies are in a dangerous ftate, when they want fupplies of nourifhment, or when any thing external would be injurious to them. But if it ap- pears that the general laws are wifely inftituted, and it be neceffary to the good of a fyftem of agents to be under the influence of general laws, upon which there is occafion for prudence and activity; the ' particular pains occafioned by anecefTary law of fenfa- tion, can be no objection againft the goodnefs of the author. Now that there is no room for com- Senfible pains plaint that our external fenfe of pain is made too whence they acute, mud appear from the multitudes we daily fee an^e* (m) See Uutchefon on the condutt of the fajjions, and Dr. J. Clark on the origine of evil* F 3 fo lie PRINCIPLES J Chap. II. fo carelefs of preferving the blefling of health, of which many are fo prodigal as to lavifh it away, and expofe themfelves to external pains for very tricing realbns. Can we repine at the friendly ad- monitions of nature, joined with fome aufterity, when we fee they are icarce fufficient to reftrain us from ruin ?" To this let it be added, that the ex- ternal and fuperficial parts of our bodies are the moft fenfible, and caule the greateft pain when they are in any wife hurt fully affected; becaufe they are ex- pofed to many various external objects, and do thus give us immediate notice fo foon as they are affected by them ; whereas the internal parts being more re- mote, cannot be fo eafily come at, and confequent- 3y are not liable to fo many interruptions from witfej out, and therefore need not fuch fubtle fenfation. Thus we experience (fay anatomifts) that the veins, arteries, bones, and the like, have little or no fen- fation at all (»). Several pains the neceflary effects of a bodily orga- nization. II. But further, let it beconfidered, that of what- ever materials a body be compofed, or whatever its particular organization may be, it mull in the na- ture of things, be liable to as many diforders as, there are means of preventing or difturbing its na- tural courfe. In general, upon the fuppofition of our being capable of agreeable fenfation, a propor- tionable degree of pain muft enfue, upon any defect or excefs whatfoever : becaufe, if health confift in a certain balance or order, every deviation from that order, mud be ficknefs or difeafe. Pleafant fenfa- tion mult be produced in fome order and method ; that is, in order to it, a body muft have a certain texture, and there muft be a certain adjuftment of external objects to that texture : but the refult of this muft be, that in a habitation like our earth, not made for any one (pedes of animals, but fitted («) See Dr. J% Clark on the wtgint of evil* for of Moral Philosophy. ji For a variety of beings, fomethings being adjufted Ch a p. II. to bodies of a different texture from ours, cannot u-— v*-*** but be contrary in their natures to ours, and fo tend to a folutio continui in refpect of them. This is as plain and as neceflary, as it is, that two parts of matter cannot tally, unlefs they are fitted by their make to one another. In other words, it is necef- fary in the nature of things, that bodies mould have each a particular mechanifm fitted for a certain end, or for certain enjoyments : and to every material mechanifm, as there muft be fomething congruous, in order to the having agreeable fenfations ; ib in a tural world, replenished with various animals, in order to make nature as rich and full with good as pofTible, fome things will of neceffity be incongru- ous, and confequently in fome manner and degree pernicious to our particular mechanifm, by being iitted to different bodies. For it is impoffible but thole objects, which are fuitable to certain organiza- tions, in order to affect them agreeably, muft be incongruous to organizations of different forms ; and being incongruous to them, they muft have fome tendency to hurt them. This is inevitably the re- iiilt of the neceffity of a thing's having a certain texture, and certain qualities in a determinate de- gree, in order to its being fuitably proportioned or congruous to another certain texture, with its qua- lities. All things cannot poffibly be equally con- gruous to all different forts of organization. Ill But if our organization be liable to be de- pa;ns are ufe- ftroyed or hurted by certain objedb, in confequence ful and pro- of the impoffibility, " That the fame texture mould Per monitors. be equally well fitted to all forts of external impref- fions, that may happen through the influence of thofe very laws of matter and motion, which are ac- knowledged to be neceffary to the general good and beauty of the material world, and to our receiving many pleafures of various kinds from it:" if this be F 4 the The PRINCIPLES the cafe, it is certainly fit that whatever externa} object is pernicious, or tends to difturb and hurt the mechanifm of our bodies in any confiderable de- gree, fhould be fignified to us by fome means or other: Now the method that nature takes is this*, " It is generally Tome pleaiant fenfation which teaches us what tends to our prefervation and well-being-, and fome painful one which fhews us what is perni- cious -," " we are directed by uneafy appetites when our bodies Hand in need of nourifnment j" " ahc\ in like manner, it is by a fenie of pain excited in us, that we are warned of the dangerous tendency of bruifes, wounds, violent labour, and other fuch hurtful caufes." Now the litnefs of onr being thus warned and ad- monifhed appears, becaufe fome warning is necef- fary •, and there can be no other but what has been mentioned, except by knowledge of the natures of things, and their aptitudes to affect us agreeably or hurtiully. But knowledge is in the nature of things progreffive, and can only be acquired gradually, as has been ihewn, from experience, in proportion to our fituation for making obfervations, and taking in ideas, and to our application to gather knowledge. The knowledge of nature is wifely left to be our own acquifition i and therefore fome other warning, even that mentioned by painful fenfations, is abfo- lutely mxefiary to us. It is only fome intuitive kind of knowledge of bodies, by immediate inflection (which is hardly conceivable) that could ftipply the place of admonitions by pain, in order to felf-prefer- vation. And if we had fuch an intuitive knowledge of tilings as is necefiary to this purpofe ; then no part of knowledge could be left to be our own acquifition by obfervatioti and reaibning. For what does not the intuitive knowledge, necelfary to be our warner of rous applications or approaches to our bodies, include in it ? It plainly comprehends in it an in- tuitive knowledge of our own body, and of all fur- rounding f of Moral Philosophy. VQunding objects to the influences of which it is ex- Efed : that is, it comprehends an intuitive know- Ige of the whole of nature. And confequently, having fuch knowledge (could we, or any crea- tures poffibly have it, as 'tis plain from the nature pf knowledge we cannot ) is abfolutely inconfiftent with the dependence of any part of the knowledge pf nature upon ourfelves °, or with fuch knowledge being in any degree our own acquifition -, that is, with any thing's being left to be matter of obfervati- on and enquiry to us, or fubject of exercife to our reafon. All parts of natural or real knowledge are fo connected together and involved in one another, that if any part of it were attainable by us other- wile than it now is, no part of it could be attain- able, as it now is, i. e. by induction, and by rea~ foning from properties fo difcovered. And would we not thus be deprived of one of our pleafanteit and nobleft employments and acquifidons ? IV. Thus then we fee the fitnefs of our being ad- From ^ np monifhed by uneafy fenfations of dangers to our bo- ceifity there is, dies of bodily neceffities and wants : becaufe thus we that bodily are directed and impelled to relieve and preferve our- ^PPetIt^s^ felves in fuch a manner, that reafon, neither hath, tencje^ w'lt^' on the one hand, little or no employment ; nor, on uneafy fenfa- the other, a very difagreeable and almoft infurmount- tionsarifesthe able talk. But it is well obierved by an excellent philo- *^!xZt^ fopher on this head, that when a neceflity of adding le?iry fenfati- ftrong uneafy fenfations to one clafs of appetites appears, ons accompa- there muft appear alfo a like neceffity of flrengthning n.vinS °"r de- the reft in the fame mind by like fenfations, to keep a f *e ca£paf- juft ballance. And thus accordingly, our bodily flons> appetites being for good reafons accompanied with uneafy fenfations, our moral defires and affections are strengthened in like manner by uneafy ftrong fenfa- tions to maintain a juft balance ; fo is plainly the Srcpyy, or natural affection to children, fo is com- panion or pity to the diftreffed, and many other mo- ral 74 We PRINCIPLES Chap. II. ral pafiions, that thus the public and focial one5 W^v^— ^ might not be too weak and feeble in proportion to thofe which terminate more directly and immediately in the prefervation or gratification of our fenfes. In a conflitution, where one degree of force is requi- fite, a proportionate degree of force in other parts becomes alfo necefTary *, otherwife the condiment parts would not bear that proportion to one ano- ther, which an equal and found balance in the whole requires. It is the fame here as with regard to anta- gonift mufcles to counterpoife one another in the body, (o) The laws of v. Let me juft add upon this head, that as for ^*" fent flat our com*ng *nto c^e world by tne way of propagati- on body ne- on we now do, anc^ with weak, necefTitous, infant bo- ceflkry. dies : It is a neceffary refult of the conflitution of this material world to which we are related by our bodies ; and befides the many good effects of it of the focial kind which are very evident, " There is And the law an abfolute fitnefs, that beings made for progrefs in of progreffive knowledge, and in every perfection by their own ap* makes infant Pncat^on an(l induftry conjointly with affiftances minds from fociety, and who confequently mult enter upon fcry. the world with infant minds, fhould likewife enter upon it with infant bodies." How very unequally otherwife would our bodies and minds be yoked ? How improper companions and mates would they be ? As for death, what may be inferred concerning it, fhall be confidered, when having enquired into all the other principal laws relative to our prefent Hate, we are able to take a complete view of it. In the mean time, it is obvious, that death, orthedif- iolution of our bodily texture, in whatever way it happens, is always the refult of our fubjeclion to fome cf the laws of matter and motion, to which our union with the ienfible world necefiarily fubjecls [o) See Hutckefon, on the conduit of the fiffiow, in whole en this obfervation. LIS , of Moral Philosophy. 75 us, and to which are owing all the pleafures we re- Chap. II. ceive from it in our prefent embodied flate. ^— — v""-^ II. The other remarkable phenomenon with re- The depen- ded to our union with a material world is, "The^,n^™^ dependence of genius, temper, and mental abilities difpofitions on upon the temperature of the body, air, diet, and the body. other fuch phylical caufes." That a variety of men- A 2reat va£!" tal temperatures, turns, difpofitions and abilities pre- ^thefe a- vail among mankind, will not be called into doubt. mong man- And as it is certain, that different textures of eyes kind. mud fee differently ; or every object muft neceflarily partake of the colour with which the eye itfelf is taint- ed : fo variety in temperature, texture and mould, (fo to fpeak) among minds, muft neceflarily produce great variety of conceptions, fentiments and judg- ments, and confequently of inclinations, appetites and difpofitions. For, fuch as the foil is, fuch will the flavour of the fruit be in the natural world ; and by like neceffity in the mora], all the impreffi- ons, fentiments, judgments, and paflionsof a mind will be correfpondent to its prevailing humour and character : they will neceffarily partake in fome de- gree of it. And, hence it is, that every man's turn of thinking is as diftinguifhable as his face or gate from that of every other : there are as few minds as faces that have not very peculiar and diftinguifhing features (p). Now, that differences among minds, in texrtire Howfertliat and character, abilities and difpofitions, are no lefs variety arifes neceffary to the well-being of fociety, and variety of 'rom and de- beauty and good in it, than differences in complexi- Pen?s onrPhy~ pns and countenances, is very evident at iirft light, has been already hinted, and will appear more fully when we come to confider the laws of our nature relative to fociety. All therefore that belongs to the prefent queftion is, how far differences among minds ( p) See what is further faid on this Subjeft, in the Chapter q requires, that we fhould give due attention to the na- tural connexions on which they depend ; and con- formably to them take proper meafures to make fit changes." That is to fay, changing and reforming our minds, as far as mind depends upon body, de- pends on ourfelves, becaufe it depends upon know- ledge of nature we may acquire, and right ufe of fuch knowledge. It is often regreted by ancient phi- lofophers, (/) that the dependence of body and mind, as evidently as its extent difcovers itfelf in many cafes, is fo little fludied and enquired into by philolbphers. Were it, fay they, more carefully at- tended to and confidered, the medicinal art would extend further than to the body : it would be able to do great fervices to the mind, by proper applicati- ons to the body, or by proper external regimens and difcipline. Upon this occafion, they have exprefTed a very high opinion, not only of certain gymnaftic exercifes, but of the power of mufic in particular ; and feem to think, that very advantageous ufes might be made of that art, in feveral cafes, for delivering the mind from diforders -, or for purging and refining True moraI-- the paflions -, calming, quieting, cheering, and ty mutt there- ftrengthning the mind. fore confider But let that be as it will, tho' the fcience we have manasacom- now been fpeaking of (the medicine of the mind, [j^"11. ^e^s and that part of natural knowledge, from which body and alone it can be deduced) be very much neglected, mind as ^ci- vet from what hath been faid of the dependence of Vro° and the formation of habits. A third clafs There are two things very remarkable in our na- ^ larvvs- ture ; " The aflbciation of ideas, or the difficulty tiv^toThe'af- with which ideas that have been often prefented to fociation of the mind together are afterwards disjoined -9 " and, ideas and ha- ** The formation of habits by repeated acts j or a fa- jts* cility in doing, and a propeniion to reiterate the fame action contracted by frequent doing it." Thefe two effects are very fimilar or like : they both include in their nature a certain kind of cohe- ??th *£*fe .r lion with the mind, formed by reiterated conjunc- fromoneprin* tion or co-exiftence between objects really feparate ciple. and diftinct from one another \ i. e. that do not ne- ceffarily co-exift? or are not naturally parts of one G whole, 82 The PRINCIPLES Ch a p . III. whole. And as they are like to one another, fo they mud go together ; or neither of them can take place in a mind without the other. If habits are contracted by repeated acts, ideas will be joined or mixed by repeated concurrence : and reciprocally, if ideas contract a fort of coherence by being often joined, habits mull: be formed by frequent repetition of acts. This is plain. For, I. Unlefs the mind were fo framed, that ideas frequently preien ted together to it, fhould afterwards naturally continue to recal one another, to blend or return together, habits could not be contracted. They mull Thus, for inftance, the habit of taking fhuff, could both go toge- not take place, did not the returns of certain per- ther. ceptions recal the idea and defire of fnuff. And the cafe muft be the feme with regard to all other habits •, for all habits, of whatever kind, ope- ; rate the fame way. The reafon is, becaufe all ac- tions of the mind are excited by and employed a- bout ideas •, and an action cannot be reiterated, un- lefs its object and motive be 'revived. A propenfion to any action is nothing elfe but the frequent return of a certain defire, which necefTarily fuppofes the e- qually frequent returns of the ideas which excite it, and are the fubject of it : and facility in acting, in like manner, fuppofes the eafy and quick return of the ideas that induce to the action, and are its fub- ject. The formation of ideas therefore fuppofes the aiYociation of ideas to take place. But, II. If aflbciation of ideas take place, habits mull' necefTarily be formed by repeated acts. For, if we attend to the matter flrictly, we mall immediately find, that the whole courfe of what is called aft'ion^ or a fcries of action, ( the wills to act or make ef- forts to act alone excepted ) is nothing but a train of paflive perceptions or ideas. Bat ideas, as often as they rcturn; muft excite certain affections, and the- affections c/ Moral Philosophy. 83 affections which lead to action, muft, asoften as they Chap. III. are revived, difpoie and excite to act \ or, in other u— *v~— -^ words, produce will to act. And if will to act be fuccefsful, the train of perceptions called attion, mull fucceed ; and, by frequently fucceeding in this man- ner, cohefion or afTociation muft be formed of this kind, that is, aflbciations that terminate in action mult be contracted. Thofe effects called the afTociation of ideas and formation of habits, do therefore refolve themfelves into the fame general law or principle in our na- ture, which may be called the (/) law of cuftcm. But, whether they are reduced to one or different Bat whatever principles, nothing can be more certain •, than that tlie cau{"e be» ideas are affociated by being frequently conjoined^ in th^fe^fFedU^ fuch a manner, that it is not eafy to prevent their are certain, mixing fo together as to make one perception, or, at leaft, their coherence and joint return to the mind ; and that habits are formed by repeated acts. Now, nothing can be of greater ufe in our frames, than the principle or principles from which thefe ef~ Both procee(i fects arife. For, what can be more evident, than from a moil that were we not fo conftituted, we could not attain ui*eful prmci- to perfection in any fcience, art, or virtue ? It p ( / ) Thus, for inflance, in the whole action of taking muff, :. what is there that is active, befides the firfl: will to take it, and the other intermingling volitions to move the hand, open the i box, &c ? The perception, uneafinefs, itch, or whatever it is that excites the will to take it, and the moving the hand, open- ing the box, taking muff between the fingers, putting it to the I noie, drawing it up, and being irritated or pung'd by it ; what is there in all thefe but mere fenfation or pailion ? The whole ef- fect, the volitions to take it, open the box, &c. excepted, is but a fucceffion of paiTive fenfations. And it is fo with refpedt to e-jerv other active habit, becaufe it is fo with refpect to every action. There is nothing in any one action befides vo- lition, but fenfation or impreffion. Volition is all that can be called active : and action therefore is nothing elfe but a train of ' idea?, fubfequent to, or brought into exillence by a ferjes of vo- ■ litions. But volitions are excited or moved by ideas : and there- fore aflociations of ideas exciting volitions, are active habits. G 2 would 84 ST& PRINCIPLES Chap. III. would not be in our power to join and unite ideas at our plealure, to recal pad ones, or to lay up a flock of knowledge in our minds to which we could have recourfe upon any occafion, and bring forth, as it were, ready money lor prefent ufe. Nor would it be in our power by all our reiterated acts to become more ready, alert, and expeditious in performing any operation than at our fir ft attempt •, but, in every thing, and on every emergence, after ever fo much part labour, all our work would conftantly be to be- gin again. In one word, habits are perfected facul- A principle culties : or faculties perfected by exercife are habits. that may juft- So that the law of habits is really the law of improve- \y be called nt tQ perfeffian . and js therefore a mod excellent, the law of a. f C 1 1 perfection. a m°ft uietul law. All this is very obvious. But fo extremely, fo uni- verially ufeful is this part of our frame, that its well worth while to examine it more fully, and take a larger view of its effects. We fhail therefore firft confider fome of the principal phenomena belonging to the-affociation of ideas. I. And, in order to proceed diftinctly, let us be fare that we carry along with us a clear idea of the thing itielf. Afibciated Senfible ideas or qualities, which by their co-exit ideas defined, tence make the fame object, (as, for inftance, it is a euimedTrom pwticukr (hape, fize, colour, tafte, and other corn- complex bined qualities in the iame fubject that make a peach) ideas, i?c. are not laid to be afibciated, becaufe they naturally and really co-exift, or naturally and really make the iame object (a). Nor is the complex idea which we have of a peach, after having tailed fevcrals, that is immediately ex- cited in us by the fight of it, before we touch or talle it, called an officiated idea \ tho' the greater part of it conflfts of ideas not perceived, but ima- («) Sec Locke on the human underjianding. The Chapter on i gined ; T o/1 Moral Philosophy. gined; becaufe the qualities imagined do really be- long to the peach. We are much indebted to the wonderful quicknefs of our fancy, in adding feveral qualities on fuch occafions to thofe really perceived, to compleat our ideas. But fuch fupplies, by the imagination to any of our fenfible ideas, as intimate- ly as they unite and blend with them, are not called ideas of ajfociation^ becaufe whatever is thus added by the imagination to the perceptions of fenfe, is a copy of a fenfible quality really appertaining to the ob- ject perceived. But, if a peach having been often prefented to us on agreeable occafions, mould become ever after- wards exceedingly more defireable than before, by recalling to our mind thefe agreeable circumftances ; then is the whole idea of a peach that thus excites our defire and greatly pleafes us, compounded of the real qualities of a peach, and of thefe other de- lightful ideas not belonging to it, but fuggefted to, or excited in our imagination by it. Or contrari- wife, if a peach which was formerly very agreeable, having been frequently prefented to us on melanchol- ly occafions, mall ever afterwards recal to our minds thefe difagreeable circumftances, and (o become hate- ful to us ; then the idea of a peach is compounded of uneafy ideas that overbalance all its good and formerly defireable qualities, or that fo entirely pofTefs the mind, that there is no room for thefe qualities to enter into it, In both thefe and all fuch cafes our ideas are made up of real and afTociated ingredients, or compound-, ed of parts, fome of which do really belong to the object, and others do not, but are added by the mind itftlf : they are made up of ingredients that have no natural or necefTary coherence, but that co- AlmoiUHour here or are mixed by cuftomary afTociation. ideas have ^ fomething in III. The inftances that have been given, in order aflbciate4 to determine the meaning of afTociation, are indeed kind. G 3 but 86 Tie PRINCIPLES Ch a p. III. but trifling and of little moment. Bat the thing it. v— — v — —^ fclf in irs full extent is of the greateft confequence. For if we confider our ideas with due attention, and take the trouble to analyfe them, we fhall find that very few, if any of the ideas, that excite our warm- ed and keeneft affections, are quite free from affoci- ated parts. The greater number of our perceptions, however agreeable or difagreeabie, are of the affoci- ated kind in fome degree. How many, how very many of them are like the peaches we have men- tioned, chiefly agreeable or difagreeabie in confe- quence of fome things united with them, that do not belong to them ? We can fcarcely name any one that offers itfelf quite pure and unmixed ; or which has no conflituent parts of the kind we are now fpeaking. But affections, that is, defires or averfi- fions, will always be proportioned to the good or evil qualities comprehended in the ideas by which they are excited. necefTariiy5 That few or none of our ideas can efcape fome happens. mixture by affociation, if we are not continually up- on our guard to prevent it, is obvious. For where the law of affociation takes place, the concomitant circum (lances in which ideas have frequently occur- red to the mind, mud become conftant parts or at- tendants of thefe ideas, if we are not affiduoufly upon the watch againft fuch affociation. This is the natural refult, or rather the direct meaning of the law. But, what is the whole frame and courfe oi nature, or what elfe indeed can it be but a conftant occafion to us of affociation, i. c. of mixture or cohe- rence of ideas ? It cannot but be fo, becaufeno idea n beprefentcd to the mind iingly, that is, without proceeding, concomitant and fucceeding circumftan- enc. ces •, and in a world governed by uniform laws, and ciliary effeft filled wit! of analogous natures and cmploy- of the world's jncnts, no idea can fail of being often prefented to general ^K" l^'m^ ln l'lc &mc or n^c circumllances. There uniform laws, arc many aflbciatioits that are entirely of our own making ; c/ Moral Philosophy. 87 making; but, fuppofe we made none, it would be Chap.IIL fufficient employment for us, either in order to have <*-— *v^— ' true knowledge or well proportioned affections, to be inceffantly upon our guard to prevent the blend- ings and cohefions of ideas, that the regular courfe of things in the world naturally tends, in confe- quence of the law of afibciation, to' form or engender in our minds. Every one who is acquainted with Natural phU philofophy, knows, that the great difficulty in at- lofophy con- taining to the true knowledge of things, take its rife flfts *n a Sreat from the difficulty of feparating ideas into the parts feparaSgaf- that naturally belong to one another, and thofe which fociations are added by afibciation. For without fuch analyfis, which the or- no objecl: can be defined, diflinguiihed, nor confe- ^^e°^ture quently examined, and fo underftood. And yet ideas, produces m in confequence of the law of afibciation, mud, from our minds, the very beginning of our exigence, fo blend and mix with others totally and efTentially diftincl from them, that it muft become extreamly difficult not to confound together qualities that being different, can never be philofophifed about, till we are not only a- ble to diftinguifh them, but to keep them before the mind without intermingling and quite feparate. In reality, the greater part of philofophy confifts in feparating ideas, that the natural courfe of things, in confequence of the law of afibciation, hath conjoined, or rather confounded. Many inftances might be given to prove this, were it at all neceffary. The jang- ling about beauty among philofophers, whether it is diftincl or net from utility, is a fufficient proof of it •, and yet into what fcience does not this diipute necef- farily enter P There is no reafoning about poetry, painting, or any of the polite arts, or indeed about morality, without being led into it. But what fuffici- ently proves it, is the difficulty mod perfons find in their entrance upon philofophy in diftinguifhing the qualities perceived by any one fenfe from thofe per- ceived by any other. How few, not very much ac- cuflomed to philofophy, are not ftartled to hear that G 4 diilance. 88 The PRINCIPLES Chap. III. diftance is not an idea of fight, but an idea of touch <*- — v™ — J fuggefted by ideas of fight ! And yet, till this is clearly underflood, and the difference is become fa- miliar to the mind, it is impoffible to have a clear no- tion of very many important truths in perfpective and optics. But if philoibphers find a difficulty arifing from the effect of the law of affociation in analyfing • - ideas *, we all find a much greater one from the fame toaations^ anQl tne immoderate luft of power, but extra- vagant defires, excited by ideas of grandeur and happinefs, fomehow blended with natural pleafures, and the defires thefe excite ? Or what, on the other hand, are patience, magnanimity, a contented mind, and other fuch vermes, but affections to-r wards certain natural objects, duly moderated by the confideration of their intrinfic values, and of the flrengrh of defire proportioned to them •, by fe- parating c/Moral Philosophy. 93 •parating from them all ideas that tend to encreafe Chap. Ill, defire beyond that due proportion ; and by affociating y — ~~ v— — -^ to them all the ideas, opinions and judgments, that tend to maintain and preferve defire in a juft tone md ballance, with relation to true happinefs ? How does patience work ? How can it work, but by alle- viating confiderations ? And what is it, for inftance, makes poverty doubly painful to one, and to ano- ther a very fupportable ttate, but different ideas in their minds, connected with mediocrity of circum- Itances in refpect of outward enjoyments, by means of different aifociations ? But indeed Mr. Hutche- fvn hath quite exhaufted this fubject. We mall therefore only obferve further on this head, IV. That as affociations of various forts muft ne- Another cir- ccflarily be formed in the mind, by the natural courfe cumftance of things, abfolutely independent of us ; fo va- ^^iatfon. rious aifociations muft produce various tempers and difpofitions of mind ; fince every idea, as often as it is repeated, muft move the affection it naturally tends to excite ; and ideas, with their correfpondent af- fections, often returning, muft naturally form in- :linations, propenfions, or tempers : for temper Like ideas means nothing elfe. But with refpect to the law are eafily af- of affociation, there is a circumftance which we fbciated- have not hitherto taken notice of; (becaufe affocia- tion ftrictly confidered, is no more but a league, or cohefion, formed by frequent conjunction in the mind) and that circumftance is likenefs or refem- blance of ideas. Though frequent concurrence be fufficient, as has been obferved, to produce the ef- fect called affociation, yet nothing is more certain, than that affociation is more eaiily engendered between ideas that have fome affinity or likenefs ; than between thofe v/hich have no kindred, no refem- blance ; as we may feel in a thoufand inftances. Now if we carefully attend to the human mind, we w-t anjj fhall find, that the aptitude to affociate like ideas judgment' that have the fmalleft refemblances > and the apti- defined. tude The PRINCIPLES 111. tude to ieparate ideas which have the minuted diffe* rences, not only make a very great diverfity in minds with refpect to genius, but likewife with regard to moral temper. Wit is juftly defined to confift in the quick and ready affemblage of fuch ideas as have any analogy, likenefs, or refemblance, efpecially in thofe circumftances which, are not commonly attend- Both fuppofe ed to, fo that the refemblance, when it is pointed the law of out, at once ftrikes by its evidence, and furprizes afl]0Cm!!°n t0 by its uncommonnefs. Judgment, on the other hand, is rightly laid to lie in nicely diftinguifhing the diiagreements and variances or differences of ideas ; thofe efpecially which lie more remote from common cbfervation, and are not generally advert- ed to. The witty perfon may therefore be laid to be one, who hath an aptitude of mind to affociate ideas which have any affinity, or rather a quick difcernment of the refemblances of ideas, in refpects not abfolutely glaring to all perfons, and yet evi* dent and pleafing to all, when pointed out to their obfervation by fuch a flrict and acute difcerner of likenelfes. On the other hand, the man of judg-^ ment or difcretion (for fo difcretion properly figni- fies) may be defined to be one who has a particular aptitude to defcry differences of all kinds between objects, even the moil hidden and remote from vul- gar eyes. Now however thefe different aptitudes may be acquired, or in whatever refpects they may be original, cogenial or unacquired •, it is manifeft that they make a very real difference in character or genius. They have very different effects, and pro- duce very different works ; and they prefuppofe the law of affociation. The improvement of the one, It is there- certainly very much depends upon accufbomance to lore j n conic- -_ . J ,'. . , *. . * quence of the aflcmble and join, and the improvement or the other UwofaiTo- upon accuftomance to difunite, break and Ieparate. riation that j>ut tnerc is jn refpect of moral character a parallel ierennrc- " var^'ly : *~omc are propenft to afibciating, and others Dim's. to disjoining. Nay as the great variety of genius*! may of Moral Philosophy. 95 i nay be in general divided into the aptitude to affoci- Ch a p. III. ! .te, and the aptitude to difTociate : fo, perhaps, almoft ' v~—~' .11 the different moral characters among mankind nay be reduced to the like general divifion, that is, 0 the afTociating and diffociating aptitude. For as 1 turn to afTemble refemblances of different kinds fuppofe of the foft and tender, or of the horrible md violent, the ferious or ridiculous) makes diffe- rent fpecies of genius, the epic, comic, tragic, hu- it gives rife norous, 65V. fo difpofitions to conjoin ideas of dif- t(? annual erent kinds, will neceflarily make an equal variety dlvenity °f )f moral tempers and characters ; the chearful, the ra&ers. melancholy, the cowardly and timorous, or the dar- ng and adventurous, and fo forth. But one who laturally delights, or by ufage comes to delight, in my one kind of alTemblages, will be averfe to its )ppofites : and exceflive delight in any one, will become a particular extravagance to be guarded a- 2jainft. In like manner, a turn or propenfion to iifunite ideas admits of as great variety as there is /ariety of differences to be difcerned, and confe- .juently there may be as great a diverfity of minds >ach bent towards diflinguifhing, as there are fepara- rions of various forts to be made. And everyone of :hefe feparating propenfions, may by over-indul- gence run into extravagance ; and often does. By purfuing this reflexion, we may fee how far va- riety of tempers and genius's among mankind de- But fo far as1 pends upon, and may take its rife from the affociat- temper de- ing power natural to the mind, in confequence of Pends on af~ different circumftances calling it forth, or employ- depeiufcon ing it in different ways, or contrariwife, checking ourfelves. it, difappointing and thwarting it, and thus oblig- ing, the mind to make frequent diffociations ; and fo ufing it to the feparating practice, till it comes to take delight in it, infomuch that it is ever difpofed to act that part, and rather chufes to diftinguifh than to join, on every occafion. But not to flay longer on this obfervation, let me only add, that on the 96 The PRINCIPLES Chap. III. the one hand, from what has been laid of wit, it k*» — v — -> is plain, that it could not take place, were it not lor the aiTociating power of the mind. And how, indeed, do poetry or oratory entertain or agitate, or wherein does their chief excellence confift, whe- Metaphor ther with refpecl to foothing and extending the ima- ^c l gination, or beltirring and moving the paifions, but tlnii. m aflbciating the ideas, which being aiTembled to- gether make agreeable, pleafant, charming, well iuited company •, in aiTociating ideas which enlighten and fet oft one another, and by being fitly and clofely joined, create great warmth in the mind, or put it into agreeable motion. Simile is likenefs of ideas, pointed out, as it were, by the ringer : and metaphor is a refemblance of ideas, that preients itfelf to the mind without any forewarning, and is doubly agreeable, like good com pan y, by furpriz- Pmlofophy ing. On the other hand, from what hath been laid of is feparating judgment, it is evident that its work fuppofes likewife W01 '' the law of affociation, becaufe it confiits in feparating ; and the philofophical turn being towards fcanning, Both may fifting and diftinguifhing, when carried to excels, run into ex- mu{\ become an enemy to all joining and uniting, *a\ agaiu.es. ^ ordinarily happens. Practical phi- But whatever be as to thefe things, it is certain lofophy or from tjie nature 0f the law now under confideration, ihe conduct tiens, confifts L That true practical philofophy confifts (y) in in the alii- what it was placed by the ancients : in the arTiduous duouscxami- examination of our fancies, ideas or opinions. For nation of our k ideas, fancies and opinions. (v\ See EpJtfeti enchiridion, and Arrian and Simplicius upon him, ■■■'-Minus's meditations, or felf-conwfation. This is the fclf-examination recommended to us even by the poets, as absolutely neceflary to felf-command, and true wisdom, or good c nducl. So Horace, lib. i. Satyr. 4. And, again, Epift. 2. Lib. 2. Quo circa mcum loquor, &C. See Cicero^ Tufcul. qucfi, I. ; I k igitur canfa omnis in opinione, nee vero segritudinis ioliiiii, fcd etiam reliquarum perturbatkmum, &ic. by cf Moral Philosophy. 97 by thefe our defires are guided or influenced : all our Ch a p. III. ' defires, whether thofe which are properly called ap- <— -v— -^ petites, having a previous, painful or uneafy fenfa- tion, antecedently to any opinion of good in the object ; or thofe which necefTarily prefiippofe an opi- nion of good and evil in their objects : all our de- fires, whether after external pleafures* pleafures of the imagination, or pleafures of the public and fo- cial fenfe. For this muft hold in general concern- ing all our defires and averfions, that according to the opinion or apprehenfion of good or evil, the defire or averfion is increafed or diminifhed. Nov/ if this be true, our great interefl and concern lies in taking care of our opinions, that they be true and juft. This ought to be the whole bufinefs of our ; life ; our continual, our daily employment : other- !. wife we cannot be matters of our defires, or keep them in juft and proportionate order. And how Education happy would it be for men, if education was right- ought to efla- ly managed, fo as to give us early juft notions of j>!il]l that h*- things, as far as life is concerned ; or but even to aJn°atf * eftablifh early in our minds the habit of calling our ideas and opinions daily to a ftrict account! But all this, it is obvious, fuppofes a reafonablenefs and un- reafonablenefs in affociations ; or a rule and ftandard for affociating and difTociating. And if it is afked wnat this rule or ftandard may be ? the anfwer is, It is the faculty by which we are able to judge both of our happinefs, and of what is becoming us, of which we are afterwards to treat, and where it mail be fhewn, " That thefe two, happinefs or intereft, and becoming or virtue, are the fame, or at leait infeparably connected." We are to alfociate and diffociate, join and feparate according to that rule ; or as our happinefs and dignity require. AfTociationfc II. But, fecondly^ let it be obferved, an aflbciation cannot be is made by joining ideas with one another; frequent- broken bY ly, and by accuftoming ourfdves to contemplate tation of ^ H them opinions* 93 The PRINCIPLES Chap. III. them fo joined and united. Bat the confuta- tion of falfe opinions is not fufficient to break an alloc iation, fo that the defire or paffion fhall not continue after our underitanding has fuggefted to us that the object is not good, or not proportioned to the ftrength of the defire. Thus we may ob- ferve, that peribns who by reafoning have laid afide all opinion of fpirits being in the dark more than in the light, are dill uneafy to be alone in the dark. And it is fo in general, with refpect to all afTocia- tions: we mull firft, indeed, correct the falfe opi- nion, from which the unreafonable defire or averfion proceeds: but this is not enough: the afTociation cannot be broken in any cafe, but, as in that in fiance juft mentioned; by accuftoming ourfelves to walk in the dark, with the abfurdity of the opinion upon which our averfion or fear was formerly found- ed prefent to our mind. Ideas which have been long aflbciated, can only be disjoined by frequently acting in oppoiition to the unreafonable afTociation. Why it is fo. Now if it mould be enquired why, whereas affocia- tions are fo eafily formed merely by ideas being frequently preferred conjunctly to the mind; diflb- ciations however are not brought about without great ftruggle and difficulty. The reply to this is at hand : were not this the cafe, the law of afTociation would not gain its end : for it is the difficulty of breaking the afTociation, which is the very end of the law, or produces all its good effects. £ut by con- trary prac- tice. Of active ha- bits properly fo called. II. I now proceed to confider fome effects, which though habits and afTociation of ideas are really one and the fame thing, and really refolve into one principle; ya are in common language called a habits. For by that name are all affociations of ideas called, which terminate inwhat is termed action either of the mind or of the body. Now provided, on this head, we make mention of the moll re- markable phenomena belonging to it, it is but of p/ Moral Philosophy. 99 little confequence in what order effects fo nearly re- Chap. III. iated to one another are propofed. ^~ — v~ — * I. It is in confequence of a propenfion to do, Hence me- md a facility and readinefs in doing, acquired by P°JT> habl~ I repeated exercife called the Law of habits, that we j^ge!"0* lave memory and habitual knowledge, learn lan- guages with tolerable eafe, attain to grace of body, is in dancing ; to a good ear in mufic, a good eye in painting or architecture, and a good tafte of any Tafleofeve- ngenious compofition, as in oratory or poetry, ry kind, For what elfe is memory, but the power of recalling with facility and quicknefs ideas and truths we i bad formerly difcovered or perceived ? and how is jit ftrengthened or improved but by exercife? with- out memory there can be no invention, judgment, nor wit, becaufe without memory ideas cannot be readily and quickly laid together, in order to be compared, that their agreements and refemblances, 3r difagreements and differences, may be difcerned. And what is tafte, but the power of judging truly with quicknefs acquired by frequent consideration and practice : that is, confirmed into habit by re- : peated acts ? In fine, it is in confequence of this And perfec- law, or formation of our mind, that the reiterated «on of what* I exercifes of any of our faculties are not loft labour, ever ^caltY^ but produce perfection. Attention, judging, reafon- ing, writing, fpeaking, compofing, in one word, all our powers and actions in their perfection are fo many refpective habits : and therefore, to afk I why the mind is fo framed, is to afk, why perfec- ; tion of any kind is attainable by us, or within our power. Inftruction and education prefuppofe this Inftru&ion frame of mind in the rules laid down with regard and education to them: and the effect of education, or early ac- Jhe ower of cuftomance is well expreffed by the common pro- habit, verb, which calls it, Afecond nature. To exemplify this obfervation, and at the fame time to fhew what true logic ought to be, and really was among the H 2 ancients, An obfer ra- tion on me- mory to il- lullrate this. ioo The PRINCIPLES Chap. III. ancients, I fhall juft mention two obfervations of Cicero (z\ with regard to the improvement of me- mory by due exercife. i . The way, fays he, to be able to retain ideas and judgments, fo as to have the ufe of them always at our command, is to ac- cuftom ourfelves to attend to things with great clofe- nefs and ftedfaftnefs ; and to afk ourfelves before we quit the confideration of any object, whether it is not worth while to flore it up in the mind. And if it be, we ought (fays he) as it were, formally to charge our memory with the cuftody of it, for cer- tain particular reafons and ufes, to be at the fame time laid up in the mind with it. Did we take this method, we fhould have but little reafon to com- plain of the flipperinefs and treachery of memo- ry. But we, it feems, expecl: it mould be ftrong and perfect, without our taking pains to improve it : that is, we expect a habit to be formed, other- wife than by repeated exercife. 2. What would be of great help to memory, according to the fame author, is, not letting any object of importance pafs, till we have confidered its analogies, relations, and oppofitions, with refpect to feveral other objects or truths already of our acquaintance. For by fo do- ing, there neceflarily would be, in confequence of the law of habits and afTociation of ideas, various fecurities for our being able to recal it, in propor- tion to the variety of analogies, relations, agree- ments, differences and oppofitions to other objects we had obferved in it. Technical rules for afiift- (z) Cicero de in-ue.ntioue rhetorica. De or at ore, Sec. There is a fine paflage to the fame purpofe, in the DiJJ~ertatior.cs incerti cu- jufdam pythagorei dorico fermone conferiptte. i'ublifhed in a collec- tion of Greek tracts, by Air. Gale. Dijhtation $. An virtus & iapientia doceri poflent. Sed optimum fuit, & in vita: commoda pulcherrimum mventUm memoriae artificium, ad omnia utile. Hoc autem in eo confillit, primo fi animum admodum ad- vertas. Secundo i\ mediteris quxcunque audieris. ■ Tertil i\ rerum quas audis, imagines reponere novfrifj &c, ing ! o^ Moral Philosophv. ioi ing and improving memory, are founded upon the Chap. Ill, 1 fame principle, viz. the law of habits. Bat there is ^— • ~v~--^ :his manifeft difference between them, and thofe ■ules of Cicero ; That while, in order to help me- nory, we are imployed in confidering many real malogies and oppositions, we really are at the ame time increafing our flock of ufeful knowledge, nd improving our inventive faculty. For does not . great part of fcience confift in the knowledge of nalogies and oppofitions among objects ? What dlb J knowledge ? And wherein does the perfection of he inventive faculty confifl, but in being able to ITemble ideas together into proper order, with Wcat facility and quicknefs, in order to difcover iitherto unobferved relations of ideas, by feeing r hem in new pofitions ? : II. It is in confequence of the law of habits, that \ye are imi< i nitation paries into cuflom, and that example has tative crea- ich powerful influence upon our temper and beha- fur.es> but it iour. Nature hath wifely made us imitative crea- ls m con*5~, •r t r r l t> ^ jt r • quence of the ires, apes, if I may fo ipeak. But our difpofition jaw of habits, d imitate would be of no ufe to us, did not repeat- that imitation i imitations produce habitual conformity to what ]iatJl its ef- re imitate. Quintilian gives an excellent advice f j , . . V..o r i ■ en And that ex- ith regard to imitation, when fpeaking of ftage- ampie hath ftors he tells us, that among them it frequently influence, appens, " imitatio in mores tranfit" He on this ccafion fagely advifes, for that reafon to be ex- *emely cautious, and to take good heed what we How oiirfelves to imitate or copy after, in writing r ftyle for inflance, but above all in life and man- ers. It is a very remarkable effect of the law of habits, lat what is at firft very uneafy and difagreeable, be- Habit ren- omes by ufe, or affociation of ideas and habit, ex- ders that eeding pleafant and agreeable. Hence it is that agreeable re come to like the train of bufinefs we have formerlTdif- >een for fome time inured to, however difagreeable agreeable, H 3 It 102 The PRINCIPLES Chap. III. it might have been at firft. Upon this is founded ^- — v*— -J the ancient fage advice to young people about the choice of a profefllon in life, " To chufe that which is likelieft to be moft advantageous to them, provided they have abilities for it, even though they mould have preconceived ibme prejudice againft it, or averfion to it, becaufe cuftom will make it agree- able (*)." It is owing in fome meafure to this law of habits, that people of the fame bufinefs in life, or of the fame rank and ftation, do fo readily afTociate to- gether. It is very fit it mould be fo on many ac- counts-, but chiefly becaufe people of the fame pro- feffion will by converfation about their common art, which will naturally be the fubject of their dif- cpurfe, mutually learn from one another, and mu- tually excite emulation one in another. And fo true is the fact, that it is become an univerfal proverb, Birds of a feather flock together. It balhnces We obferved before, that a fondnefs after no- our natural velty is necefTary in our nature {b\ to ipur us to Novelty1 ter ^ee^ a^ter new ODJefts> anc* new knowledge •, but that this defire of novelty is ballanced in our frame by the liking contracted to an object by ha- bitual commerce with it, left our itch after novelty mould render us too unfteady, too defultory, and confequently too fuperhcial and heedlefs in our at- tention to an object, to be able to attain to the full knowledge of it. Now it is in confequence of the law of habits, that this liking to an object is formed. By long or frequent converfation with an object, we become more pleated with it: the more narrowly and attentively we have confidered it, the more we delight in it •, for we find by frequently reafoning about the fame object, that it is not new objects on- ly that can afford us frefh entertainment •, but that (a) Plutarch dc fanitate tuenda. \b) In the firft chapter, upon our furniture for progrefs in knowledge . every of Moral Philosophy. 103 :very object is an endlels fund of new diicoveries : Chap.IIL md we at the fame time experience, that the more v-^-y-W ve employ ourfe'ves about the lame object, the nore eafy it becomes to us to make progrels in lew diicoveries about it •, and thus a fondnefs for he fame object, or the fame train of ftudy, is con- tacted, ib that we are not eafily prevailed upon, Flow it does fven by quite new ones, to defert it : or if we are, f°- fet we return to it again with luch a relilh, as one renews converfation with an old acquaintance he lad not feen for fome time. III. But one of the moft remarkable advantages ^Y the Iaw of the law of habits is, (I (hall give it in the words °/ hablt parf" r 7; 7 / n 6 • i i nve im pref- er an excellent author (V), a power with regard to nons grow pleafure and pain in refpect of practical habits. As weaker, in ■practical habits are formed and ftrengthned by re- proportions J peated acp6 ; fo paffive imprefllons are found to grow habitlfare weaker by being repeated on us. Whence it mud ftrengthned. follow, that active habits may be gradually forming and ftrengthning by a courfe of acting upon fuch and fuch motives •, while excitements themfelves are proportionably by degress becoming lefs fenlible, that is, are continually lefs and lefs felt, as the ac- tive habits ftrengthen. Experience confirms this. For active principles at the very time they are lefs lively in perception than they were, are found to be fomehow wrought into character and temper, and become more powerful in influencing our prac- tice. Thus perception of danger is a natural ex- Inftances, citement of paMIve fear, and active caution : and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are gradually wrought, at the fame time that the for- mer gradually leiTens. Perception of diftrels is a natural excitement, paffively to pity, and actively to relieve it. But let a man kt himfelf to attend to, enquire out and relieve diftrened perfons, and he ( d) Dr. Butler (the Biihop of Brijtol) upon analogy. H 4 cannot Me PRINCIPLES cannot but be lcfs and lefs affected with the various miferies of human life, with which he mult become acquainted : but yet, at the fame time, benevolence confidered, not as a paffion, but as a practical prin- ciple of action will flrengthen -, and whilft he paffio- nately compafTionates the diftreffed lefs, he will ac- quire a greater aptitude actively to affift and be- friend them. It is the lame with all other affections which may be worked by exercife into active prin- ciples, and being fetded and eftablifhed as fuch in the mind, conftitute a habitual character or tem- per that exerts itfelf calmly and regularly. Tisinconfe- IV. It is indeed, in confequence of the lav/ ofha- qaence of the j^jjj tjiat temper or character is formed, for tho* that temperas a^ tlUie affe<^^ons °f mankind be, and muft be origi- furmed. nally from nature-, and art, or exercife, cannot cre- ate, but can only make fome change to the better or worfe upon what nature hath implanted in our breads j yet habit is the nurfe of all affections : it is by repeated acts that any one is wrought into tem- per or becomes habitual. Whatever temper we would form, we muft do it not merely by enforcing upon our minds, a ftrong conviction of its ufefulnefs and rca- fonablenefs ; but chiefly by exerting ourfelves to call forth into action the affections which conftitute it ; by exercifing them frequently, or by various acts ; and that without intermiffion till the point is gained ; that is, till theie affections are become ftrong, ready to go out into action on any proper occafion ; and we have contracted a propenfion to exert them. , - This is the way temper or character is formed. And quence of that by this means, it is in our power to change any law, wc arc temper we may have contracted, and to form our- able *? j°Tm felves to any defireable one. And this leads me to in our minds °bferve, that the chief benefit of the law of habits, the delibcra- is our being able in confequence of it to acquire tivc habit. the deliberative temper or habit: that is, the habitual power of enquiring and judging before we choofe or act j of Moral Philosophy. 105 lift; the oppofite to which is the habit of acting Chap. III. precipitately, and in blind, flavifh obedience to eve- u^~v^— ^ j fancy or appetite that affails us. Whatever me- raphyfical janglings there have been about the free- dom of our will -, our moral dominion, liberty, and Ttafterfhip of ourfelves certainly confift in the efta- aSffied habit of thinking well before we ad; info- nuch as to be fure of ourfelves, that no fancy or ap- petite mail be able to hurry us away into action, till eafon and moral confeience have pronounced an im- partial fentence about them. It is this command )ver ourfelves, this empire over our pafiions, which Which is felf- Enables us to puttruft or confidence in ourfelves, and ^^f^ ; -enders us fure and truft-worthy in fociety to others. berty. In it do true wifdom and freedom lie. And as it xight to be the chief bufinefs of education to form ; ?arly this deliberative habit and temper in young minds ; and the conftant employment of every man Howitisefta- :o preferve and maintain it in due llrength ; fo the blifhed or 1 >nly way to attain to it, or uphold it, is, i . By in- l01'111^ andj :ulcating upon ourfelves the excellence and ufefulnefs to )f it, and the manifold difadvantages that redound rom the want or weaknefs of it. And, 2. by prac- :icing ourfelves in choofing and acting after the ieliberative judicious manner; in habituating our- elves to call all forts of ideas, fancies, and motives .0 a ftrict account ; or in accuftoming whatever opi- nion or defire claims our purfuit, to give in its rea- sons at the bar of reafon, and to wait patiently its ex- imination and fentence. Thus alone is the right mo- jral temper formed. And thefe two exercifes will be the conftant employment of every one, who aims at the improvement and perfection of his mind ; or at acting like a rational creature, and with true inward liberty and felf-dominion, which, like every other habit, can only be acquired by practice and cuftom. 'Tis no matter as to the prefent cafe, how the will is determined, by motives or by defires, by the lad: act of the judgment, or by the mind itfelf, that is, by io6 fhe PRINCIPLES Ch a p.III. by its own felf-motive power. For whatever be the meaning of fuch phrafes, 'tis as certain, that command over ourfelves is liberty, as that being fo enthralled by any appetite, as not to be able ib much as to examine its pretentions before we yield to it •, or being fo habituated to defultorinefs and thought- Jefsnefs, and blind rafh choice, as not to have it in our power to think or judge before we aft, is vile Jlaroery and impotence. It is therefore Thus thercfore it is rea]]y in Confequence of the this law or . 7 i i r im cur nature law or habits, that we are capable of liberty, or are that renders free agents (e). 14s capable of n0W5 j fa^ from what has been faidof the afTo* befn/frec0 ciation °f ideas and of habits, we may juftly con- moral agents, elude, " That the laws relating to them are of great life in our nature , either neceiTary, or fitly chofen. And confequently, that no effects which take their rife from them, are evils abfolutely confidered, or Condufion with regard to the whole frame and conflitution of from the the human mind." wjox\ -gat t^ere js a trutj1^ which necefTarily refults from what hath been laid down, that may juftly be added to this article, by way of corolary y and it is this, " That even in an abfolutely perfect conflitution of things, where the law of habit and aflociation takes place, A ufeful coro- if knowledge be progreflive, and gradually acquireable y' in proportion to application to improve in it, and confequently minds muft be in an infant ftate at their entrance upon the world ; fome aflbciations and ha- bits muft be early formed by minds in fuch a ftate ( c ) So the ancients define liberty. Soli enim hi vivunt ut vo- Junt, cui quid velle debeant didicerunt. Ineruditae autem & rationis expertes animi imitationes atque actiones exilem quan- dam ignobilemque voluntatis libertatem multa cum pcenitentia conjunctam habent, &c. Plutarch de auditione libellus. So (croi paradox. 5. Quid eil enim libertas ? poteftas vivendi ut vc- I is. Quis igitur vivit, ut vult ? nifi qui rccla fequitur, qui offi- cio gaudet, cui vivendi via confiderata atque provifaeft, dec. See a fine defcription of this moral freedom by Pet-fas, Satyr. 5. Li- berate opus eit, (fvc. of of Moral Philosophy. 107 if things, which ought to be broken, and yet Chap. III. vhich cannot be broken or difiblved by reafon with- out difficulty and ilruggling. For it is impoflible, >ut fome ideas, by being frequently prefentedto the nind conjointly mud affociate, which ought not to 3e afTociated ^ or the afTociation of which is contra- y to happinefs and reafon." But this obfervation, b plainly follows from what has been proved, that t is needlefs to dwell longer upon it. I fhall there- fore but jult add, that if any one will puriue it in his own mind through all its confequences, he fhall find i folution arifing from it to many objections made againft the prefent ftate of mankind •, to thofe efpe- cially which are taken from the prevalence of vice in the world : for wrong opinions muft produce wrong choice and action : and yet of mofl wrong choices, it may be faid, Dscipimur fpecie retli. c H A P. IV LE T us therefore proceed to examine the laws Another clafs relative to our reafon, moral fenfe, and the of laws rela- rule and ftandard of our moral conduct with tlve *° our . which we are provided and furnifhed by nature. apk and^our' We have already confidered our conftitution moral con- with regard to knowledge. Bat in an enquiry into dud. human nature, it is certainly proper to take yet a further view of our frame with refpect to our moral conduct and guidance ; or of the powers we are en- dued with, to direct us in the management of our °ur exceI; affections, and in all our actions ; and of the rules or -^ou/haVhis laws nature hath fet before us for our meafure and reafon and a guide. Reafon, as it relates to our moral conduct, moral fenfe may be defined to be, " (/) Our power of making t0 SLliie oar {/) So Cicero defines it, in the beginning of the firft book of his Offices. Homo autem quod eft ration is particeps, per quam confe- jo3 The PRINCIPLES Chap. IV. ajuft eftimate of human life, and its principal end, V — v*-—-* by connecting things pail and to come with what is reafo-i ST"** Pre^ent ' anc^ dm °f computing our true intered, and difcovering what is bed and fitted to do in any cafe ; or ccntrariwife, what is oppolite to our intereft, and unbecoming our natural rank and dignity.*' Now, that we have fuch a faculty is readily owned j nor does any one hefitate to affert, that our chief ex- cellence above lower animals void of reflexion con - fills in our having it. 'Tis for this reafon we affume to ourfelves the name and character of moral agents. We may obferve a nice, fubtle and uninterrupted gradation in nature from the lowed degree of meer perceptivity to this perfection man is diftinguifhed by, thro' many intermediate fteps gradually attend- ing one above another, without any chafm or void. Thus, nature is full and coherent. How we rife Far as creation" "s ample range extends* in the fcale of The fcale of fenfual, mental pow'rs afcends : k^S °y our Mark how it mounts to man's imperial race* all our force From the green myriads in the peopled grafs ! or at leait our What modes of fight* between each wide extreme^ chief one. The mole's dim curtain, and the lynx's beam : Of fmell the headlong lionefs between* And hound* fagacious on the tainted green •* Of hearing* from the life that fills the flood* To that which warbles through the vernal wood : The fpider's touch, how exquifitely fine, Feels at each thread, and lives along the line : In the nice bee, what fenfe fo fubtly true* From ptiS nous herbs extracls the healing dew. confequcntia cernit, caufas rerum videt, earumque progreflu.s & > ifi antcceflioncs non ignorat, fimilitudines comparat, & rebus prcfentibus adjungit, atque anneclit futuras : lacile totius vitas carfum videt, ad eamque degendam prxparat res necefTaria?, Sec. So . I.i. Etenim ratio qua una praeftamus belluis, per quam conje&ura valemus, argumentamur, refclliraus, differi- Twa [quid, concludimu,— — (juid eitAiivinius, quae . eft, nominatur rite fapicntia, &c. How ^Moral Philosophy. Flow inftinct varies ! in the groveling fwine, Compared half reasoning elephant with thine. 'Twixt that, and reafon, what a nice barrier, For ever fep9rate, yet for ever near : Remembrance, and reflexion, how ally'd ; What thin partitions fenfe from thought divide : And middle natures, how they long to join, Tet never pafs th9 infuperable line ! I Without this juft gradation, could they be Subjected thefe to thofe, or all to thee ? tfhe powers of all fubdued by thee alone, Is not thy reafon all thofe pow9rs in one ? EiTay on man, Epift. r. Bat if reafon be acknowledged to be a perfection it is our guid- or power fuperior in the fcale of life to meer fenfi- ing principle, tive being, the confequence muft be, " That reafon *nd oughf; to ought to be upon the throne within us, fet up and r^Q maintained by us, as the judge and ruler, from which all appetites, fancies, affections and purfuits ought to receive their commands, and to which they ought to be fubject and accountable (g) ". This feems to need no proof. One may as reafonably ask, why we ought to open our eyes, make ule of them, and take care to prefer ve them from all dif- eafes and imperfections •, as why, having reafon, we ought to exert it, give it its proper place, and preferve it pure and untainted, and in full poiTeftion of its natural right, to guide, direct, and command <: all our inferior appetites and all our affociations. It is as evident, that our appetites and affections are made to be guided by reafon, as that reafon is a (g ) Eadem ratio habet in fe quiddam ampium atque magni- ficum ad imperandum magis quam ad parendum accommodatum. Cicero de finibus, Lib. 2. No. 14. Duplex enim eft vis animo- rum atque naturae : una pars in appetitu pofita eft, quae eft off.H grace, quae hominem hue & illuc rapit : altera in raticne, quae docet & explanat quid faciendum fugiendumque fit. Ita fit at ratio praefit ; appetitus vero obtemferet;&c- Cicgro de officiis, Lib. 1. No. 28 and 29, judging no T/je PRINCIPLES Chap. IV» judging power, and as fuch, our diftingnifhing; our ^— — v— -^ fupreme excellence. If reafon be our natural dignity, or that which conftitutes us a fuperior rank of beings above thofe which have no fuch governing principle \ it muft be true, that we only maintain our natural dig- nity in proportion as reafon prefides and rules within us •, and that we fall below the rank of men, in propor- tion as reafon is weak, impotent, over-powered, and unable to act as a ruling or commanding faculty, in truth, to afk, why man is obliged to act accord- ing to his reafon, or to be ruled by it, is to afk, why reafon is reafon. It cannot be denied, without afTerting, that it is not a higher rank of life to be endowed with it, than to want it ; upon which fup- pofition, man is not one ftep removed in dignity or perfection above meer animals and a gradation or icale of being, are words without any meaning. There are two But there are two things which deferve our particu- thinS* to be lar attention with regard to our natural capacity and with refped to farniuire for directing our conduct, or for the regu- our guiding lation of our appetites, defires, affections and actions, principle and " We have a moral fenfe, or a fenfe of right and our rule of wrong. And we have a fenfe of interefl and happi- Our fenfe of ne-s-" Now if it mail appear, that thefe two fenfes right and do not contradict one another •, but that they agree in wrong- pointing; out to us the lame courfe of management £ ? ou- r and action-, then muft it be granted, that our nature is very well conftituted with refpect to our moral con- duct. Were thefe, indeed, at variance, our frame would be very unaccountable, or rather monftrous ; but if virtue and intereft be really the fame, then is every part of our moral frame confonant to every o- ther part of it •, and fo it is a good or well compofed . r , whole. I have ufed the word virtue, to exprefs what ' ine;e co .- ,- ,- . , , j jffree our ienfe of right and wrong recommends to our fhall be (hewn choice, becaufe it is univerfally fo ufed and under* «u"ds. flood : to ufe that term, in that fenfe, is not to beg the queftion •, or to fuppofe a difference between virtue and vice before we have proved it : it is no more c/ Moral Philosophy. hi more than forewarning, that we are to ufe virtue and Chap. IV; vice, with thefe other words right and wrong in the v-*--y~*— ' fame fenfe, becaufe we think thefe words are very generally employed as equivalent terms. That we have a fenfe of virtue and vice, or of right and wrong, is now to be proved. This is a queftion about fact, and confequently it Qur ^n^e of can only be refolved in the fame way, that other fa- right and culties or powers may be proved to belong to our na- wrong, or our ture. Bat I am apt to think, that every one lhall moral fenre* immediately perceive, that he has a moral fenfe in- herent in him, and really infeparable from him ; if he will reflect, " Whether he is not fo conftituted as to be neceffarily determined by his nature, to ap- prove and difapprove certain affections and actions?" For if that be owned, then are there certain afFecti- ^^j^1 f~ ons and actions which he is necefTarily determined by from approba- his nature to pronounce right, and certain affecti- tion. ons and actions which he is necefTarily determined by his nature to pronounce wrong. The queftion now under confideration can be no other than whether we have a determination in our nature to approve and difapprove affections and actions ; and what we are thus determined to approve and difapprove. For if there are certain affections and actions which we are conilantly fo determined to approve or difapprove that we cannot chufe but approve the one kind and dif- approve the other •, then, whatever thefe may be, they are with refpect to us neceflary objects or motives, the one kind, to approbation, and the other, to condemnation or difapprobation. Hardly will any one fay, that we have no determination to approve or difapprove. " Approbation (||) is a fimple idea " known by confcioufnefs, which can only be ex- 4t plained by fynonimous words, or by concomitant cn- probation and difapprobation, then muft we have an approving and difapproving faculty -, a determina- tion to approve and difapprove : and there muft likewife be objects to excite our approbation, and ob- jects to move our difapprobation. So that the remaining queftion is, what thefe objects are ? Actions muft I- Now it is plain, that we never approve or difap- bj done with prove, neither with reipect to ourfelves or others, but freedom, af- when we are fenfible an action is done voluntarily, by flexion toex- choice,with reflexion, and without external compulfion cite approba- or neceflity. Thus we neither approve nor difapprove tion or con- what is done by a brute, an ideot* or changeling ; demnation. nor even wjiat a rat;ona| creature does, not of itfelf, but when externally forced and compelled. Ap- probation and diiapprobation always iuppofe their object to be matter of voluntary and free choice and affection. We neither approve nor difapprove our- felves, but when we are confcious that what we do is our own voluntary deed. And with regard to o- ther beings, in like manner, we can neither approve nor difapprove, but when we imagine an action is per- formed by them with like choice, affection and free- Our fenfe of honour and fhame fuppofes this faculty : fuch affections can only fpring from it : they arc abfolutely nn accountable on any other hypothefes, becaufe they cannot be re- • Qd into any other principle. dom ; of Moral Philosophy. 113 \ dom, as when we approve or difapprove ourfeives Chap. IV* , for doing or omitting. It is not merely becaufe ac- \~*~y~*~iditatem ingenuit homini veri inveniendi.-— His initiisdu&i ; om- tia vera diligimus, id eft, fideiia, fimplicia* conftantia : turn 'ana, falfa, fallentia odimus, ut fraudexri perjuriaro, malitiam, njuriam, &€, I or The PRINCIPLES , or move us ? Are they pleafant to us on reflexion and contemplation, or difagreeable, or do they no way touch or move us •, but are we quite neutral and indifferent to them : or when we are agreeably affect- ed by the one fort, and difagreeably affected by the other fort, as we certainly are, whether we will or not, when they are prefent to our mind, and reflected upon. Is it the fame fort of pleafure or pain we perceive when we reflect upon a beautiful and ufeful plant or an ugly and pernicious one ? One or other of thefe muff be faid. But furely it will not be affirm- ed, that we are quite unmoved by fuch contemplation, and that no affections, whether of the generous or ungenerous kind, do either excite our like or dif- like, our approbation or difapprobation ; for this wrould be to affert, that no one character is more a- greeable to us than another •, but that the mind is equally indifferent to all forts of characters and tem- pers. Far lefs will it be faid, that the falfe, deceit- ful, mercenary man is agreeable to us *, and that the faithful, trufty, and benevolent man moves our ha- tred. And to fay, that tho' we are differently af- fected by thefe oppofite characters, yet it is no other- wife than as we are differently affected with fruit, for inilance, according as it is pleafant or difagreeable to our tafte, is abfurd. For however much we may like or diflike a particular fenfation of tafte fruit may affect us with ; yet furely we do not like and diflike, approve and difapprove fruits, in the fame way we like and diflike, approve and difapj prove characters. Do we like or approve our ge- nerous friend in no other way than we like or diflike our dinner? But if we are affected by fuch actions and charac- ters, as have been defcribed, agreeably or di fag ably, in a difercnt way from the agreeable or dif- agreeable manner in which meats and drinks aflat us •, then it mud follow, that we are fitted and de- termined by our nature to receive from the conf> deration of fuch actions and characters a particular kind ^MoraL Philosophy. 115 kind of agreeable or difagreeable fentiment, properly ClIAP.IV. exprefTed by approbation and difapprobation. For v,^\— W this muft be true, in general, that no one thing can give us pleafure or pain unlefs we are fitted by our make to be fo affected by it. We could not, for inftance, have the pleafures which the modifications of light and colours give to the eye, if we were not fo framed as to perceive them and be agreeably af- fected by them. Now if we are determined by our nature to approve or difapprove characters, in the way that has been mentioned, we may give and ought to give* this aptitude, this determination in our nature a particular diflinguifhing name to denote it. Let it therefore be called a fenfe of the difference between actions or characters, or more fhortly, a moral fenfe. Let us reafon about this matter as much as we will, Whether we ill we can do is but to turn this queflion into various !?a!.e a mora! fhapes, viz. " Whether we are not neceffarily deter- a queflion of mined to approve the public affections in ourfelves facl. Dr others, which lead to fuch conduct as promotes the good of our fellow creatures, and to difapprove their oppofites ; and that immediately^ fo foon as any one of them is prefented to our mind." For the queflion is about a fact, a part of our constitution ; about fomething felt and experienced within us, in confequence of our frame •, and it cannot poffibly be decided, but by confcioufnefs* or by attending to bur mind, in order to know how we are affected on certain occafions by certain objects. But if any mat- Arguments to ter of experience merits our attention, this does, prove we have and therefore I lhall offer the following confidera- lC* tions about it. I. Did not affections, actions and characters, when they are contemplated by the underflanding, and are thus made objects of thought and reflection, move us agreeably or difagreeably, there would be an analogy in nature wanting^ which we have no reafon from From anal©- nature to think can be wanting* For theft! is no- gy. I 2 thine n6 The PRINCIPLES Chap. IV. thing more certain, than that all fenfible forms, fo *■— "V J ibon as they are prefented to the mind, do affect it with the agreeable perception of beauty, or the dif- agreeable perception of deformity. Some objects of fenfe do indeed fo little affect us, that the perception For we have produced by their contemplation is fcarcely attended be uty in fen t0 ' but every perception, as fuch, muft be in fome fibie forms, degree either pleafant or painful •, tho' it is only when perceptions have a confiderable degree of plea- fure or pain, that they confiderably intereft us, and we are therefore at any pains to clafs them, and give particular names to their effects upon us. However, letting afide that confideration, it is evident, in fact, with regard almoft to all bodies or fubjects of fenfe, that they give us either the idea of beauty or deformity according to the different difpofition, mea- fure or arangement of their feveral parts. It is the fame withrefpect to founds; from every combination of them, there neceflarily refults either harmony or difcord. Now, did not moral fubjects affect us in like manner with the fenie of beauty and deformity, as fenfible fpecies or images of bodies do (7), there would (/) See Cicovs offices, lib, i. Nee vero ilia parva naturae vis rationifque quod unum hoc animal fentit, quid lit ordo, quid fit quod deceat, in faclis diclifque qui modu... Itaque eorum ipl'o- rum quae adfpeclu fentiuntur, nullum aliud animal pulchritudi- nem, venuftatem, convenientiam partium fentit ; ouam fimilitudi- ncm natura, ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo ctiam niagis ; ulchritudi nftantiam, ordinem in coniiliis faftiL;u :. So dc Jinibus^ lib 14. and de jbubus, lib. 5. No. 17. Quid, in motu, & (tall corporis nihil ne eit quod vrtendum elfe natura judicat? Queraadmodum qi -at, qui dudus oris, qui vulrus inquoquefit: ni. , quod dignum libcro aut in- digi puicmus ? Non odio dk;nos multos ducimus, qui qu 1 aut ftatu videntur naturae legem & modum con- quoniam haec deducuntur de corpore, quid eft, cur n ii reel i puK liritudo el 1 nda duca- imminatiOnemque corporis, propter fe fug is, cur ii magis, propter form* dignitatem fcquatour— ^— Quoniam enim natma omnibul ^TMoral Philosophy. 117 would not be that analogy between the natural and Ch a p. IV. moral world, or between the fabric of our mind with relation to fenfible and to moral objects, that one is naturally led to apprehend mull take place by the univerfal analogy of nature to kklf obferved throughout all its works. No object can indeed be prefent to the underftanding or perceived by it, without affecting it in fome manner as an object of the underftanding, or as an intelligible fpecies. And therefore every moral object mud be fitted to affect the mind with fome affection fuited to ic as a moral fpecies, or an intelligible form. But not to lay any ftrefs at all upon that abftract truth. How can we acknowledge a fenfe of beauty and deformity with refpect to corporeal fubjects, and no analogous fenfe with refpect to mental ones ? Can we allow the mind to have an eye or an ear for bodily proportions and harmonies -, and yet imagine it has no eye or ear by which it can diffinguifh moral appearances and effects? No fenfe, whereby it can fcan thoughts, and fenti- ments, and affections, or diftinguiih the beautiful and deformed, the harmonious and diffonant, the a- greeable and diiagreeable in them. Does the bodily eye afford us perceptions of pleafure and pain diftinct from the fenfations of touch ? And has the underftanding or eye of the mind, when it is employed about moral forms, no fuch difcernment? Has it no clafs of plea- sures and pains belonging to it, as a feeing or dif- cerning faculty ? Are all the pleasures or pains excited in or perceived by the mind, with relation to af- fections and fentiments, only pleafures and pains of mental touch or feeling, fo to fpeak .? Is there no- thing of the agreeable and difagreeable kind refill t- omnibus partibus expleri vult hunc (latum expetit, &c. See de legi- bus, lib. £. numb. 19. An corporis pravitates, fi erint perinfig- nes, habebunt aliquid offcnfionis, animi deformitas non habebit ? Cuius turpitudo ex ipiis vitiis facillime percipi poteft. Quid enim fcedius avaritia, quid immanius libidine, quid contemptius timi-. but be found abfo- lutely neutral, towards whatever is prefented to them of that fort. " A foul (/) indeed may as well be without fenfe as without admiration in the things of which, it has any knowledge : coming (/) See Sbaftsburfs ejfaj on virtue •, whofe words thefe are. therefore. 122 The PRINCIPLES Chap. IV. therefore to a capacity of feeing and admiring in v-— -Y— — ' the moral way, it muft needs rind a beauty and a deformity as well in actions, minds, and tempers, as in figures, founds, or colours." Let the philo- fophers, who are for refolving all our publick af- fections, and all our liking and difliking of actions and characters into certain fubtle, nimble reflexions of felf-love upon private intereft, try whether they can thus account for the love, admiration, efteem and concern excited by a fictitious reprefentation : but if they find the attempt vain here, muft it not likewife be fo in the original life, from which fictitious reprefentation mult be copied, in order to be natural ? Sure there is not one nature, for life, and another for fiction. Without fup- IV. But who can confider human nature, and deny pofing or that we have public affections towards the good of °^lfj: pothers ; or affert that all our paflions fpring from coune tcTvery feJf-l°ve and defire of private advantage-, and that we fubtle reflexi- have no moral fenfe. For take away a moral fen fe and ons (of which public defires, how very fmall a fliare of our prefent not confcious excitements t0 action would remain with us ? It is and for which owned, that the affections called public, make in- it hath not deed the greater part of our employments •, or, time) to ac- that without them we would be almoft reduced veraT ^eno- to abr°lute indolence. But when they are faid mena j which not to be really focial or public affections, but is abfurd. modes or arts of felf-love, how are they accounted for? How are our natural affection to parents and offspring •, our compaffion to the diftreffed ; our gratitude, our benevolence •, or whatever, in one word, hath the appearance of focial in our frame, or of affection to public good : how are they re- duced to felf-love, but by fuppofing us, when the objects, which excite thclc affections are reprcfented to us, immediately to make fome very cunning reflexions upon felf-intcreft or private good, which there 0/Moral Philosophy. 123 there is neither time for, nor are we confcious of? Chap. IV. And can we think that to be true philofophy, or w— v-—J a juft account of human nature, which is forced to have recourfe to the fuppofition of many re- fined fubtle reafonings on every occafion, in every honeft farmer or peafant ? That one confideration is fufficient to refute it, and to mew it to be falfe and unnatural. But what puts the reality of pub- lic affections in our nature, the immediate object of which is the good of others, and of a moral fenfe by which we are neceffarily determined to approve fuch affections, beyond all doubt, is, that whatever motives there may be from the fide of pleafure or intereft, by which we may be bribed We can no to do an action ; yet we cannot poffibly be bribed more ** brib* to approve it contrary to our inward fenfe : or ^n ^aST0^ whatever motives of fear there may be to terrify than to affent us from doing an action, yet we cannot be ter- to a propofi- rified into the approbation of the omiffion, if it be tlon* not really approveable. If a moral fenfe be owned, the reality of public affections in our nature will be acknowledged ; for it is only about actions pro- ceeding from public affections, that there is any difpute as to our determination to approve or difapprove : but if we have no moral fenfe, agree- ably to which we muft approve, and contrary to which we cannot approve or difapprove; whence comes it about, that though we may be allured, or frighted into doing an action, yet we can nei- ther be allured nor frighted into approving or difapproving an action, no more than we can be bribed or terrified into affenting to a propolition which we perceive to be falfe ; or into refilling our alfent to a propofition which we perceive to be true. If that be the cafe, then approbation or difapprobation depends (m) as abfolutely upon the appearances (m) Nam ut vera & falfa, ut confequentia & contraria, fua fpocte, non aliena judicantur : lie conilans & perpetua vita? ra- tios i24 The PRINCIPLES Chap. IV. appearances of actions to our minds, as affent and diffent do upon the appearances of propofitions to our minds. But that it is fo, every one will feel by asking himfelf, whether an eftate can bribe him to approve any degree of villany, though it may perfwade him to perpetrate it ; or whether he can poflibly think treachery, ingratitude, diffimulation or any fuch actions laudable and approveable in themfelves, whatever evils may be averted by them in certain circumftances ? Confequences cannot alter the moral differences of actions no more than they can alter the nature of truth and falfhood. As a proportion mud be true or falfe in itfelf, indepen- dently of the lofs or gain the profeflion of the belief of It may bring •, fo actions muft be the fame in themfelves with refpect to their moral na- tures and qualities, with whatever circumftances re- lative to intereft, the doing or not doing may be accompanied. But as truths could not beunderftood or affented to, had we not a faculty of diftinguifh- ing the appearances of truth from falfhood •, fo actions could not be difcerned to be morally beau- tiful and fit, unlefs we had a faculty of diftinguifh- ing the moral differences of actions. Farmer refle- But all that relates to a moral fenfe in our nature, xions on mo- hath been fo fully handled by feveral excellent wri- ters (»), that I mail only fubjoin a few further re- flexions upon it, with a view to fuch philofophers as do not deny the thing, but feem to quarrel with the name ; which however will be of considerable ufe tio, c\ux eft virtus, itemque inconftantia, quod eft vitium, fua natura probatur. Sed perturbat nos opinionum varietas, ho- minumque diffentio ; & quia non idem contingit in fenfi- bus, &c. Cicero de legibus. Lib.x. No. 17. & deinceps. ( >/ ) By Crouzaz, in his trait e Ac beau. Hutchefoh in his enquiry into the origine of beauty, and his illujiratiom on a moral fen fc hhaftsbury in his cbaraclerijiics* And Dr. But/iT, JJifhop of Briflol, in his admirable Jennons. to o/Moral Philosophy. 12^ ^fet our moral fenfe itfelf and its ufefulnefs yet in Chap.IV, : clearer light. u^y— — ' I. Firfl of all, it is no great matter for the name, 'Tis not - the thing itfelf in queftion be acknowledged, worth while Vnd it certainly is by all, who acknowledge the dif- b° ut! I n^me erence between good and evil ; however, they may or appellation, hufe to exprefs that difference by calling it truth, if the thin§ ' eafpnablenefs, fitnefs, or by whatever other appel- eowne ■ ition. For if there is truth, fitneis, or reafonable- lefs in actions with regard to us, it is perceivable by is -, and if we perceive it, we are capable of per- :eiving it ; that is, we have the faculty requifite to perceiving it, or which enables us to perceive it. Let iherefbre the capacity or faculty of perceiving mo- f *al differences of actions or characters, be called rea- j on, as it is exercifed about actions and their moral ! lifferences, moral difcernment, or moral confcience ; ve fhall not difpute for any word : All we want to 'flablifh, is, that as we are capable of diflinguifh- ng truth from falfehood, fo we are capable of iittinguifhing good and approveable actions, affec- tions, and characters from bad and difapproveable :>nes : And • that we are not more necefTarily deter- ^nd lC ™UJ* mined by our nature, to aflfent or diffent according _» °T^e0^ y j r 1 • ist wilo ao to the appearances of things to our undemanding, knowledge than we are necefTarily determined by our make moralldiffe- to approve or difapprove affections, actions, and r.ence;i °J^f" characters, according to their appearances to our ra$arSp underflanding. Now as all, who own a neceffary and effential difference of the moral kind between any action and its oppofite, (as between gratitude, for example, and ingratitude) mufl own the necef- fary determination of our minds to approve the one, and difapprove the other, fo foon as thefe moral differences are prefented to the mind ; fo every one mufl be obliged to acknowledge certain neceffary and effential differences of actions in the moral kind, refulting necefTarily from their natures, according 126 The PRINCIPLES Chap. IV. according to which the mind muft approve or di£ *"— -"V— *■> approve, fo Toon as the images of them are rei prefented to it ; or he muft fay that the mind in no cafe approves or difapproves, but that it is quite a ftranger to all fuch fentiments as thefe words ex- prefs. For it is felf-evident that if ever approba- tion and difapprobation be excited, there muft be an exciting quality. It is not more true, that when there is election there is fome quality exciting to it $ than it is neceflarily fo, that wherever there is ap- probation, there is a ground, a reafon, a motive of approbation, fome quality, fome appearance to the mind that excites it. As we cannot have or conceive pleafure of any kind, without affection to it, nor alternately affection, without fome pleafure towards which it tends-, fo we cannot conceive de- light in approving, without fomething which creates that delight or complacency ; nor alternately any thing fitted to excite delight or complacency felt in approbation, and yet the mind not affected by it in that manner. But it is no uncommon thing to find philofophers afferting propofitions which neceffa- rily terminate in affirming, " There may be piea- fures without affections, and affections without or> jects -, though hardly will any one philofopher make that affertion in direct terms." I think an excellent philofopher has reduced mod of the objections againft a moral fenfe to fuch conclufions (o)i However it is \\ But if the determination in our nature to proper, nay approve puDiic affections and virtuous actions, and licuiljryto rr I ' give this fenfe to difapprove their contraries, be acknowledged, m our natures though it is of no importance by what name that adjitinguifh- determination be expreflcd •, yet it is certainly necef- ing name. j. ^ ^^ ^Qmc Qne j]101]jj j^ gjven jr, and fixed to it by philofophers who own the thing. If there is any reafon for concluding from the pleafures of ( 0) Hutchcfan in his Ulujl rat ions on a moral ftnfe. harmony 5/"Moral Philosophy. 127* larmony we receive by the ear; from the plea- Chap. IV. iires of light, and colours, and vifible beauty we v»^*-y~,—j -eceive by the eye \ from the pleafures of truth ind knowledge we receive by the exercife of the inderftanding about fpeculative matters ; or from :he pleafures of affection and paffion we receive by laving our pathetic part agreeably moved and be- lirred : If there be any reafon to conclude from :hefe perceptions that we really have the faculty of ielighting in mufic, diftinct from that of enjoying yifible beauty, and both diftinct from the faculty of :omparing the relations of ideas, and perceiving their agreements or difagreements, and confequent- ly of delighting in truth ; and all thefe diftinct from the capacity of receiving pleafures from our affections duly moved (as by a good tragedy for inftance) : There muft be good reafon to conclude from the manner in which we are differently affected by the moral appearances of actions and characters, when prefented to our mind, either in real life, or by imitation, that we really have a faculty of difc cerning the moral differences of actions and cha- racters, diftinct not only from all our outward fenfes, but alfo from the capacity of perceiving the truth and falfhood of proportions. And for the fame reafon that it is not only a This is no Iefs proper and diftinct way of fpeaking in philofophy, neceffary then but a neceffary one, to fay, we have a fenfe of jj^nt0uf^ harmony, a fenfe of vifible beauty, a capacity of dif- names t0 our cerning truth from falfhood, &c : For the fame other fenfes reafon it muft not only be a proper and diftinct, and forties. but a neceffary way of fpeaking in philofophy, to fay, that we have a fenfe of moral beauty and fit- nefs in affections, actions, and characters, as diftinct from all thefe as they are from one another ; pro- vided we really are fo made, that affections, actions, and characters do neceffarily excite our approbation, or diflike and condemnation, according to their moral differences. If there be fuch a faculty or determination i2S The PRINCIPLES Chap. IV. determination in our nature, it ought to have J! ^- — v ' diftinct name ; as well as our other faculties have; We cannot treat of it diftinctly no more than of any other of our powers, capacities, and affections, without having ibme determinate word to exprefs it. But moral fenfe, moral tafte, moral difcernment, or moral conference, well exprefs it ; and feem to be the propereft phrafes in our language, to anfwer to thofe ufed to fignify the fame determination in our nature by ancient philofophers (p ). That we are III. Some philofophers feem to be exceflively determined fond Qf tjle worc]s pkafure and pain, and to have by pleasure . r • r • j and pain in Sreat tetisiaction in repeating over and over again, all our mo- that it is only pleafure and pain that can excite tions is true in defire, or move and affect the mind. But though a certain t]iat pr0pofition be very true, when pleafure and pain are taken in a large fenfe, comprehending all the objects which affect the mind agreeably or dif- agreeably J yet of what u(e can it be in philofophy ? or, what truths can we difcover by its help, till all various forts of pleafures and pains •> that is, all ob* jeets which affect the mind agreeably and difagree* ably arc diftinguifhed and claffed, that they may be eftimated and apprized ? One may as well think of carrying on philofophy diftinctly without diftin- gui filing the various pleafures of the fenles from one another, becaufe it is the mind perceives them all ; and they may for that reafon be all called perceptions and pleafures of fenfe -9 as think of car-* rying on philofophy diftinctly without diftinguifh- ing not only moral pleafures from fenfible ones ; £ut this gc- but the various kinds of moral on.es from one an- i'r"P°r!' other, according to their different values, degrees, tion is of little ° ' ° ufe in philo- fophy, till all (/ ) AfNEfUf AyihtiSm. Senfus decori Sc honefti, fenfus our pleafures vcri ac pulchri, and fometimes, fenfus communis. So Juvenal, | e Ctifuubon, Salmajtus, G Maker. So and diilin- Horace, Satyr 3 . J. 16. See Lord Sbaftsbury's Chat gilifhcd. T. 1. %£*} 1 "f ' iy/V and buriour. and o/ Moral Philosophy. 129 Lnd natures. Pleafures of fenfe, pleafures of ima- Chap. IV. filiation, pleafures of contemplation, pleafures of ^ — sT"-* bntimenr, and feveral other clafles, that might be Lamed, are all of them but different forts of plea- ares ; but becaufe they are different forts, they iUght to be diftinguifhed. Or till they are fo, how ,m they be compared and have their moments determined ? If any philofopher afks, u if one can Ject or approve without being pleafed ?" I will nfwer, u That we cannot be pleafed without being leafed." But that election and approbation are s different perceptions or pleafures as any two he !an name. If he continues to urge, " That one pay fay what he will, but one cannot be determin- ed to act but by pleafure, for nothing can pleafe ! Without pleafing." I anfvver, " Pleafure is pleafure, id nothing can be pleafure but pleafure. But slight in a good action by approbation is as dif- ferent a pleafure from delight in any advantage it pay bring, as pleafure in a picture is from pleafure 1 muiic, or as both are from the pleafure of a ; inner, a good picture or a fine tune may procure. pur determination to approve or difapprove actions id characters, renders us capable of a fett of ieafures far fuperior to any which fenfe can afford in |ie mofl proiperous circumftances of outward en- yment : and it likewife renders us capable of a . . , J c - r • r ill -^nd °ur mo- tt or pains far more miupportable than any we raj fenfe ren_ m poffibly have from any other quarter. For ders us capa- ; hat pleafures are equal to thofe of felf-approba- We of a pecu- on, and the confcience of having acted agree- tjfjj;ettt£f )ly to the relations of things, to moral beauty and higheft we rnefs, the dignity and excellency of our nature, are fufceptible id in concert with that amiable temper and difpofi- of?°r can con- on of the Author of nature, which appears through- ce^e* it the whole of his works? And what pains, on the :her hand^ can be compared' with thofe of a Ml- Hidemriing mind ? But it is our fenfe of agree- )lenefs and difagreeablenefa in actions, and our 4 K neceffary 130 The PRINCIPLES Ch a p. IV. neceffary determination to approve or difapprove *— ^y" ^ according to the moral differences of affections and actions, which alone renders us, or can render us fuf- iceptible of thefe higheft of pleafures or pains. They are and muff be peculiar to creatures capable of reflecting upon the images of actions and characters, and of approving or difapproving, according to a natural fenfe of amiabknefs and its contrary. And in fine, for any one to fay, " That he who does good and virtuous actions becaufe he has pleafure in doing them, and an averfion or abhorrence of their contrary, as much purfues his own pleafure as any other perfon can be laid to do, whatever he takes pleafure in •, and confequently that all men are equally felfifh, though nothing be more true than what the poet tells us, nee voto vivitur uno (q)" This is indeed no more than telling us, that plea- fure is pleafure. And we fhall not fcruple to grant them all they demand, provided they will but al- low, Firft^ That no man can be faid to be virtuous, unlefs he does virtuous deeds from good affections, and with an approving fenfe of what he does. And therefore, Secondly ', That virtue and vice fup- pofe a determination in our nature to approve the one and to difapprove the other, both which I think have been fufficiently proved. The caution IV. But after all that has been granted with re- of the ancient ^ t laying;, "That it is always pleafure which de- moralifts in ° J & ' ~ '„ C , ,. „ , ufing the termincs us to elect or approve •," I believe, all who words good acknowledge the reality of virtue, if they have al- and evil very tended to the importance or rather neceflity of commenda- u£ma jiftindl determinate terms, and keeping clofcly to definitions, elpecially in moral philofophy, in order to avoid ail ambiguity and collufion ; will ( q ) Mille homlnum fpecies, & rerum difcolor ufus Velle luum cuique eit, mc voto, vivitur u?io. Perfius. very of Moral Philosophy. 131 • very readily approve the cauiioufnefs of the better Chap. IV, ; ancient moralifh, " When they would not allow fenfual gratifications, which fo often come into , competition with virtue and the pure folid fatisfac- tion which virtuous confcioufnefs alone can give, , to be called by the fame name of pleafure (volup- tas,) nor any pain to be called by the fame term i evil (malum) defigned to fignify the greater!: of all ; evils and diforders, to avoid any fteps towards the introduction of which into the mind, all other : pains or evils ought to be undergone with for- \ titude : even the corruption of the mind by vice". ; Such caution is very neceffary in moral philofo- \ phy. And the reafons fo often given for it by 5 ancient philofophers, by Cicero in particular, in his \ reafonings againft the Epicurean fyftem, in which \ it was the fundamental and favourite maxim, that : all our determinations to act, proceed from pleafure, Omnia initia agendi a voluptate proficifcuntur ; is beauti- fully englifhed to us by an excellent modern philo- fopher, who was indeed a perfect mafter of all true ancient learning (r). " To bring (fays he) the fa- " tisfactions of the mind, and the enjoyments of caujas. Now in order to be convinced that we have fuch But we have a fenfe, let any one but afk himfelf, (for it is, as a nobler re- hath been often faid, a queftion that depends upon inward experience) whether there be not a very . ^ h r _ wide, a total difference, between doing a good ac- fore we have tion becaufe it is good, or from love and affection a moral fenfe, to good, and a thorow feeling of its excellence, and doing it merely becaufe it will gain him fome exter- nal advantage or pleafure. Let him take the poets Elfe what catechifm, and flrictly examine himfelf and his na- h°auvne ^n rural fentiments by it. poet's quef- tions ? by Falfus honor juvat, & mendax infamia ferret, which if we Quern, nifi mendofum & mendacem f Vir bonus eft quis ? 0^r morcd ^ Qui confulta patrum, qui leges juraque fervat. — — fenfe will Sed videt hunc omnis domus & vicinia tota, f°on# fpeak Introrfum turpem, fpeciofum pclfc decora. °ut .lts real Nee furtum feci, nee fugi, Ji mihi dicat Servus : habes precium, loris non ureris, aio : Non hominem occidi : non pafces in cruce corvos. Sum bonus & frugi : renuit, negat at que Sabellus. Cautus enim metuit foveam lupus accipiterque, Sufpeclos laqueos, £s? oyer turn milvius hamum. Oderunt pec care boni vir tut is amore. Tu nihil admittes in te formidine pcence. Sit [pes fallendi, mifiebis facra profanis. Hor. Epift. Lib. I. 16. Let him afk his heart, whether he can approve No man > himfelf ; or think he will be approved by- any be- £a*lPut h,m- ing who hath a fenfe of worth and integrity, how- peer t°^i Pby~ ever cunning, prudent and fagacious he may be to examination, fecure his outward interefls ; unlefs he hath a heart without feel- that contains all villany •, and would not facrifice in- ing hf ,haia . { ' 1 1 • 1 r. 1 moral feme, tegnty in any one indulgence to the highe.il plea- K 4 lures. 136 The PRINCIPLES Ch a p . IV. fores of fenfe : The " jus fafque animo fanBofqut \-~~~v~~—J recejjus mentis & incotlum generofo pectus honefio H Whether he can chufe but deteft all treachery, all villany, all bafenefs, ail difhonefty, however pro- fitable it maT: be in the ordinary way of fenfual ap- petite and gratification. Whether he can reprefent to his mind the images of veracity, truth, honefty, benevolence, a fincere, unaffected regard to honour and virtue ; and the calm regular prefidence of rea- fcn and moral conscience in the heart, without ap- E roving and loving them. And whether, finally, e can conceive a greater plague than that impre- cated by the fatyriil's direful curfe, Virtutem videat intabejeatque relief a. To be fatisfied of the univerfality of this fenfe, let one but try the loweit of mankind in underftand- ing, and fairly reprefenting to him the virtues and vices, bring forth his natural, his firfV fentiments about them •, for he mall find that even the moll illi- terate have a flrong moral fenfe. Qua enim natio non comitatem, nqn henignitatem, non gratum animum & beneficii memoretn diligit, qua fuperbos, qua male- ficos, qua crudcles, qua ingraios ?ion afpernatur non edit ? Indeed, if thefe fentiments of virtue and vice It is abfurd common to au men ancj which none can fully ex- to iuppole . ,, i • ' • • j r i a moral fenfe tirpate from their minds, are not from nature, but are not to be the offspring of flattery upon pride, and begot by the de- from nature. vjces 0f cunning politicians *, we are, that is, fociety is much more indebted to fuch politics than to na- ture : for fuch fentiments are the bond, the cement which holds fociety together, without which no- thing that is truly great or noble could fubfift in human life. But how ridiculous h it to afcribe them to any thing c\Cc but nature ? For how can cuftom, education, example, or ltudy, give us new ideas ? " They might make us fee private advantage of Moral Philosophy. 137 in actions whofe ufeleffhefs did not at firft appear ; Chap.IV*- or give us opinions of fome tendency of actions to ^--* -\~-* our detriment, by fome nice deductions of reafon •, or by a ram prejudice, when upon the firft view of the action we mould have obferved no fuch thing : but they never could have made us apprehend ac- tions as amiable or odious, without any confidera- tion of our own advantage." (||) Let fuch philo- fophers coniider, that it muft be a determination previous to reafon, which makes us purfue even pri- vate good as our end. No end can be intended without defire or affection, and it is nature alone can implant any appetite, any affection or determi- nation in our nature, whether toward private good or publick good •, whether toward pleafure of out- ward fenfe, or pleafure of inward approbation. It is equally abfurd in the natural and moral world, to fuppofe that art can create ; it can only work upon Art cannot lubjects according to their original properties, and create. the laws of nature's appointment, agreeably to which certain effects may be produced upon them. No art can therefore educe from our natures an affec- tion or determination that is not originally there, no more than art can give bodies a property which they have not. To affert a determination in our mind to receive A mora] the fentiments or ftmple ideas of approbation or fenfe does not difapprobation from actions fo foon as they are pre- fuppofe innate fented, antecedent to any opinions of advantage or ideas' lofs to redound to ourfelves from them? is not to af- fert innate ideas, or innate knowledge ; it is only to affert an aptitude or determination in our nature to be affected in a certain manner fo foon as they occur to the mind. And this muft be true with regard to the mind in refpect of every pleafure it receives, that k is fitted by nature to receive it. But it is well worth obferving, u That though we have no innate ideas, in the fenfe now commonly affixed to thefe words 5 yet as in the fenfible kinds of objects, the fpecies, (II) See Hutchefon on the pajfions* 138 The PRINCIPLES Chap. IV. fpecies, the images of bodies, colours and founds <*— — v ' are perpetually moving before our eyes, and acting: But moral ^ Qn Qur fenfes^ even wnen we fleep, fo in the continually moral and intellectual kind, the forms and images haunting are no lefs active and incumbent on the mind at all our mind. feafons, and even when the real objects themfelves are abfent. But in thefe vagrant characters or pic- tures of manners, which the mind of neceflity fi- gures to itfelf, and carries ftill about with it, the heart cannot remain neutral, but conftantly takes part with one or other : however falfe and corrupt it may be within itfelf, it finds the difference as to beauty and comelinefs between one heart and ano- ther, one turn of affection, one fentiment, one be- haviour from another ; and accordingly, in all dif- interefted cafes mull approve in fome manner what is natural and honeft, and difapprove what is difrio- neft and corrupt." Whether we will or not, mo- ral ideas are always haunting and aflaulting us : we muft not only fhun the world, but fhun and avoid ourfelves to get entirely rid of them. And let the moil hardened, callous wretch, the molt abandoned to all fenfe of honour, fhame and integrity that ever exifted lay, if he dares in a ferious converfation with himfelf approve one vice, or difapprove one virtue, however profitable the one, or difadvantageous the other may be. N , r Thus then we fee how we are conitituted, with fore hath not regard to a rule and flandard of action, and that left us quite nature has not left us quite indifferent to virtue and indifferent to vice m t>ut hath planted in us a natural fenfe, which virtue and vice (/) Sec Sbaftsburys enquiry concerning virtue ; vvhofe words are. (/) Eft quidem vero lex, refta ratio, natune congruens, dirTu- l'a in omneis, conitans, fempiterna, qua; vocet ad otricium ju- , vetando a fraude deterreat, qua? tamen ncque piobos truilra jubet, aut vetat, ncc improbos jubendo aut vetando mo- I ; 1 1 1 c legi nee obrog.ni fas eft, ncque derogari ex liac ali- quid licet, Deque tou abiogari poteit. Nee vero, aut per fma- tum, pf Moral Philosophy. 139 vhlch as often as confulted, will not fail to tell us Chap. IV. >ur duty and fet us right •, and which, let it be op- u^— y"-"*j )oled or born down with ever fo much violence, or ailed afleep by whatever delufive arts, will often 1 incalled upon, tell the villain to his face he is fuch, ind bitterly tear his guilty mind with agonizing re- norfe, terrible beyond expreflion. And who can bear :he horrid pangs of a guilty, felf-condemning heart, :onfcious of the worth and excellence of abandoned virtue, and of the bafenefs, the enormous bafenefs Df every vice, whatever advantages it may bring ? We had therefore good reafon to fay with refpect to knowledge, in the firft chapter, that nature hath kindly provided us with a natural fenfe which leads 'and prompts us to enquire after good, final caufes ; in the adminiftration of nature, and thus directs us ' to an enquiry the moft affiftant to virtuous temper, • and of the moft pleafmg kind ; and which at the \ fame time directs us in every cafe, if we will but [confult it, to our duty, or to what is excellent, laudable and praife-worthy in itfelf, independently of all computations with refpect to private good, or intereft. This fenfe is therefore juftly faid to be engraven on our hearts, innate, original, and uni- verfal. But then fuch is our excellent make in general, that gut our mo- this rational fenfe or moral confcience common to ral fenfe, like all men, muft, like all our other faculties, depend aiI our °*ner for its ftrength and improvement upon our culture -, j^/ de'end on our own turn, aut per populum folvi hac lege poffumus, Neque eft culture or quacrendus explanator, aut interpres ejus alius : nee erit alia care to im- lex Roma?, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia pofthac : fed & omnes prove it, gentes, & omni tempore, una lex & fempiterna, & immortalis continebit ; unufque erit communis quafi magiiier & imperator omnium deus ille, legis hujus inventor, difceptator, lator cui qui non parebit, ipfe fe fugiet, ac naturam hominis afpernabi- tur, atque hoc ipfo luet psenas maximas eti.imn caetera fupplicia, qua* putantur, efTugeri^. Ckeronis frag, in Lattantio, Lib. VI. Cap. S. («), upon *4° The PRINCIPLES Ch a p. IV. (#), upon our care to preferve, to nourifh and improv it. Such, as has been obferved, is our frame in ge nerai ; and therefore, though this fenfe can no mor be produced by education, where it is wanting, thai an ear for mufic ; yet as the latter, fo the former i greatly improveable by inftruction and cxercife both may be rendered lefs delicate, nay, almof quite dead and infenfible ; or at leafl they may b< confiderably vitiated by wrong practice, by unna- tural affcciations of ideas, through the influence ol bad example, and other depraving methods ; but both are improveable to a great pitch of perfection by proper pains, and both require cultivation to their improvement. And certainly, with regard to the latter, it is the great bufinefs of education, and the great bufinefs throughout the whole life of every one, to .keep it in due exercife, to preferve it from being corrupted by bad opinions and wrong aifocia- tions of ideas, or over-powered by contrary, cor- rupt, head-ftrong affections : and for this reafon very often to reflect ferioufly upon it, as the dignity of our nature, and to recal to our mind all the: motives and confiderations which tend to uphold and corroborate it ; to accuftom ourfelves to review our actions, and to pafs judgments, not only upon what we have done, but upon what we ought to do in circumftances that may occur : and in fine, thus to accuftom our moral fenfe to work and act, that it («) See Plutarch de liheris educandis. Quod de artibus & fci- cntiis diccre folcmus, idem & de virtute pronunciandum eit ; fcilicet ad ejus perfe&ionem tria concurrcre opportere : naturam, rationcm & afiuefaclionem. Natura enim fi abfque difciplina fit ca:ca eft. Difciplina f a natura deftituatur defccla : exerci- tatio, his [duobus demptis imperfecta eft. Et quemadmodum ad agricultural!), &c. — And therefore he adds, the mo- ral virtue* arc very properly exprefled in the Greek ianguagc by rd which fignifics affkffaS tun, Cicero de *grit*iint ■ Tufc. quell. I ib. III. Sunt enim jngeniis noftris femina innata virtutum : qua: ii adolcfccre liccra rduceret may of Moral Philosophy. 141 nay be rendered by the law of habits habitual to CnAP.IVi js, and may become larger, and more comprehen- v^^-v—- J five than it can be at firft ; that is, abler to take in :omplex ideas, and fo to judge of wide and exten- five , objects : till like a well formed ear or eye, it is capable to judge eafily and readily, as well as truly, of any the mod complicated piece of har- mony. Now nothing is more conducive to fuch improvement of it, next to exercifing it about ex- amples, in judging and pronouncing fentence, (which mud be the chief thing) than the philofo- phical confideration of its analogy to our fenfe of beauty in material forms, and of the connexion in both cafes between beauty and utility. In this fenfe, and in this fenfe only, can the love of virtue be taught. Bat this leads me to enquire, how interefl and virtue agree, according to the conflitution and laws of our nature. For if it fhall be found, that in the moral world, as well as in the natural, utility or advantage is infeparately connected with beauty ; then mull our frame be an excellent whole. " For Conclufton. hitherto we have found our nature to be admirably well conftituted, with regard to virtue and vice, or moral conduct." chap. v. LET us therefore enquire into the laws of our Another clafs. nature, relative to utility or interefl, to pri- °* laws* vate and publick good •, the natural end and T, f happinefs of every man in particular, and of fociety tjve°tQ ™~_ or our kind in general. reft or pri- One of the bell modern writers on morals has ™te and Pub" given us a very accurate divifion of the chief quef- llc §ood* tions relative to morality. (||) The rirft is, to know (fays he) whether thereare not fome actions or affections which obtain the approbation of any fpectator or obferver, (||) See Eutchefon on the pafftons, 142 Chap.V. The feveral enquiries a- bout morals clafied. The PRINCIPLES obferver, and others which move his diflike ant condemnation. Now this queftion, as every mar can anfwer for himfelf, fo univerfal experience and hiftory mew that in all nations it is fo -, and confe- quently the moral fenfe is univerfal. 2. Whether there be any particular quality, which, whenever it is perceived, gains approbation, and the contrary raifes difapprobation ? Now we fhall find this qua- lity to be kind affection or fludy of the public good of others. And thus the moral fenfes of men are generally uniform. About thefe two queftions there is little reafoning : we know how to anfwer them by reflecting on our own fentiments, or by coniult- ing others. 3. But what actions do really evidence kind affections, or do really tend to the greateft public good ? About this queftion is all the fpecial reafoning of thofe who treat of particular laws of nature, or even civil laws. This is the largelt field, and the molt ufeful fubject of reafoning, which re- mains upon every fcheme of morals. 4. What are the motives, which even from felf-love, would ex- cite each individual to do thofe actions which are particularly ufeful. Now it is probable, indeed, no man would approve as virtuous, an action publickly ufeful, to which the agent was only excited by felf- love, without any kind affection : it is alfo probable, that no view of interefl can raife that kind affection which we approve as virtuous ; nor can any reafon- ing do it, except that which fhews fome moral goodnefs, or kind affections in the objects -, for this never fails, when it is obferved or fuppofed in any perfon to raife the love of the obferver; fo that virtue cannot be taught. Yet fmce all men have naturally felf-love, as well as kind affections, the former may often counteract the latter, or the latter the former : in each cafe, the agent is in fome de- gree uneafy and unhappy. The firlt rafh views of human affairs often reprefent private interefl as op- pofiOG to the public : when it is apprehended ielf- lovc I^Moral Philosophy. 143 3ve may often engage men in public hurtful actions, Chap. V. : diich their moral fenfe will condemn, and this is the u-~y"— — ' >rdinary courfe of vice. To reprefent thefe mo- ives of felf-interefl: to engage men to publickly ufe~ hi actions, is therefore the moil neceffary point in norals." Now this is what I proceed to confider, in )rder to fhew that by the laws of our nature, what ;he moral fenfe approves or virtue is private, as well is public good ♦, and what the moral fenfe difap- proves or vice is private as well as public ill. I. Andfirft of all I would obferve, that there is no Beauty is in- i philofophical fubject which affords more pleafure to Separably con* I the mind, than the confederation of the find union ^ Wlt f and connexion between beauty and utility prevail- throughout all ijing throughout nature (#), as far as we are able to nature, ipry into it •, and which therefore muft be carefully at- : tended to, and obferved in all the arts which imitate nature. It is this union and connexion, (as I have ob- , ferved in my treatife on ancient painting) between I beauty and advantage, or utility in all fiibjects, natu- ral and moral, throughout the whole of nature that i renders nature one, or a beautiful coherent analogous i fyflem •, and for the fame reafon renders all the fci- : ences and arts one body, or makes them fo intimate- ly related and fo infeparable one from another. Tho' beauty be an agreeable perception excited in It is (o in all us, neceffarily and immediately on the firft fight or the imitative contemplation of certain objects qualified by nature artSf arcilltec" r j ~i j ture, paint- (x) This obfervation is taken from Cicero. See it explained by him at great length, de aratore, Lib. 3. No. 45. Edit. Scbre- anc^ v'gour °f the particular fpecies defigned. fo in nature Now, what is the reafon of this ? But, becauie it is the ftandard fo in nature, where univerfally the proportionate and of truth. regular (late is the truly prosperous and natural one in every fubject. Health of the body is the juft pro- portion, truth and regular courfe of things, or the found ballance of parts in our conftitution. The lame features which produce deformity, create in- commodioufnefs and difeafe. And as it Is in the hu- man body, fo is it every where throughout nature. It is fo in our The found ftate is the beautiful one. Whence it is mundan A- juftly laid down, by the ancients, as an univerfal ca- sern. non ^^ regar(j t0 arts anc| fciences, and with re- gard alfo to moral conduct, becaufe it is every where true or an univerfal law of nature, " That juft pro- portions and beauty arc infeparably connected with utility." Nuntytafo a veto t utile. What is beautiful of Moral Philosophy. 145 beautiful is good and ufeful, and what is good and Chap. V. ufeful is beautiful. ^- — /-— ^ Is not the order of our mundan fyftem moft tranfportingly beautiful and pleafant in idea or con- templation ? But do not the fame general laws which produce that delightful ravifhing beauty, order and greatnefs, likewife tend to the greatefl good and ad- vantage of the whole fyftem ? What law can be al- tered without introducing inconveniencies proportio- nable to irregularity ? And what is it that charms And on the us when we iurvey with rapture the beauty of the bodies of all mundan fyftem ? Is it not the fimplicity and the ammal*. content of the few laws which hold fuch a vaft com- plication of mighty orbs in due and advantageous order? And when we contemplate the human body, or any other animal ftructure ; or in general, wherever we fee beauty and order in nature, what is it we find to be the bafis of all that beauty and order which fo ftrongly attracts us ? — Is it not the fimplicity, the frugality, the analogy, and conftancy of nature, in bringing about an ufeful end ; or, in difpofing, adj lift- ing, and compounding various parts, fo as may beft ferve a particular good end, without either too little or too much? All that we admire, as has been al- ready obferved, is fitly exprelTed in this general rule obferved fteadily by nature. Nilfruftra natur a fa- tit (y)* Which frufira is likewife very well defined by {y) This maxim is well explained by Sir Ifaac Newton, in thefe words. " Superfluu ■■ caujis non luxuriate See moral beau- ty explained by Cicero in feveral parts of jus offices:, fome of the paffages have been already quoted. See what is faid of it in the Chapter of knowledge . It confiils in the middle between tae ni- miam andparum. There is a decorum belonging to every particular character, and therefore to every man ; for every man has his diftin- guifhing peculiar character. This is treated of at large by Cicero. Eut the decorum belonging to a virtuous affection or action, confifts in its being duly proportioned to its end, neither too little, nor too much ; analogoufly to what is called eafe and grace, in dancing, in any other exercife, or in any art. All the phrafes among the ancients, ufed to fignify the beauty, harmony, and * confilkncy of virtuous manners, are taken from the beauty of , L feniible i Tie PRINCIPLES V. by Frufira fit phiribus quod fieri poteft paucioribus. And therefore with regard to all arts which imitate na- ture, poetry, painting, architecture and ftatuary * and even with regard to all reafonings, arrange- ments of truths, or demonftrations in the fciences, this is the only rule to attain to beauty, truth and uti- lity. Denique fit quodvis /implex duntaxat £5? unum. It is, andmuft Now, as it is with regard to the fenfible world, be 1° S^a* anc* to a^ arts an f° ls lt a^° witn refpect the fabnck of t0 our cental fabrick : its health, foundnefs, and the human beauty, confifl in the due ballance of all its powers mind, affefti- and affections, or in juft fubordination to a well im- ons, anions, proved m0ral fenfe. This produces moral beauty and charac- f ~ , C , ] ters> in affections, in actions, and in character or temper ; and this temper is the mofl advantageous one : It is the found, the healthful, the natural, the inoftplea- iant ffate : Every exercife of the affections and powers, in fuch a cbnftitution is beautiful, and it is pleafant : Agreeable in immediate feeling, and good and a- greeable in its confequences : every deviation, by whatever affection, from this temper or ftate, is pro- portional deformity, difeafe and fuffering. And, finally, in proportion as the mind is nearer to this its perfect ftate, or further removed from it, fo it is in all its exercifes more happy or more wretched. 'i i\e proof of jj To prove this, we muft confider the nature f VdVrom °f oura^ect^on-S their operations, and their mutual the anatomy bearings, dependencies and connexions. The ibluti- or texture of . . . the mind fcniible forms in nature, or in the arts which imitate nature, mu- iic, painting, &c. Such as Numeros modofque ne's mouth ? This we mall find to be true, if we >ut look into the collections of proverbs of diffe- i ent nations. For where, for initance, or in what ! lation however barbarous, is not cunning diftingui- i hed from true prudence •? and are not temperance, lonefly, faithfulnefs and generofity or benevolence, Irongly inculcated by fome very expreflive apo- :hegm ? Nor can it indeed be otherwife, fo plain ind evident are the good effecls of virtue, and the 3ad confequences of vice ; and fo clearly diftinguifh- ible is virtue in every cafe from its contrary. " Afk your own heart? and nothing is fo plain? 'Tis to miftake them? cofts the time and pain" But the queftion we are now upon is of fuch mo* ment, that it is well worth while to give a fhort view of fome of the different ways ancient philo- fophers have taken to mew, that virtue is man's na- tural end ; at once his dignity and his happinefs. The way C7- I. If we would know (fays Cicero) for what end cero rcafons man is made and fitted, let us analyfe his fouc-^^1^ ture, and confider for what end it is adapted ; njty and hap- for thus only can we know the end of any con- pinefs, fhew- ftitution, frame, or whole. Now if we look into ing that a11 the frame and conflitution of man, and carefully ^eanThe examine fame thing. 7he PRINCIPLES V. examine its parts and their references to one an-'?! other, we (kill plainly fee, fays he {a\ that it is fitted for thole four virtues, prudence, benevolence, magnanimity, and moderation, or harmony and de- corum •, for thefe four virtues are nothing elfe but his four mofl diftinguifhing natural powers and difpofitions, brought by due culture to their per- lection. There are, fays he, in our conflitution, together with the defire of felf-prefervation, com- mon to al] perceptive beings, four diilinguifhing principles which render man capable of a peculiar ' dignity, perfection and happinefs, fuperior to what merely perceptive beings can attain to. " The defire of knowledge, or the love of truth, and the capacity of attaining to it ; a focial difpofition, or the love of public good, and the capacity of intend- ing and purfuing it." The defire of power and do- | minion, principatus^ or of making ourfelves great and able to do much good to ourfelves and others, and the capacity of attaining to great efleem, power, and authority among mankind. And laiUy, the fenfe and love of harmony, order, beauty, and con* fiftency in our behaviour, and the capacity of at- taining to a regular and orderly adminiflration of our appetites. Thefe are the endowments, difpofitions, and capa- cities which conflitute our diilinguifhing excellence, or give us a higher rank in being, than the merely fenfitive appetites which we have in common with other animals : but if it be fo, then mud the im- (vement of thefe powers and principles in our Chap. V :ure to the higheft pitch of perfection they can t brought to, be our higheft end, our duty, our ^nity, our happinefs, if thefe words have any Ickning at all. And accordingly all the virtues 1 1 graces which adorn man, or make him per- [t and happy, may be reduced to four, which ! nothing elfe but the beir improvements of l^fe our four abovementioned diftinguifhing powers ;; d principles •, prudence, benevolence, magnanimi- I: and moderation. 'Tis thefe virtues mixing and I, mding together, which make up the beauty and jrtion to their improvement, that all the happinefs e can enjoy which is peculiar to us as intelligent ! tional beings of a higher order than meer fenfi- re animals confifts. This reafoning mufl be juft, thefe principles do really take place in our na- re •, for if they do, they mufl: be placed there, order to work together jointly in proper pro- >rtions, or with forces duly and proportionally gulated and combined ; and the perfection of ar nature mull necefTarily confift in their fo work- ig ; that is, in our taking care that they be all uly improved, and have all of them due exer- ife. If thefe principles do really belong to us, len it as necefTarily follows that we are made by ature for acquiring and exercifing prudence, be- evolence, and magnanimity, and for reducing all ur fenfual appetites into comely and decent order ; s that the perfection of any piece of mechanifm, nuft lie in its operating regularly towards the nd for which its whole ftructure confiding of arious powers, proportioned to one another, and luly combined, is fitted. It cannot be more true, hat the perfection of clockwork confifts in its ptitude to meafure time regularly, than that the perfection %be PRINCIPLES perfection of a being, endowed with the powers and diipofitions fitted for acquiring knowledge, perceiving public good with delight and compla- cency, and for regulating all its appetites and af- fections, according to a fenfe of order, fitnefs, de- cency, and greatnefs, mull lie in exercifing all thole powers and diipofitions. To acquire thefe virtues and exercife them is therefore, with regard to man, to follow nature, and live agreeably to it •, for it Lis to follow and live agreeably to his conilitution. Virtue is therefore man's natural end or excellence, in any fenfe that any thing can be faid to have a natural end or excellence. Now having fixed this point, Cicero (£), after ex- plaining fully the feveral exercifes of thefe powers which by being duly improved to their perfec- tion are the human virtues or duties, and the im- perfedtions to which thefe powers are liable, thro' neglect of proper culture and difcipline, or mif- guidance ; he proceeds to mew, that credit, re- putation, efteem, love, power, authority, health, ielf-enjoyment, and all the advantages of life, are the natural effects and confequences of prudence, benevolence, fortitude of mind, and rightly mo- derated appetites ; and that every vicious indulgence or neglect is as dangerous and hurtful, according to the natural courfe of things, as it is bafe and contrary to the perfection to which we are made to attain. And indeed it cannot be difputed, that it is the real intereft of every man to be good, fince the villain finds himfelf obliged to af- fume the femblance of virtue •, and it is much eafier to be really good, than to act the counter- feit part fuccefsfully ; for how rarely is one able to carry on a fcheme of villany under a mafque, (/>) See the fecond book of the offices^ and the books tie ', where virtue is proved to be happinefs. And Tufc. qutrji. Dc viitute feipsa conlenta. De ;egritudine lenienda, &c. without of Moral Philosophy. 157 lithout being difcovered ; and what are all the Chap. V. [vantages of life, if reputation is loft ? u^^y— J For riches ', can they give but to the jufi His own contentment , or another* s truft ? Judges and fenates have been bought for gold^ Efteem and love were never to be fold. Eflay on man, Epift. 4, Virtue is the fureft way, according to the natural ourfe of things to health, fafety, peace, efteem, and d all the goods of life : it of itfelf makes or caufes i!o unhappinefs ; it naturally produces no hurtful ; onfequences, and even from the vicious, virtue ■ommands efteem and refpect. But without the Ibve and efteem of mankind, how miferable muft } ian be ! ( c ) He is a disjointed limb, forlorn and veftitute; for no limb is more dependent on the yell-being of the reft, and its union with the whole >ody, than every man is upon fociety. But the main ftrefs of ancient reafoning to prove Upon what '> hat virtue is happinefs lies upon this, " That man t}le arguments s fo made that the pleafures of the mind, i. e. ^[^r^T = ri ii j- c r • ir philofophers, )1 knowledge and virtue, are far luperior to thofe to prove that : )f fenfe ; and that even the beft enjoyments of virtue is pri- enfe are thofe which the virtuous man receives yate good, from his temperate and well regulated gratifications, or depend " Not only is it in confequence of our make the high- eft fatisfaction which one can enjoy, to be able to approve our conduct to realbn and to a moral fenfe ; but fo are we alfo framed, that fecial exer- cifes, virtuous affections, and the temperate ufe of bodily pleafures are the gratifications which afford us the moft exquifite touches of joy and fatisfac- ( c ) That emphatical fentence of Homer hath the air of a proverb familiar in his time. Never, never, »Ad altiora quaedam, & magnificentiora mini crede, Torquate, nati fumus : nee id ex animi folum par- tibus, in quibus ineft memoria. Tu autem etiam mem- bra ipfa, fenfufque confidera : qui tibi ut reliquae corporis par- tes, non comites folum virtutum, fed miniflri etiam videbun- tur. Quid fi in ipfo corpore multa voluptati prseponenda funt, ut vires, valetudo, velocitas, pukhritudo? Quid tandem in animis cenfes? Defintbus, lib. 2. Compare lib. 5. Atqui perfpicuum eft, hominem e corpore animoque conitare, cum prima: fint animi partes, fecundae corporis, &c. fitisfadtion 160 the PRINCIPLES Chap. V. fatisfaction from nobly defpifiug them, than from enjoying them in the way of ordinary appetite. It is not only greater, but it is plealanter becaufe it is greater to contemn all pomp, pageantry, and fenfuality, than to poiTefs the means of them. Vir- tue, in its original fignification, means flrength of mind, or fuch firmnds as is able to withftand all temptation, whether from the fide of enchanting pleafure, or from terrifying pain, rather than con- tradict our natural fenfe of what is fit and becom- ing ; and there is not only a pleafure arifing from the confcience of Rich flrength of mind upon re- flexion which is ineffable, but there is a divine fa- tisfaction in every act of fuch fortitude. Some of the ancients divided virtue thus defined into two principal parts or branches (V), " Being able to deny ourfelves any fenfible pleafure, if reafon or our moral fenfe forbid the indulgence : being able to withhold from the faireft prornifes of pleafure, till we have fully confidered their pretenfions, and what our" moral confcience fays of the fitnefs or unfitnefsof the purfuit. And being able, on the other hand, to endure with magnanimity any pain rather than counteract our fenfe of honour, efteem and true merit." And man, inftead of being made for voluptuoufnefs, is made for thofe virtues, fuftinence and abftinence. In exerting thefe he feels more fincere delight, than in wallowing in fenfuality •, becaufe he is made to love power. We cannot have thefe virtues in perfection, but as all other perfections and habits (e) See Epi&itus and hrs ancient commentators. See particu- larly 71/. Antoninus Pbilofopbus. Atqui vide, ne cum omncs recti animi afttclioncs virtutes appellantur, non fit hoc proprium nomen omnium, fed ab ea, quae una cocreris antecellit, omnes nominate fint. Appellata enim eft ex viro virtus : viri a u tern propria maxime eft fortitude Cujus munera duo funt maxi- ma, mortis dolorifque contemtio. Utcndum eft igiturhis, ft virtutis compotis, vcl potius fi viri volumus efie, quoniam a viris virtue nomen cit mutata. Cicero Tu/cul, i£uajt. lib. 2. No. 18. arc of Mor a l Philosophy, i 6 i are acquired, but we are made to attain to them Chap. V* by exercife and application. Virtue is, and muft **-* -""NT*— -^ be, in the nature of things, a progreis. But tho* it be a progreis, a ftudy, a ilruggle, a violent Itruggle, in like manner as getting to perfection in any lcience or art is -, yet it is a pleafant exer- cife, a pleafant druggie in £very flep. Man is made for exercife, for making acquifitions by la- bour and induftry. And therefore exercife is ne- cefTary to the welfare and pleafant feeling, fo to fpeak, both of body and mind. And this is the exercife for which man is bed fitted, and in which he feels the higheft pleafure, even the vigorous efforts of his mind to improve his rational powers, to keep his fenfitive appetites in due fubjection to reafon, or to obtain the mafterfhip and command of them, and of himfelf. Virtue is therefore at rh^ vir^ou3 the fame time, that it is afferted to be man's plea^- J^ gra^fyne fanteft employment, very juftly reprefented by the our natural ancients as a warfare, as a driving for victory, as ^""e of contending after perfection, and mounting up P°.w5randdo* i • ° T . F i i • n r<\- minion en- tovvards it. It indeed chieiiy conliits in conquer- graf^j jn u3 ing our fenfual concupifcences l, and in fubmitting for that pur* them to the rule and government of reafon : but P0^ it does not follow from this, that virtue is not hap- pinefs. This brave warfare is at once our honour and our happinefs ; For thus alone can the natural greatnefs of the human mind, or its ardent de- fire of power, dominion and independency be fa- tisfied. It is true, virtue is not fo delightful in its firff. Heps, as it becomes in proportion as it im- proves. We muft diftinguifh here in the lame manner as with regard to any fcience or art : as there the firft elements are harm and only afford pleaiure to ftudents, becaufe they know they mull afcend by degrees to perfection ; and that the fci* ence, when once they have made any confiderable advances in it, v/ill well reward their labour and become eafier, and that they are fuitably employing M their 162 The PRINCIPLES Chap. V. their time and talents: fo is it likewile in the firft Heps of virtue, efpecially if one has bad habits and long indulged, impetuous, pafiions to grapple with and conquer. But virtue, like fcience or art, becomes more pleafant as one improves or proceeds in it. When one is become mailer of his pafiions, and virtuous inclinations are become, as it were, the bent of the foul, then all goes fmoothly and equally on •, and in the mean time the gradual ad- vancement recompenfes all the labour it requires, becaule the mind feels itfelf grcaten, feels itfelf iuitably employed, and feels its power and domi- nion increafe. We have already mentioned fome good effects of the greatnefs of our mind, with relation to knowledge •, but herein chiefly does its ufefulnefs confift, that it moves us to ieek after true ftrength of mind -9 and no power, no dominion affords fatisfa&ion to the mind of man equal to that power over ourfelves and our appetites, to excite us to endeavour after which the defire of greatnefs was implanted in us. It is becaufe the natural defire of power mu ft be fatisfied in fome manner that other power is fought -, and it is becaufe this true power, the j weeteft and pleafanteft of all power, is not earneftly contended for, that the mind, if it is not employed in the purfuit of fome falfe fpecies of power, preys upon itfelf, frets and fours •, and becomes at laft quite languid and infenfible, or quite cankered and infupportable. But the mind gradually greatning and expanding itfelf, as it advances in the domi- nion which virtue gives, is ever pleafed and hap- py ; for thus a natural and elfential appetite of our nature is gratified, even the defire of power, (prin* cipatuS) as Cicero calls it. (/) The extenfive power to (/) We had occafion already to mention the natural grratnefs of" our mind in fpeaking of knovvK is the of liberty and power, or tiie difpafuion of the mind, pund and dilate iticlf and prove its force, which is the foundation of Moral Philosophy.1 163 to which inward independence and felf-command Chap. V. is abfolutely requifke. *— — v J Let me fubjoin to all this, in order to illuftrate Some other a point of the greater* importance in the philo- ^f&™s fophy of our nature, the three following confide- fubjea, taken rations, all of which are likewife urged by ancient from ancient authors with a beauty and force of expreffion I authors, am not able to approach. Virtue fitves and delivers from many evils, it brings no pains along with it •, it is the only fup- port under accidental calamities, and frequently brings good from them, and converts them into real benefits to ourfelves and others. Its enjoy- ments never fade or become infipid, but on the contrary wax more pleafant and delightful by life and practice. And as true virtue knows no reward, but in the exercifes and fruitions of more improved and exalted virtue, fo it is pregnant with the molt comfortable, joyous hopes. I I. Virtue faves from many terrible evils, the na- tural concomitants or followers of vice. Ignorance is full of doubts and fears, from which knowledge of nature, or of the real connexions of things, deli- vers : for he who encreafeth in knowledge, increa£ eth in ftrength ; the wife man is ftrong •, he is Hea- dy and immoveable, but the ignorant are weak and feeble, a reed fhaken with every wind. And it is the calm undifturbed empire of reafon over the ap- petites that faves from inward riot and tumult, and preferves the mind in that ferene chearful flate, without which it is impoffible to relifh any pleafure in the happieft circumftances of outward enjoyment : that chearful eftate which is health to foundation of all the great arts, and of all the great virtues." Virtue is really pleafant, becaufe it brings forth the ftrength of the mind into aclion, and makes the mind feel its own. power to enlarge itfelf. M 2 the The PRINCIPLES . ths heart, and marrow to the bones. For liothinw can plcafe the mail who is difpleafed with himfelff and the vicious peribn cannot bear to fee his own image. What vice is not either painful in the im- mediate exerciie, or brings fuffering after it, or is in both thefe refpects a great evil and mifchief, as well as bale and unworthy : for abftracting from the ill confeioufhefs which the vicious mind, ever felf-condemned, cannot efcape or fly from, does not envy torture the mind, emaciate the body, and render one contemptible, or rather hateful, as a common enemy, which he mud neceflarily be con- sidered to be ? Does not avarice cark and corrode with the vile double cares of hoarding and guard- ing, ftarve the body, and eat up the foul? (g) Does not intemperance and fenfuality furfcit, ficken, and at laft deftroy die very fenfe of pleafure, and load the body with weariibme, fatiguing pains ? Are not anger and revenge a boiling, fcorching fever ? The little pleafure they afford when their end is accomplifhed, what elfe is it but a fhort- lived relaxation from the moft tormenting pain, which is quickly followed by remorfe and juft fears ? And malice, or Mifanthrop\\ is it not mifery ; univerfal and conftant bitternefs of mind ? It is an invenomed heart always throwing out its poifon, and yet never relieved from the cruel, inward rack* (jf) This is Homer's phrafe fpeaking of a melancholy perfon, Qv^riv y&TzJkov. lpfc cor fuum edens. See Cicero Tujcul. P> 5, from whence all thefe arguments are taken, bee Hnracc't Epijlles, Lib. III. Epift. 2. Semper a varus cge:- Invidus alter ius maerejeit rebus opimis. He ules the fame phrafe ■ Si quid efi animUm\ (s'c. There lore philolophy is called Medicina mentis. Cicero Tufcul. Sh t Lib. III. Eft project o animi medicina philofopbia. See a line defcription of it in Plutarch de educandti libcris. See Horace Ep. i . Sunt cert a piacula, tsV. ings of Moral Philosophy. i6£ ings of its exhauftlcfs gall and difcontent. Now Chap. V. virtue, or well regulated affections, fave from all thole miferies of body and mind, which vice pulls upon us inevitably, in confequence of the frame of our minds, and the connexions of things, that the mind may fly from every tendency towards the im- moral ftate : that it may guard againft vice as its greateft enemy, as well as debafer, and run to vir- tue as its health and peace, its preferver, upholder and comforter, as well as its exalter and ennobler. What pain does temperance bring along with it ? What difturbance did ever goodnefs and generofity produce within the bread ? Or what mifchievous confequence, can we fay any of the virtues hath naturally and neceifarily attached to it? Do re- gularity, good humour, and fweetnefs of temper, and generous affection, incapacitate for the pleaiures of fenfe ? Do they not rather double them ? And what fignifies it to be furrounded with all the beft means of pleafure, if the mind is uneafy, or galled and fretted by evil confcioufnefs, or by turbulent peevifli appetites and palfions. If it be diflatisfied with itfelf, and keenly fet upon fomething without its reach. And what is there within our power, or abfolutely dependent on ourlelves, befides the regu- lation of our paffions and appetites, and their hap- py effects within ourfelves? It is the joys of vir- tue only which nothing can take from us. The hap- pinefs of the fenfualift is as independent upon him as the wind or the tide. For do not riches make to themfelves wings and fly away ? whereas a good confcience abideth for ever. Does virtue either bring difeafes upon the body, or introduce uneafi- nefs into the mind ? Does it render us hateful to others, or deprive us of their efteem, truft and confidence ? Does it not, on the contrary, com- mand refpect, and excite love, and truftful reliance, felf-approbation, and the gladfome fenfe of merited affection. Mutt not the vicious man put on the M 3 maik. 166 The PRINCIPLES Chap. V. mafk, the femblance of virtue, in order not to be marked oat for a common enemy ; and to gain his felfifh, bale ends ? Dare he declare his inward thoughts to others ? Or can he approve of them to himielf ? Can we be faid to be fitted for luxury, debauches and voluptuoufnefs, fince the gratifica- tions of fenfe, when they exceed the bounds which reafon prefcribes, produce uneafinefs, confume the body, and are not more oppofite to the exercifes of reafon and underftanding, or even to the pleafures which imagination, when it is well formed and re- fined yields, fo far fuperior to thofe of mere fenfe •, than it is to a continued flow of agreeable bodily fenfa- tions ? Are not a very great mare of the very word diftempers and pains with which the body is fome- times fo violently tormented, juftly attributed to exceftive fenfual indulgences ? Whence elfe come broken conftitutions ? Whence elfe comes rottennefs, corruption and infenfibility fo early upon thofe who live in riot and wrantonnefs ? whilft the fbber, the induftrious and temperate, are generally healthful and eafy, and truly venerable in their old age. The old age in which a well fpent life naturally termi- nates, is full of iatisfaclion, fit for council, and highly honourable (£). II. Virtue is the only fupport under calamities, but vice adds to every torture. By accidental ca- lamities, I mean all fuch, as arifing either from the laws of matter and motion, or from our focial con- nexions, are inevitable by prudence and virtue. A difeafe may be entailed by a father on a fon. Vir- tue often fuffers in fociety through the vices of others; and diftempers or lolfes which flow from the cenfutution of the air, and other material caufes which work uniformly and invariably, muft {h) See Circro de finiSutt ■ ■ Sua enim vitia infipientes, & fuam culpam in fenedutem conferunt, &c. happen of Moral Philosophy. 167 happen alike to all men, good and bad : but un- Chap. V. der fach diftreflfes, virtue can alleviate pain, and " bear up the mind. It hath many cordials to relieve and ftrengthen the foul \ but whither can the vi- cious fly for eafe and comfort in fuch cafes ? fince he dares not look within his own bread, without being yet more exquifitely tormented ; nor can he have any fatisfaclion from the Ccnic of merited efteem and love, but muft confider every one of his fellow creatures at beft as his defpifers : and fince fpurning and fretting but augments his fuf- fering. A man may fuftain bodily infirmities, but a wounded fpirit who can bear ? The horrors of a guilty mind are truly infuppor table. On the con- trary, wherever the virtuous man is able to turn his thoughts, every object, whether within or with- out him, affords him pleafimt matter of reflexion j and his being able to withhold himfelf from com- plaining and fretting is itfelf a very comfortable confcioufnefs of becoming flrength of mind, or manly patience. But which is more, wifdom and virtue are able not feldom to extract goods out of fuch evils, and to convert them into bleffings. In diftreflfes that leave room for thought, the virtuous make reflexions which are of great ufe to the temper: this all the good, who have been afflicted, know ; nor can it be doubted by any, feeing even the vi- cious are often brought by diftrefs to a juft fenfe of things ; and come forth out of the furnace of af- fliction purified from much drofs and corruption : made fitter for the offices of fociety, better friends and neighbours, more prudent, regular and virtu- ous in their conduct, and confequently much hap- pier. III. In fine, the pleafures of virtue never fade or become infipid : who was ever weary of acts of ge- nerofity, friendfhip and goodnefs ? or who was ever difturbed by the confcioufnefs of order, and worth, M 4 and 168 The PRINCIPLES Chap. V. and of merit, with all good and wife beings? W^-y~ — / Whence proceed dhTatisfaction, ficklenefs of appe- tite, and naufeatirig amid ft the greater!: affluence of outward enjoyments, but from felfifhnefs and fenfuality, from feeking pleafure where it is not placed by mature, and cannot therefore be found ; from endeavouring to derive more fatisfaction from external objects than they are capable to afford; and from overtraining our bodily fenfes, while in the mean time the exercifes of reafon and ibcial af- fection are quite difcarded, and have no place in our pu rib its and employments ? Ambition of do- ing good may not have means equal to its generous defires, or may be ciifappomted •, but the inward fenfe of good intention, llifficiently rewards all its fcheming, all its activity. But felfifhnefs is tor- mented with continual difappointments, and by the want of means equal to its infatiability ; and if it reflects upon itfelf, is yet more fo by the inward confeioufnefs of its worthlefs, bafe, fordid demands. It has been often juftly obferved, that with regard to the pleafures of the body and the mind, the virtuous man, or he who is acquainted with the exercifes of reafon and virtue, is the propereft judge to make a decifion as to the preference ; fince none can fay the pleafures of fenfe are lefs fatisfactory to him, and he alone hath fully experimented the other. But we may appeal even to the vicious, the moil fenfual and felfilh, whether their joys are durable, and do not commonly terminate in difguft and difcontent? or whether, if at anytime they have felt the workings of the good affections ex- cited in them, and they have indulged them for a, little, thefe were not the happieft moments they ever enjoyed; the only moments which they take delight to call to mind and reflect upon. No man is (o cor- rupt, {o loft to all fenfe of humanity, as not to have, on fome occafions, felt fo much of the plea- fure attending virtuous affections, as ' to be able to judge of Moral Philosophy. 169 idge of the happinefs the habitually good mull Chap. V. 11 joy *, how pure, how conftant and unchanging it l'uft be : and he who is thoroughly acquainted with le pleafures of knowledge, of the contemplation of rder and beauty, and above all of benevolence, daces his happinefs fo entirely in them, that he an defire no reward, but better opportunities of xercifing and improving virtue. The only long- ngs of his foul are after more knowledge, larger 'iews of nature, and better occafions of exercifing Hendfhip, goodnefs, and focial love. What other mppinefs, wholly diftinct from this, can be offered o him which he would look upon as a recompence ? , Would he prefer larger draughts of merely fenfua! oy to an improved mind, and more entenfive nfight into the beauty, order, wifdom and good- lefs in nature ? Or would he imagine himfelf bet- tered for all his generous, benign, focial, public- fpirited endeavours, by any change of circum fiances, into eafe and foftnefs, in which he mould never a- gain feel thofe amiable, tranfporting workings of a good mind, which are now his fupreme delight? Virtue alone can be its own reward : There can be nothing in nature fuperior to virtue, either in worth and excellence, or in pleafure and fatisfaction, but higher and more enlarged virtue •, and therefore to fuppofe it recompenfed by any other enjoyments, of whatever kind (z), is to fuppofe it rewarded by being funk into a merely animal flate, confiding of no higher gratifications than thofe of fenfe, with- out the exercifes of reafon and generous affection. For all other enjoyments are necefiarily as much inferior to virtue, as merely animal or vegetative life is to reafon and intelligence. (0 Praemia virtutis & officii, fancla & cafta efle opportere: neque ea aut cum improbis communicari, aut in mediocribus Jlominibus pervulgari- Cicero de invert, rhetorica, Lib. II. In The PRINCIPLES In whatever light therefore we confider virtue, it is man's higher! excellence and happinefs, and the end to which his whole moral ftru£ture points and prompts him. Tho' one may fuffer by the vices of others, fince no evil in fociety can be fmgle, but as in the natural body, fo in every fyftem, where one member fuffers, the whole muft fuffer in fome proportion, the more adjacent parts chiefly. And tho' one may alio fuffer with all his virtue by means of the neceffary operation of thofe very laws on which many portions of his happinefs, as a certain fpecies or a part of a fyftem, depend; yet without virtue no perfon can have any happi- nefs of the rational kind, and but very little even in the ienfitive way, or by gratifying common lower appetites. The reafon is, as hath been faid, becaufe in the nature of things the happinefs of an infect or brute will only make an infect or brute happy : A nature with further powers muft have further en- joyments ; and therefore, man, confidering the powers he is endowed with, muft have another hap- pinefs, another fet of enjoyments, in order to be fa- tisfied, than a being merely confiding of fenfes without reafon, confcience of merit, a public fenfe and generous affections. All I have been now faying, is moil feelingly ex- preffed by our excellent moral Poet. What nothing earthly gives, or can deftroy, "The foul's calm fun-(hine, and the heart felt joy, Is virtue's prize : — And again. Know, all the good that individuals find, Or GOD and nature meant to meer mankind ; Reafon' s whole pleafires, all the joys of fenfe Lie in three words, health, peace, and competence. But ^Moral Philosophy. But health confifts with temperance alone •, And peace, O virtue ! peace is all thy own : The good or bad the gifts of fortune gain ; But thefe lefs tafte them, as they worfe obtain. Say, in purfuit of profit or delight, ■ Who rifque the moft, who take wrong means or right % Of vice or virtue, whether bleft or curfi, Which meets contempt, or which compajfwn firjl ? Count all th9 advantage profp'rous vice attains ', 'Tisbut what virtue flies from, and difdains •, And grant the bad what happinefs they wou'd, I One they muji want, which is, to pafs for good. Eliay on man, Epift. 4. Thus then it appears that we are made for virtue •, Conclufions ; nd that it is our trued intereft ; and that whether concerning pre are to fubfift after this life or not ♦, it is prefent "^^teKStot ' lappinefs, the only prefent happinefs which bears any private good, proportion to our constitution. I fhall conclude this article with obferving, that Some obferva- philofophers, ancient and modern, have taken routs, ^^a-6 ' which at firft view appear very different in eftablifh- mong modern ing the nature of human duty and happinefs, but all moral ills a- _ thefe terminate in the fame conclufion. Whether bout obll2atl- we confider the fitnefs of things, the truth of the on'- cafe, our intereft or our dignity, 'twill (till come out, that virtue is what man is made for. As for the quibling and jangling about obligation, it is fuffi- cient for us to remark, I. If by it is meant a moral neceflity arifing from the power of a fuperior to enforce his commands, by rewards and punifhments, then obligation being fo defined, a man cannot be laid to be obliged to virtue, but fimply in refped of his being under the influence of a fuperior, who commands him to be virtuous by laws, which he has fufficient power to en- force by rewards and punifhments. If by it is meant a moral neceflity arifing from natural connexions, which "The PRINCIPLES which make it our intered to behave virtuoufly, thei is man obliged to virtue limply in this refpect (that being then the definition of obligation) be-i caufe fuch is the natural order and edablifhment ol things, that virtue is his intereft. If by it be mean! the fame as more reafonable, more becoming, more! perfect, &c, then is man obliged to virtue for thei fake of virtue, or on account of its becomingnefsi and excellency. II. Now in ail thefe different views may obligati- on be taken if philofophers pleafe. And in all thefej different fenfes have philofophers proved man to be obliged to virtue : whence it mud follow, that when it is owned, that virtue is fit, becoming, reafonable, and our perfection, if man is not allowed to be obli- ged to virtue in that fenfe, it muft only be becaufc obligation is thought more properly to mean one or other, or both of the other moral neceffities, and not the laft one named ; and fo the debate is mere- ly about the life of the word obligation. III. But it is obvious, that in all reafonings to prove that man is obliged to virtue in the firft fenfe, the fitnefs or becomingnefs, or the natural beauty and excellence of virtue, mud be laid down as the principle upon which they proceed and are found- ed. For how elfe can we know the will of the Deity with regard to our conduct; but by know- ing what is in itfelf bed and fitted ? For how in- deed can we prove tlie Being of a GOD, unlefs we have fird formed and edablifhed, adequate and clear ideas of moral excellence and perfection ? 'Till we have conceived what virtue or merit is, we cannot have any idea of GOD, or confequently of what he wills and approves. IV. With regard to the other fenfe of obligation in which it means the feme as intered. As all rea- fonings o/Moral Philosophy. 173 Tings about the obligations to virtue, which fup- Chap. V. fe its excellence muft be highly affiftant to virtue, d confequently are of the greateft importance in oral philofophy ; fo, on the other hand, what- it pretences are made to fupporting virtue by any liloibphers who deny the dignity of virtue, they ; t but iuch adherents to it as fome are faid to have en to the doctrines of Jesus Christ, who fol- ded him for the fake of the loaves with which he p them. I ufe this fimilitude, becaufe if there be real difference between efteem, love and friendfhip, r the fake of one's amiable temper, and great and food qualities, and that hypocritical pretended affec- pn which only eyes fome feliim advantage, there uft likewife be a real difference between the in- f ard efteem and love of virtue for its own intrin- i: beauty, and meer outward conformity to its rules 1 >r the fake of fome conveniences and advantages* to ' ithout any inward liking to it (k). If there be any :al difference in the one cafe there muft be a real ' le in the other. He alone can be faid to do a vir- i ious action, who does it with delight and compla- : mcy in it as fuch -, otherwife one who inwardly ates the perfon he carefTes and flatters in order to et his confidence, and then betray him, is his real •iend till the moment he hurts him, notwithftand- lg his diffimulation and evil intention ; and he who bftains from robbing for fear of the gallows is as oneft as he who would rather fuffer the crtieleft tor- nents than commit the leaft injury to any one in hought, word or deed. But all that hath been faid, (from which it clear- y follows, that the laws of our nature with regard 0 virtue, and private and public good are fo fitly (k) See Cicero de finib Lib. 2. No. 22. Nemo pius eft qui ietatem metu capit, &c. And, de legihus. Lib. I. No. 4. Turn autem qui non ipfo honefto movemur, ut boni viri mus k&3 militate aliqua atque fru£tu, callidi, fumus non boni, chofen) The PRINCIPLES 174 Chap.V. chofen) will be yet clearer when we confider our confutation or frame with regard to fociety. Mean time we may conclude with my Lord Shaft/bury. , " Thus the wifdom of what rules, and is firtt and chief in nature, has made it to be according to the private intereft and good of every one, to work to- wards the general good ; which if a creature ceafes to promote, he is actually fo far wanting to himfelf, and ceafes to promote his own happinels and well- fare. He is, on this account, directly his own ene- my : nor can he otherwife be good or ufeful to him- felf, than as he continues good to fociety, and to that whole of which he is himfelf a part. So that virtue, which of all excellencies and virtues is the chief and moil amiable *, that which is the prop and ornament of human affairs ; which upholds communities, maintains union, friendfhip and correfpondence a- mongft men ; that by which countries as well as pri- vate families flouriffi and are happy ; and for want of which every thing comely, conipicuous, great and worthy, muft perifh and go to ruin ; that Jingle qua- lity', thus beneficial to all fociety, and to mankind in general, is found equally a happinefs and good to each creature in particular \ and is, that by which alone man can be happy, and without which he mud be miferable." CHAP. VI. Another clafs ^ ^ _ , . . r oflaws.Thofe TT ET us confider another law of our nature, relative to fo- " The law of fociety. In confequence of ciety and the J[ j which all men are not only HI to Ibciety by human' happi- feveral ftrong affections and difpoficions -, but man is nd per- fo framed for fociety, that private and public hap- n/mfo- pinels and perfection exceedingly depend upon our JThSyunftri uniting together in a proper manner, or under j roper laws, c/ Moral Philosophy. 175 l/s, and a right form of government, for promot- Chap. VI. if 5 our common happinefs, dignity and perfecti- ^— -"v — *** We are led to fociety by an appetite after it, which A 8Qne™1 r • r i • 1 7 r rn n- j view of our ( mot be fatisned without company, rellowihip, and fociaj make : rial communication : nay, fo focial is our make, or form. at neither the pleafures of the body, nor thofe of e mind, feparated from fociety or public affection, n afford us any lading enjoyment. • Remember ; man, " The univerfal caufe \ Acts not by partial ', but by general laws." 1 And makes what happinefs we juftly call .' Subfift, not in the good of one, but all. f There* s not a bleffing individuals find, ■ But fome way leans and hearkens to the kind* ; No bandit fierce, no tyrant mad with pride. No cavern9 d hermit, reft felffatisfy9d -, ; Who moft tojhun or hate mankind pretend, Seek an admirer, or would fix a friend: 1 Ab ft rati what others feel, what others think, All pleafures ficken, and all glories fink ; Each has his fhare, and who would more obtain Shall find, the pleafure pays not half the pain. Effay on man, Epift. 4. We have all the affections which are neceffary to the naintenance of fociety, and to receiving happinefs )y focial correfpondence and participation : an incli- lation to propagate our kind ; natural affection to our offspring and to our parents •, difpofition to friendfhip ; tendernefs to the fex -, regard to reputa- tion, or defire of fame and efteem •, gratitude, fym- pathy and companion ; delight in the happinefs of others, in that particularly which is of our own giv- ing or procuring to them \ fatisfaction in whatever prefents us with the agreeable idea of the power, im- provement and perfection belonging to our nature. All thefe affections and difpofitions are deeply em- planted 176 The PRINCIPLES Chap. VL planted in us, as we may be as fure, or rather furer by experience, than we can be of any properties be- longing to external objects of fenfe. And fuitably to theie affections and difpofitions, men have diffe- rent tarns, capacities, genius's and abilities, info- much that they are as dillinguifhable from one ano- ther by their different moral features, as by their outward airs, fhapes and complexions -, and as are de- pendent upon one another as they can be conceived to be, in order to render fociety at the fame time ne- ceMiry and yet agreeable or the object of voluntary choice. For if we were not united together at once by fuch affections, and by fuch reciprocal wants as neceilarily refill t from diverfity of interefls, abilities and tempers •, fociety would only be merely neceiTary or merely agreeable ; but being fo tied and connected together as we are, fociety is neither folely neceflary, nor is it merely matter of choice -y but it is equally requifite and iatisfactory. It is needlefs to dwell long upon proving, that we are formed and made for fociety, and dependent one upon another: our very manner of coming into the world, and education to the (late of manhood, the fource of many endearing relations, and agree- able affections and offices fufficiently prove it. And what can be more obvious, than that no confiderable improvements can be made in the arts and fciences, or in true grandeur and elegance, without focial union and rational virtuous confederacy ? In order, however to give a juft view of the extent and ufeful- nels of this law, and of the phenomena belonging to it, I mall offer the few following obfervations (/). I. We (P Ql3X quidem omnia contingent, fi quis rertip, I utam nancifcatur. Id quod quidem Amalthede quod < , Hi nu voco. Etenim in urn coniliturione funt . j ncque maximum nature humanoe bonum vel exiitere abfque mparatum & autlum permanere pofllt. Nam i item & ad virtutcm viam huec in fc continct, c-uandoqui- dem of Moral Philosophy, 177 I. We cannot more certainly pronounce, that a Chap. VI* /atch or any other machine is formed for a certain u-^~v~- — ' nd from the confideration of the parts of which it is M*\™**™fe ormed ; than we may conclude from all the parts of £[adefor foci* >ur con dilution, and their mutual references to one tyas any ma- nother, irtiat we are formed for fociety and for focial chine for its lappinefs : and if it be fit, wife and good that it fhould end* >e fo, then muft our conftitution as fuch, be wife and $ood. Hardly will any one call into doubt, the fitnefs, he wifdom and goodnefs of our being defigned and nade for fociety, of our being made one kind, and xir having as fuch a common flock, a common md, a common happinefs. One of the greateft objections brought againftour frame and conftitution s, that fociety is not natural but adventitious, the neer confequence of direful neceffity ; men being laturally to one another wolves ; that is, not is wolves to wolves for there a kind of union and ■fociety takes place, but as wolves to fheep, devour- ; ers and deftroyers. Men, fay they, are made for rapine and plunder ; to fight for victory, and to fubdue and enflave each as many of his fellow-crea- The funda- tures as he can by force or ftratagem* In one word, mental error men, according to this fcheme, are made to be a ^s ^^s ^ prey one to another : The only natural principle or fidering the inftinct thofe philofophers acknowledge in our na- defire of ^ ture is, the lufl of power and dominion, and an in- power which fatiable defire of tyranizing: And were this a true man^hison- account of our nature, and of the flate for which \y natural pa£ our author has intended us by our make, a ftate of fion or in- perpetual war ; then indeed it would be impoffible ftmft*. to conceive a good opinion of his difpofition towards dem in ea parfclm naturae bona procreantur, partim & mores, fludia, leges optime fe habent & re&a ratio, pietas, fanclimonia, magnopere vigent. Quamobrem qui beams fututus & feliciter vifturus eft, eum in bene conftituta repub- & vivere neceife eft & morij &c. Hyppodamus Tburius Pythag. de felicitate, N his i78 Tbe PRINCIPLES Chap. VI. his creatures. Bat fo far is this from being a true v-*— v~— ' defer iption of human nature, that nothing is more repugnant to feeling and experience (m). Cicero ', in- deed, and all the beft ancient philofophers, have ta- ken notice of a very laudable greatnefs in the human Our natural mind, which makes its capacity for great virtues and deilreof power nQye eg-orts jn confequence of its natural defire of as it is con- . . ' „. ~.. . . . r joined in our principalis, as Cicero calls it : that is, or power and frame with rule or independence. But this difpofition or in- other equally ftincl: is not the only one in our frame -, it is ballan- isVmoftno-8 cec^ ^y feveral others which ferve each in its turn as ble and ufeful a counterpoife to it. All theie natural difpofitions or inilinft. inftincts are enumerated and explained by Cicero, in the firft Book of his Offices at the beginning, as the foundation of all the virtues which conftitute human dignity, perfection and happinefs, as we have al- ready had occafion to fhew : viz. the defire of know- ledge, the defire and love of fociety, and a moral fenfe, or a fenfe of beauty and deformity in affecti- ons and characters, analogous, as he obferves, to our fenfe of beauty and proportion in corporeal forms. Now our defire of power and rule, as it is united with thefe other difpofitions, is fo far from being a hurtful principle in our nature, that it is of admir- able ufe. It ferves to pufh us on to improve all our powers and faculties •, it impels us to exert ourfelves with all our might to attain to the higheft perfection in knowledge, and in every ability we are capable {m) See the firft Book of Cicero's offices. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adjunfta eft appctitio quardam primipatus, ut nemini parere animus bene a natura infonnatus velit, nifi praecipienti, aut docenti, aut utilitatis caufa, juite & legittime imperanti : ex quo animi magnitude) exilrit, humanarumque rerum contemptio. — — Omnino roitis animus 8c inagnus, duabus rebus maxiine cemitur : quarum una in rerum externarum defpicientia ponitur, cum perfuafum fit, nihil hominem nifi quod honeftum, decorum- que fit, aut admirari, aut optare, aut expeterc oportere: nulli- que neque homini, neque perturbationi animi nee fortun* fuc- cumbere. Altera eil res, utcuin ita fis affe&us ammo, ut fupra <\ixi. res geias mannas, Alias quidem & maximc utiles, 8tc of. cfMoRAL Philosophy, 179 f. It ferves to excite us to take a very high aim ; to Ch a p. VI. efpife mean and low objects, and to delight in u-*-v*» -J /hatever prefents us with a very high idea of our Greatnefs of wn capacity > force and perfection. Without fuch 0fpower,how principle, man would indeed be alow, a timid, unat ufeful in our firing creature, incapable of fortitude and magna- frame, limity : incapable of ruling his fenfitive appetites ; ncapable of great attempts, and of defpifmg langers for the fake of virtue. But then, on the >ther hand, were not this Ioftinefs of mind, this de- ■ ire of power and rule checked by the love of foci- >:ty, by generous public affections, and by a fenfe of >eauty in good affections and actions, it would in- leed make every man naturally a tyrant \ and produce 111 the horrible evils, which Hobbs fays, muft be the ; product of men*s natural dilpofition, till they refolve f o live quietly, and make a voluntary league for the k ake of fafety and peace. It is impoffible to have a uft idea of any whole by confidering any part of it ' ingly or abflractedly from all the other parts. But J f we confider our difpofition to feek after power, as 1 it is joined in our frame with the other equally natu- ral and ftrong difpofitions in our nature which have been mentioned, we fhall be led immediately to C7- cero's conclufion, That by thefe difpofitions, as they are united together in our conflitution, we are made to acquire prudence^ to exercife benevolence* and to ftudy order and beauty in our moral behaviour ', and for fortitude and magnanimity. This natural greatnefs of mind, confidered with regard to our equally natural appetite after knowledge, conduces to prompt us to feek after large and comprehenfive views of nature ; knowledge of the mod enlarging, ennobling and exalting kind ; fuch knowledge as will be moil conducive to increafe our power and domi- nion : It makes us delight in contemplating great objects ; objects which wonderfully fill and delate the mind j objects which prove its force and put its grafp to the trial : hence the origine of the fublime in fenti- N 2 meats, 180 tTbe PRINCIPLES Chap. VI. ments, in difcourfe, and in actions, and of all the pleafure it gives, as Longinus has obferved. This na- tural greatnefs confidered with refpect to our love of fociety, ferves to fave it from degenerating into too tame and fimple fubmifftvenefs for the fake of eafe and quiet to every proud ufurper of dominion : and it ex- cites us to aim at power in order to do good, in or- der to fpread happinefs round us with a liberal hand. Our natural greatnefs of mind or defire of Power is indeed the fource of ambition : but of what ambi- tion is it naturally the fource ; as it is conjoined in our mind with benevolence and generous affection? Thus it tends to excite the great and God-like am- bition of being able to do glorious and meritorious fervices to our fellow-creatures : it excites us to feek after inward liberty and independency. To no other ambition does it, or can it excite us as it is directed by the love of fociety, and the benevolent principle with which it is united in our frame, that it mi^ht co-operate with it. For it is that different fprings or movements may work jointly that they are placed together in any piece of mechanifm : and it muft be fo likewife in moral conflitutions. Finally, this natural defire of power and rule, or independency, when it is confidered together with the love of or- der, and regularity in affections, conduct and foci- ety, prompts us to purfue regularity and good order in all our behaviour, and to fubdue all the paflions which tend to introduce irregularity and diforder into our own breads, inconfiftency and irregularity into our own outward actions, and proportionable difor- der and irregularity into fociety. All thele inftincts or difpofitions therefore as they are contrived by na- ture to ballancc one another, and to co-operate in our minds, make a very beautiful conditution, or a conftitution adapted to very noble ends and purpofes. If any of them be too drong or vehement, then is the ballance didurbed, and (o far is our frame difop- dered : but that any one of them which is mod in- dulged of Moral Philosophy. 181 Iged mould become flronger than the reft which Chap. VI. e Ms fo, is the effect of an excellent general law *-0 ith regard to temper and habitude of mind already rplained. It is juft fo in natural compofitions or lachines, in which fome particular fpring may ac- lire too much force in proportion to the reft, and ie end of the whole, by various caufes : and as it in mechanifm, fo is it in moral nature. When all ie fpringsand wheels are found and right, and in a ' ft ballance, then and then only all will go right. 'he happinefs as well as the proper bufinels of man Is a rational agent, confifts in exerting himfelf to un- erftand-his frame j and underftanding it, to give ue attention and diligence to keep all his moral 'brings and movements in their due and proportioned "rength, as benevolence and his love of beauty and ; rder direct, and as felf-love itfelf requires for inte- I *ft's fake : virtue and happinefs being the fame, as 1 as been proved. (n) Our affections, no doubt, one and all of them All our affec- ; re often matter of uneafinefs to ourfelves, and t»ns,not only ; Dmetimes occafion mifery to others ; it muft be fo the P"blic /hen any one is indulged and nourifhed into a t°hneCprVateVen egree of ftrength above its proper tone ; but the refpeclfociety, [ueftion is, which of them we could have wanted and are form- vithout greater lofs and fuffering in the whole. e? Wlth a They are by nature ballanced one againft another, view t0 lf* is the antagonift mufcles of the body, either of .vhich feparately would have occalioned diftortion ind irregular motion^ yet jointly they form a machine molt accurately fubfervient to the L.eceffi- ties, conveniencies, and happinefs of the whole fyftem. We have already obferved whence the ul- timate necefiity arifes of adding certain uneafy fenfations to all our defires, from which they have the name of paflions||. And we have a power of ( n ) Sec Mr. Hutchefin on the paJpons% whofe words I here ufe. || In the fecond chapter. N 3 reafoa iSt lie PRINCIPLES Chap. VI. reafon and reflexion by which we may difcern what courfe of acting will naturally tend to procure us the moft valuable fort of gratifications of all our defires, and prevent all intolerable or unneceffary pains, or provide fome fupport under them. Nay we have wifdom fuffkient to form right ideas of general laws and conftitutions, fo as to preferve large focieties in peace and profperity, and promote a general good amidft all the private interefts. Now as to take away our paflions and affections would be to deprive us of all the fprings and motives, all the principles necefTary to action, and to leave nothing to our reafon to govern and guide ; fo, on the other hand, to rob us of our reafon, would be to deprive us of a guiding principle, and to reduce us to the lowed condition of animals impelled and driven by inftinct and appetites, without any fore-* fight, without capacity of chufmg, and confequently without all capacity of virtue or merit. As well there- fore may one deny that we are made for walking erect, and not to grovel on the ground, as that we are made for focicty ; fince all our powers and affections are contrived for the good of our kind. Even thofe of the private fort are plainly fo ; for do they not then only work towards private good when they preferve that due proportion which the common good of mankind requires ? and becoming too itrong or too weak with regard to the general good of our kind, do they not likcwife become difproportioned with regard to the private fyftem and its well being ? This is plain from the very principle of felf-prefervation, or the love of life, that becomes unable to anfwer its end in the private fyftem, producing inability to fave ones felf when it is too ftrong ; and when it is too weak, is the occafion of equal mifchief to our- (elves and others. For as the timorous and fearful cannot help themfelves and others, fo the rafh and adventurous do not bring more hurt upon others than of Moral Philosophy. 183 in upon themfelves. Thus therefore the private Chap. VI. : teclions are equally well adjufted to private and , iblickgood. But if they fhould be faid to be- ng merely to the felfifh fyftem, and to have no rther refpecl in their contrivance and tendency, ere are however many other affections in our iture, which do not immediately purfue merely •ivate good, but which in many cafes lead us di- ctly beyond ourfelves, violently interefling us in it concerns and for the affairs of others in their Iverfity as well as profperity, and conducing to .; take us regardlefs of ourfelves, or at lead to make |< ; prefer the intereft of our fellow creatures to our I vvn private eafe. What elfe are our companion I id friendly fenfe of forrow, but the alarms and t npulfes of kind nature, watchful (0 ) for the whole, ji ) engage us in the intereft of others, and to ' rompt us to fly to the relief of a fuffering brother? < Vhat are the gropyv\ -, i. e. natural affection to off- 1 3ring, fympathy, friendfhip, the love of ones coun- 7 ; or, in one word, all our focial feelings, which lake up (p\ or lay the foundation for fo much I f our happinefs, but fo many neceffary ties by ; rhlch we are linked together and make one fy- f tern ? By thefe each private agent, is originally nd independently of his own choice, made fub- srvient to the good of the whole. And in con- equence of this mechanifm of our nature, he who voluntarily continues in that rational union, culti- vates it, and delights in employing his powers md talents for the general good of his kind, makes limfelf happy ; and he who does not continue this natural union freely, but voluntarily endeavours ( 0 ) See Mr. Hutchefon on the pajjions. (p) See Cicero, de legibus, lib. i. And de offices, lib. i. No. 7. Sed quoniam ut praxlare fcriptuni eft a platone non lobis folum nati fumus in hoc naturam debe- nus ducem fequi & communes utilitates in medium afferre, fec< See now ^ refutes towards the end of this book ifrofe who held that we are not of a focial make, N 4 ta 184 The PRINCIPLES Chap. VI. to break it and difunite himfelf from mankind, U**-Y— —- ' renders himfelf wretched •, and yet he cannot to* I tally burft the bonds of nature. His moral and public fenfe, his defire of honour and efteem, and the very neceflities of his nature will continue to make him dependent on his kind, and oblige him to ferve it whether he inclines to it or not. Society or va- II. But let it be obferved in the fecond place, riety of fecial That men could not be made fit for fociety, or happmefs re- for tj ^ ^ happinefs which arifes from partf quires variety r rt . , . . r. of talents and nerfhip, from communication and participation, characters. and the reciprocal interchange of friendly offices, without being fo conftituted that they mould mu» tually (land in need of each other •, and hence it follows that in order to fociety, not only diver-r fity, but inequality of talents, mental as well as bodily, is absolutely neceflary, for otherwife there would be no dependence, and confequently no place for focial affections to exert themfelves, or for the mutual contribution toward public good, which is involved in the very idea of fociety and commu-* jiity. Now this diverfity and inequality which part- nerfhip, [g) Cicerc often takes notice of the likenefs among man- kind to one another in their frame, whence it plainly ap- pears that we are, as he expreffes it, ad juJUtiam nati. Id jam patebit A hominum inter ipfos focietatem conjunttionemquq perfpexeris. Nihil eft unum uni tarn fimile, tarn par quam omnes inter nofmet ipfos fumus, &c. De legibus, lib. i. But fee what he fays of our perfonal differences. De officiis, lib. i. n. 30. Intelligendum eft etiam, duabus quafi nos a natura indutos t^ perfonis, quarum una eft communis altera autem quie proprie fingulis eft tributa. Ut cnim in corpori- bus magna? diiiimilitudines fie in animis exiftunt etiam. majores varietates. He gives inftances, and then (which no other moralift hath done) he explains the decorum belonging to every particular character. Admodum autem tcnenda funt fua cuique, non vitiofa fed propria quo facilius decorum illud quod qurprimus retincatur, fie enim faciendum, ut contra uni- vcrfam naturam non contendamus : ea tamen confervata, pro- pi iara naturam fequamur, Arc. This lays a foundation for great of Moral Philosophy. 185 -rfhip, communication, and focial intercourfe re- Chap. VI. jire, is in our cafe in a great meafure (as has been || n ^-**v ' jferved) the neceffary refult of our being related to \ he ^x,Sen- fcnfible world •, or of that mutual union between animai nfc ur minds and bodies which is requifite to our hav- require diver- lg the pleafures of every kind we are fufceptible %• 1 in that way, which have been enumerated. So trict and clofs is the concatenation of things with egard to our make, that whatever is found to )e fit or neceffary in one refpect, is fo in all re- gards and views. The bodies by which we have 1 communication with a fenfible world, and are capable of enjoying it, muft.be fupported, nourifh- ,ed, and defended by methods which require di- \ verfity and inequality of powers ; diverfity and in- : equality of fituations -, fuperiorities and inferiori- ; ties arifing from feveral varieties and differences. Minds united with bodies muft be affected with the laws of matter and motion ; and their different manners of being affected with thefe laws muft be uniform and fixed, ib that like effects may always great variety of beauty in human life. Hence in poetry what is called decorum, as Cicero obferves in the fame place, or truth and confiftency of characters, which makes fo eflential a part of poetical imitation. Let us imagine human fociety diverted of this variety, and by confequence of the different duties and de- corums arifing from it, and we reduce fociety to a very uniform lifelefs ftate.— See Homers Qdyffey, B. 8. line 185. Pope's Tranfation. With partial bands the gods their gifts difpenfe, Some greatly think, fome /peak with manly fenfe. Here heanJn an elegance of form denies, ' But wifdom the defecl of form fupplies : This man with energy of thought controuls, And Jieals 'with modeji violence our fouls ; He fpeaks referv'dly, but he /peaks with force. Nor can one word be chang d but for a wotfe. Sec. How fade and infipid would human life be without that pleafant beautiful variety of colours, which different characters arifing from various caufes caft upon it, || In the fecond and third chapters. proceed 186 The PRINCIPLES Chap. VI. proceed from like caufes and connexions. But all <■— — v ' thefe dependencies on matter are the foundations of focial exercifes, and neceflary to the pieafures and advantages of united focial life. So complete then is the whole building, if I may fo fpeak, that if any one part is altered, the whole can no Ion- Moral happi- ger ftand or fubfift, but muft fall to the ground. nefs require what is neceflary or fit for our progrefs in know- the lame di- , , , J r r ri i n 1 verfitv. Jecige, and to our enjoyment or a ienhble world, is likewife requifite to our moral perfection and to focial happinefs ; and reciprocally whatever is necef- fary to the latter is neceflary to the former ; for focial happineis muft in the nature of things be a happinefs of participation and communication ; it mult be a happineis that is reflected, as it were, from one creature to another, and that admits of various changes and modifications. Now different textures of bodies are not more neceflary to the va- rious reflexions, refractions, and tranfmiflions of light, which conftitute all the vifible beauty of the corporeal world, than different ftructures and mo- difications of human minds are to the various re- flexions and refractions, fo to fpeak, of focial hap- dVeremrem- P^ne^s? which are requifite to the beauty and flap- pers and cha- pinefs of fociety. The only queftion with regard rafters is re- to the latter is, Whether they are not the pro- quifne to pereft to produce in the whole of things as equal ™flexioVn7orUS a diftribution of happinefs, as thofe in the fenfible modifications world do of light and heat *, that is, as equal a di- of focial hap- ftribution as is confiftent with the very nature of pinefs. reflected happinefs itfelf, and with the other ufeful laws relative to our frame ? But hardly can we conceive better provifion made for the equal diftri- bution of reflected and participated happinefs con- flftently with it as fuch, than by the ftrength which nature hath originally given to our generous affec- tions and to our moral fenfe: that is, to our de- fire of fpreading happineis, and to our delight in (he contemplation of that beautiful order which the regular of Moral Philosophy. 187 gular exercife of benevolent affections naturally Chap. VI. nds to produce. u^-v—— ' By means of different moral qualities, tempers, id fituations, the fame kind of happinefs has no fs various effects than light by its various refle- ions and tranfmiffions in the fenfible world. Hap- inefs is thus modified or changed into various ap- earances and effects no lefs ufeful as well as beauti- jl than the variety of colours which make the j.armony of the vifible world. But by means of ; . moral fenfe and of a focial difpofition, mankind ire as firmly tied together as they can be confi- dently with the power of regulating themfelves, 3r with the dependence of their temper upon their 3wn care to form it, or upon habits of their ^li Social vir- Dwn contracting. There can be no fociety, tues fuppofe no mutual dependence, without fuppofing mutual mutual de- ants ; for all focial exercifes may be reduced to lcJ\ fTn"f giving and receiving. But thele two neceliarily fup- for they may pofe differences among mankind, and inefficiencies all be reduced in every one to be happy by himfelf. And in fact, t0 thefe tv™> fuch amidfl great diverfity is the equality of man- g™ewiw kind, that none can ever be without wants which he himfelf is utterly incapable to fupply, however . extenfive his power of giving may be. But what can be happier than deficiencies and wants, which are the foundation of fo many and fo great goods ; of focial union, of love and friendmip, of genera- lity and kindnefs, gratitude and reliance, and fym- pathy ? If thefe are removed, what remains in hu- man life worth enjoying ? Even the gratifications of fenfe, as has been obferved, dwindle into no^ thing ; as is plain from confidering one, which will readily be acknowledged to be none of the leaft ; where the /pes mutid credula animi is felt to be the principal ingredient. Order is heatftfs firft law ; and this confeft, Some axey and mufl be^ greater than the reft, More 188 The PRINCIPLES Ch a p. VI. More rich, more wife : but who infers from hence ^^*\"- -^ That fuch are happier, fhocks all common fenfe% Heav'n to mankind impartial we confefs If all are equal in their happinefs : But mutual wants this happinefs increafe, All nature' \s difference keeps all nature's peace. Condition, circumdance is not the thing : Blifs is the fame, infubjecl or in king, In who obtain defence, or who defend \ In him who is^ or him who finds, a friend, EfTay on man, Epift. 4 And again, Heai? n, forming each on ether to depend, A mafter, or a fervant, or a friend, Bids each on other for qffiftance call, 'Till one man's weaknefs grows the ftrength of allm Wants, frailties, poffions, clofer ftill allye The common in f reft, or endear the tye : To thefe we owe true friend/hip, love fine ere, Each home-felt joy that life inherits here. EfTay on man, Epift. 2. Natural di- ^ we ta^e an imPartial yiew °f mankind, we verfities make fhall find, that with all the inequalities which focial different ma- happinefs or intercourfe of good and kindly offices tenals for a reqUire there is however fuch an equality, that variety of n . v 1 • • 1 good by our evel7 man does ln reality bring into the common own improve- flock, together with his mare of the natural aifec- ment, or of tions common to all men, a certain peculium, fome- our own ac- thjng pr0per to himfclf, which is of great ufe or rather neceility to the common welfare of the kind : and that can be nothing elfe but fome particular ability, or fome peculiar modification of the na- tural and common affections. This will plainly ap- pear if we diftinguifh well between what is natural and what is acquired •, and remember that, as no- thing could be acquired were there nothing natural, fince of Moral Philosophy, 189 nee art or exercife can only diverfify what was Chap. VI, riginally of nature's growth or implantation, and lat according to fettled methods and connexions xed by nature for making acquifitions of any ind by exercife and art poffible ; fo were nothing sft to art and exercife, nothing would of courie >e left to ourfelves to do ♦, we could make no ac- juifitions at all. There are indeed acquired difpo- itions which are very prejudicial to fociety ; but :hefe are affe&ions in themfelves exceeding ufeful, perverted by wrong aflbciations of ideas and bad ha- bits : and what diverfity is there among mankind with refpecl; to ability, genius and temper, that there is ground to think natural, which is not neceflary to the various employments and purfuits without which there cannot be merit of different kinds, nor a fufficient variety of happinefs and perfection in human life? What natural talent or turn of mind is not a good foundation to work upon, or may not be improved to the great advantage of fociety ? Let us but think what an infipid ftate ours would be, were there not that diverfity of turns and cafts of mind, fo to fpeak, among mankind which now obtains ; or if all men had the fame qualities pre- cifely in the fame degree ; and there were no diffe- rences among them at all ? Variety is as neceflary to general beauty, perfection and good, as uniformi- ty : it is uniformity amidft variety, which pro- duces beauty and good in the fenfible world. And it is uniformity amidft variety amongft mankind, which alone could render them capable of fimilar beauty and good in the moral way ^ or make them a fyftem of beings in which variety of beauty and good of the moral fort could have place, equal or analogous to that variety of beauty and good, which conftitutes the riches and greatnefs, the magnificence and fulnefs of the corporeal world. In fine, *tis as impoflible that there can be fociety amongft man- kind without great diverfity of powers, abilities, and 190 The PRINCIPLES Chap. VI. and difpofitions, as it is that there can be a whole v-^-v *> without parts, of various natures adjufted to one another by their differences, and fo making a whole. Benevolence HI. J^t it be remarked, in the third place, with or focial affec- regar(j to our natural qualifications for ibciety and tion naturally r °. , , . ■ r . i n r • , •• • T , , works in thefe loclal nappineis j that the iocial or uniting principle proper propor- in us is fitted by nature to operate in thofe pro- tions which portions, which are mod conducive to the com- te general mon j ^ Qur ^n^ j cannot better explain good of locie- l • i i -i • • i i r • ty requires. this than by comparing the uniting, benevolent prin- ciple in our nature to attraction in the material fy- It operates Item. It is indeed moral or focial attraction ( r ), like attraftion ancj operates like the other proportionally, as belt world™ fuits to the upholding of the whole fabric in per- fect order : it is ftrongeft and moil fenfible when clofe cohefion is abfolutely neceffary, as betwixt parents and offspring : and it diminifhes in propor- tion as we are removed from one another. Yet fo are we framed, that with regard to our whole kind, when that idea is reflected upon or prefented to us, it is experienced to be exceedingly warm 'and ftrong. We all feel that the general good cannot be confi- dered without fuch due affection towards it, that there is a difpofition and tendency in our breads to fubmit all particular connexions and attachments to it, with a ftrong conviction of the fitnefs of iiich fubmiffion. Man muft firft be able to conceive a large whole, and to confider mankind as one fami- ly, before he can feel affection to his kind as fuch : but as one can hardly think at all without being led to perceive the common relation of men to one another as one kind *, fo every one foon attains to this idea, or rather it obtrudes itfelf upon all men whether they will or not •, and the idea of one's own child does not more neceffarily excite natural ( r ) See an excellent paper in the Guardian to this purpofe. affection, I c/Moral Philosophy. 191 affection, than the notion of one kind begets ftrong Chap. VI. public affection toward it as fuch. Hence it is v-^-v-"^ that no perfon capable of reflexion is not touched with the diflrefs of a man as man, without any o- ther attachment -, and does not, on the other hand, rejoice and perceive pleafure, even at the recital of happinefs enjoyed in any part of the world, or at any period of time, however remote from all his private interefts. Now this is the cement or attraction towards a common center, which toge- ther with the particular attractions between perfons nearly joined and related, or particularly adapted and fuited one to another, holds the whole fyftem of mankind together, or by which it coheres. This is indeed the natural progrefs of the human mind. God loves from whole to parts : but human foul Muft rife from individual to the whole. Self-love but ferves the virtuous mind to wake, As the fmall pebble firs the peaceful lake, The centre mov'd, a circle ftrait fucceeds, Another fill, and fill another fpreads, Friend, parent, neighbour, firft it will embrace, His country next, and next all human race *, Wide, and more wide, th' overflowings of the mind Take ev'ry creature in, of ev'ry kind ♦, Earth fmiles around, with boundlefs bounty bleft, And Heaven beholds its image in his breaji. Effay on man, Epift. 4. The notion of a public good, or of theuniverfal The notion «f happinefs of our kind, is a complicated idea, which ? Public §ood is not immediately apprehended lb foon as one fees formed^han or feels, but requires fome reflexion and a pro- due affeaion grefs of the mind to form it -, whereas particular arifes towards generous affections are immediately excited by u* their proper obje&s, fome of which are ever af- failing the mind ; (as in the cafe of natural af- fection, properly fo called, fympathy with the dif- ftreffed, And our mind is fo fitted by nature to form chat no- tion that we cannot avoid forming it. But benevo- lence, like o- thcr affecti- ons, is liable to chai and may bedi- minifhed or fatngrheneeL "The PRINCIPLES ftrefTed, and complacency with the happinefs 6f others, naturally dear and near to us.) But nature has fitted the mind to form the idea of our kind, and of its genera] good -, tor every particular exer- cife of the mind in the benevolent focial way, na- turally tends to beget and eftablifh fuch a preva- lency of good humour, tendernefs, and benevolence in' the general temperature of the mind ; as when it is formed, mud naturally dilpofe it to feek for exercife and entertainment to itfelf in the mod en- larged way ; and thus the inclination to extend be- nevolence growing with every particular exertion of it, the idea of good to be purfued, will natu- rally expand itfelf, till it not merely comprehends our own kind, but takes in and embraces all beings in general, or the whole fyftem of nature. As the excitement of every particular object naturally fup- pofes its objecl: preient to the mind, either really or in fancy ; fo the notion of public good muft precede the defire and purfuit of it ; but in propor- tion as the temper is fweetned by particular exer- dies of generous affection, the mind will enlarge and open itfelf to make more room for benevo- lence to exert all its benignity ; and fo a more comprehenfive objedfc will naturally be imagined. And when the idea of public good is but once fo far extended as to take in our own fpecies as one kind, it naturally, and as it were necefiarily inflames the breaft with affection, large, extenfive and over- flowing, in proportion to the greatnefs and compre- hend venels of the idea which beftirs it. This will be ftrongly felt, if one who hath ex- perienced any of the particular and more limited outgoings of the mind in natural affection, compaf- fion, or friendfhip, will but afk his own heart. — And if this be duty, what then does my country require at my hands ?-Hath the public no claim upon me?— For if he but underftands theft queftions, and can put them to himfelf s nature will quickly give the anfwer of Moral Philosophy*. anfwer by a fudden overflowing of the warmefl af- fection towards the public ( s ), to which he will feel every other paffion fubmitting itfelf, as confci- ous of its fit fubordinacy or inferiority to it. Let it however be remarked, that the analogy be- tween moral and natural gravitation mufl fail in ; this refpect, that whereas the latter is only a mechani- cal principle which we cannot change ; the former is a moral principle, and therefore fubject to di~ verfities fuperinduceable by ourfelves, in conlequence particularly of the law of habits and aiTociations of ideas already mentioned j intbmuch that benevolence may be exceedingly weakened and diminished, thro* trie prevalence of other paffions. If therefore in fome conflitutions benevolence is very weak, and felf-love is almofl the only prevailing principle, let it be called to mind that in other conftitutions felf- love is really too weak, and fome generous affection is too flrong. From hence it follows^ that as in the jt js difficult latter cafe it would be abfurd to argue from fome to determine few inflances, that the principle of felf-love had ori- the original ginally no place in our frame j fo* by parity of rea- ^fy °f an*y fon, it would be equally abfurd to infer from a few our hearts, particular inflances* where felf-love is too ftrong* and benevolence almofl quite extinct^ that originally there was no focial principle in our nature. Such changes are all accountable whether on the one fide or on the other, and in general with regard to all paffions, in the fame way ; that is, from different affociations of ideas, and different contracted ha- bits. The only inference, experience leads to with regard to them is, " That paffions are overpower- ed by paffions *, and that paffions grow more powerful in proportion as they are indulged ; or (s) See Cicero's offices, Book i. No. 16. &c. Sed cam omnia ratione animoque iuitraris, omnitim focietatum nulla eft gravior, rmlla carior, quam ea, qua? cum repub. ell unicuique noitrum : cari Cunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui, familiarcs : fed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa eit. O as i94 *& PRINCIPLES Chap. VI. as circumftances have conduced to excite and em- V-— ■v*——-1 ploy them -, Iince by repeated acts all paflions are proportionably wrought into temper." It may in- deed be difficult, perhaps impoffible, to determine the original forces of benevolent paflions in any particular conftitution antecedent to all particular cxitements and exercifes ♦, Iince from the beginning objects which naturally excite and employ them are continually affecting us, and calling them forth in- to exercifes or acts : but then it is no lefs To for the fame reafon to determine precifely the forces of the private or felfifh affections. We fee variety in both cafes, and we know how this variety muff arife from circumftances of exercife and action in either cafe. But he who denies any focial tendency in our na- ture to our kind, or the original implantation in us of any principles befides the meer felfifh affec- But it cannot tions, and afcribes all that is focial or kindly in us be afferted to education, cuftom and fuperinduced habits, is that there is obliged to give an account of moral phenomena, nothing fecial j . { are abfolutcly inexplicable upon that fuppofi- m our nature, J r r Vir/i without deny- tion *, fince we may appeal even to the molt felhlh ing the moil perfon, to him who has ftudied and laboured the evident truths mQQ. t0 ma]<-e himfelf fuch, and to extinguish all regards to others, whether he has been able to fuc- ceed : whether he can attain to his ends, fo as never to feel any ftirrings within him of focial and public affections •, and whether he can ever ferioufly and deliberately, in conversation with his own heart, approve to himfelf fuch an aim. If bene- volence is fuperinduced, and not originally from aire, whence comes it univerfally that this cut tomary and fuperinduced nature, is ftronger than original nature itfelf ; infomuch that, far from be- ing capable of being totally deftroyed, it is < thwarting the felfifh paifions, and creating difcon- tand remorfe in a narrow, fordid breaft. This truly cannot otherwifc be explained, (unlefi it is af- firmed that habits may be contr i . . ted acts, without e/ Moral Philosophy. 195 vvirhout any defign or appointment of the Author Chap. VL of nature that it mould be To) but by faying, that though nature has not planted in us originally any focial propenfions, yet the circumftances of human life are fo ordered by the Author of it, that thefe propenfions mult necefTarily arife in every mind to fiich a degree of ftrength, that nothing mail be able afterwards to eradicate them ; nay, fb much as to hin- der them from exciting bitter diflatisfaclion with ones felf in the felfifh mind whether he will or will not ; Or at leaft, from creating horrible difturbance and remorfe within fuch breads, as often as they fincere- ly afk themfelves, whether the felfifh conduct be right or wrong, approveable or d if appro veable. If he fays, the part that man ought or ought not to adtj right and wrong, fit and unfit, are cheats, or meer words without any meaning, he is not one bit nearer to the folution required of him for the phenomena now under confideration. Be- caufe the queflion ft ill returns, why are human af- fairs fo ordered t, if thefe words exprefs no moral immutable differences of affections and actions, and correspondent obligations, that yet univerfally every thinking man, as often as he thinks, mull approve or difapprove, according to that deceit or falfe imagination, and cannot poffibly approve (/) or (t) See how charmingly Cicero argues this point, de legibit^ Lib. I. No 15, Sec. Atom, fi natura confirmatura jus non erit, rirtutes omnes tollantur. Ubienim liberalitas, ubi patriae caritas, hbi pietas, ubi aut bene merendi de altero, aut referenda? gratiae voluntas poterit exiflere ? Nam hzec nafcuntur ex eo, quod natu- Yd propenfi fumus ad diligendos homines, quod flmdamentum juris eft. — — - Atqui nos legem bonam a mala, nulla alia nifi nature norma dividere poflumus. Nee folum jus & injuria a natura dijudicatur, fed omnino omnia honefta, ac turpia. Nam 8c communis intelligentia nobis notas res efficit, eafque in animis nottris inchoavit, ut honefta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia. Haec autem in opinione exiftimare, non in natura pofna, de- mentis eft. Nam nee arboris, nee equi virtus, quae dicitur (in quo abutimur nomine) in opinione fica eft, fed in natura. Quod fi its eft j honefta quoque, & turpia, natura, dijudicanda funt, &c. O 2 difap» 196 "The PRINCIPLES Chap. VI. disapprove according to any other rule, however he may act ? For this is as certain as attraction, elafticity, or any other quality of bodies perceived by our ienies, that no perfon ever can, at any time of life, reflect upon his actions, and approve of falfehood, diffimulation and diihonefty, not to fay barbarity and cruelty : or not approve truth, vera- city, candour, gratitude and benevolence, and pub- lic fpirit. How the mind is differently affected by any ideas or objects, is matter of experience, and therefore the fact refts upon the fame indubitable evidence which afcertains other facts, that is, experience. Butv in accounting for this fact, it is neceflary to refolve it ultimately into our being originally m framed as to be fo affected ; in which cafe, the ori- ginal fociality of our nature is acknowledged ; or it muft be refolved into a fecondary intention of nature, to bring about our being fo affected by moral objects, which, fo far as it has any meaning at all, muft be, to all intents and purpofes, the fame with a primary and original intention or ap- pointment of nature. There is no middle hypothe- cs between thefe two, to explain the matter by. And to lay that this, or any influence of objects upon the mind, may be totally the effect of edu- cation, cuftom, exercife, or art, or any caufe what- ioever, without any intention or appointment of na- ture that it fhould be fo, mud terminate ultimately in faying, that effects may be produced without caufes, or without any appointed manner of their being produced. Now how abfurd would it appear to every one, if a perfon fhould lay, that an artift may work matter into any intended form, any how, at random, without any means, or by whatibever means he pleafes ; or that he could do it, though there no certain knowable way of doing it. This would unanimoufly be owned to fhbek all common fcnfc : arid yet it is the very (iime thing that muft be of Moral Philosophy. be faid by thofe who afcribe all that is focial in our nature to art, cuftom, and fuperadded habit, without nature's having at leaft appointed the way ^.he ai?^ur" in which art, cuftom, and fuperadded habit may ^ fbcialPP°" produce fuch an effect. For were there not origi- or any afFec- nally in us certain qualities for art and exercife to tion t0 be operate upon, according to certain fixed methods Foduced hY of nature's inflitution, there would be no materials for art to work upon ; nor no means of operating by any moral art or exercife. In moral nature, as well as in the material world, no quality can be fu- perinduced which is entirely the product of art. All arts of the one kind, as well as of the other, are but certain methods of bringing forth into action qualities naturally belonging to fubjects, according to the means appointed by nature for bringing them forth into action, in this or the other degree or proportion, and with thefe or the other appearances. I mall conclude this head with an admirable defcrip- tion of nature, our focial nature in particular, by the excellent moral poet fo often quoted. GOD, in the nature of each being, founds Its proper blifs, and fets its proper bounds : But as he framed a whole, the whole to blefs On mutual wants built mutual happinefs : So from the firft eternal order ran, And creature linked to creature, man to man. Whatever of life all-quickening pro- per to promote the end of union, which is public hap- ^ Moral Philosophy. 199 happinefs, as joining or uniting in another form. Chap. VI Need I flay to prove what is as evident, as that there may be a better and a worfe mechanifm for the end of a watch ? Yet if this be true, it evi- dently follows, that the greatefl common happinefs and perfection of fbciety cannot be effected, but in proportion to the fitnefs of the form in which fbci- ety is conftituted, to procure that end. According- ly, the moft remarkable differences among focieties are fuch as reflilt from their political forms, or from the natural tendency of their laws, government, and civil policies. There are, indeed, other differences, as with regard to climate, foil, and other fuch things depending on phyfical caufes. But are not the chief differences confeffed to be fuch as refuk from civil conflitutions, or the various forms of go- vernment ? If, for example, the flourifhing of all the ingenious arts, of philofophy in all .its branches, of poetry, flatuary, painting, fculpture, architec- ture, &c. conflitute a very confiderable part of the happinefs and grandeur of fociety, as being the pro- perefl methods for employing men's noblefl facul- ties, and all the wealth that may be purchafed by commerce : If it be true, that it is the polite arts which give tafle and luflre to human life, or add ele- gance and a due polifh to it ; that they are the gran- deur and grace (it), and comely pride of mankind, with- out which wealth rots a nufance : if this be true, it is at the fame time equally certain, that one form of government is fit for promoting thefe arts, and an- other is quite the reverfe. " Hence it is that thefe arts have been delivered down to us in fuch perfec- tion by free nations, who from the nature of their government, as from a proper foil, produced the generous plants , whilfl the mightiefl bodies and vaflefl empires, governed by force and defpotic power, could, after ages of peace and leifure, pro- duce no other than what was deformed and barbae [u) Liberty, by Mr. Thorn/on. O 4 rous 200 The PRINCIPLES Chap. VI. rous of the kind." It was in confequence of this ^- — v -' natural fitnefs or unfitnefs of certain moral means >ome ttates ^^ rejpeft to certajn morai ends, that the laws re acjiiited c T r ' r a n i to one end, 0i J-Xcurgns, according to the conreliion ot Ariftotle^ fome to ano- Platb, and other wife and obferving politicians, ther. tended to make men ferocious, and to prevent their being civilized and polifhed by the humanizing arts : there was no provifion made by that inftitu- tion for their culture and advancement ; but, on the contrary, all was calculated to exclude them ; and therefore they could not poffibly be engendered, far lefs could they come to perfection in fuch a ftate : whilft, on the other hand, at Athens they flourifhed, becaufe every thing concurred to promote them. But it is not my bufineis now to examine different forms of government. All that belongs to our prefent purpofe is, to remark that men are capable of a very great degree of grandeur and hap- pinefs, as we feel by experience, in confequence of cur own moft happy conftitution, and its aptitude to promote public fpirit, virtue, and arts, beyond any other in the world : and that the perfection at) iefi of mankind mud depend upon the natural fitnels of the form of government they live under, or ci their civil and religious conftitution, mor3l in order to produce that end, is as certain as that end, as well there are proper and improper means with relation *5 every na- to any end •, or that no end can be accompli Hied, rhuartahl[f fit to attain it: an univeHal felf- . t truth in moral as well as natural mcchanifm, r with refpeel to moral ends as well as natural by which a fequence of which it is that the fcience J' of politics in judging of the propriety and ' fitnels, moral and political, of means to bring a- bout a' >te the (ble end of government, the ha > , )rdingly that ra and politicians have been able, in many ini , to form inch true judgments of the nment, laws and policies, as (like of Moral Philosophy. 201 : ^like Polybius (z), with regard to the Roman republic) Ch a p, VL ,cq . foretel the revolutions and changes of govern- v-— -v—^ iv.Qnt which muft happen, merely from the exacl knowledge of the neceflary effects of moral caufes. Here, as well as in the natural world, effects may be Hence it is with certainty inferred from their caufes ; for in that politics both cafes, from a certain concurrence of circum- is a faence, ftances or caufes, certain confequences necefTarily re- fult. To be fatisfled of this, one needs only look into the political reafonings of any good writer on politics, Ariftotle, Polybius, or our own Harrington. So that we may lay down all that is requifite for our purpofe to make out as an indifputable truth. That fuch is the natural dependence of men upon each other, that they cannot attain to the perfection and happinefs for which they are intended by nature, but by their uniting together, in order to promote it by their joint application : and that there are in the nature of things, improper and proper means of acting for obtaining that end. We are certain- ly intended by nature for whatever happinefs and perfection we are qualified to purfue and attain to, whether fingly or by united force. But all means and manners of uniting together, can no more be equally proper for attaining to an end in moral combinations of powers and qualities, than in natu- («) Hence it is that the political fcience is able to amount to. what Cor. Nepos fays in his Life of Jtticus, concerning Cicero's Letters to him. Quae qui legat non multum defideret hifto- riarn contextam, illorum temporum. Sic enim omnia de ftudiis principum, vitiis ducum, mutationibus rcipub. perfcripta flint, ut nihil in iis non appareat : & facile e'xiftimari poffit, pruden- tiam quodamodo Divinationem. Non enim Cicero ea folum yix two is accidemnt futura praedixit : fed etiam que nunc ufu veniunt, cecinit vates. To be fatisfied of the truth of this re- mark, one needs only lock into the fixth book of Polybius, and obferve from what principles he reafons, And if we confult our own Harrington, we lhall fee from his reafonings in one fngie inftance, viz. about property, how necefTarily the kappiaefs of mankind depends upon a good conftitution, fageiy and honeftly adminiilred. ral 202 "The PRINCIPLES Chap. VI. ralones. And the wifdom and goodnefs of our Au- thor clearly appears in making us fecial, and reci- procally dependent ; in fitting us for attaining to a very great degree of happinefs and perfection in that way ; in prompting us by our natural be- nevolence, and other difpofitions, to eftablifh our- felves into the bed form for that end ; and in direct- ing us to find it out by our moral fenfe. This is all the provifion nature could make for uniting us together in the propereft form, confid- ently with making our chief intereft dependent on ourfelves, or happinefs to be our own acquifition. And thus nature appears to be exceeding kind,"eipe- cially when we call to mind, that though fecial hap- pinefs makes fecial dependence abfolutely necenary ♦, yet at the fame time, the chief happinefs of every private man, as far as it can be acquired fingly, or independently of fociety rightly conflituted and mo- delled, confifts in the exercife of the fame virtuous temper, which fits for and points to the proper man- ner of uniting, in order to promote general happi- nefs or perfection •, it being in every one's power, confidered as one individual, to regulate his af- fections according to the real nature of things or truth •, from which government of opinions and af- fections no unhappinefs refults ; but from it, on the contrary, do many goods naturally fpring, in com- parifon of which, all other enjoyments are of very little confideration or importance, equally grofs and unfatisfoctory, as has been already obferved. " Thus, then, it plainly appears that we are excellently formed for procuring to ourfelves that true perfec- tion and happinefs, which mud, in the nature of things be the effect of right government, or well conftituted fociety." Let us now confider, whether man, who is made for virtue and fociety, hath any further refpect •, or whether he is not likewife made for the pleafures of true religion and pure devo CHAP. F Nature could not have dealt more kindly with us than it hath done, by making us focial crea- tures, and by pointing and prompting us to right union by our natural difpo- fition to focie- ty, and by our moral fenfe. (/Moral Philosophy. 203 C H A P. VII. MAN cannot open his eyes to confider the ftupendous frame of nature, to contem- 0^^m plate his own make, or indeed any other Thofe relative object which ftrikes his fenfe or underftanding, with- to religion, out apprehending or conceiving fome mighty power that made, upholds and governs all. The idea of a Man is made creating and iuftaining power or principle immedi- for religion as ately prefents itfelf to his mind. He cannot efcape ^jj^8 forming it •, fo ftrongly does nature, every thing in nature, befpeak and proclaim it to him (y). Hence that idea may be called innate ; that is, an intelli- gible form or conception, which offers itfelf naturally to the mind as foon as it reflects -, an idea the mind cannot avoid if it thinks, but that necefiarily occurs to every one. That it is fo is plain from univerfal experience ; for no fact is more certain, than that no nation ever was fo barbarous, but that it acknow- ledged a fupreme, independent, creating power, the father of the world and of mankind. We . (y) All the reafoning in fins chapter is chiefly taken from Cicero. See de legibus, Lib. I. No. 7. & fequ. . Eft igitur, quoniam nihil ell ratione melius, eaquc & in homine, 8c in deo ; prima homini cum deo rationis focietas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eofdem etiam recta ratio communis eft. Quse cum fit lex, lege quoque confociati homines cum diis putandi fumus. Inter quos porro eft communio legis, inter eos communio juris eft.- ■ Ut jam univerfus hie mundus, una civitas communis deorum, atque hominum, exiftimanda. Cumque alia quibus cohas- rent homines, e mortali genere fumferint, quas fragilia eflenr, & caduea ; animum tamen efte ingeneratum a deo : ex quo vere vel agnatio nobis cum cseleftibus.— Itaque ex tot generibus lam eft animal, prseter hominem, quod habeat notitiam ali- quam dei : ipfifque in hominibus nulla gens eft neque tarn im- manfueta, neque tarn fera, qua; non, etiam fi ignoret, qualem ha- Tie PRINCIPLES We are neceilariJy led by the confideration of our own exiltence, which is felt to be derived and de- pendent, to perceive our dependence upon the Au- pe ff n . . thor of nature. And our moral fenfe, fo foon as hardlv avoid a- * c • i 11 j-r r forming the v/e tnmK °* a creating principle, naturally difpofes idea of a fu- us to afcribe the belt difpofition and temper to fuch preme power, a mind. So are we framed, that every effect leads "'•■on ! us to apprehend a caufe ; and confequently, the ex- 'y -n r r i 1111 i i a i ■ litence or the world leads to apprehend an Author of it. And every thing great, regular or propor- tioned, excites admiration, either towards itfelf, if we imagine it animated -, or, if not animated, to- wards ibme apprehended caufe. No determination of our mind is more natural than this; no effect more univerfal : one has indeed better reafon to deny the connexion between the fexes to be natural, than to deny a difpofition in man to admire the Author of nature, which is a difpofition to religion (||). Ar,A ~„- Our fenfe of natural and moral beauty necefTarily And our . . J J moral ftnfe ieads us to enquire into and admire the order, beau- naturally ty, grandeur, wife and good oeconomy of the leads us to WOrld j and to apprehend that our difpofition to only intelH- underftand and love order and goodnefs cannot gence, but but proceed from an Author whofe mind is perfect the love of order and goodnefs. And, indeed, it is ascertain hfL-l ■ - as t^iat we ^avc intelligent powers, and a moral lenfe implanted in us, that our Creator muff, have in- the fi] telli- original habere drum dece«*i tamrn habendum fciat. F.x quo efficitur : is agnofcat Deum, qui, unde oitus fit, quafi recorde- tur, ac nofcat. J • m in homine, ac deo eft. ; 11 autem virtus nihil aliud, quam in le perfetfa, & ad nmum perdu^a natura. Eft igitur hoinini cum deo fimili- i poteil efl'e proprior cer- tio;-. tio ? Quid eft cnim verius, quam nemincm c(Te opor- ■ tarn Unite arrogantem, ut in fe rationem, m, putet undoquc nor. putet ? Aut ut ca, quae vix lum- . nulla ratione moveri putet I \ Compare dt valuta deo . n ex ipfa honiinum folertia efle aliquara n tern,. af Moral Philosophy, telligence, and benevolent, generous affections to- wards public good. For if the contrary is fuppofed, then are we more perfect than our maker; then have we in our nature a better, a more noble difpo- fition than our Author, the contriver and creator of all our moral powers and difpofitions, and of all the beauty, order, and good we fee and admire. Nay, if the Author of nature has no perception of order, good and beauty, nor no difpofitioa to approve it, then we have an excellent difpofition in our frame of which he could not have any idea, and which is therefore blindly and undesignedly implanted in us. This reafoning is not above the reach of any one ; it is what every perfon who thinks at all, is naturally led to by the turn and difpofition of the human mind. For how can we avoid laying to ourfelves, when we look upon the immenfe power, wifdom and goodnefs the creation manifelts ; when we look into our own minds, and confider our natural delight in analogy, harmonies, general laws, and the good that re- fults from them -, that whatever power or excellency, wifdom or order is derived, the Author from whom it comes, muft poffefs fuch power, intelligence or virtue, in a degree far fuperior to all his creatures. He who gave us underftanding, does he not under- fland ? He who gave us reafon, has he not fupreme and perfect reafon ? He who gave us capacity of per- tem, tc earn quidem acriorem, & divinam, cxiflimare debemus. Unde enim banc homo arripuit ? ut ait apud Xenophontem Socra- tes.— Ut fi quis in domum aliquam. aut in gymnafium, aut in forurn venerit : cum videat omnium rerum rationem, modum difciplinam„ non poffit ea fine caufa fieri judicare, fed effe ali- <]uem inteliigat, qui profit, & cui pare.itur : multo magis in tantis motionibus, tantifque viciffitudinis, tarn multarum rerum, atque tantarum ordinibus, in quibus nihil umquam immenfa, & innnita vetuftas mentita fit, ilatuat necefTe eft, ab ali.jua mente tantos naturae motus gubernari. * — Si enim, eft aliquid in rerum natura, quod hominis mens, quod ratio, quod vis, quod poteflas humana efncere non pofiit : eft certe id, quod illud efficit, no- mine melius. Atqui res cceleftes ■■■ -Quid vero ? tanta rerurn con- the PRINCIPLES perceiving order and delighting in it, does he net underftand and love order ? He who made us fo that we muft approve truth, veracity, benevolence, great- nefs of mind, and every virtue, and difapprove the contrary affections, does not he like thofe virtues, has he not a fenfe of their excellence ? Does he not de- light in them ? Whence can he have copied the ideas of them' but from his own mind ? Had he not thefe excellencies originally inhimielf, whence could he have formed the notion of them ; or whence could he have been moved and determined to give them to us, or to implant them in us ? Could he form thofe, or any difpofitions in our natures without having an idea of what he was doing ? Or could he have been moved to plant fuch difpofitions in us by a temper quite the reverfe of what he was doing ? By a temper quite the reverfe of all excellency and goodnefs ? We may therefore be no lefs fure, that our Creator has underitanding, reafon and benevolence, as well as creating power, in the mod perfect, pure, unalloy- ed, unlimited degree, than we are fure that what we have is derived underflanding, reafon and benevc^ lence. Such reafon- Now thefe reafonings are not only juft, but they are ings are natu- natural to the mind : it as naturally tends to form mtn°mkd. U tnem> as it tends to delight in any object which is adj ufled to its frame, but is not an immediate ob- ject confentiens, confpirans, continuata cognatio, quern non coget ca, qua; dicuntur a me comprobare ?■ ' Mxc ita fieri omnibus inrer fe concinentibus mundi partibus protecto non poilent, nifi ca uno divino, & continuato l'piritu continerentur. ' Talis igttur mens mundi cum fit, ob earn que caufam, vel prudentia, vel providentia apprllari recle poflit, hacc potimmum provider, & in his maxime ell occupata, primum ut mundus quam aptif- fimus fit ad permanendum, deindc ut nulla re cgeat, maxime autem ut in eo eximia pulchritudo fit, atque omn'b ornatas.— ' '- Mulue autem alkT naturx deorum ex raagnU eorum benefices, & a Grzciz fapientibus, & a majoribus noltris conitituta:, nomi- n^tarque foot Quidquid enim ma^nam utiliutem gencri arFer- ret c/ Moral Philosophy. je<5t of fenfe. And indeed all the opinions of philo- fophers about chance, mechanical blind operation of matter, or whatever other ftraage hypothcfes, if they are not abfurd, (as they plainly are) they are at leaft fubtleties, which lie very remote from the hu- man mind, and to which it can never yield. Religi- on is therefore as natural to the mind as a moral fenie. But, like it, or being but a part of it, it muft be im- proved by culture, by contemplation and exercife. Where there is a moral fenfe, reflexion muft foon lead to apprehend an infinitely good mind, the caufe of all things- And where there is a moral fenfe, an infinitely good mind cannot be apprehended, with- out the higheft love and admiration, without fupreme complacency and delight : but the idea muft be im- proved to its perfection, like every other object of contemplation, by due confideration, by carefully examining it, left any thing contrary to it mould be affociated and mixed with it on the one hand, or on the other, left it mould be too defective and in- adequate, or too weak in its influence upon our minds. If it isafked, how then it comes that fuch deprav- Whence then ed notions of the Deity, fo deftructive of morality, j^re°^i-nio°n and therefore fo oppofite to a moral fenfe, have always prevailed in the world ? To this I anfwer, i . That nothing is more plain from hiftory, than that even amidft ret humano, id non fine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbi- trabantur. Itaque turn illud, quod erat a deo natum, nomine ipfius dei nuncupabant.— — — Turn autem res ipfa, in qua vie ineft major aliqaa, fie appellator, ut ea ipra vis nominetur deus. Alia quoquc ex ratione, & quidem phyfica, magna fluxit multitudo deorum : qui induti fpecie humana fabulas poe- tis fuppeditaverunt.. -Videtifne igitur, ut a phylicis re- bus, bene, atque utiliter inventis, tracla ratio lit ad com men ti- tios, & fiftos deos? qua; res genuit falias opiniones, errorefque turbulentos, & fuperftitiones psene anileis. Haec & dicun- tur, & creduntur ftultifiime, & plena funt futilitatis, fummaeque Igritatis.'-* ■ ■ "■»■ Sed tamen, his fabulis fpretis, ac repudiatis, deus 2cS The PRINCIPLES amidft the prevalence of fuperftition and idolatry, all the thinking part of mankind have ever had veryjuft notions of the Deity and religion. What one of the per- ionages in Cicero's Dialogues about the gods fays, was ever the opinion of all philolbphers, a few only except- ed, who ltudied and laboured hard to contrive ibme other uncommon fyftem : Namely, That the doctrine of many gods, unlefs it be underftood allegorically, is glaring nonfenfe. 2. It feems plain from hiftory, that fuperftition crept in gradually by means of vari- ous artifices j and not improbably, it took its chief rife from, or was principally promoted by tyranny, as it is faid in the book of wifdom. It feems to be its cruel invention in order to enflave men more effeduallyj or to make them more eafy dupes to its ambitious It took its rife amls- It is an art invented or promoted by tyrants with tyranny, and their flattering accomplices who fhare the prey or was pro- with them, to inftil into the minds of thofe they mote y it. wou]d enthral and hold in compleat {abjection to their lawlefs will, a notion of divine right communicat- ed to them from above, to bear abfolute fway on earth till they take their places among the gods de- flined for them. Hence the deification of tyrants and heroes in which idolatry at lirft confifted, and from whence it moll probably took its origin. "The workman from the work diftincl was known, ./f^fimple reafon never fought but one : E\r deus pertinens per naturam cujufque rei — Cultus autem deorum eft eptimus, idemque caitillimus, atque fan&iflimus, pleniilimuf- quc pietatis, ut cos fern per pura, integra, incorrupta & mente, & Voce veneremur. De natura deorum, Lib. II.— Superilitio fufa per pntci-, oppreiTit omnium fere animos, atque hominum im- becillitatem occupavit. Nee veto (id enim diligentur in- volo) fuperititione toilenda religio tollitur. Kite prar- ii. mum aliquam, aetexnamque naturam, & earn fufpicienaainj admirandamque hominum generi, pulchruudo mundi, ordoque rerum t a,-; -ilium cogit cunlitcri. Quamobrem ut religio propa- ganda of Moral Philosophy. ££*er wit oblique had broke that Jleady light, Man, like his Maker, faw, that all was right, To virtue in the paths of pleafure trod, And own9 da Father when he own'd a God. Love all the faith, and all th9 allegiance then \ For nature knew no right divine in men, No ill could fear in God ; and underftood y/fovereign being, but a fovereign good. True faith, true policy, united ran, Shat was but love of God, and this of man. Whofirft taught fouls enflav'd, and realms undone^ Th9 enormous faith of many made for one ? That proud exception to all nature9 s laws, T9 invert the world, and counterwork its caufe ? Force firft made conquer!, and that conqueft, law j Tillfu perdition taught the tyrant awe, Then fhar9d the tyranny, then lent it aid, And gods of conqu9rors, Jkves of fubjecls made : She, midft the lightning9 s blaze and thunder9 s found, When rock9d the mountains, and when groan9d the ground, She taught the weak to bend, the proud to pray To pow9r unfeen, and mightier far than they : She, from the rending earth, and burfting Jkies, Saw Gods defend, and Fiends infernal rife •, Here fix9d the dreadful, there the bleft abodes ; Fear made her devils, and weak hope her gods : Gods partial, changeful, paffionate, unjuft, Whofe attributes were rage, revenge, or luft, Such as the fouls of cowards might conceive, And form9d like tyrants, tyrants would believe. Zeal ganda etlam ell, quae eft junfta cum cognitionc nature : fie fu« perflitionis ftirpes omnes ejiciendae. De dintinat. Lib. II. bed fie, Scipio, ut avus hie tuus, ut ego, qui te genui, juftitiam cole, & pietatem : quae, cum fit magna in parentibus, & propin- quis ; turn in patria maxima eft : ea vita, via eft in caelum, & in hunc ccetum eorum, qui jam vixerunt, & corpore laxati ilium incolunt locum. - ■ Sown, Scipionis. Etenim cognitio con- fcmplatioque manca nature, quodam modo, atque incho- P ata zio Tbe PRINCIPLES Zeal then, not chanty ', became the guide, And hell zvas built on fpite, and heaven on pride. Then fac red feem'd tt? ethereal vault no more ; Altars grew ?narble then, and reeked with gore : Thenfirft the flamcn tafted living food, Next his grim idolfmeafd with human blood ; With heaven's own thunders jhook the world beloivy And play'd the God an engine on his foe. Eflay on man, Epift. 3. Bat no argu- Now, If it is afked how men, notwithftand- ment can be jng ^-j. mora] fenfe, came to fuffer themfelves to thence againft t>e f° gr0^y impofed upon to their difadvantage ? a moral fenfe May I not reply, 1. That fuch an impofition being Id our nature. not more repugnant to a moral fenfe and a benevo- lent principle, than it is to felf-love, or a defire of private good and happinefs ; no argument can be brought from it3 taking place again ft a moral fenfe, that does not equally militate againft the reality of felf-love in our nature ; the being and power of which principle was never on that cr any other ac- count called into doubt. 2. It appears from hiftory, that fuch hath always been the care of providence to fave, guard againft, or deliver men from fuch per- nicious errors, fo contrary at once to private intereft and to moral fenfe, as far as could be done confiftent- ly with making knowledge progreillve and depen- dent on ourfelves : That in all ages of the world, there have appeared true philofophers of generous public fpirit, who taught true virtue and religion, and fit, fi nulla actio rerum confequatur. Ea autem aftio in ho- mtnum commodis tuendis inaxime cernitu»\ Perciner igitur focietatem generis human i. Ergo rurioni anteponenda atque id optimus qui pfa oftendit, & judicat. *- Itaque nifi ca virtu.-, quae conilat ex hominibus tuendis, id eft, ex foe. humani, attingat cognitionem rerum, folivaga cognuio, &j ur. Itemque magnitudo animi, remcta conuxmnitate, conjun&ioncqoe human . > fit qusdam im* manitas. of Moral Philosophy, 2x1 md boldly oppofed corruption, fuperftition, and ill enflaving doctrines about government ; fuch Ntrt Pythagoras 1 Thales, Solon, Lycurgus, Socrates, Plato, Confucius, Zoro after, and others : and fuch muft Mofes, the J ewijh prophets, and Jesus Christ De allowed at leaft to have been. But leaving thofe with other objections to another place, I mall only idd now, that to afk why nature has not prevented all error, all falfhood, all impofition, all falfe opini- ons and prejudices, all credulity, all wrong affocia- tions of ideas and bad habits •, is in reality to afk, why nature has not done more than can poffibly be i done for making us capable of attaining to true know- ledge, juft ideas and opinions, rational conclufions, : improved powers and good habits. For it has been I already proved * that we are furnifhed and qualified for the purfuit of and attainment to knowledge, and for arriving at moral perfection, with all the provi- fion that thefe ends require in our fituation : or with regard to fuch beings as mankind are and muft be, to render the fcale of life full and coherent. I fhall therefore proceed to obferve on the head of D r - . ,. • r,-., r -r c , • Religious con- religion, 1. That every exercile or contemplation, templation is admiration, and love towards an all-perfect creator a very plea- and governor of the world, is in its nature exceed- ^ant exerafs. ing pleafant and delightful. All beauty is naturally agreeable to our mind, but chiefly moral beauty. And therefore the contemplation of an all-perfect mind, compleatly wife and good, as well as omni- potent and infinitely removed from all imperfection, muft manitas. De.Offic. Lib. I. — Ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad a* gendum efTe natos ; actionem autem genera plura.— maxima? autem funt, primum, ut mihi quidem videtur, confideratio, cogni- tiove rerum cceleftium, quas a natura occultatas, &■ latenteis,- indagare ratio poteft : deinde rerumpub. adminiftratio, aut ad- miniitrandi, fciendique prudens, tcmperata, fortis & jufta ratio, reliquasque virtutes, & a&iones virtutibus congruences, qua? uno Verbo complexi omnia, honefta dicimus ; ad quorum etiam cog- P 2 nitianeni, The PRINCIPLES mu ft greatly raife, tranfport and exhilerate the mind. This is the necelfary confequence of a moral ienie. .,,... 2. Such contemplation muft be highly afTiftinp- to Ana hiehly , • . f , T n improvmgto and ^proving of the virtuous temper. It muft virtue. ftrengthen our love of virtue ; and redouble our emulation to improve and excel in it. It is indeed nothing but the love of virtue in its higheft degree. And how doubly fatisfying muft the confcience of fincere endeavours to advance in virtue be, when one reflects that it is the way, the only way to be like our Creator, and to recommend ourfelves to his favour here or hereafter : That it is imitating him, and acting in concert with him . But good afTe- 3- But as every felf-affection may be too ftrong as ftionsmaybc- well as too weak, fo may every generous affection come too kp ftrong or ve- nt. This is what Horace means when he fays, c c Infant fapiens nomen ferat, aquus iniqui, Ultra quam fa! is efi^ virt litem ft pet at ipfaw." The beft affections may not only be too weak to gain their ends •, but by mifguidance, or too great . Jpt re_ indulgence, they may become too ftrong and vehe- admj. ment. The love of mankind may thus become ro- i is apt mantic. And, in like manner, religious contem- >jne* plation and admiration, tho% on the one hand, it may be too little cxerciled in order to our happinefs, and nitionem, & ufum jam corroborati, natura ipfa praeunte dedu- cimur. Omnium enim, rerum principia parva funt, fed fuis pro- greilionibus ufa augentur, &c. De finibus, Lib. 5. Sed praefto cil domina omnium & regina ratio, oux conncxa per fe, & progrefia. longing fit perfecta virtus. I lac ut imperet ill i parti animi, qua: obidire debet, id videndum eft \ iro. Quonam mo- do ? inquics. Velut dominus fervo, velut imperator militi. Quar funt ilia arma : contcntio, confirmatio, fermo intimus cimi ipfe fee urn. c/^Moral Philosophy. and the improvement of our temper ; yet, on the ! other hand, it may become too ardent ; and thus it may degenerate into fuch exceffive delight in rapto- rious contemplation, as may render averfe to action, the great end of knowledge and of religion. And when one abandons the world to give himfelf up to religious contemplation, mankind being naturally made for focial exercife and communication with one another in many acts of benevolence and friendfhip, the right ballance of the mind will be loft : action not being duly mixed with contemplation, the ima^ gination will become vifionary and romantic. And hence it is, that fuch perfons are apt to imagine an extraordinary commerce and peculiar intimacy with the fupreme Being ; and to fancy all the thoughts or virions, which prefent themfelves in confequence of their devotional contemplation and admiration, to be fpecial dictates from heaven to their minds. It is true, good and juft (entiments which are thus excited in the mind, as they are in that refpect peculiarly the jf any oi^er effects of religious acts, they may, in that fenfe, guide'is fet up be faid more efpecially to be from God ; but they in our mind are not from him in any other way, than as they *dPeriQj[ t0 na" are the natural fruits of fuch contemplation and de- ancj not t0 £e votion according to the natural frame of our mind : tried by it, our and one cannot be too cautious in guarding againft whole frame the perfwafion of any fpecial communication with the ls unhmSed- Deity, which pride is fo apt, if it is once fuffered to enter into the mind, or in the lead indulged, to nou- rifh to great extravagance •, becaufe in proportion as any other guide is fet up in the mind befides reafon and moral confidence, in proportion will thole our natural guides be abandoned and forfaken by us in favour of that imagined fuperior one : and thus the fecurri.— — — -Obfervantur fpecies honeftae ammo. It is rea- fon, good fenie, or philofophy, that mult prefide, in order to preferve the human mind found, governable, and unfantaiiical. O vhx dux, virtutis indagatrix. Cic. tufc. qua-JI. Lib. V. P 3 whole ii4 Tbe PRINCIPLES Chap, whole coherence of the human moral texture will VI I. be greatly endangered. But perhaps there is not fo much reafon to cauti- on againft excefTes, into which pious and devout af- fection may be mifguided, as to recommend ftrong- ly the pleafure and pro fi table nefs to virtue, of devo- tion rightly governed. And then certainly it is fo when we take frequent pleafure in contemplating The genuine tne divine perfections -, and fuch contemplation pro- effects of true duces, on the one hand, chearful fubmiffion to the wellmoderat- divine pleafure with refped to all things independent c e^otl.^?» of us, or abfolutely external to us, and out of our. are fubmiffion 5 J >; . to providence, power, from the periwahon that the divine provi- and activity dence does all for the bed in the whole. And when, m doing good. 0n the other hand, the contemplation and love of the Deity excite us to action, or to feek with delight- ful attention and care, opportunities of exerting our benevolence, and of doing all the good we can •, from a perfwafion that it is only active benevolence which can liken or approve us to that infinitely perfect Be- ing, whofe happinefs confifts in communicating his good nefs as extenfively as Omnipotence can. Thus we fee, we aremade for religion as well as for virtue *, and that indeed in our nature, religion and virtue are one and the fame thing : it is the fame na- Conclufion. tural difpofition of the mind, employed contempla- tively in admiring and loving fupreme virtue ; and actively in imitating that model \ or in endeavouring to become more and more conformable to it. And as this is the idea which reafon gives us of religion id virtue, fo it is the idea chriitianity gives of it. The fum oi' religion and virtue according to that doctrine, is to love God, and to love our neighbour; and according to that doctrine thefe two good difpo- parable : They mult go together. He who tl be lovetb God, and loveth not his mfelf3 for God is love. CHAP, A brief review of Moral Philosophy. 215 CHAR VIII. HAVING thus confidered the chief laws and principles, powers and properties in the human nature relative to our bodily or mo- ral frame, to our fenfitive part or our connexion with a material world, relative to knowledge, to vir- £f7he human tue, to intereft, and to fociety : I think we may nature, and conclude, that human nature is well conftituted, and its powers and makes an excellent fpecies which welldeferves its place dirP°^tl0n?» in the rifing fcale of life and perfection : a fpecies of iaws, being which fhewsan Author of perfect wifdomand goodnefs. Now that all the principal phenomena relating to human nature and mankind, are accountable by re- ducing them to good principles from which they muft refult, will appear by calling our eye upon the following Table of effects^ for thefe feem to be the principal phenomena belonging to us as men ; and they are all reducible to the laws that have been al~ ready found either to be necefTary, or fitly chofen and'eftablifhed. Phenomena belonging to the general law of power. Goods. Evils. Having a fphere of power Want of power through ^ ta°k °^tne and activity. Liberty and ignorance and neglect of cul- Pnenomena> dominion ; and fo being ca- ture, blindnefs, impotence, f°? • pable of praife, virtue and flavery, confcioufnefs of act- ^onSing^to good defert : Having great ing ill ; remorfe, ftiame, a turef^re- knowledge and proportion- defart and uncultivated, or a faking from ed power in confequence corrupt and difeafed mind, its contexture. of culture or care to im- prove ourfelves, p 4 h r<* 2x6 The PRINCIPLES Chap, VIII. i. To the laws Goods. Science, prudence, philo- sophy, arts, good fenfe, good tafte, a refined imagi- nation, an extenfive under- standing j knowledge of the beauty, order and wifdom of nature, and skill in imi- tating it by various arts. of knowledge. Evils. Ignorance, error, preju- dices, narrow views, dull or flow imagination, corrupt fancy, falfe tafte ; caprice and fantaftical purfuits. 2 . To the laws of the fenfible world and our union with it< ous Senfitive pleafures of vari- s forts ; contemplation of nature or natural knowledge, pleafures of imagination, fa- cial intercourfe about moral ideas, fenfitive appetites to be governed. Senfitive pains, fubjection to the laws of matter and mo- tion, falfe imaginations and pains arifing from them. Un- ruly excefiive fenfual appetites and paflions ; uneafy fenfati- ons annexed to moral or in- tellectual defires, as well as to fenfitive ones. 3. To the laws of ajjociation of ideas and habits. Habitual knowledge, me- mory and acquaintance with nature, perfection in fcience, in arts, in every faculty, good tafte, invention, a- vancement toward moral perfection, inward liberty, ieif-command, free agency. Wrong aflbciations, fan- taftic imaginations, bad ha- bits, unimproved faculties, inward flavery, indolence and impotence. 4. To the laws of our moral fenfe., reafon and moral conduff. Reafon, a moral fenfe, beauty, harmony, and con- fiftency of manners, confei- ous virtue, or a fenfe of me- rit, greatnefs of mind, for- tixudc, magnanimii Depraved tafte, remorfe and felf-condemnation, irre- gular (elf-tormenting, felf-di£ approving affections, lownefs of mind, pufillanimity. To of Moral Philosophy. 5. To the laws of inter eft and happinefs > or of private and public good. Goods. Generous affections, well governed private affections, focial ones, their pleafant ef- fects and happy confequen- ces, the purfuit of private and public good, or virtue and intereft the fame. Evils. Ungenerous, unfocial fel- fifh affections, diforderly de- fires, and their unhappy ef- fects and influences ; private and public ill, or vice and mifery the fame. ^0 the laws of fociety9 our focial make and our mu- tual dependence. Social union, mutual de- pendencies, derived happi- nefs by communication and participation ; confederacy to promote virtue, and the true elegance, grandeur and happinefs pffociety. Difunion, tumult, difor- der, tyrany, rebellion, bar- barity, flavery, public low- nefs and mifery. 7. To the law of religion. True ideas of God and providence, true religion, its pleafures, refignation to the Deity , imitation of the Dei- ty, confcioufnefs of confor- mity to him, and of his fa- vour and approbation. Falfe ideas of God and providence, fuperftition, ido- latry, blind zeal,dread of the Deity, fenfe of difconformi- ty to him, and fear of his difpleafure. This is a fhort view of the principal appearances in the human fyftem. Now all the appearances re- ducible to thofe laws mult be good, the laws being good. And that they are fuch is evident ; for if the preceeding account of our frame, and the laws re- lative to it be true, it plainly and neceffarily follows, 1. " That, in confequence of them, we are made for a very coniiderabJe degree of happinefs and perfection pf the moral fort chiefly-." And, 2, "That there is no affection, All thefe phe- nomena are reducible to the excellent general laws already con- fidered, which fit and qualify man for a no- ble end or happinefs. 2i8 the PRINCIPLES Chap, affection, difpofition, power or faculty in our nature VIII. which merely produces evil ; or which, on the con-, trary, does not produce very many great goods and no evils, but what are the effects of fuch a general prevalence of thefe laws, as makes our conftitution a good whole, or adapted to a noble end". But if Therefore thefe conclufions be true, then are no effects in the evi'Ta^fohue- ^uman fy-em evils absolutely confidered ; that is, ]y confidered with refpecl: to the whole frame and conftitution of arifing from human nature. In order to have a juft notion of our frame. t^e government of the world, and of its Author, we this cafe^s"1 neec* only a*k ourfelves, towards which kind of phe- we do in other nomena, the good or theoppofite bad ones, thena- like one?, we tural tendency of our powers and difpofitions is ? thaf a'uur^ whether jt is f?r the fake of the bad ones> which arife powers are gi- fr°m tneir mifufe or mifguidance, that we are en- ven us for a dowed with thefe powers and difpofitions which con- very ufeful ftitute our frame ; or for the fake of the goodones to- 0 eend- wards which thefe powers and difpofitions naturally operate ? Let us judge here as we do in analogous cafes with regard to moral agents. Is one thought to have beftowed money, power, or any gift upon one which may be employed to good purpofes, that they may be mifapplied and abufed to bad ones, imlefs we are previoufly certain of the malignity and wicked diipofition and intention of the giver : but ought we not to form like judgments in like cafes ? But which is more, if we reflect that together with all our powers and difpofitions, the Author of nature hath given us a moral icnic^ to what other purpofe can we fuppofe our powers to be given in this man- ner, or lb conjoined, but for the befl ufe or the bed: nra] end ; fince our moral reafbn and icnf^ cannot be im- ^beei- P^antcd m us for any other purpofe, but to point and venusforany. prompt us to the beft ufc of all our powers, appc- reafea tites and affections ? For this moral lenfe is asnatu- ;!ly fitted for directing us right, and for no other o -uide and fteer a fliip. How of Moral Philosophy. How do we judge of any machine natural or arti- titicial ? Do we not fay, it is fitted for that end to which it is propereft to ferve \ or that to be applied to its mod ufeh.il purpofe, is its perfect and moft na- tural ftate ? Thus we judge of plants, trees, fhips, watches, and all forts of ftructures, animate or in- animate. Why then mould we pronounce or judge (z) otherwife concerning man and the human fy- ftem ? or can we do fo without departing from all the received rules of judging of any thing •, all the rules of judging either ufed in philofophy or common life ? Ought we not therefore to reafon in this manner with regard to every law of our nature? as for inftance, ! with regard to the law of knowledge ♦, that muft be owned to be a good law which is necefiary to our be- Our whole i ing capable of fcience, prudence, philofophy, arts frame is g°od- natural and moral, power, virtue and merit •, tho* in ^°L .} e™a* confequence of the fame power we cannot but beca- the law of pable of contracting prejudices, forming narrow knowledge, views, and making falfe judgments ; or tho' in con- fequence of the very laws and eftablifhments that render knowledge progreflive and dependent on our- felves, and by which we have a certain fphere of ac- tivity, power and dominion, errors, prejudices, wrong affociations, falfe judgments, and therefore bad choice, and unreasonable purfuits cannot be other- wile avoidable by us, than by the right exercife of our underftanding and reafon to which we are prompt- ed and directed in the only way we can be fo confid- ently with our own exercifing and employing them ; that is, by our delight in order, general laws, and the contemplation of public good. Or to give ano- anaan ef&&s ther inftance, 2. With regard to the law of fociety. reducible to" That muft be a good law with regard to the human t]}e Iaw of fo- fyftem, which binds and unites us together, by mak- Clety ; , or tof ing our greateft happinefs depend upon our uniting the lawfe)? This is the ancient way of reafoning about man analo- our nature a- go us to our way of reafoning about all other conflitutions natu- hove men- tal or artificial. Inftances of it have been already quoted from tioned, $icero and others ; and another fliallbe addecl immediately. together The PRINCIPLES together in a proper manner to promote that end; tho' in confequence of that very law our greateft happinefs cannot otherwife be acquired or attained than by right confederacy and union ; and therefore many miferies mud arife from difunion, and from uniting in an unfit or improper manner, — and fo on. — For, in like manner, mud we reafon with refpect to all the other laws of our nature that have been men- tioned, and their phenomena or effeds, which it is needlefs again to repeat. Now if this way of rea- fbning be good, then is nature fufficiently vindicated by the account that hath been given of the laws of mult be fuffi- our nature j for if it be good, then every effect con- countedfor jf cerning which we can reafon in the manner as above, explication of * Sufficiently explained and accounted for morally as phenomena well as phyfically ; fince' it is thus reduced to [an hath any ^ edablifhment or general law and principle in nature, meaning at necefTary t0 many excellent purpofes, for which were notour nature fitted, it would not be fo perfect as it is. But that the reafoning is good, is evident, i. For all the Since it is that very way of reafoning we admit in preceeding every other cafe to be good, and without admitting reafonmgs a- which natural philofophy cannot advance one ftep : for nefs* o/laws w^at does' or can natural philofophy do, but re- go on in the duce natural appearances to general laws, and mew lame way the goodnefs of thefe laws. 2. But which is more, It that is admit- mufl. ^ true^ jn gCnerai9 that no whole can be a good in every other wno^e m any other fenfe but this, that its parts, and *nd ln" ever, or whether it lafl but one day or a thoufand tnefame°prm- years-, fo man mufl be made for what he is made, cipleswehave whether he is to lafl but threefcore years, or forever. »a»d dovvn in But having now found for what end man is made I™8 eflty* while he exiits, let us enquire what reafon can deter- therefore to be mine enquired how Jong man is Nam cum animus, cognitis, perceptifque virtutibus, a corporis "kelytoexift ; obfequio, indulgentiaque difcefTerit, voluptatemque, ficut labem ?r wnetn^r he aliquam decoris opprefierit,omnemque mortis, dolorifque timorem ls,rlot dengn- effugerit,focietatemque caritatis coierit cum fuis omneifque natura e<* *or unmor* conjun&os, fuos duxerit, cultumque deorum, & puram religio- tant7* nem fufceperit, & exacuerit illam, ut oculorum, fie ingenii aci- em, ad bona diligenda, & rejicienda contraria : quas virtus ex providendo eil appeilata prudentia : quid eo dici, aut excogitari poterit beatius ? Idemque cum ccelum, terras, maria, rerumque omnium naturam perfpexerit, eaque unde generata, quo recur^ rant, quando quo modo obitura, quid in iis mortale, & cadu- cum, quid divinum, seternumque fit, viderit ipfumque ea mode- rantem, & regentem paene prehenderit, fefeque non unis cir- cumdatum mcenibus, popularem alicujus definiti loci, fed civem totius mundi, quafi unius urbis, agnoverit : in hac ille magnifi- centia rerum, atque in hoc confpe&u, & cognitione naturae, dii immortales, quam ipfe fe nofcet ! Atque hsec omnia, quafi fas- pimento aliquo, vallabit difTerendi ratione, veri & falfi judicio, fcientia, & arte quadam intelligendi, quid quamque rem fequa- tur, & quid fit cuique contrarium. Cumque fe ad civilem focie- Wtcm natum fenferit, non folum ilk fubtili difputatione fibi u- tendura The PRINCIPLES mine with any probability concerning his duration % or whether there is not good ground to believe that he is made immortal, and confequently for eternal progress, in proportion to his care to improve his moral faculties. Which is the point propofed to be proved by this enquiry. But before we gLlt before we proceed to that, in order, by a kind proper to 'op- °^ contraft> to giye further light to the preceeding pofe to the reaibnings concerning man, let us endeavour to preceeding ac- imagine to ourfelves an idea of what the workman- c.°^t0^inan> fhip of a malicious creator mult have been, in confe- mankind as it cjuence o£his malign difpofition \ for certainly we ihali is reafonable find that human nature mud have been the very re- to fuppofe verfe of what it now is, had it been formed by a inuft have malicious Creator, or with vicious and ungenerous dud ofama- intention. " Would we allow room, (fays an ex- lignant Crea- cellent author) to our invention to conceive what tor, who had fort 0f mechanifm, what conilitution of fenfes or no ien e o , a^e(c|-joris a malicious, powerful being; mufl have r.or regard tor , n . . rr , r °. , virtue, or the formed, we ihould ioon lee how rew evidences there gocd and per- are for any fuch apprehenfions of the Author of this iec"tion of mo- wor]d. Our mechanifm, as far as ever we have yet dif- ral beings. J tendam putabit, fed etiam fufa latius perpetua oratione, qua re- gat populos, qua ftabiliat leges, qua caitiget improbos, qua tue- atur bonos, qua laudet claros viros : qua praecepta filutis, 8c laudes apte ad perfuadendum edat fuis civibus : qua hortari ad decus, revocare a flagitio, confuiari point afflictos : fataque, & confulta fortium, & fapientum, cum improborum ignominia, iem- piternis monumentis prodire. Qure cum tot res, tantxque Tint, quas inefie in homine perfpiciantur ab iis, qui feipti velint nofle, :m parens eft, cducatrixque fapientia. This is a true piclure of human nature, and of our duties. And truly had we not been made by an infinitely wife and good being, man mufthave been quite the reverie ; fuch an animal, as Uhffes's men were meta- orphofed into by Circes in Homer, the fuin of which fiction a- raouuts briefly to thib in Horace's words. Siren urn voces, & Circes ho cut a v.ofti : -Zim' ft cum fociis ftultus cupidufyue bibijjet \ Sub dom'tna minreU ice fuijfet turfis <5* excors, ■mmitndus, phi cenfent) nihil icnt.iam : non vereor, ne hunc errorem >phi iirideant. the t Of MO kAL P H 1 L 0 ■ S 0 P 'U Y. Hfj the body is heavily opprefTed and difordered, the Chap. IX. mind is bowed down, and cannot raife itfelf to its *— ~v*—^ higheft exercifes. But all this only proves that in this prefent ftate, our minds and bodies are united together in the clofeft and moft intimate manner : nay, properly fpeaking, it only proves, that in this prefent ftate our minds are varioufly affected by the various operations of the laws of matter and motion, according to a certain fixed order. For it is our mind, or thinking part, which perceives, or which is touched and affected : matter or body cannot per- They only ceive or feel. Body, or union with body and mat- Prov^ a Pre* ter, can, therefore, only mean a certain order or dence of our method, according to which the mind is affected, body and And therefore to lay, that mind muff, ceafe to exifl mind, accord- when body ceafes, is indeed to fay, that mind muft jnS t0 certain neceffarily ceafe to exifl, when one way of its being t**s affected no longer takes place : or it is to fay, that mind itfelf is not diflinct from fome of its percep- tions, and the order in which thefe are conveyed to it ; both which afTertions are equally abfurd. To fay with the above-mentioned authors, 4C What probability is there, that we begin to live when we perifh •, that we become gods* or at leaft demi-gods9 in comparifon of our prefent ftate, when we ceafe to be •, or that we are deftroyed in order to exifl: in a more perfect manner?" All this is manifeftly begging the queflion, and taking it as granted that our minds diflblve with our bodies, and confequent- ly, that our thinking part is nothing diflinct from its fenfible perceptions. But who is not confcious that the principle in him which receives ideas from without, is totally diflinct from thefe paffive im- preffions ? Or can any philofopher affert fo glaring an abfurdity, as to fay, paffive, un perceiving mat- ter can any otherwife affect a thinking being, than by means of laws appointing a connexion between its operations ; or, more properly fpeaking, opera- tions produced upon it, and certain fenfations or paffions 233 The PRINCIPLES Ch a p. IX. pafTions in minds. But all the idle fluff about mat* U-—V-—- - ' ter's acting has been too long ago exploded by phi- lofophers to be now refuted. This is a V. Let us therefore proceed to fuch conclufions, very pod ^ a complete view of our prefent frame and ftate fucha^ro-01 ^uSSe^s' w*tn- regard t0 our furviving the diflblu- greffive being tion of our bodies, or the prefent arbitrary union, as man. by means of our bodies, with a fenfible world. Now from what has been proved to be really our confu- tation, it is plain that we fet out with very good furni- ture for making confiderable progrefs in knowledge and virtue : our very fenfes are chiefly given us in order to be inftruments and means of virtuous exer- cifes in this prefent ftate : what therefore is the na- tural language refulting from fuch a frame, but that we are made for continual progrefs in moral per- fection, in proportion to our culture, and our fitua- tion for culture, in whatever ftate or circumftances we may be placed ? For becaufe death happens, no- thing more can be faid on that account, than, " That there is a way at prefent by which our thinking part is affected, according to certain laws, which ceafes upon the d involution of our organical frame by death." A firft ftate It cannot be faid, merely on that account, that a cannot laft Being fitted for moral progrefs, cannot make pro- It!^!;.,. srefs after i'uch a way of being; affected from with* mult give & / & way to ano- out no more takes place. I he more natural con- ther. clufion is, that fuch a way of being affected ceafing, Beings fitted for progrefs fhall be placed in new cir- cumftances of progrefs and improvement. A pro- greflive being cannot be made to continue always in the fame ftate ; and therefore a being Co made has no rtafon to imagine its firft ftate fhall be its only ftate-, or to conclude any thing elfe, when its firft ftate ceafes, than that, as a firft ftate ought not to be, nor cannot indeed in the nature of things be the only ftate of progrellive beings-, fo accordingly, it now goes to another, proper to fucceed to its firft. This of Moral Philosophy. 239 .""his is certainly the conclufion death leads us to, u Chap. IXa /e take a juft view of our moral make -, moral pow- u^v~"-J rs being evidently made for progrefs, and therefore lot for one ftate : otherwife we muft fay, that mo- It is therefore al powers, which in themfelves look to be defigned reafonable to md fit for perpetual cultivation and improvement, ^is* ftat/only null necefiarily ceafe to be, becaufe, though they ceafes, as the nuft have a firft ftate, and are not made always to firft ftate of a continue in one ftate, but for progreffion, yet this Progreiriv« (late ceafes to be; which is in effect to fay, that be- to'do.0"2 caufe our firit ftate ceafes, we are not likely to have another, though it muft ceafe, becaufe it is but a firft. In other words, it is to argue thus -, we muft have a firft ftate, being progreffive beings, which ftate can only be a firft ftate ; yet if it ceafes, we muft ceafe to be. Than which nothing can be more abfurd. It is true, our prefent ftate is diflblved with con- That our comitant pains*, but what fallows from thence? but death is at- that it is diffolved in confequence of certain laws tended Wltfl of matter and motion, which muft, till they have ™oves°tnat no longer any influence upon us, varioufly affect us the laws of with pains and pleafures : it only follows from hence, uaion Wlth that the diffolution comes about analogoufly to, or ^d/ecr°a^^f confiftently with the general laws, according to the un;on js which we are affected with pain or pleafure from quite diflblv- without. Thefe pains are no more a proof of the ed- diffolution of the mind, than any other pains pro- ceeding from the fame laws, which the mind fur- vives. And our moral fabric plainly befpeaks only a temporary connexion with matter, as a proper firft ftate, for their formation, exercife and improve- ment. For even during this connexion, our fenfi- ble appetites and gratifications are, according to our fabric, made to fubmit to our moral powers, in fuch a manner that unlefs they are directed and governed by them, they afford no true happinefs and enjoy- ment to us *, but rather contrariwife bring pain and mifery The PRINCIPLES Qn a p. IX. nufery upon us. To illuftrate this reafoning more v^-v"*— ' fully, let us confider, There is a VI. There is an evident reafon why, in the fcafe Shy tern" °f exiflence> there fllould be fuch a beinS as *«* fliould be fddi mat lsi a moral being connected for a while with a a being as material world ; fince were there no fuch being in !!!,a?*T °r ? tne world, there would be a great void in nature : fuchmoral iuc^ a kind °^ De*nS 1S absolutely necefTary in the pottos united gradation of life and perfection, which makes the with body, riches, the plenitude of nature ; becaufe without fuch a being, nature would not be full and coherent. But there is no reafon, on the other hand, why a being made for progrefs, fliould always continue in the lame ftate : nay, it is repugnant to the very na- ture of a progreflive being, or a being made for progrefs toward perfection proportionably to the culture of its powers, that fuch a being fliould al- ways continue in that fituation which is its beginning or fir ft ftate. This prefent condition of mankind, which is requifite in its place to the fullnefs and confidence of nature, affords us in our firft begin- ning excellent materials and means of improvement in knowledge and virtue, confidered as a beginning. J>ut there is And therefore the queftion is, why it ought not to no reafon to be confidered merely as a beginning? If there is an think fach an enc| t0 \v as t}icrc plainly is by death, what does that union mould , , r, • • ' c n n. . c conti- Prove> out that a beginning or hrit ltate or pro- rue, 'or be greflivc powers does not always laft ; or that, as it ite ought not to laft, fo neither docs it ? An end to a firft in^hich our ^atc can provc no niore> but that it is a firft ftate; are placed.* lts farther icoi: mult be inferred from the nature of the powers themfelveSj which make this firft ftate; and therefore it having been found that our powers, d moral, as they are conjoined in our (ran* make an excellent firft ftate, for our forma- tion and improvement in moral perfection ; which )L eans the only ftate our thinking part, ith all its moral powers, can fubfift in 3 it is rea- fonabte of Moral Philosophy. x 241 fonable to conclude, fince this, confidered only as a Chap. IX. firft ftate, is a very good and proper one, that it is \***~yr*^ only fuch. In that viewj all is orderly and confo- nant to the general courfe and analogy of nature, fo far as we can pry into it ; and the oppofite notion is quite repugnant to the order, beauty and wife ad- miniftration every where dilcernible in nature. And therefore this mud be the true view of our prefent [late, " That it is indeed our firft, which muit ceafe* but not the whole of our exiftence." VII. But in the next place, as we fee a plain rea- And it is evi- fon why the prefent condition of mankind fhould dent tha5 •take place in nature, which is fo fit a ftate for usJJodTanda to be formed in, or rather to form ourfelves in, to a material very high degree of perfection, fince without fuch world cannot ; a being as man, nature would not be full and co- always laft* herent ; fo we may fee a very plain reafon, why this : ftate does not always continue : not only a moral reafon, why, being a beginning ftate, it fhould not continue \ but a phyfical reafon why it cannot laft always. The exiftence, that is, the perception of a fenfible world, is neceflary to the fullnefs and riches of nature, and the perfection of its works. But this beautiful and ufeful fenfible world, with which we have now communication by means of our bodily organization, muft wear out, it cannot laft for ever : fuch is the nature and conftitution of mat- ter, or fuch is the eiTential law of nature, with re- gard to all matter that falls within our fenfe or ob- servation, that it, like artificial machines, is wafted by attrition; all the fprings in it decay, become weak, and unable to perform their functions, and at laft are quite worn out : nay, this happens to ar- tificial machines, becaufe they are material ones. Such then is the nature of bodies ; fuch is the nature of matter in general. Wherefore the prefent con- ftitution of our mundan fyftem cannot hold out for ever, its powers will fail, it will at laft be no R longer 242 The PRINCIPLES Chap. IX. longer able to produce its ends. Or, which is the v— — v~— ' fume thing to us, to all intents and purpofes, fince This is a tne ienfible world to us, is the fenfible world we are quenoofthe affe(^ed DY> perceive, and have commerce with-, properties of our bodies, by which we have communication with body or mat- a material world, as they naturally grow up to per- ter* feclion, fo they as naturally decline and dwindle a- way : nor can we have bodies that mull not fo wafte and confume, compofed of any matter we know •, or endued with the properties our bodies muit ne- cefTarily be, to have correfpondence with the matter we are acquainted with •, fince all the matter we know is evidently alterable in it* form and texture, by the fame laws which render it of any ufe to It is owned Us. This all philofophers are agreed in, and there- by all philo- fQre we neecj not jnjj£j. ionger Up0n it> But what follows from this, when we compare our moral powers with this fyitem of matter with which we are now united, which thus perifhes; whereas they are of an unperifhing nature, and ca- pable of eternal improvement, without any ipecific alteration of their prefent make : what follows from thence, but that we are but for a time, and in our reafowblTto beginning flate, united with what, though it can- conclude, that not laft for ever, yet while it laits ; or, which is the our moral fome thing to us, while our correfpondence with it powers, na- j ^ affords to our moral powers in their firft be- turally cara- . '. . . x , i r i bleoflailino- ginnings, very proper objects to exert themielves for ever with- about ; very proper means and occafions for their out wearing improvement. This, certainly, is what alone can uSted7<£a ^e Rationally inferred from the complex view of our time with bo- frame, eipecially if we add to this, dies, in order to the fuineis VIII. That in confequence of the frame of our teiufck b earch> and the nature of our Prelent united ftatc» a very proper all mankind cannot live together on earth •, but as firfl itate for it now happens, one generation muit make room our power, to for another . becaufe the earth would foon be over- and^nlpjovcd Peopled, if it were not inhabited as it is, by iiicccf- in. fions. of Moral Philosophy. 24 jf Ions. I need not tell thofe who have the fmalleft Chap. IX, ncture of natural philolbphy, that in order to make ^— - >rmmmJ lr earth more capacious, or a proper habitation ,Men muft . i . c • 1 1 • r • live upon >r a much greater number or inhabitants or various earth rhy fuc- inds than it now is, that its magnitude mult be in- ceffive gene- •eafed, and confequently the whole conftitution of rations, jr mundan fyftem, if not of all things that exift, luft be changed : for if the proportions of the lagnitudes of the bodies which compofe it be ai- red, their diftances, orbits, attractions, and in tie word, all the laws relative to them, mud be langed : and therefore to demand ilich an akera- : on with regard to our earth, is in reality to defire, iere were no fuch fyftem in nature as our mun- an one, but that its fpace were entirely void, or lied with another fyftem of a different texture: hich will be allowed to be a demand that is phyfi- Our earth illy abfurd ; fince, as far as we can carry our re- cou*d n°c bs arches, or as analogy can lead us to form any no- ^g^apa. on of things, nature is full and coherent as it is, ciOUs, with- ld cannot be fo if any change were made. But out altering ncQ it is fo that mankind muft occupy the earth by our whole iccefiive generations, and that the earth which is ^m, a"nd -~n fit and proper part of our mundan fyftem ; which all likelihood 1 its fpace is the propereft fyftem with regard to the the whole 'hole of nature : what follows from this, according univerfe* d the rules of analogical reafoning, but that though [ ne generation of men gives place to another, and Wiien our nuft do fo, and things are likely to continue fo, mundan fy- /hile the earth continues to be a fit habitation for ftem is able to hem, which it is likely to be while the laws of our ^de?utt{jere nundan fyftem are able to hold it together in tole- is rfaf0'n from able order ; yet our mundan fyftem, and confe- analogy to juently our earth, and all fuccelTions of its inhabi- think lt ^a11 ants, muft have an end at laft, and mail be fuc- ^ anothe? reeded by another fyftem, formed perhaps out of proper to fuc- :he ruins of this, which mall be in its place and or- ceed to it, ier of fucceflion, as beautifully, regularly, and be- PerhaPs rifinS icficially conftituted, as this prefent one is. This is ?j£0 lts ru~ R 2 indeed, 244 M* PRINCIPLES Ch a p. IX. indeed, what prefent order, and the analogy 01 w— — y — -J things naturally lead us to conceive : for why fhouk we apprehend nature to be exhaufled by the prefem production ? What reaibn have we to believe its fe- cundity fo limited and fcanty ? Or if this be not it! only birth, why mould we imagine that its future ones fhall be lei's regular, fhapely, and found ? Buf thefe things I only mention, to (hew how analog); leads us to think of nature in general, or with re- gard to its general order of production, that wd may the better feel the force of the preiumptiom which arife from analogy, with regard to ourielves. But if fa, we For if we have reaibn to think fo of nature in gene have yet bet- rai9 as hath been fuggefted, why ought we not tc tfcj k^lV t-° tnn:1^ °f nature w^tn regard to ourfclves in like man- but our firft ner-? What reaibn have we to fear that the pareni fete, which who produced us, hath provided fo liberally for us. lhali be fuc- and fet us f0 wen at prefent, cannot provide anothei vfrf propeMo *abitation for us> when this fails> ™ wel1 fitted t0 U! fojlow it. as a fecond (late, as this is as a firft iiate ? Hath nature, which hath produced our moral powers, anc fuch variety of entertainment and employment foi them, no further power, no further fertility ? Is ii quite drained, is it quite unable to fupport us longer, or to make further provifion for us ? If mankind IX. Before we proceed to other arguments tc to be at corroborate all that hath been faid, let us add, thai ^H*' thfrrC ^ ^me Pr^nc^P'e *b ea^y admitted by all philofo nly be^a voi'd, Pners' Wltn regard to our prefent ilate, " Tha a chafm in ' without it nature could not have been full and co nature. herent," extends a great deal further than fome an apt to imagine. It affords an excellent argumerr tor our future exiflence. For if mankind ceafe tc be at death, or when their bodies are dilfolvcd, there muft neceflfarily, upon that event, be a chafm 01 blank in nature ; fince it is only a tranfition by mar from this to another ilate, fuitcd to him as coming from the prefent one, which can continue the chaii 0 c/Moral Philosophy. 245 "being without any interruptionbr breach. It is, Chap. IX. Don fuppofition of our perifhing totally by death, *— - — /— - ^ roken and difcontinued. This opinion concerning le plenitude of nature, and a riling fcale of exil- nee through all poflible gradations of being, to ie higheft, is not only an ancient one, but it is \ hat the contemplation of nature naturally, if not eccffarily directs us to: for where do we perceive ly void ? how nicely, how fubtly, or by what im- erceptible fteps do beings rife to man, the only ■ rder of moral agents within our obfervation in our ircfent ftate ? And if we do not perceive a chafm in s le defcending gradation of nature, from us to meer ] egetative life, why mould we dream of any blank •1 the afcending gradation above us, to which by j ur imagination (fo vaft is its expanding power) we an fet no bounds. This however is certain, that if That nature lie maxim be well founded, and there be no reafon is full and 0 think that there ever can be any void in nature ; coherent, we 1 1 tnuft likewife be true, that no perceiving being ^conclude :: hall ever ceafe to exift, but mall continue to be, and from experi- 0 pafs through the gradations fuited to its kind, and ence and ana- onfequently to the riches and fullnefs which makes IoSy* he perfection of nature. Or whatever may be laid )f merely fenfitive beings of the lower order (to vhom, however, why mould we begrudge immor- ality, as if the value of ours would be lelfened by ts being common to all perceiving beings) at lead, et . A at>/ , r. & c>/ r 5 maxim mull it muit be true that moral agents cannot ceafe to be falfe, if be, but muft continue for ever, and mud pafs thro5 man is not the feveral gradations naturally fuited to them, in Jnac^e ]foT e~ proportion to their culture and care to improve, S^ ^d This muft be true, becaufe indeed, not only upon ceafes to be the ceafing of any fpecies, but upon the ceafing of at death. any individual of moral agents to exift, there necef- larily would be a chafm, an interruption in the chain of nature •, a want, a deficiency, inftead of fullnefs. For a moral being, inftead of making the progrefs ir is naturally fitted for, would thus flop fliorr, and R 3 fo 246 The PRINCIPLES Chap. IX. fo leave nature void of that particular progreflion it v-^V-"— ; and it alone, can make or fill up. The progrel man, as fuch, is fitted to make in a fucceedini ftate to this, is no lefs neceffary to the complet fullnefs and perfection of nature, than that whicl he is fitted for in this prefent ftate •, for it is only i being fo conftituted, that is, it is only man, wh< can make that progrefs -, and all pofiible progrefTe in moral perfection are requifite to make nature ful and coherent. That idea involves in it the exifteno of all capacities of moral perfection which can exift and consequently of all pofiible progrefTes, or all thu progrefTes which may be made by moral powers o all forts, in proportion to the culture, implied ii the very notion of moral perfection, of each ac cording to its kind, and in its particular manner But we have ^ therefore the riches and perfection of nature con no gTound to fifts in fuch fullnefs, and fuch fullnefs really be tht doubt of the end purfued by nature, man is not to perifh, but tc ture"6 S na ma^e f°r ever progrefs, in proportion to the pain< he takes to improve himfelf. But, indeed, as wc cannot form any other notion of fullnefs and per- fection in nature, but this which hath been de- fcribed, i'o the further we advance in the knowledge of nature, the more inftanceswe find of this fullnefs, riches, and coherence ; and confequently, the more . mint we be confirmed in this opinion of nature, than natural to "he wn,cn nothing can be more delightful. Our mind mind ; it feems to be formed to conceive it, take hold of it, lyde- ond rejoice in it with unfpeakable triumph. Whence in n- elfe could it afford us the latisfaction and tranfport it docs ; how elfe could it fo wonderfully dilate, expand, and quicken our mind, were we not made to be ib affected by it? And if it is naturally fo ling, fo exhilarating to the mind, muft it not be true? can it be a delulion ? Were not nature really as great conception, fo natural to the human mind, represents it to be, whence could we have that idea ? How could we be ib great-mind- ed of Moral Philosophy. 247 :d as to form it ; how could nature lead us to it as Chap. IX. ? I :he moft natural fentiment ? <*— — v—-^ It is needlefs, however, to tell philofophers that But by full- his notion concerning the fullnefs of nature, cannot ne& ofna- \mthout manifeft abfurdity, be extended to fignify, ^^fy •' That nature hath always been full •," fince created fu\\ progrefs, beings muft begin to be -, and that only hath no be- ginning which is uncreated, and exifts by necefTity ; of narure from all eternity : nor to fignify, " that nature hath at all times been full, with all kinds of perfection and happinefs, or capacities of them :" fince moral powers, the chief of all powers, are in their .nature progrefiive; and progrefs, in the very idea of it, fuppofes a time preceeding every acquired degree of perfection, in which that did not, nor could not exift ; or, in other words, fuppofes inter- : mediate fteps by which the progrefs is made. The- fullnefs of nature, therefore, can only mean a con- ,; tinued, unbroken progrefs towards fullnefs ; if which ; take place, man muft be immortal. For otherwife which can- '} a certain, pofiible progrefs would not take place \ not be the and fo nature would not be a perfectly full, and co- cafe, if man herent progrefs, which we have fo good reafon from ls not immor" the analogy of nature to think it is intended to be. Hitherto I have only fpoken of nature -9 becaufe Hitherto we reafonings from analogy require no more, but that have only we argue from the obfervable ftate and courfe of en(luired ,.&A, ,. .. r n . what ought things. And according to this way or reafoning, t0 be inferred we fee that from nature, confidered as a whole, as from the one frame or conftitution of things, there is no courfe of na- ground to imagine that the better or nobler parts |^e y ana~ in it, moral powers, do not, as well as all its other parts, naturally tend towards their higheft and no- bleft end ; or that they (hall only laft for a while, But ^ and then be deftroyed : there is no appearance of courfe of na- any fuch imperfection, any fuch diforder and wafte, ture proves any fuch deftroying humour and tendency in na- the Authof0** ture. In this way of reafoning, we have abftracted p^aiy Jell R 4 from difpofed. Let us there- fore confider how the ar- gument will (land when inikad of na ture, or the courfe of things, we fay the The PRINCIPLES from all confederation of the temper and difpofition of che univerfal mind ; and have confidered nature itfelf juft as we would confider and argue from any machine, by itfelf, with refpect to its ultimate ten- dency. But fince there can be no eftablimed courfe of things without a mind •, and foch a fettled, wife courfe of things as we have found human nature and the laws relative to it to be, plainly proves the efficiency and fuperintendency of a powerful, wife and benevolent mind ; let us now fee how the con- clufion will turn out upon changing the phrafe : and if in (lead of arguing from the Hated order and courfe of things, we reafon from the nature of the Author, of which that affords a plain and irrefiftible proof. " Perfect, good and wife contrivance, is the good contrivance of fome mind equal to it ; it is therefore the contrivance and effect of a very powerful, wife, and good mind." Let us therefore no longer leave the governing mind out of the queftion ; and let us now afk ourfelves what it is reafonable to think con- cerning death, fince, i . Our frame and contexture fhews in every refpecl: an excellent moral difpofition in our Maker, pro- vided we are not deftroyed by death, but are really intended, as our moral powers evidently feem to be, . for eternal progrefs in moral perfection, propor- tionable to our care to improve in it ; or iince, could we but conclude that to be the cafe, there would be no ground at all to doubt of the per feet good and wife goodnefs of our Author, our prcfent ftate being, up- Authorof on that hypothecs, a moft excellent firft ftate of nature. trja| ancj format;on for our moral powers, and con- fcquently a full proof of an infinitely wile and gene- rous fuperintendency. Since, 2dly, We not only can exift after our u- nion with a material world by means of our bodies ceafes, there being no nccerlary, but only a volun- tary or arbitrary connexion between our moral powers and bodies ; or a fcnfihlc world, and the of Moral Philosophy. 249 liffolution of our bodies is but the necefTary effect of Ch a p . IX. he very fame laws which render a fenfible world, «— - --/——*' vhich cannot always laft, while it lafts, fo fit an oc- :alion and fubject for the improvement of our mo *al powers in this their firft ftate. Since, gdly, The very nature of a progrefs fup« pies a change of ftate, the oeflation of a firft, and a tranfition to another : fince, I fay, all thofe prin- ciples are true, let us afk ourfelves, whether it is not reafonable to look upon this as our proper firft ftate, which mall be fucceeded by another, as fit to fol- low it as this is to be our firft ftate ? Let us afk our- felves, whether this is not a reafonable conclufion from thefe principles *, or what elfe can be fuppofed, that is fo confonant to the nature of things, and to that temper and difpofition of the Maker and Go- vernor of the world which it indicates? For the How the ar- argument in its weakeft form muft ftand thus, " All ghu™e^ "^ nature looks well with refpect to virtue, provided j^weakeft death does not annihilate our moral powers, and this form. be but our firft ftate of trial and formation : all but this one doubtful phenomenon befpeaks an excellent Maker and Governor." Now if this be the cafe, why does this fingle fact alarm us, or appear fright- ful to us, fince our communion with this fenfible world is but an arbitrary connexion ; this fenfible world cannot laft always, but our moral powers may furvive its destruction, and we cannot pafs into an- other ftate without leaving this, which we only do in the manner necelfary, in confequence of the very laws which render our prefent ftate, while it lafts, fo fit a fubject and means for the improvement of our powers. This, I fay, is the only probable con- clufion we can draw concerning death, from the consideration of our prefent frame, if our prefent connexion with a fenfible world be only an arbitrary connexion. But the ftrength of conviction this ar- gument carries along with it, in this fhape, will en- creafe upon us, the more we reafon the matter with oiMefjres, from the account that has been given of our *F° The PRINCIPLES Chap. IX. our conftitution, and of the order of tilings in this v- — y J our prefent fixation, relative to our moral powers. It gathers For, 1. If in the prefent ftate of mankind, even itrength from thofe laws of matter and motion, in confequence of deradons°nil" which death haPPens> are fo ™ell adjufted to our happinels, or our progrefs in moral perfection, what realon have we to apprehend fuch bad management and intention toward man, as his total deftrucbon It is only by death plainly imports ? It is only con fufion and from confu- diibrder which forebodes greater confufion and fonanddif- diibrder: it is only evil difpofitions and intentions order tnat plainly difplaycd and evidenced, which can reafona- confulion and ui r r j n.- T difordcrcan wy create fear: preient order prognofbeates future lionably order; evidences of goodnefs and kind intention n*d. ought to create truit and confidence : feeing there- fore man is made for a very noble end here -, and fince all the laws and powers relative to his fituation are excellently litted to that end, what ground can we have to conceive fo ill of the difpofition of our Author, as to think he had no other defign with regard to us, than to equip and furnifh us for ever- laibng progrefs, merely to have the pleaiure of dis- appointing us, by demoliihing our powers almoft as loon as he gave us being •, or as we had arrived by the courfe of things, to a tolerable conception of what our powers may attain to by due culture, if they are not wilfully deftroyed. We can draw no juft conclufion concerning the diflblution of our bo- dies at death, in confequence 01 the laws of the ma- taJ creation, without taking into our confidera- tion the other parts of our preient make, and the ends to which they are adapted -, for that would be c" to reafon from a very partial view of the object. \.h! therefore the only queftion with regard to man is any ground DO think, from the 4 his many moral faculties, tlpt thefe to be deftroyed with our bodily frame : I there is nor, on the contrary, better rea- . ik chat thi9 iiate is his firft probationary one^ of Moral Philosophy. 251 one, or one very fit for him in the beginning of his Chap. IX. exiftence, in order to his being fchooled, tried and s.*^v—-^ improved to a very confiderable degree of perfecti- on, but not his only one, or the whole of his exift- ence. Now the refult of all that has been faid of our frame and conftitution, and of the laws relative to our prefent condition prove, that it is an excellent firft ftate, a very proper fchool for our moral im- provement •, a ftate in which we may by proper cul- ture, in confequence of the occafions, materials and means it affords us, arrive at a very confiderable de- gree of perfection as a firft ftate. And why there- fore fhould we think, that when our bodily organi- zation is deftroyed, and confequently all the prefent material objects of gratification or exercife are taken from us, our minds capable of higher pleafures and enjoyments, are alfo quite deftroyed together with what they have only an arbitrary connexion with : a connexion which ought to ceafe with its end and life ; a connexion which cannot in the nature of things always laft •, and which muft of neceflity ceafe if we are progreflive beings, as we as plainly appeat to be, as any machine appears to be fitted for its end : for a ftate cannot fucceed to another, unle& that other give way to it. Would not this indeed be to conclude, that to beings made for progrefs, and therefore to change ftates, what may be only a change of ftate, and what muft happen upon the change of our prefent ftate according to its very good laws, is not a change, but deftruction of be- ing ? Is it not, in fhort, to fay, that what is well conducted as a firft part, is for that reafon not to be looked upon as a well conducted firft part, but as a bad whole ? II. We cannot fuppofe death to be a tranfition jt js no obje- to another ftate, but the fame pains and other cir- aion again cumftances which now attend it, muft likewife ao this reasoning, company it on that fuppofition : fince they are the that death neceftary effects of our bodily conftitution. and the ^en at all laws ages, 252 The PRINCIPLES Chap. IX. laws of matter and motion. But it is mod confer nant to the nature of our moral powers, and to the provifion made for their improvement here, to fup- pofe it not a diflblutionof our whole frame, but mere- ly of our bodily part, and a traniition into another ftate 5 and therefore the preemption muft be that it is fuch. Some may imagine that there would not be fo much ground for doubting about our future ex- iftence, if all mankind lived till their conftitutions were quite worn out in old age, and none were de- For as this is ftroyed violently. But what tho' fome die in infan- the neceffary cy otners in their prime ? What tho' death comes effeft ot good J ' n r r . . . laws, fo it upon men at aH ages ; iince it always happens in con- may be reqai- fequence of laws of matter and motion neceffiry to fite to general many excellent purpofes in our prefent ftate; and na- good m a fu- ture m jiaye ad;ufted the ftate into which men pafs from this, at whatever period or hre, or with whatever temperature of mind, fo as that a future life fhall make with this a very regular, con- fiftent and veil adjufted who'e ; a complcat1 drama, as fome of the ancients have not improperly expref- fed it. The only queftion is, Whether there is not good realbn to think fo from the prefent ftate of things, and no juft realbn to fear the contrary? Whether our being does not begin in fuch a manner forebodes an orderly and proper progrefs inftead Hidden deftruetion ? Upon iuppolition that this is not the whole of our being, but that there is a fu- ftatej or, ftofpeak more agreeably to what our moral being prefeges) upon fuppofition that we are immortal, it is eaiy on that hypothecs to conceive how mankind's entering upon a future ftate, at va- rious ages, may contribute to the happinels, variety and general good of a future ftate. But death, however it happens, is the effect of the fteady ope- ration of the laws of the material fyftcm, which are found to be every way well adjufted to it \ and it is* not inconvenient, but rather neceffary. to the general ing of mankind in this ftate. For which i ,,% unlefsit could be proved that this phenome- non i c/Moral Philosophy. 253. non cannot poflibly contribute otherwife than to dif- Chap. IX, order in a future ftate, it cannot be any ground for W-v— -^ calling the good government of the world into que- ftion, or of fears with regard to futurity. III. In fine, if it be true, as I think it hath been fufficiently proved, that man is made in this (late To imagine (whether it be his only one or not) for progrefs in ^ we *r* virtue ; for governing his fenfible appetites by reafon deathis to and a moral fenfe, and for the generous purfuit of think worfe public good ; and that all the parts of his frame con- of the Author cur to lit him for that end, pufh him to purfue it, of nature rthan rr i i • r r ' • i r we can °f anV or afford him means or purluing it ; and conlequent- rational crea- ly of exerting great virtues : if this be true, then there ture. can be no more reafon to apprehend that the Author of fuch a frame and conflitution of things, only defigned man to make progrefs in it for a fhort time, and after that to ceafe by being deftroyed, than there is reafon to imagine that he would have made us for moral perfection, and for happinefs by fo do- ing, if he had no pleafure in moral creatures and their virtuous improvements and happinefs. And fure no other reafon could have induced our Author to indue us with reafon and a moral fenfe* but fa- tisfaclion in the improvement and happinefs of mo- ral beings. But fuch a motive could never have de-* termined him to fet fuch narrow bounds to our mo- ral improvements, by allowing fuch a fhort duration to our exiftence, as is the cafe on fuppofition that we perifh with our bodies. Why mould we conceive ib of our Author -, fince hardly is there any one a- mongus that would do fo, or any thing like it, had v/e any power analogous to his ? For can there be among men goodnefs furpafling that of the univer- ial parent ; benevolence excelling his, who made us capable of forming the idea of benevolence, and de- lighting in it. We may here apply what the Poet fays on another occafion, and afk, Hens age^ rejponde, minimum eft quodfcire laboroy De Jove quid fentis ? eft ney utpr that the know but a part, cannot reafon about what the ^rneTb^ greater! good of the whole may or may not require : |enerai ]aws. For tho' it be very true, that we know but a fmall part of the immenfe fyftem of nature, and that our faculties are very narrow, compared with that vaft object ; yet our knowledge muft certainly extend as far as we have clear and diftincl: ideas, and are able to perceive clearly their agreements and difagree- ments. And we may form the ideas of a whole, and of univerfal order and good from the confideration of any part of nature : every part, as for inftance, every vegetable, or every animal, being itfelf a parti- cular whole, tho9 a part of a larger fyftem : or we may form thefe ideas from the confideration of any machine of human invention : and fo foon as we attend to thefe ideas of whole and univerfal good, we clearly perceive, 1. That all the interefts of intel- ligent beings require that nature fhould operate ac- cording to general fixed laws ; and there cannot be beauty, regularity and perfection in a whole, with- out the obfervance of general laws in the difpofition, oeconomy and operations of the whole. The very notion of a whole, includes in it an aptitude of parts to a principal end, a fixed defign, and regular fixed means operating towards that defign in the fimpleft and fteddieft way. In like manner may we *56 "the PRINCIPLES Chap. IX. we conclude concerning a whole of intelligent beings. *— -"v—*-1 2. That no effects of the general laws neeeffary to That no f- ^^ ^00c^ are ev'* Wlt^ re§arc* t0 t^e whole, fince fefts of gene- a^ ^ie inconveniencies of the uniformity of fuch ral goodTlaws laws are fully compenfated by the particular advan- are evil. tages which reiult from them, together with the ge- neral advantages redounding from the univerfality and uninterrupted operation of laws. 3. In like manner may we conclude, that fomething muft be That a whole wanting to the perfection of a whole of intelligent fed, if any^ ^einSs> ^ anv additional quantity of happinefs could greater, quan- take place in it. 4. In like manner may we con- tity of happi- elude, that a whole, confiding of a variety of mo- neis could mj bejngS tne happinefs of whom is made depen- take place 'n , ° ,7 r, *' . . . . r\ 1L dent on tnemielves^or to be acquired by themlelves; is a more perfect whole,- than one confiding merely of perceiving beings incapable of reflexion, willing, chufing, appro ving,- diiapproving affections and ac- That the good tions 5 or, in a word,- who have no dominion, power of a moral or fphere of activity. All thefe, and many other iyilem ought {uch genera| conclufions may be as certainly laid red to the * down as any conclufions whatfoever in any fci- good of an in- ence : they are plain corrolaries from the very idea animate fy- or definition of a whole, and of general perfection item. ancj g00C|# Good mult mean the good of fome per- ceiving being *, and if one perceiving being may be of a higher order than another, (as very different or- ders, daffes and ranks may be conceived) then is moral perfection, or the capacity of attaining to mo- ral perfection, higher than merely perceptive power,- that is, mecr capacity of receiving fenfations. And if fo. the greater quantity of happinefs producible, mud mean no more, than the greated quantity of capacity for moral happinefs. VI. Nay, tho' we are not able to comprehend the whok of nature, there are yet more particular infe- rences which we may deduce with as great certainty as thefe general ones concerning the perfection and good c/ Moral Philosophy. 257 good of a whole, with reference to our exiftcnce af- Chap. IX. ter the diflblution of our bodies. 1. It is only the v— "^v^ due care of moral beings that can make a perfect whole ; for they are the chief beings in rank and dig- nity ; or their happinefs is the objec\of the greateit importance, the greater good. And therefore it is not confident with good order, not only to fuppofe the laws of matter not fubfervient to them, fince matter itfelf is incapable of happinefs or enjoyment ; but it is likewife fo, to fuppofe the greater quantity of moral happinefs to be lefTened to make room for, or give place to a quantity of merely perceptive enjoy- ment. 2. The happinefs of moral beings, their mo- The greater *al inftrudtion, or their encouragement to the im- happinefs of provement of their moral powers, cannot rcquirc "^^"^ :hat any moral being, who in their firft Hate have the deftruftion nade good improvements, or have laid themfelves of moral xit with all fincerity and conftancy to make progrefs Powers* :owards moral perfection, mould fo foon as they uve done fo be deftroyed. 3. Far lefs can any 0f Ordl("cou" :hefeends require, that they mould be moved into "f^^aVii-' mother Hate, in which improvement mail be under ture ftate. /ery great difcouragements and difad vantages, and -vhere moral beings who have made confiderable mprovements mall have lefs occaiions and means of mproving in moral qualifications, than in their be- ginning ftate. Thefe ends cannot require, that vir- ile mould be necelTarily pufried backwards, forced nto decline, or deprived of all opportunities of ad- vancing. Nothing can be more repugnant to :he idea of a good governor, and of the purfuit "if general good, and of a perfect whole, than fuch par jefs tjie idminiftration. 4. Far lefs ftill can thefe ends re- abfolute mife- quire, that beings furniflied, prompted and encour- *y of" virtue, aged, as we are in this ftate by our make and frame to make progrefs in virtue, mould, after having ta- ken due pains to attain to a certain degree of it, be banifhed into a ftate abfolutely contrived for the fuf- fering and mifery of fuch moral beings, 5. Not on- S ly The PRINCIPLES ly are fuch propofitions diametrically oppofite to the notion of a good and perfect whole, and of a wife The general and perfect governor ♦, but from the very idea of a good muft perfect whole of moral beings, it neceffarily fol- cefTar "that" S' ^at be*nSs wno nave faffered m tfteir && tried and im- ^ate by their fteady adherence to virtue in fpite of proved virtue all oppofition through the vices of others, muft be promoted. have reparation made to them •, that is, be placed in fuch happy circumftances for the exercife and improve- ment of their virtue, as fhall make their reflexion up- on their pad flruggles and fufferings for virtue's fake exceedingly delightful to them, and greatly contribute to ftir them up to redoubled zeal ta make higher improvements fuitable to fo generous a recornpenfe from the governor of the world, by placing them in It cannot re- happier circumftances of improvement. In general, Sent am- we mav conclude, that if the greateft good and per- nexions of feet ion of moral beings be intended and purfued, the things mould happy connexions which now take place, in confe- be changed in quence 0f which virtue is the higheft enjoyment or ' moral perfection, is the greateft ha'ppinefs, fhall not be changed for the worfe, or to the difad vantage of moral perfection ; nor thofe which tend to make e- very degree of vice it own punifhment, give place to others, which fhall abfolutely invite and encou- rage to vice, and difcourage virtuous excrcifes and im- provements. We cannot indeed imagine, that mo- ral beings ceafe to be agents, or are laid even by way of punifhment under a fatal, phyfical neceffity of be- ing irreclaimable \ that they can be made utterly incapable of reflexion and reformation, or be tied to vice by any other fetters, befidcs thole arifing from habit, which hold the wicked fo faft intangled. Bat then there is no reafon to think, that their bad con- tracted habits will not adhere clofly to them, and greatly torment them, all the means and objects of their gratification being removed : much leis that there will be fuch a change in a future ftate in favour of vice, that it fhall not fo much as fuffer in any way analogous c/ Moral Philosophy. 259 maiogous to what it fuffers here, by being its own Chap. IX. :ormenter and punifher : but that it fhd.ll immediate- y become happier than it now is or can be -, whilit :he hatred of it is quite inextinguifhable in our minds. In one word^ if we are made for virtue, and fo to be happy by attaining to it here to as high a degree of perfection as is confident with a firft flate •, then to apprehend any fucceeding flate, in which all the prefent conflitutions in favour of virtue, and the dis- couragements of vice fhall be reverfed, is contrary to analogy, to probability, and, in one word, to all our methods of reafoning about beings and things. It is to conclude from wife and good adminiftration, that very bad government fhalifucceed : it is to in- fer malice from goodnefs: it is to deduce grounds of diftruft and fear from the plaineft fymptoms of fin- cere kindnefs and good-will. All thefe reafonings about futurity muft hold good, if in the prefent flate, things are fo far conflituted in favour of virtue and moral perfection, that there is reafon to conclude our Maker and Governor fm- cerely loves and delights in our moral improvements. Were there not indeed manifeft tokens in the pre- fent oecononly and government of our Author with relation to us, and to all beings within our obferva- tion, of due regard to virtue ; fuitablecare of its educa- tion, improvement and happinefs, then truly might we with reafon dread a fucceffion of worfe govern- ment, and fear this were but the prelude to complete' mifery : but if from what hath been faid of human nature, it plainly appears, that while due care is ta- ken of inferior beings in our fyflem, fuitable provi- fion is alfo made for us who are capable of very high moral attainments ; that is, for our improvement ia many noble moral gratifications, in fo much that all the laws of the material fyftem, to which we are fubje&ed by cur union with a fenfible world, are admirably conducive to our moral improvement and moral happinefs $ then may we juftly not only hope S 2 weH 260 The PRINCI PLES Chap. IX. well concerning futurity, but reft fatisfied that fuch u^^-— ' an excellent firft (late of mankind mail be fucceeded not by a worfe, but by a better with refpeft to vir- tue and moral perfection ; that is, one fuited to tried and proved beings. To apprehend the contrary, would be to fear where there is the bed foundation for comfortable expectation. It would be to think worfe of the Author of nature than we can think of any man, who has any degree of goodnefs, any iparksof wifdom, or any benevolence in his conftitu- tion. For can he be called good among men, nay, or any thing elfe than the crueleft of tyrants, who would exerce his power in the manner fuch fuppofi- tions make the Author of nature, and of all the goodnefs men are capable of, to aft with regard to hs moral creatures ? The only objections againft the preceeding train of argument I can forelee, which deferveour atten- tion, are thefe two following ones. r,k ■ o. I. It may be laid, that almoft all the knowledge we can acquire here, is luch knowledge or the mate- rial world, and of our prefent connexions with it, as can only qualify us for living in this ftate, or in one very fimilar and analogous to it : It can be of no ufe to us in one quite new, cr abfolutely different from this prefent condition of mankind. How can our prefent ftate be confidered as a fchool to form and fit us for another fucceeding one, unlels we can attain here to fuch knowledge of our future life as may prepare us for it? For without fuch inflruftion, whatever other knowledge we may acquire, we muft be as great novices at our entrance on a future ftate, and as much to begin to learn then how to act or behave ourfclves, as we are when we enter upon this prefent flage. Mow can that be called a fchool for a (late,' m which we cannot poflibly acquire any noti- on of its conftitution and laws, or be any way made acquainted with it, but to which we mult needs go as o/ Moral Philosophy. 261 as much at a lofs about every connexion and law in Chap. IX, it, as if we had had no fchooling at all ? Bat what can we know here of our future condition ? All we can learn here hath only relation to this ftate, and is hardly fufficient for our direction in it. This objection appears at firft fight not unplaufi- ble. But it will foon evanifh when we confider, I. That thofe powers which, at our entrance upon ^ /. life, are and muft neceflarily be but in embrio, rude and lhapelefs as it were, or quite unformed, may ', be made very vigorous and perfect here by proper ' exercife and culture ; fo as to become fit to be em- ployed about any objects of knowledge of whatever kind, or however different from thofe which make the prefent materials of our ftudy and fpeculation. Infomuch that this ftate may as properly be faid to be a fchool for forming and perfectionating our ra- tional powers, in order to their being prepared and fitted for exercife about higher objects in a fuc- ceeding ftate *, as the firft part of our education here is called a fchool for life, or to prepare us for the af- fairs of the world and manhood, which are objects far above our reach, till our underftanding by pro- per gradual exercife and employment is considerably ripened, or enlarged and ftrengthened, which is the proper bufinefs of liberal education. II. But not only is it true, that our underftand- ing may be fharpened, invigorated and improved in this ftate by fui table culture, fo as to be rendered lit for progrefs in knowledge in an after-life, which rational powers cannot be but in a gradual progref- five manner, in confequence of due exercife and cul- ture : Bat which is more, the knowledge and virtue *, or, in one word, the moral perfection of whatever fort we acquire here, can never be loft la- bour, or be ufelefs to us, however foreign to the pre-. S 3. fent the PRINCIPLES fent ilate of mankind any other we go into may be. For, i. Imagination and memory may retain the idea of the prefent world, and all the knowledge we have acquired of it, fo as to be able to compare the new one with it •, as a perfon, who happens to lofe his fight after he had attained to a very confider- able acquaintance with the vifible world, may always retain that knowledge, of which there are many ex- amples. 2. No (late into which moral beings can be fuppofed to pafs, can be abfolutely, or in all ref- pecls fo difanalogous to that from which they go in- to it, but the knowledge of their own powers, or of the fabrick and conflitution of their mind ; and all the knowledge of moral powers which analogy can lead us to, mud be in feveral regards of very impor- tant ufe to them. Every flate of moral beings muft be in many refpedls analogous to every other ftate of moral beings ; becaufe moral beings, how- ever different they may be from one another, muft in feveral refpec~ls bear an analogy or likenefs one to another. And as that muft be true in general of all moral beings ; fo muft it likewife be true, that e- very new progrefiive ftate of the fame moral beings muft bear a very particular analogy or likenefs to the flate immediately preceedingit : Therefore, as much knowledge of the common properties, relations and laws relative to all moral beings, and all moral en- dowments i and as thorough a knowledge of our- felves in particular ; that is, a,s extenfive a moral knowledge as we can attain to in this ftate, muft be of very great confequence to us upon our entrance into any new one, however different it may be from the prefent. 3. Tho', in progrefs of time, all memo- ry of our prefent ftate mould be entirely loft or quite effaced •, yet beings who have made progrefs in knowledge, and undcrftand what enquiry into the nature of things means, and how iiich refearches ought to be carried on and purfued, muft be fo far pari ichcoling, that they lhall no more need to learn or of Moral Philosophy. 263 or be inftructed in that art, which however is not p P TV only the firit and mod effential, but the mod diffi- cult part of knowledge \ without which indeed no progreis can be made, and which being acquired, progrefs is very eafy and rather pleafure than toil. This done, the fcience of advancing in knowledge is maftered, the nature of truth and knowledge is un- derftood ; and that being over, the mind is fo far very- well fitted and prepared for any ftate, and can never again be fuch an infant or novice in any ftate of mo- ral powers, as it mull neceflarily be at its firft exift- ence, before any notion of knowledge, or of the methods and arts of acquiring it is formed ; and while its powers are quite weak and uncultivated as moral powers muft needs be till they are unfolded and perfected by ufe and culture. All this will be yet clearer if we reflect, 4. How much is over when beings have learned to reduce appearances to general laws, and to look out for harmonies, analogies and agreements of effects •, and are, by practice in induc- tion, become mailers of that only way of reafoning by which real knowledge can be attained. For they are thus prepared for unravelling any appearances, and for tracing them to their fources and caufes, or general laws •, and fo are fit for ftudying any fyftem in order to get the knowledge of its conftitution and Jaws. Into whatever ftate one may pafs, it muft certainly be a very high and advantageous preparati- on for it, to be able to know how to go to work to get real knowledge and to avoid error ; to have di- ftinct ideas of general order, beauty and good, and of government by univerfal laws. Now fo far may all advance in this ftate, who will give due diligence to improve their underftanding and reafon in the fearch of nature. 5. Befides, it is evident, that in- to whatever ftate one enters, the knowledge of num- ber and proportion muft always be of ufe, fince theie are properties or relations which muft belong to all obje&s, and to all ftates, 6. And as for the S 4 know- ?be PRINCIPLES knowledge of moral duties refulting from moral rel- ations, that fcience, which of all others is the molt becoming moral beings, and ought to be their chief ftudy, it muft be of perpetual and unchangeable ufe. The prefent virtues and vices muft remain eiTentially the lame in every ftate. Benevolence in all its bran- ches muft endure for ever. And what elfe are all the Virtues but acts of generous affection ? New relati- ons will produce new obligations and duties; but the nature of moral obligation being well underftood-, new relations can no fooner prefent themfelves to a mind fo well qualified, but the duties refulting from them muft immediately be difcovered and perceived. 7. And, in the laft place, as for the dominion over ourfclves, and the inward liberty and power, and all the good habits which may be formed and acquired here by the affiduous ftudy and practice of virtue, to attain to which is our, principal bufinefs in this our firft ftate, thefe being once acquired or eftablifhed, that important work is over ; that part of education or fchpoling, fo efTential to the happinefs of moral beings in whatever ftate they may be placed, is paft ; and being accompli fhed, it muft produce its natural good fruits and effects. The happinefs refulting from a well-formed mind, and highly improved virtue, can- not take place till virtue is brought by due culture to great maturity and perfection. That is as impofli- ble as it is for any plant to come to its maturity other- wife than by gradual progrefs, and to yield its fruit before it is grown up to its fruitful ftate ; but when the good feeds of virtue are ripened, then muft its happy harvcft naturally fucceed ; then muft virtue have its full effect : we muft fow before we reap -, but as we low, fo mall we reap •, fuch really the confti- tution of things with regard to us evidently appear! to be. So that, in every proper fenfe, this prefent ftate may be called our lchool, or our ftate of educa- tion for a future ftate, however new that ftate may be to us at our lirft arrival into it : our ftate of for- mation, * of Moral Philosophy. 265 mation, difcipline and culture, whether with regard Chap. IX. to our underftanding or our will -, whether with re- v— -v-— •* gard to fcience or temper •, knowledge or virtue ; our rational faculties, or our appetites, affections and paffions. But all that hath been faid will be Hill more evident when we have confidered the other ob- jection, to which I therefore proceed. II. It is laid, why is not virtue compleatly happy Another ob- here, and vice, on the other hand, compleatly mi- jettion. ferable ? Or fince it is not fo, what reafon have we to imagine a fucceeding ftate fhall not be of the fame mixed kind, in which the vicious may have a great ihare of pleafure, and the virtuous a large fhare of uneafinefs and fuffering, and in which goods and evils fhall be as promifcuoufly difpenfed as they are here ? If we reafon from analogy, let us reafon ana^ logoufly, and not conclude a better Hate from this confufed, promifcuous diftribution of things, in which virtuous and vicious perfons (to fay no more) are not diftinguifhed from one another by any re- markable difpenfation of favours to the former, and punifhments to the latter. For here do not all things happen alike or indifferently to all men? that is, are not external advantages and difad vantages admin i- ftered either by no rule at all, or at leaft, in a way which virtue has but little reafon to think particular- ly in her favour and intereft ? Now in anfwer to this objection, which hath been ^nfwer. often urged in various forms, let it be obferved that, were not the prefent condition of mankind a very proper firfl ftate for forming and training up moral powers to great perfection, there would, indeed, be no reafon at all to think well of the Author of na- ture, or to hope well concerning futurity. But, on the contrary, if it really appears to be a very pro- per firft ftate for the education of our moral powers to a very high degree of perfection, then there mult be 266 The PRINCIPLES Chap. IX. be ver^good ground to entertain a good opinion of our Creator, and to expect fuch a ftate to iucceed to this, as is proper to fucceed to a ftate of education and difcipline. The whole ftrefs of our argument lies upon that. Now that this prefent ftate is a very proper one for the education, exercife and culture of our moral powers, is manifeft : For, i. We have moral powers capable of improve- ment to great perfection -, and this ftate affords us excellent means, occafions, fubjects and materials for their exercife and culture, in order to their very high improvement. And all the laws relative to the growth and improvement, or the degeneracy and cor- ruption of our moral powers are very fuitable to the nature of moral powers, and their progreflive formation and courfe, in general ; and to our rank and fituation, in particular : infomuch that all the goods and evils which happen to us in this life, may very properly be confidered as fit means and occa- fions of improvement in virtue : not the evils only, but likewile the goods-, for as adverfity is neceflary to form, exercife and improve certain virtues, fo is profperity, to exercife, form and improve other virtues : and in a ftate of trial, formation and cul- ture, various means of exercife, trial and culture are abfolutely neceflary. Objectors againft providence are apt to reprefent diftrefles and afflictions, only as trials •, but thofe who take a right view of moral powers, and of the natural progrefs of virtue to perfection, will confider profperous circumftances in the lame light, with regard to beings, whofe firft end is to be formed to virtue; that is, by ansof trial. Nay, thofe who have thoroughly ftodied human nature, have not lcrupled to pro- nounce eafe and plenty to be a feverer fearcher, explorer, and prover of the human mind (/), than (/) So Safujt. Secundzc res animum fapientis fatlgant. So Taci- tus, Hill. lib i . Fortunam adhuc tantam adverfam tulifti : fe- cunda: res .icrioribus ilimulis animum cxplorant. Quia mifcri« rantur, fllic'iatc corrumpimur, &q. the ^Moral Philosophy. 267 lG more ordinary and tolerable vexations of human Chap. IX« fe. 2. And yet all the evils complained of in hu- lan life, which do not flow from the vices of man- ind, and which ought therefore to be confidered s its natural and proper bad confequences, it being if the nature of vice to do hurt or mifchief : all tther evils, I fay, do either proceed from the conftant >peration of the general laws of the material world, vhich by their fteady, unvaried operation, produce in excellent fyftem, without the exiftence of which, while it can exift, nature would be incomplete and incoherent *, an excellent fyftem with refpect to our moral powers, and their exercifes and improvements, as well as with refpecl: to the fenfitive enjoyments it affords us. Or, 5. They are the effects of another moft excellent general law ; even that univerfal law of our nature, in confequence of which all moral and natural goods are our own acquifitions ; namely, that our in- duftry and application fhall gain its end, (g) and that nothing internal or external fhall be procured by us, but in proportion to our diligence to acquire it. For the goods of life which are faid to be fo unequal- ly diftributed, fall no otherwife in great abundance to any vicious perfon, than in confequence of that univerfal law, fo efiential to moral beings, and their powers, by which it is, that whatever we ikt ourfelves to acquire is acquired. They fall to one's (hare in the fame way that the philofopher hath his beloved pleafure arifing from large and extenfive knowledge 1 and that the virtuous man acquires the treafure upon which his foul is folely bent, even a well regulated mind, and confcioufnefs of merit in the eyes of every wife and good being. Good habits, ( and all the virtues are fuch ) are formed and eftablifhed by our own induftry to attain them. And if bad habits are acquired by thofe who fet themfelves to form them, it is becaufe it is fit that generaj law fhould take ( £ ) The law explained in the beginning ©f the firft chapter. place 268 The PRINCIPLES Chap. IX. place with refpefr to the fruits of our induftry and application, that as wefow, fojhall we reap. Now it is in no other way that external goods fall to the lhare of any one. It is only becaufe he fets his heart upon them, bellows all his thought, time and care about diem, and leaves no ftone unturned to procure them: and it is a proper general law, that our goods or evils mould chiefly be of our own procurance, or of our own making, and that application iliould not be fuccefslefs. 4. But when external goods are acquir- ed in great redundance, they cannot give the true happinefs of the rational mind. That can only pro- ceed from improved virtue •, and virtue, in order to be formed and improved, muft iikewife beearneftly contended for and fought after ; or due pains muft be taken to advance and raife it to perfection. How happily is all this, (which follows fo clearly from the account that hath been given of our nature and frame in this EfTay) expreiTed by our incomparable Poet. cc Whatever is, is right" —This world, 9tistruey Was made for Casfar, — hut for Titus too : And which more lie ft ? who chair? d his country, fay% Or he, whofe virtue fight d to lofe a day ? cc But feme times virtue ftarves while vice is fed. What then ? is the reward of virtue, bread ? That, vice may merit -, His the price of toil : The knave defervesit when he tills the foil, The knave deferves it when he tempts the main, When folly fights for Kings, or dives for gain \ The good man may be weak, be indolent, yior is his claim to plenty, but content. UHoat nothing earthly gives, or can deftroy, The j a it's calmfun-fhine, and the he art -felt joy, Is virtue's prize. <) Tool ! to think, God hates the worthy mind, lover, and the love, of human tynd, o/Moral Philosophy. 269 Wbofe life is healthful^ and wh.ofe conference clear ; Ch a p. IX. Becaufe he wants a thoufand pounds a year! EfTayon man, Epift. 4. Here is, in a few words, {in a fhort, clear, but moll extenfive reafoning) a full folution, to all who are able to purfue it in their thoughts [throughout all its confequences, of all the objections brought againit the prefent diftribution of goods and evils ; a full vindication of the ways of God to man. 5. But let it alfo be c-onfidered, that as education muft precede perfection, and virtue cannot be formed but by de- grees, and in proportion to culture ; fo the fruits of improved virtue arifing from its proper exercifes, ! cannot take place till virtue is brought to its maturi- ty. That is as impoflible as it is in nature for har- veft to precede feed-time and due hufbandry. Vir- tue cannot yield the fruits and advantages of com- plete virtue, nor be fit for the exercifes and em- ployments from which its happinefs muft arife, till it is fuch. The good habits, whence the felicity is to arife, muft firft be formed or acquired before the happinefs which can only refult from their proper ex- ercifes can take place. The foundation muft be laid before the fuperftructure can be raifed. But proper exercifes to form, fchool, difcipline, try and im- prove moral powers, having the fuitable degrees of enjoyment attending them as fuch, as properly or naturally prognofticate a harveft of virtue, a moral ripenefs and its, fruits, as fuch, to fucceed to this ftate of moral culture, as feed-time and induftry promiie a harveft in the natural world. 6. And finally, as no ftate can be blamed in which the after-reaping is proportionable to, and of a kind with the fowing, or in which it is the general law of nature with refpecl: to moral beings, that their future perfection and happinefs fhall be in proportion to the foundation they lay by their moral improvements : ib, on the other hand, no happinefs, but on the contrary, mi* fery 270 The PRINCIPLES Ch a p. DC fery alone can be looked for from the total corrupt!-. On of the mind by vice, from confirmed evil habits and pafiions, efpecially after the external means of fenfual gratification fail, or are quite removed from them ; which is the cafe, fo foon as our minds are divefted of our bodies^ and feparated from a material world* If there be any effential or eftablifhed diffe- rences between virtue and vice, or the improvement and abufe, the perfection and corruption of moral powers ; the final effects of thefe muft be as different or contrary, as the roots from which they proceed, are. But thefe two oppofites cannot have their full effect till a certain time of culture, formation and probation is pad ; becaule a moral building muft ad- vance gradually, as well as a material one 5 or be- caufe a moral harveft requires as neceffarily a pro- grefs towards it, as a natural one. We muft either deny, that the proper adequate happinefs of a moral being muft be the refult of his perfection, or of the high exercifes for which greatly improv- ed moral powers are qualified, which is abfurdly to diftinguifh the proper happinefs of a rational being from its proper perfection i Or, if we afk, why vir- tue is not compleatly happy while it is but in a ftate of formation -, we really abfurdly afk, why edu- cation muft precede perfection. But if complete ratio- nal happinefs muft be the natural effect of highly improved virtue fuitably placed and employed, what can be expected from a degenerated corrupted mind in a ftate far removed from all material objects, but the natural effects of diforderly paffions, depraved habits, and the confeioufnefs of deformity and guilt: a harveft of corruption and proportionable mifery ? Thus therefore, in whatever light we confider our preicnt ftate, there is good reaion to think it our firft ftate only, and a very proper one as our firft ftate : our moral feed-time to which our after-har- veft fhall be proportioned. For this is evidently the law of nature with regard to us. That as we fow, fo we o/ Moral Philosophy. 271 e mall reap. The moral improvements, from which Chap. IX. lone the happinels truly fuited and proportioned to ur moral frame can fpring, mult be acquired by ue culture and exercife. They cannot have their amplete and perfect effect till they are arrived to per- sction : But a proper flate for their education to ierfecl:ion, plainly betokens a fucceeding {late, in /hich effects fhall be congruous and proportionate 0 the culture paffed through, and its fruits. Let us only add to all this, that the hope or pre- entiment of future exiftence is natural to man : and vhence elfe can this proceed, but from the care of our viaker, who will not difappoint any inftinct, defire, )r hope he hath implanted in his creatures ? It is tieaven that points out an hereafter, and dictates 'ternity to mankind-, 'tis Heaven hath infpired us with this pleafing hope, this longing after immorta- lity y which is fo noble a fpur and excitement to vir- tuous labours and deeds. And fearch all nature throughout, and fhew one inftance, if you can, where it works in vain ; or merely to difappoint even bodily inflincts, much lefs well governed rational affections and defires. What future blifs, he gives not thee to know9 But gives that hope to be thy bleffmg now. Hope fprings eternal in the human breaft ; Man never is, but always to be Heft ; The foul uneafy, and confined at home, Refts, and expatiates, in a life to come. EfTay on man, Ep. i; And again, For him alone, hope leads from gole togole, And opens ft ill, and opens, on his foul, 'Till lengthen d on to faith, and unconfin'd, It pours the blifs that fills up all the mind. He fees, why nature plants in man alone Hope of known blifs, and faith in blifs unknown t (Nature, whofe dictates to no other kind Are giv'n in vain, but what they feek they find) ffifi The PRINCIPLES Wife is her prefent : Jhe connecls in this His greateft virtue with his gnateft blifs. At once his own bright profpecl to be bleft, And Jirongefi motive to affift the reft. Efliy on man, Ep. 4, Conclufion. Man therefore is made for eternal progrefs in mo- ral perfection proportionally to his care and diligence to improve in it. And with refpect to death, we have reafon to fay with an excellent Ancient, " Eo itaque fimus animo^ ut horribilem ilium diem aliis, nobis fauftum put emus : Non enim temere9 nee for tut to fat: £5? creati fumus ; fed profeclo fuit qua dam vis qua ge- neri confulerit humano : nee id gigneret^ aut akret, quod cum exanclavifjet omneis labores, turn incideret in mortis malum fempiternum — portum potius paratum nobis &f perfugium putemus. The End of the First Part. THE fHE PRINCIPLES O F. Moral Philosophy, PART II. BEING A further vindication of Human Nature; in which the chief objections made againft if are examined, and proved to be abfurd. Quod (i mundi partes natura adminiftrantur, necefle eft mun- dum ipfum natura adminiftrari ; cujus quidem adminiftratio nihil habet in fe, quod reprehendi poffit. Ex iis enim naturis, quae erant, quod effici potuit, optimum, effe&um eft. Doceat ergo aliquis potuiffe melius, fed nemo unquam docebit, & fi quis corrigere aliquid volet, aut deterius faciet, aut id quod fieri non potuit defiderabit. Cicero de natura Deorurii, Lib. IL Refpe&ing man, whatever wrong we call, May, nraft be right, as relative to all. EJfay on man, Epijl, tl THE PRINCIPLES O F MORAL PHILOSOPHY. PART II. INTRODUCTION. IN tfie former part of this enquiry, we have proved from the direct confederation of our ant rod. frame and conftitution, that it is good •, or that ^*""""v~ we are made for an excellent end. But becanfe this How it is pro fubjectisof the laft importance, it is well worth while pofed to an- te conlider the objections which are made againft hu- ^r ^J^1* man nature, and the prefent ftate of mankind. ons. Now before I examine particular objections, it is ^hich'end ci- proper to premife in general, tner in de- manding an I. That objections which neccffarily-tcrminate in impoffibility, demanding impoiTibilities, are abfurd^ And fuch ^wor^ire T 2 are,, bfurd. 276 The PRINCIPLES In t rod. are all thofe which imply in them as direct a contra- u-^-v— — ' diction, as if it were demanded that man fhould be, and not be, at the lame time. II. Such objections are likewife abftird which de- mand any alteration to the worfe ; or a change from which greater inconveniencies would necefTarily fol- low than thofe complained of. For a more inconve- nient law would certainly be a worfe one. It is neceffary to premife^thefe two plain truths in an EfTay, wherein it is propofed to fhew, that the ob- jections brought againft our prefent ftate, do, if not at firft fight, yet whenclofely purfued to their ultimate meaning and tendency, terminate either in 'demanding animpoffibility, orachangetotheworfe. But they are alfo premifed, becaufe a great many imperfections and evils in the world, are refolvedby fome ancient What the an- Pml°f0Pners into what they call inbability or obliquity dents meant of the fubjett^ and neceffity of nature. By which I am by the inhabi- apt to think, they meant im perfections and evils Iity or obh- which are, in the nature of tilings, abfolutely unavoid- ?ub!ec° * aD^e uPon ^ie fcppo^i00 of tnc exiftence of certain fub- jects, as being absolutely infeparable from them And, without all doubt, the objections which terminate in demanding fome law or property in a material being ; for initance, which it cannot in the nature of things admit of, are abfurd for that very realbn, if there is a moral fitnefs, that there fhould be a material crea- tion, (a) I give this example, becaufe thofe philofo- phers had recourfe to the inhability or obliquity of the fubject, and the neceffity of nature chiefly in ac- counting for apparent evils of the phyfical kind •, that is, apparent evils rcfulting from the properties* of matter, and the laws of corporeal motion. But we may juftly call inhability of the fubject and ne- ceffity of nature, all natural or effential incapacity in any fubject, moral or material of any demanded per- (a) Plutarch de prouea'jone animx. fection. g/*MoRAL Philosophy. Fcction. For certainly all fuch appearances are fuffi- :iendy vindicated, which are fhewn to be the necef- fary refult of the effential qualities of a fubject, natu- ral or moral •, or all fuch objections are fufficiently re- futed, which are fhewn to demand fomething incom- patible with the effential properties of afubject, pro- vided it can be proved to be morally fit and good that fuch a fubject mould exifl. Thus all objections againft the material creation, which neceflarily terminate in demanding that matter fhould be active and not pafiive, are certainly ab- furd. If it be morally fit that matter mould exifl : fince matter is eiTentially, or as matter, paflive and inert. In like manner, all objections againft: a mo- ral creature, which neceflarily terminate in demand- ing impeccability in fuch creature •, or a phyfical im- pofnbility of its forming any wrong judgment, or chufing unreafonably, muft be abfurd, if it be moral- ly fit and good that fuch a moral creature ihould ex- ifl ; fince impeccability or abfolute impofiibility of erring is incompatible with the moral powers and properties which conflitute a moral creature. All fuch demands terminate in an abfurdity, becaufe they require what the fubject cannot admit of; what is con- trary to its nature, that is, what is really impoflible and contradictory. Now inhability of a fubject, or neceflity of na- ture, as we have explained it, fuppofes no limitation n l u-X 5s i r i • rri_i- c 1 ■ mhabihty of creating power, unlefs the impofiibility or working the llibjeft contradictions ; as for inflance, of making a thing to fuppofes noli- be and not to be at the fame time, or of making the nutation of fame fubject poffefs at the fame time repugnant and the ne incompatible qualities, be a limitation of creating power, which cannot be afferted. Nor does inhabi- lity, or neceflity of nature, as we have explained it, prefuppofe the neceffary cxiflence of any fubject pre- vious to and independent of the mind that created the world ; it only fuppofes, that fubjects of a cer- tain nature, if they be created, muft be created with T 3 that The PRINCIPLES that particular nature, or with the properties whicl belong to it-, and that properties which are abfoluteh in their effence repugnant to co-exiftence in the farm fubject, cannot be made to co-exift in the fame Tub- ject. And that is, not to fuppofe creating power li- mited by any thing, or fubjected to any thing, finc< the im portability of making contradictions to be true is no limitation of power. Objeftlons II. The other propofed method of foiving objec- that terminate t;ons made againft human nature, and the preient ™^T™Z ftate of mankind, by mewing, that they terminate the worfe, in demanding a change to the worfe*, or that would arcabfurd. be attended with more or greater dilad vantages than thofe complained of, does not involve in it any limi- tation of creating power •, fince power cannot be faid to be limited or confined, becaufe it is directed by wifdom and goodnefs-, and is only employed to pro- duce that from which greater good, in the fum of things, mud: neceffarily enfue. Nay, if we rightly confider the matter, it will be found, that this laft way co-incides with the former ; and that fuch de- mands, as well as the former, terminate in requiring a natural impofftbility. For, fo certainly do all de- mands terminate, " which require the general advan- tages of a general law without the general prevalence of chat law ; " " or the goods of one law by means of another law •," ^ that an end mould be produced without means proper and appolite to its producti- on •, " " or that fuch and fuch a law mould be gene- ral, and yet feveral liccefiary effects of its general operation be hindered from taking place." To require a change of any law on account of the incon- veniencies which attend it, if thefe be compenfated by the good effects of that law, is an abliird de- mand «, fince all the interefts of intelligent beings re- quire, that the laws by which they are regulated, or which are fixed for their regulation of themfclves, ihould be general and prevail uniformly : and to re- quire; of Moral Philosophy. 279 quire that a being fhould be progrefiive, without the confequences which neceffarily redound from progreffivenefs , is plainly an abfurd demand. But all this will become clearer, when we confider particular objections. And whatever ancient philo- sophers meant by the inhability of the fubject, and neceffity of nature, we mall fee that the greater part of the objections againft man, do neceffarily termi- nate in fome contradictory, or very unreafonable re- queft, and that in this fenfe, " Si quis corrigere vole/ , aut deterius faciet, aut id quod fieri non potuit defide- rabit" CHAP. L LE T us firft confider the effect of complain- ing that man is fo perfect as he is ; or tha^ he has the powers and affections he is really endowed with •, and, fecondly, the effect of com- plaining that he is not more perfect than he is. I. All objections which tend to cut off and re- Some obJee" trench any perfections which man is endowed with by ^°anns *f^n nature •, any of his fenfes, appetites, affections, or really objec- capacities of pleafure, his reafon, activity, moral tions againft agency, power and liberty, or any other property, his perfc&ton, are objections againft his perfection ; they are com- plaints againft the Author of our nature for making him fo perfect as he is. For which of them is not exceeding ufeful ; the fource of very noble enjoy- ments-, the foundation of many excellencies and virtues ? Our difcerning, diftinguifhing, judging and For ,, reafoning powers, are evidently the foundation of powers, dif- our being capable of rational exercifes and enjoy- pofitions and ments : and as for our appetites and affections, they a^aions are are eidier of private or public ufe> or both. We^papc^s^d T 4 may perfeftiqn. 286 The PRINCIPLES Chap. I. may call the private ones modes of felf-love, for they are all moved by a profpect of real or apparent good to ourfelves. But can a perceptive being exift without a principle of felf-prelervation •, or without, the love and defire of pleafure •, or can the love and defire of pleafure in a fenfible being be lefs extenfivc than its ideas of good and pleafure ? The public ones we may call modes of benevolence or focial love ; for they are all moved by the fpecious fhew of pub- lic good : and is it not fit that rational creatures mould be endowed with fuch affections as unite and bind them together, and without which there can be no merit, no fociety, no happinefs by communi- cation and participation \ which would be the cafe, were we not endowed with a principle of benevo- lence, and the focial affections which fpring from it ? All appetites and affections, of whatever kind, may be rendered weaker or ftronger than they ought to be by habit ; but fuch active, beftirring principles, as appetites and affections, are neceffary in our con- futation, to be the fprings of motion, to prompt, to impel, or rather to drive us into action : not the private only, left we forget the public, and reafon fhould not be fufficient, or have force enough to perfuade us before it is too late, to mind that inte- reft, which, though in one fenfe it be foreign to us, is in reality our molt natural or beft good. Nor yet the public only, left by being wholly taken up a- broad, we fhould entirely forget home affairs, and foon become incapable either to look abroad, or to take care at home to any advantage. It is, indeed, hard to fay, whether the focial without the private, or the private without the focial, would be more pernicious to us. And not only is it neceflary, if either the one or the other have any confiderable degree of force in our frame, that the other fhould Jikcwife have confiderable force, in order to preferve a juft ballance •, but it is requifite that both fhould have a confiderable degree of force, that they may be of Moral Philosophy. be able to move us, and that we may have pleafure and fatisfaction in our purfuits ; for without affec- tions and appetites there can be no enjoyment. Reafon itfelf can only give us fatisfaction by its exer- cifes, whether in fearching after knowledge, or in acting agreeably to the nature of things, in confe- quence of our having in our nature an appetite after knowledge, and a moral fenfe of the fitnefs of actions. Now as for appetites and affections, their being So are all the diminifhed or flrengthned in their force by habit ;lawj withre- this is neceffary, in order to our being really bene- ^g i°w q™# fited by the exercifes of our faculties; or to their be- habits in par- ing bettered and improved by our diligence to im- ticular. prove them. For what is any habit, but a faculty or affection brought to great force and vigour by re- peated acts ? without fuch a confutation, we could never attain to perfection in any fcience, art or vir- tue. And which way more honourable or advanta- geous to us could have been contrived for improving all our different powers and affections to their great- eft perfection, and for keeping them in due order, than befides the natural controul which thofe of one kind are to thofe of another, to have given us a cool and fedate principle, to deliberate, advife and , govern them : our reafon, which alfo becomes ftronger or weaker, in proportion as it is exercifed ; and foon becomes mailer as it ought to be, if it has but fair play allowed it, or if it is not violently op-, pofed and born down. For reafon, by frequently exercifing our powers and affections aright, forms many good and perfect habits in us. Let us examine all our fenfes, all our appetites and paffions, and then ht us fay which of them we would not have to take place in our frame : not thofe which impel us to take care of ourfelves, for why mould the private fyftem not be preferved ? or can the public fyftem be fufficiently taken care of by nature, unlefs each private part of the whole be furnifhecj zU mnaftices adjumen- to & medicine : in animo iiutem erudition^ & philofbphiae be- neficio. Ha? enim facilitates nutriunt & roborant, &c. Timteus Locnu de anima inundi. Hoc opus fapientia-. milu videtur ad quod natus & conftitutus eft homo, atque ad quod initrumenta & facilitate* Deo accipit- Homo in hoc natus & conftitutuj ell, ut nature rntionem in uni- verfo amtempletiu : & cum :ple lit fapienti:c opus, fpeculari pru- dentiam quae in exiftentiblU reperii-ccur, -^'C Arcbyt* libro de fapientia. This' of Moral Philosophy. 289 This is what I have been endeavouring to prove Chap. I. to be the cafe, in the firft part of this eflay ; and ^>- *J that no doubt may remain with relation to it, I fhall To *!*1S go on to confider, firft of all* two of the mod ma- Efficient an- terial objections made againft the prefent ftate offwerhath mankind ; and then I fhall conclude, by endeavour- f>een given ing to make every objector againft the government m jhe prm" of the world feel the abfurdity of all objections againft it ; or clearly perceive that whatever change he can poflibly defire or imagine, would make a very bad ftate of things, could it poflibly take place. The two great objections made againft the ftate of mankind are, I. The prevalence of vice; and II. The unequal diftribution of the goods of fortune^ as they are called, or external goods. CHAR 11. I Shall therefore* in the firft place* lay a few ob- The chief fervations together* in fuch an order as feeras objections to me to give full fatisfaction, with regard to confuted- the prevalence of vice in the world. Firft of all let it be obferved, that (/) u Here The object u men are apt to let their imaginations run out up- tion taken " on all the robberies, pyracies, murders, perjuries, fr°m the Pre" " frauds, maflacres, affaffinations, they have either vjce amon2 " heard of, or read in hiftory, thence concluding mankind. " all mankind to be very wicked : as if a court of " juftice were a proper place to make an eftimate c of the morals of mankind, or an hofprtal of the I healthfulnefs of a climate. But ough^ they not (/) See Mr. Hutcbefm on the Pajfions, whofe words thete are. u "» 29o The PRINCIPLES Chap. II." to confider, that the number of honeft citizens ^— t0^rmmmJ " and farmers far furpaffes that of all forts of crimi- " nals in any ftate •, and that the innocent or kind " actions of even criminals themfelves, furpafs their " crimes in numbers. That it is the rarity of crimes, " in companion of innocent or good actions, which " engages our attention to them, and makes them " to be recorded in hiftory, while honeft, gene- Not fo much " rous, domeitic actions are over-looked, only De- vice as is ge- 4c caufe they are f0 common ; as one great danger, ginecL " or one month's ficknefs, fhall become a frequent- " ly repeated ftory, during a long life of health " and fafety." Cicero (g) mentions a book written by a famous Peripatetic philofopher, Dic affection, faculty or appetite in our nature at all Since there can be no faculty, no affection, or appetite even of the focial or benevolent kind, which may no1 by mifguidance become the fource of evil. Or. 2dly. Why any circumftances are allowed to take place, which may invite faculties, appetites or affec- tions to operate in any way that is vicious or hurtful To which queftion, the only proper anfwer is to afk, what circumftances in life happen antecedent to, or in- dependent of all wrong excrciies of human powers, af- fections and appetites, which are not the confequence* of fome general law relative to our frame and ftate, which is of excellent ufe *, nay, neceffary to our perfec- tion and happinefs : and what circumftances in life hap- pen confequenrly to mankind's own wrong exercifes oi their ^f Moral Philosophy. 295 their powers, which are not likewife the fit and proper Chap. IL :onfequences of their being made for happinefs and per- fection, proportionally to their right ufeof their powers and faculties : Or to afk in general, what effect be- longing to human nature may not be reduced ta fome general law, either of the natural world, or of the moral kind, which is itfelf of the greateft utili- ty, if not necefllty to our happinefs and perfection. Now it hath been proved over and over again in this , EfTay, that every faculty, appetite, and affection in our nature, and every law relative to their exercifes, is of admirable ufe. In fine, to infer from our being fo made by nature, that our affections, appetites and faculties, which are of very great ufe, may be perverted and abufed, or wrongfully employed ; to infer from thence, that we have a very bad make and conflitution ; or that our make and conflitution is very improperly fituated and placed ; is not only to argue again ft the utility of a thing from the perverfion of it, which is allowed in every other cafe to be an abfurd way of reafoning ; but it is to infer that we are badly made, becaufe we are made capable of turning a very large flock of powers, faculties, appetites and affections to very good account •, in fuch a way as we may have the merit of it, and the pleafure arifing from the confcioufnefs of fuch merit. For it is felf-evident, that were it not the order and conflitution of nature with regard to us, that right ufe and bad ufe of our natural flock mould depend on ourfelves, we could make no acquifition ; we could not be capable either of praife or blame, good or ill defert, becaufe no- thing would be ours in any proper fenfe of that word. Obferving the connexions of things, in or- der to act wifely or agreeably to them, could not be our employment, or the fource of our happinefs, as it is at prefent : We would only be capable of re- ceiving a fuccefiion of meer fenfations, external or U 4 internal, 296 *fc PRINCIPLES Ch a p. II. internal, without any of the interpolations of our own "U-*v"""—- ' reafon or will, which being our own interpofitions, give us a title to the character of moral active be- ings •, and are the fource, as fuch, of all the nobleft pleafures we enjoy. 9wo principles in human nature reign, Self-love to urge \ and reajon to reftrain ; Nor this a good, nor that a bad we call, Each works its end, to move or govern all : And to their proper operation tlill Afcribe all good -, to their improper, ill. Self-love, the fpring of motion, acts the foul > Reafon'* s comparing Ballance rules the whole -, Man, but for that, no action could attend, And but for this, were active to no end. Fix'd like a plant, on his peculiar fpot, To draw nutrition, propagate, and rot ; Or meteor-like, flame lawlefs through the void, Dcftroying others, by himfelf deftroy'd. Eflay on Man, Ep. 2. We may illuftrate all that hath been faid by this miuhisfoL-" °kvious fimilitude. Does not every one reft fatis- tion to be fod, that the right culture of his garden depends good; or fay, abfolutely on himfelf, tho' notwithftanding a fenfe that good tafte 0f harmony, beauty, and of true imitation of na- be^nacquir- ture De natural to all men, yet one muft have im- able perfefti- proved that fenfe very much, and have ftudied gar- on. dening before he can be able to lay out fields with good tafte : and tho5 it be morally impofiible, fome amongft mankind mould not fall into a wrong tafte of imitating nature, or of beauty in laying out fields, or in other imitative arts, notwithftanding the natural fenfe of beauty common to all mankind, capable of being improved by all to a perfectly good tafte. Does any one think his gar- dens independent on him, becaufe his fields are notfo made, that nothing can fucceed, but what is done ac- cording to right tafte, and tends to make a good whole ^ Moral Philosophy. whole ; or becaufe negligence and wrong tafte have bad effects, and it is only good culture and good tafte, that can make a well-difpofed garden, fuitably furni fried with all that is ufeful and delicious, whole- fome and beautiful ? Would any one have our tafte in this, or any other of the elegant arts, not to depend upon our own improvement of our natural faculties, or to be acquirable otherwjfe than it is by us ? Does not every one take the acquifition of fuch a tafte to be fofficiently in his power, as things are conftituted j and is he not fenfible of the abridgement, nay, to- tal deftruction of the pleafures the elegant arts now give -, that would neceffarily enfue, if improvements in them were not made as they now are ? But if this be owned, it muft by parity of reafon be acknowledged, that the right culture of all our which none other natural powers and difpofitions, and of the will fay. mind, in general, is fufHciently in our power as we are now conftituted ; and that, in any other way, our improvement would not be our own acquifition, nor by confequence give us the pleafures it now does, by being our own work and acquifition. Let not men therefore contradict themielves, and call that unreafonable and unfit in one cafe, which they allow to be proper and very well ordered in ano- ther precifely parallel or like cafe : but let it be re- membered, that the way of the human mind's ope- ration towards its improvement, ought to be uni- form ; that the way to one improvement ought to be analogous to the wTayof improvement in every other Cafe : or that it is fit there mould be an univerfal fixed order with regard to the manner of attaining to perfection of whatever kind ; that is, of whatever faculty, difpofition, tafte or affection in our nature, viz. that it mould be in proportion to our diligence and care to improve our knowledge and tafte. Vices are but the corrupri- III. All this will be yet plainer, if we confider the ons 0T. de2e- • « r i • i • i- ri i neracies of -vices of mankind in their true light, or trace them d and u!-fi_ to jul affe&ions." The PRINCIPLES to their real fprings ; for we univerfally find, " that no man acts from pure malice ; that the injurious perfon only intends fome intereft of his own with- & out any ultimate defire of our mifery ; and that " he is more to be pitied for his own mean felfifh " temper, for the want of true goodnefs, and its " attendant happinefs, than to be hated for his con- " duct, which is really more pernicious to himfelf " than to others. There is no reafon to think, *-' there is any juch thing as pure difmterefted ma- lc lice in the moil vicious of mankind. " (g ) Some of felf- And, in reality, if we trace vices to their fources, love which is We mall find, that they are all the corruptions or de- ^ilurv617 nC" generacies of highly ufeful and noble affections. This point is exceedingly well handled by Plato in his Gorgias, but I mail only on this fubject, excerpt two obfervations from two excellent modern wri- ters upon it, which are fufficient to mew us from what fprings all vices proceed, or to what caufes they ought to be afcribed. Dr. Henry More^ in his Di- vine dialogues, {peaking of vices, fays, " They are the fpawrn of felr-love, which, if we eye narrowly, we mail find to be very ufeful, nay, a very neceilary mother in lociety. Self-love is abfplutely neceffary : nay, it is no more than the defire of pleafure and hap- pinefs, without which a fenfitive being cannot fublift r and if rightly conducted, it would lead us to the purfuit of virtue as our intereft. Yet wrath, envy, pride, luft, and the like evil paflions, are but the branches and modifications of this fundamental ne- cefiary difpofition towards good and happinefs ; for what is wrath, but fell-love edged and ftrengthencd ior landing off the afiaults of evil? What is envy but felf-lovc grieved at the fenfc of its own want, ag- gravated and made more fenfible by the fullnefs of another's enjoyment? What is pride, but felf- love defiring to be the beft, or afpiring for the beft, (^) Sec llutcbrfon en tie pajjions, whofe words I her* ufe. and p/Moral Philosophy. 299 and partly triumphing and glorying that itisnowCtfAP.il, become none of the leaft ? He quotes an excellent V-*-v— v* faying of Socrates to this purpofe, that the wicked man really purfues, by a fatal miftake, that which is word for himfelf -, that he himfelf is the greater! fufferer ; and that therefore, with the wife and good he can be no objecT: pf envy, but of pity and com- panion. " Such indeed was the opinion of all the wifer and This was the better ancients (b) concerning vices. A philofophy ?Pnnlon of the as much more tender and humane, as it is truer than ( h ) See Plutarch de wirtute morali. Multo autem his utiliores funt affe&uum fcetus, rationi przefto ubi funt, eique ad virtutum enitenti opem ferant. Sic moderata ira fortitudini adju- mento eft, odium in malos juftitiae, ac jufta indignatio adverfus nullo fuc merito rebus fecundis elatos, quando hi dementia fimul atque petulamia inflarnmati$ animis corre&ione opus habent. Jam. ab amicitia naturalem ad diligendum propenfionem, ab humani- tate mifericordiam, a vera benevolentia gaudere una atque do- tere, ne fi velis avellere ullo modo poflis. Proeterea fi peccant qui una cum infano amore omnem tollunt amorem : equidem. non refte agunt, qui propter avaritiam pmnes etiam ajias dam- nent appetitiones. Sed perinde agunt ac ii quis currendum, quod aliquando impingatur, aut jaciendum neget, quia nonnunquam a fcopo aberretur ; aut canendum quod inicite canatur. — - Adde quod ti omnino evelliex animis affefluspoflintmultorum eorum ra- tio hebetier tierit atque ocicfior, ficut gubernator vento ceflante non admodum habetquod agat. Atque haec utapparet, obfervantis le- gumlatoris id in civitate ambitionem, aemulationemque excitant, &c. — Non enim tarn refte cum Xenocrate dixeris, mathematicas difciplinas effe anfas philofophiae : quam hoc, affectus iftos vere- cundiam, cupiditatem, pcenitentiam, voiuptatem, dolorem, anfas effe adolefcentium : quas falutari atque concinna opportunitate ra- tio & lex apprehendentes, eos cum profeclu in re&am perducant viam, ut non male profeffus fuerit Laco ille paedagogus erTeeturum fe, ut puer gauderet honeliis, ac molefte ferat turpia. quo libera^ lis inftituuonis fine neque major poteft ullus, neque pulchrior nun- cupari. Virtus eft raiionis prudentia, irae fortitude, cupidinis tempe- rantia, & totius animi juftitia. — Vitium ex oppofitis ; ra- tionis infipientia, irae pavor, cupidinis intemperantia, totius de- nique animi in juftitia, Virtutis ex recta vivendi ratione, recla- que educatione ; vitia ex contrariis. Salufti pbilofopbi de diis cif n^undo. Cap. 10, the 3co The PRINCIPLES Chap. II. the prevailing modern philofophy, which delights v-^^v—^— ' in exhibiting man in the blackeft colours. There certainly is implanted in our nature that defire of power and dominion which Hobbes takes notice of : and from the degeneracies, corruptions and perver- fions of this natural appetite, many woful evils do indeed arife. But Hobbes's error confifts in his confi- dering, that defire of power and dominion as the only principle of our nature, and not taking along with it the other equally natural appetites with which it is united in our frame, and with which it is there- fore intended to co-operate; and in the jufl ballance of which kept and maintained by the prefiding au- thority of reafon, virtue or the health and perfecti- on of the mind confifts. Now thefe other appetites and difpofitions are our love of knowledge, and our delight in truth, or our defire of knowing the real connexions, relations and values of things : our love of fociety and public good : and our moral icnk or our determination to approve or difapprove affecti- ons, actions and characters, according as they are conducive to public good or public mifchief. My Lord Shaftbury refutes this gloomy pernicious doc- trine of Hobbes i in the truly philosophical, pleafanc and good natured way, of which we have feveral examples among the ancients when they are reafon- ing againft the lame tenets. We find Arrian jufl ar- 7? m guing in the fame way in his commentaries upon £- example of piRetus againft that opinion, as Lord Shaftjbury does the befl man againft Hobbes. Cicero often treats the fame opinion of contu- [n t]ie fame pleafant manner : and thofe excellent au- thors do indeed fet a noble example before us, that ought to be imitated in all difputes and controver- fies, even of the molt important kind. For what can be of greater moment than the queftion about the human make, whether it argues a good or a bad difpofition in its Author : and yet even upon this fubject, they fhun invectives and life kindly terms, preferring hard arguments to abufive words. It ncr tation ^Moral Philosophy. 301 It was certainly, as Lord Shaftjbury obferves, f| an Chap. If. extreme dread of anarchy and licentioufnefs, that frightened Hobbes^ into his fyftem of abfolute mo- narchy and paflive obedience : the fright he took up- on the fight of the then governing powers, who un- juflly affumed the authority of the people, gave him fuch an abhorrence of all popular government, and of the very notion of liberty itfelf, that to extin- guish it for ever, he recommends the very* extin- guishing of letters, and exhorts princes not to fpare lo much as one ancient Greek or Roman hiftorian. His quarrel with religion was the fame as with liber- ty ; the fame times gave him the fame terror in this other kind : he had nothing before his eyes befides the ravages of enthufiafm, and the artifices of thofe who raifed and conducted that fpirit. Hence like- wife his quarrel with human nature. But what mould we lay to one of thefe anti-zealots, who in the zeal of fuch a cool philofophy, fhould affure us faithfully, " that we were the moft miftaken men in the world to imagine there was any fuch thing as natural faith or ju- ftice ? For that it was only force and power that con- ftituted right. That there was no fuch thing in reality as virtue ; no principle of order in things above or be- low •, no fecret charm or force of nature, by which every one was made to operate willingly or unwil- lingly towards public good, and punifhed and tor- mented if he did otherwife. Is not this the very charm itfelf? Is not the gentleman at thisinftant un- der the power of it? — " Sir, the philofophy you have condefcended to reveal to us is the moft ex- traordinary. We are beholden to you for your inftruc- tion. But, pray, whence is this zeal in our behalf ? what are we to you ? are you our father ? or if you were, why this concern for us ? is there then fuch a thing as natural affection ? if not, why all this pains ? why all this danger on our account ? why not keep this fecret to yourfelf ? or what advantage is it to you I See his EJfay on the freedom of n 11 taken. " generous of Moral Philosophy. 303 " generous fpirits are the moll combining. They CHAP.Ii " delight moil to move in concert, and feel, if I " may fb lay, in the ftrongeft manner the force of " the confederating charm. The fame Author furnifhes us with another ex- ample in caballing or cantonizing. " How the wit of man, faith he, mould fo puzzle this caufe as to make civil government and fociety appear a kind of invention, and creature of art, I know not. For my own part, methinks this herding principle and afTociating inclination, is ktn fo natural and ftrong in moft men, that one might readily affirm, 'twas even from the violence of this paflion, that fo much diforder arofe in the general fociety of mankind. u Univerfal good, or the intereft of the world, in general, is a kind of remote philofophical ob- ject. That greater community falls not eafily un- der the eye. Nor is a national intereft, or that of a whole people, or body politic, fo readily appre- hended. In lefs parties, men may be intimately acquainted or converfant, and acquainted with one another. They can there better tafte fociety, and enjoy the common good and intereft of a more contracted public. They view the whole compafs and extent of their community •, and fee, and know particularly whom they ferve, and to what end they affociate and confpire. All men have naturally their fhare of this combining prin- ciple, and they who are of the fprightlieft and moft active faculties, have fo large a fhare of it, that uolefs it be happily directed by right reafon, it can never find exercife for itfelf in fo remote a fphere as that of the body politic at large. For here, perhaps, the thoufand part of thole whofe. interefts are concerned, are fcarce fo much as known by fight. No vifible band is formed -, no ftrict alliance -, but the conjunction is made with different perfons, orders, and ranks of men ; not fenfibly, lie PRINCIPLES fenfibly, bur in idea ; according to that genera view, or notion of a flate or common-wealth. " Hence other divifions amongft men. Hence " in the way of peace and civil government '* that love of party and fubdivifion by cabal " For fedition is a kind of cantonizing already be " gun within a flate. To cantonize is natural, wher " the fociety grows vaft and bulky : and powerfu. " ftates have found other advantages in fending co- " lonies abroad, than merely that of having elbow- " room at home, or extending their dominion intc " diftant countries. Vaft empires are in many re- " fpects unnatural* but particularly in this, that be " they ever fo well conftituted, the affairs of many " mult, in fuch governments, turn upon a very ct few ; and the relation be lefs fenfible, and in a " manner loft, between the magiftrate and people, •* in a body fo unwieldy in its limbs, and whofe M members lie fo remote from one another, and *' diftant from the head. " 'Tis in fuch bodies as thefe that great factions " are apt to engender. The aftbciating fpirits,« cc for want of exercife, form new movements, and " feek a narrower fphere of activity, when they " want action in a greater. Thus we have wheels u within wheels. And in fome national conftitu- iC tions (notwithftanding the abfurdity in politics) :c we have one empire within another. Nothing is ;c fo delightful as to incorporate. Diftindtions of t many kinds are invented •, religious focietics are c formed ; orders are erected ; and their interefts c efpoufed and ferved with the utmoft zeal and k pafllon. Founders and patrons of this fort are c never wanting. Wonders are performed in this c wrong focial fpirit by thefe members of fepa- 1 rate focicties. And the allbciating genius of man ' is never better proved, than in thefe very ibcie- ' ties, which are formed in oppofition to the gene- * raJ c^Moral Philosophy. 305 c< ral one of mankind, and to the real intereft of Chap. II. " the ftate. " In fhort, the very fpirit of faction, for the " greateft part, feems to be no other than the abuie " and irregularity of that focial love and common " affection* which is natural to mankind. For the a oppofite to fociablenefs is felfifhnefs. And of all " characters, the narrow* felfifh one is the leaft " forward in taking party. The men of this fort " are, in this refpect, true men of moderation. " They are fecure of their temper* and poflefs " themfelves too well, to be in danger of entering " warmly in any caufe, or engaging deeply with " any fide or faction." Thus we fee that almoft all the vices of mankind are nothing elfe but the degeneracies of good and ufeful affections •, or good, ufeful affections influenced by narrow views. I do not fay this to extenuate the guilt or deformity of vice, but to mew how we ought to judge of our make and conftitution, not- withftanding all the vices which have or do prevail in the world. For fure that ought not to be imputed to the Author of nature, which is in reality a perver- fion of the qualities he has endowed us with for ex- cellent purpofes. Properly fpeaking, the original flock is his, and what alone he is accountable for , the ufe or abufe of our affections is ours, if there be any being in the world who hath any thing that can be called its own ; or if there can be, with regard to any being, any foundation for approving or blaming Itfelf; All this is delightfully illuftrated by the excellent moral poet fo often quoted, in feveral parts of his truly philolbphical, as well as poetical, effay on man. Better for us^ perhaps, *it might appear, Were there all harmony 1 all virtue here ; That never air or ocean felt the wind •, That never paffion difcompofd the mind: X Mut the PRINCIPLES But all fubjijls by elemental Jhrife ; And pajfwns are the elements of life. The general order , fence the whole began, Is - ature, and is kept in man. //". y this man? Now upward would be foot And little lefs than angel, would be more ; :• looking downwards, juft as grievW appears, To want the ftrength of bulls, the fur of bears. Made for his ufe all creatures if be a Say what their ufe, had he the powers of all? EfTay on man, Epift. J And with regard to the paflions implanted in oil nature, ds fruits ungrateful to the planters care, On fivage flocks infer ted, learn to bear ; The fur eft virtues thus from paffwns jhoot, Wild nature'* s vigour working at the root. What crops of wit and honefty appear, From pie en, from obftinacy, hate, or fear* anger, zeal and fortitude fupply ; 'rice, prudence -, floth, philofophy \ Envy, to which th* ignoble minus a jlave, 1 1 emulation in the learn' d and brave : I ; .r, thro* fome certain ftrainers well refirfd, U gentle love, and charms all womankind: :ue, male on female, can we name, B:. will grow on pride, or grozv on Jbame. is nature gives us (let it check our pride) The virtue near eft to our vice allyd-, Reafon the byafs turns to good from ill, And Nero reigns a Tims, if he u -I he fiery foul abhorred in Cataline, In Deeius charms, in Curtius is divr,h\ The fame ambition can dejlroy, or fn\\ •kes a patriot, as it makes a knave. Eflay on nun, Epift. Bu of Moral Philosophy. 307 IV. But to clear up this point yet further, let us Chap. II. reflect what we would have done by nature to fet us i-«-v— '— ' right, and to prevent our abuie of our powers and Nature could affections ; or what we can conceive poinbk for nature jJav^done^ to have done for that effect, which it hath not done, more for us It appears from what has been faid of vices, that than it has. none of them take their rife from affections or ap- petites in our nature, merely implanted for evil purpofes, or to qualify us for vices. No vice takes it rife from a paffion or affection abfolutely hurtful, and not fitted for very good purpofes. Even the love of power, as hurtful as it is by fome effects of it, is in itfelf a mod noble principle in our nature, as being the foundation of greatnefs of mind, and of many lofty and excellent virtues. Without it, the human mind would have been timorous, fubmif- five, low and groveling; it could never have rifen to great attempts, or have been capable of great fentiments. Magnanimity, defpight of danger, and public fpirit* could not podibly have been virtues within our reach, without fuch an original greatnels of mind, as iuppofes the defire of extending our abilities and our fphere of activity. But if this is really the cafe, nature acted a kind part with regard to us, in implanting in us this principle ; it certain- ly intended our good and perfection by it. Or would any man chufe to have had mankind fecured againft the bad effects of wrong-turned ambition, at the expence of our being utterly destitute of a capa- city of noble and worthy ambition, of high ideas, great fentiments, and fuitable actions? How, therefore, can v/e conceive mankind to be The original fecured by its Author again ft the vices which really ^^^^4 fpring from affections neceffary to cur good and *nQ.) The ignorance and barbarity of certain nations and times have been ftudioufly magnified by fome tra- velers and hiftorians, to ferve I know not what pur- pofes : but from others we learn, that hofpitality, juftice, gratitude, candor, temperance, and all the (p) That temperance is the beft. prefervative of health, and that honefly is the beft policy, are univerfal proverbs in all countries, and they ever were fo ; and are not thefe a com- plete fyftem of morals. For every one become? foon enough ac- quainted with his conftitution to know what dilorders or diicom- pofes him ; and, in order to know, what honefly requires in any particular inftance, one needs only fuppofe himfelf in the cafe propofed, and ask himfelf, what he would defire or expect to be done to him in it. But which is more, in all countries there are prevailing fables known to the vulgar, that exprefs in a very flrong manner, all the more important duties and rules of life, Y virtues 322 The PRINCIPLES Ch a p. II. virtues have been found very general, even in nati- u— ~y ' ons called the mofl barbarous. Infomuch that no: country has ever wanted its proverbs, as has been juft foid, expreffing very fitly the advantages oi them, and the obligations to them : not even the countries the moil corrupted and perverted by iuper ftition and tyranny : the two other great evils com- plained of in human life •, and which are indeed the two greateft obftacles to the progrcfs of ufefiil know- ledge j the great fources and fupports of all the ig norance that has prevailed, or ft ill prevails among mankind. III. Now with regard to them, we may obferve, This reafon- that though we want very much a hiftory of fuperfti- ing applied to tion, faithfully collected, it feems evident that if tyran- tyranny. ny ^e not ^t jnventrefs and mother of fuperftition. yet at lead, they have always gone hand in hand, kept pace, and acted as it were in concert. Tyranny no doubt, fays a noble author, has a natural tenden- cy to corrupt mens notions of the Deity, and of re ligion and morals. " Morality and good govern- ment mufl go together : there is no real love ol virtue without the knowledge of public good And where ablblute power is, there is no public Accordingly, they who live under tyranny, anc admire its power as facred and divine, are debau ched as much m their religion as in their morals public good, according to their apprebenfioir, I as little the meafure or rule of government in the univerfe as in the ftate. They havefcarce anyno> tion of what is good and juft, other than as men will and power have determined. Omnipotence, they think, would hardly be itfjf, were it not a liberty to difpence with the laws of equity, anc change at ptcafurc the ftandard of moral rectitude.' " But, notwithftanding the prejudices and cor ru prions of this kind, 'tis plain, there is fomc thing Hill of a public principle, even where it ii moil perverted and deprejjed, The word of ma- " giftracics, of Moral Philosophy. a giftracies, the mere defpotic kind, can fhew fuffi- " cient inftances of zeal and affection towards it. a Where no other government is known, it feldom " fails of having that allegiance and duty paid it, " which is owing to a better form. The eaftern " countries, and many barbarous nations have been, " and ftill are, examples of this kind. The perfonal " love they bear their prince, however fevere to- " wards them, may fhew how natural an affection " there is towards government and order among u mankind. If men have really no public parent* " no magiftrate in common to cherifh and protect " them | they will ftill imagine they have fuch a :' one ; and, like new-born creatures* who have ne- H ver feen their dam, will fancy one for themfelves, " and apply (as by nature prompted) to fome like " form, for favour and protection. In the room of :' a true fofter-father and chief, they will take after " a falfe one ; and$ in the room of a legal govern- " ment and juft prince, they will obey even a ty- u rant, and endure even a whole lineage and fuccef- " fion of fuch.'* All this is very true with regard to tyranny and its To fuperfliti- natural tendency ; fo that the greater! corruptions a- on which is mong mankind, either in morals or in religion, may f0U"f-toJ^Oj be afcribed to it as their fource and firft canfe : but J£h Lrannya furely* tyranny * and its difmal effects, are not more repugnant to benevolence, than they are to felf-love and felf-intereft. For at what would we think mould felf-prefervation make us fpurn and rebel more zea- louQy, than the cruel ufurpations of defpotic will and lawlefs power ? But if the rife of fuperftitidn, or falfe religion, mould not be thought iufficiently ac- countable, by fuppofmg it the device of tyrants to carry on their ambitious fchemes (q) of enflaving mankind {q) A late author, {Hiji. duCiel) in my opinion, hath rendered it exceeding probable, that fuperftition or idolatry toolkits rife from the misinterpretation of the fymbolical language in practice Y t among *■ Ttje PRINCI PLES mankind more eafily and fuccefsfully ; or whatevr may have been the rile of it, fore any barbarous - iages which have been eftablimed by it, are equally p* pugnant to the love of ourfelves, and to the love one another. From all which, it follows, that thing can be inferred from any vices which have e\ reigned among mankind, but that men are pable of falling into fad corruptions, if they do I ufe their natural powers rightly. To which ought, on the other hand, to be oppofed, that ma kind are capable of great perfection and happin by the right ufe of their powers. And this bei; the cafe, it can never remain a quellion, whetl: man is well formed by nature, with thole who thii the greateft of all happinefs and perfection is tr! which is attainable by a being itfelf, in proporti to its care to improve its natural flock of powers aj amongft the Egyptians more efpecially, the firft meaning which, after the invention and common ufe of letters, was fc forgot. But, at the fame time, he (hews, that the worihipj dead heroes was the earlielt fpecies of idolatrous worlhip ; cient fymbols that were originally ufed, to fignify the propel cupations of the different feaibns and months of the year, and mark out the returns of feaits, having been, after their propel was forgot, firlt interpreted to fignify the inventions or a£ti< of deceafed benefactors, heroes or kings. And nothing more plain from hiltory, than that ambitious men were at gr pains to promote the cuitom of Jpji'hicfu, in cencprt with til employed about facred things, who found tjieii account in it many considerations, In fine, we may judge how idola introduced and kept up in ancient times, from the way in whi faife religion is now fupported. Tyrants, and corrupt prie mutually rinding their intereit in it, cordially league and un to uphold it by all the arts they can devife : 'I is the dn right of theie two to enflave the relt of mankind, and to ] luxuriantly upon their indulhy, or rather drudgeiv, that is I i lutf end of all the mixed policy of arbitrary power and fup itition. But the fuccefs of fuch cruel policy, To evidem contrary to the well-being and happinefs of every individual fuch tyrannies, mufl firlt be aliowed to be a good argum againit our being naturally fenfible to mii'ery and happinels, fore it enn be brought as one to prove/ that we have in our i ture no focial feeling, no difpofuion toward focicty and union affectio .ce/o of Moral Philosophy. affections. To what hath been faid, we may juft fub- join, that almoft at all times, and in all ages and coun- tries, even among the moft barbarous, enthraled and fuperftitious, there have not been wanting fome per- fons who not only had arrived, by the due exercifes of their faculties, to juft notions of religion, morality, and mankind's true interefts ; but wholikewife thro* public fpirit, boldly bore teftimony to the truth, and called upon mankind but to open their eyes, that they might fee the happinefs and perfection for which nature hath kindly deligned them. For this fact is fufficiently attefted by hiftory, VI. But I proceed to another confideration, in Without a order to fhew the abfurdity of the complaints mixture of made againft human nature, on account of the vices f£° a"^ eY^> to which it is liable. We have often had occafion to no place for defire it to be obferved and remembred, that moral prudei ends and effects muft have their ftated means and caufes, as well as natural ones ; otherwife there could be no fuch thing as moral connexions, moral order, and moral knowledge : let thofe therefore who ob- ject againft the human make, and the prefent ftate ef things, on account of phyfical and moral evils which fpring from certain caufes, confider well the ultimate refult of their objections ; whether by them they do not demand caufes without their effects, or effects without their caufes, both which are equally abfurd •, both which are owned to be grofly abfurd with refpect to natural caufes and effects : and both which muft, by parity of reafon, be abfurd with regard to moral effects and caufes. 'Tis certain- ly abfurd to wifh to have the capacity of forefeeing the confequences of things in the natural world to any degree, and the power of procuring goods to ourfelves, of avoiding evils, or of turning evils in- to goods, in confequence of that capacity 5 and, at the fame time, to defire that there were no bad con- fequences, no evils to be guarded againft, or turned Y 2 into the PRINCIPLES into goods. Now the fame muft likewife hold true with refpect to moral connexions, and our capacity, of foreseeing moral goods or evils, and our power in confequence thereof, of fhunning or warding of] fuch evils, or of turning them into goods. Nature, in both cafes, has defigned to make procuring goods and avoiding evils dependent on ourfelves, in order to make the ftudy of nature our employment, and our happinefs in a great meafure our own work and acquifition. And therefore, if on the one hand, we think fuch conduct of nature neeeiTary with regard to us, in order to our enjoying the pled fures of knowing nature's laws and connexions, of forefeeing confequences, and of exerting our- felves wifely, as it certainly is, then let us not blame nature for having fo conftituted things, that knowledge and forefeeing might be necelTary ; or that there might be place for fuch a thing as act- ing wifely, and chufing well, fince thefe could not take place, were there no evils to be avoided or con-j: verted into good by wifdom and virtue. If, on the other hand, we do not like the conduct of nature, which lays a foundation for wifdom and virtue, good and pradent action, forefight and felf-appro- bation \ let us fpeak out plainly the ultimate mean- ing of our complaint againft nature •, and lay, na- ture hath dealt unkindly by us in making our hap- pinefs depend in any meafure on ourfelves, and in making us capable of the pleafures of know^ ledge, forefight, felf-direction, and good manage- ment, (r) Before (;•) See this fubjeft finely treated in Tlutarch dc fortuna. Vi tarn regit fortuna, quidam dixit, non fapientia. Quid ergo i Deque juftitia, neque equalitas, neque temperantia, neque mo- deftia res Kumanas dirigunt ? Sed a fortuna & propter foriunam I eft ut in fua pcrfeveraret Ariftides paupertate cmnparaic divitias iibi poftet ? Et Scipio, &c. ■ jam confiiio dex- tciitate fublaUj par eit neque confukrationem ullaiu rerum re linqui ; ^ Moral Philosophy. 327 Before we object againft a ftate of rational crea- Chap. II. tures, becaufe evils do refult from certain combina- <— ■ — v — J tions of things, as goods do from others, according ^ence ™5 **e- to fixed laws, afcertainable by them, in order to be 0feev1b. ' y the rule of their choices, conduct, and purfuits ; we ought to be fure whether it is pofllble in the nature of things, that there can be rational creatures capable of the pleafures refulting from choice and wife pur- fuit, were there not evils refulting from certain choices and purfuits, in confequence of the connec- tions linqui ; neque inveftigationem utilitatis. ■ Quid enim inve~ nire aut difcere homines pofTent homines fi fortuna omnia diri- gantur?— — — Ita prudentia neque aurum eft, neque argen- turn, neque gloria, neque valetudo, neque robur, neque pul- chritudo. Quid ergo ea eft ? Id quod recle his omnibus uti poteft, ac fingula horum jucunda facit, laudibilia, utilia, cum line hac inutilia, fterilia, damnofaque fint, & moleftiam dede- cus poflidenti ea adferant. Prasclare itaque Prometheus apud Hefiodum praecipit Epimetheo. Ne munera magno Ab Jove mijfa unquam accipiat, fed habere recufet. Nimirum de fortune bonis loquens : perinde ac II muficae ig- narum canere fiftula, aut recitare indoctum, aut equitare igna- rum equi gubernandi vetant : ita eum hortans ne magiftratum gerat cum imprudens fit, neve fit dives animo pneditus illiberal:. Non enim duntaxat res fecundae indigno oblatae occafionem, ftultis exhibent malorum confiliorum, ut Demofthenes dixit; fed & profperitas merito major imprudentibus calamitatum anfa & origo eft. The fubftance of all this account amounts briefly to this. If the moral and natural world are not governed by general laws, they are governed without order in a dilatory indeterminable manner, which is chance, or equivalent to it : and if, accord- ing to the general laws by which the world is governed, there are not evils to be avoided, as well as pleafures to be purfued .; there can be no fuch thing as prudence and folly. Which is as plain, as that there can be no fuch thing as >n art of avoiding, where there is nothing to be avoided ; or an art of procuring happinefs, where happinefs cannot be the object of fearch and pur- fuit. This reafoning goes further than it is necefTary to my pur- pofe to purfue it. It is difficult to handle the neceftity of evil in fuch a manner, as not to Humble fuch as are not above being Y 4 alarmed 328 The PRINCIPLES Chap. II. tions of things ; or if not pofitive evils, at leaft what may be called evils, that is, pleafures very inferioi to other pleafures : but that is fo far from being pof- fible, that we cannot poflibly conceive how there can be any fuch thing as place for right or wrong choice, wifdom or virtue, but in fuch a ftate ; nay. we clearly fee there cannot be place for wifdom and virtue, good and bad conduct, but in fuch a flate : for right and wrong choice, with refpecl to what- ever mind, even with refpect to the creating mind, neceffarily fuppofe connexions productive of happi- nefs, and connexions productive of evil, or at leaf] of lefs good. There is therefore an abfolute ne- alarmed at proportions which have an uncommon found. But if philofophers will but reflect calmly on the matter, they will; find, that confidently with the unlimited power of the fupreme caufe, it may be faid, that in the belt ordered fyftem evils mull have place, But becaufe fome will eafily grant that with re- fpect to phyfical evils. I would only fuggeft here to fuch, one thing that I have purpofely avoided in this enquiry, which is, that whatever way moral good and evil be confidered, or from, whatever fource they are derived, moral evil fuppofes phyfical evil to be the effect of certain actions in confequence of the laws of nature. The deduction of moral obligations from the ciTential differenceof actions in refpect of beauty or fitnefs (which muft be the bafis whatever other method is taken) neceffarily fuppofes phy- fical evils to be the confequence of certain methods of action. Suffer me, however, to propofe one qucition to philofophers, the confequences of which, whatever way it may be determined, reaches very far. " Whether all conftitutions or connexions of things can be indifferent to the firft independent mind, the crea- tor of all things ; that is, equally agreeable to him, of whatever temper he may be fuppofed to be, good, or bad." Every one will eafily perceive, that to fay, if he is good, he mull like what is belt, is no anfwer at all ; becaufe if there be no goodnefs or badnefs, but what is of his appointment, whatever he appointee would have been good, if he had appointed it to be fuch. The fame queilion may be put thus, in other terms, " was the lirlt mind determined to chufe by any meliority in what he chofej or would any other frame of things have been equally good, if he had appointed that to be the frame of things. Wherever choice it> made, there is better and worfe independent of choice. Whe- ihi r a mind be neceffarily determined in. his choices by motives o: not i deliberation itfelf fuppofes fomcthing to be preferred. ceffity o/ Moral Philosophy. 329 eefllty in the nature of things, that in order to the Ch ap.IL exiftence of agents capable of good and bad choice, «— -y*^-* there fhould be, at lead, very high goods to be ob- tained by certain purfuits, in comparifon of others, to be obtained by other purfuits. And is not this coming very near to admitting an abfolute neceflity of connexions from which evils refult, in order to the very being of rational creatures, and their diftin- guifhing excellence and happinefs. But if we are obliged to go fo far, in admitting a neceflity of evil in a comparative fenfe, ought we not to be very cautious how we object againft any evils which take place : or can we, indeed, reafonably object againft evils, unlefs we can clearly prove, that they are not at all necefTary to the happinefs and perfection of rational creatures ; for till we can prove that, (a ne- ceflity of comparative evil being once admitted) the preemption will lie with refpect to any particular evils, that they may be necefTary to good, the greater good of rational beings : but as fuch, they are goods, and not evils. But, having but juft fuggefted this general obfer- Several vlr- vation, I fhall now go on to mew, from particular tues neceffa- inftances, that many of the evils complained of in n[y PreruP- human life, moral as well as natural, are, in the K^d but7 nature of things, necefTary, abfolutely neceflfary to m0ral evils, many goods, without which human life could have no diftinguifhing excellence, nor indeed any confi- derable happinefs; which inftances will confirm, a pofteriori, our arguing, as we have juft done, ab- ftractedly, from the nature of things, for the necef- lity of evil in general. I. Not only is it true in general, as has been al- ready obferved, that there can be no rational crea- tures, capable of right and wrong choice, good and bad conduct, wifdom and virtue, unlefs there be, with regard to them, connexions which are pro- ductive at leaft of leffer and greater pleafures, to be the The PRINCIPLES the objects and rule of their conduct and purfuits But with refpect to man, it is certain, that fevera vices and imperfections (/), as well as phyfical pain! and wants, are abfolutely necelfary to the very being and exercife of certain virtues, which are the higher! glory of human life, and afford men their bed plea- lures and enjoyments. Not only are darknefs, doubts, ignorance, narrow views and falfe conceptions, as neceflary, in the nature of things, to giye a high relifh to knowledge, truth (/), inftru£tion, recovery from error, and the breaking in of light upon the mind, as hunger, thirft, and other urgent appetite* are to the exquifitenefs of the pleafure fenfible gra (/) The whole diflertation of Plutarch de capiendo, ex inimici utilitatt is a proof of this. Vis inimico ut egre fit fhcere, nol ei exprobare lafciviam, molitiem, intemperantiam, illiberalita- rem, ipie fortis efto, callus, verax, humanumque & .equum ii, cum quibus tibi res eft te pra:be. Quod fi ad maledicendum, &c < — Si illiteratum, ftudium difcendi tuum laboremque in : tende : fi timidum, excita fortitudinem tuam, fi lafcivum del< ex animo fi quod reftat delitefcens libidinis vefligium. Atcjue hoc modo licet in inimicitia manruetudinem 8c malorun tolcrantiam demonftrare. Simplicitati & magnanimitati atquq bonitati plus loci hie eft, quam in amicitiis. Nonenimtan. pulchrum eft, bene amico tacere quam turps non faccre id, cum: neceflitas ejus rcquirit. Cactcrum oblata occafione ulcifcendi ini niicum, eum milium facerc xquanimitatis eft. Qui vero & mi. feratur inimicum affliclum Sc opem infert indigenti, & filiis eju ac familise adverfo ipforum tempore operam fuam ftudiumqui defert ; hunc qui non amat ob animi humanicatem neque probi* tatem laudat, Huic peclus atrum eft atque adamantinum. — He concludes with a molt generous remark. Qui vero non ex c.icatur cdio inimici, led vitam ejus, mores, di&a, factaque ul» inconuptus fpedator contemplatur, is pleraque eorum, quorun^ fintftra semulatione correptus elt, intelliget ei diligentia, provi dentil, probifque aclionibus parta efle: eodemque contendere ftudium houeftatis, gloru que luum augebit ; vanitate & ibcordi;J- affectuum amputates &c. (/) vSo Cicero, in a fragment preferred by D. Jug. Lib IV cap. 2. fate. Nee cnim fortitudinis indigeremu nullo pro pofito aut labore aut periculo : nee juftitia cum effe nihil, 1 alieni: nee temperantia qua; rcgeret cas ii null ics : ncc prudentia- quidem egeremus null CO Lor.orum & malorum. tification {/"Moral Philosophy. 331 tifications afford; infomuch that the one could not Chap. II. be without the other : but which is more, feveral moral difeafes, imperfections and vices, make the materials and fubjects of many excellent virtues, they make place for them, they call them forth in^ to action, they give them occafion to exert them- felves, prove their force, and difplay all their beau- ty. As without diftreifes, wants and afflictions of the natural kind, there could be no room for pa- tience, fortitude, companion and charity ; fo with- out moral evils to combat with, or to remedy, there could be no place for heroifm, for generous in- ftruction, for noble efforts to reform mankind from errors and vice, for ftruggling againft corruption and tyranny -, in one word, for any of the noble, public-fpirited, generous virtues, which add fuch luftre and glory to human life ; and often render it a fcene not unworthy of higher orders of rational beings to contemplate («). Here then is not only an excellent (») See Seneca. Quare bonis viris mala accidunt quum ft providentia. He perhaps goes too far, when he fays, Nobis in- ferdum voluptati eft, fi adolefcens conftantis animi irruentem feram venabulo excipit, fi leonis incurfum interritus pertulit, tantoque fpe&aculum eft gratius, quanto id honeflior fecit. Non funt ifta quae poftunt Deorum in fe vultum convertere, {ed puerilia & humanae oblectantia levitatis. Ecce fpeclaculum dig' num, ad quod refpiciat intentus operi fuo Deus. Ecce par Deo dignum, vir fortis cum mala fortuna compoiitus, utique fi & provocavit. Non video inquit, quid habet in terris Jupiter pul- crius, fi convertere animum velit, quam ut fpeclet Catonem ? He makes, however, very good reflections upon this fubject Vir bonus omnia adverfa exercitationes putat. Quis autem, vir modo, & ere&us ad honefta, non eft laboris appetens jufti & ad officia cum periculo promptus ? Cui non indullrias otium poena eft? Athletas videmus quibus virium cura eft cum fortiftimis quibafquam confligere.-— — — Marcet line ad verfario virtus. Tunc apparet quanta fit, quantum valeat polleatque cum quid poflit, patientia offendit. Magnuses vir; fed unde fcio, fi tibi fortuna non dat facultatem exhibendi virtutis ? j -Nemo fciet quid potueri6 ; ne tu quidem ipfe. Opus eft enim ad noti- tiam fui experimento. — Gaudent magni viri rebus adver- ts, non aliter quam fortes milites bellis. — — «»— Ad quam rem non 332 Tie PRINCIPLES Chap. II. excellent ufe of thefe moral evils, which are how- as we have feen, nothing but the cor- ruptions and perverfions of affections, which in themfelves are of the higheft importance to our dig- nity and perfection : but here is plainly a neceftity of im perfections and vices, to the very exiftence of many virtues, or to their formation, trial, exertion, and glorious efforts. Imperfections and vices do in- deed give force and heightening to good qualities and virtues, as the fhades in a picture fet off the brighter and more enlightened parts. It is not pofUble that there can be an agreeable variety of beauty in the moral world, without foils and con- craft, any more than in the natural ; for whatever is raifed, heightened, or made confpicuous in na- ture, muft be rendered fuch by made and contrail; And let us but think how dull the hiftory of man- kind would be, or how low, untouching, infipid and r.on opus e ft aliqua rerum difHcultate ? Gubernatorem in tempe- rate, in acie militcm inteDigas. Ipfis, Deus confulit, quos efle quam honeftiftimos capit, quoties illis materiam prrcbet ali- quid animofe fortiterque faciendi. Calamitas virtutis occaiio eft. Hos itaque Deus quos probat, quos amat, indurat, re- cbgnofck, exerctt : Hanc itaque rationem dii fequuntur in bonis viris, quam in difcipulis fuis praeceptores: qui plus la- boris ab his exigunt, in quibus certior fpcs ell.' Quid mi- rum, ft dare generofos fpiritus Deus tentat ? Nunquam virtutis juolle documentum eft, Ignis aurum probat, miferia fortes viros. Hoc eft propofttum Deo, quod fapienti viio, offendere hie qua; vulgus appetit, quae refbrmidat, nee bona efle nee mala. Apparebunt autem bona efle, ft illo non nift bonis \ iris tribuerit, & mala efte ft malis tantum irrogaverit. Omnia mala ab illis removet. Scelera & flagitia & cogitati- ones improbas & avida conftlia, & libidincm caccam & alieno imminentera avaritiam. lit iquos pro fcclicibus afpicitis, ft non qua occurrunt fed qua latent, videiitis, miferi funt fordidi, tur- ,1 ninilitudincm parietum lucrum extrinftcus culti. Non eit ilia l'olida & fincera faelicitas: (Jrulla eft, & quidem tenuis. Cum aliquid incidit, quod dillurbet & detegat, tunc a] paret quantum altx ac verae facditatis alien us fplcndor abfeon- deril \ obis dedi bona certa manfura : quanto magis verfave- St undique afpejeeritis, meliofa rnajoraque permift vobis, npo egere felicitate ixlicitas veftra eft, groveling of Moral Philosophy. 333 groveling a mow to ourfelves, human afFairswouldCHAP.il. be, without the magnanimous contefts, and heroic u* — v~* -J atchievements of virtue contending with vices. But this is not all the vices ferve for, merely to illu- ftrate virtues, and to difplay their charms to ad- vantage : for benevolence, magnanimity, gratitude, patriotifm, public fpirit, and all the other virtues, which are the great ornaments of mankind, could not take place, were there no wants among man- kind to fupply, or diitrefTes to be relieved, no mon- ftrous paffions to bear down and fubdue, no favage enemies to combat and deftroy, no great goods to bring to mankind, or no great evils to deliver them from. A Hercules could not have afcended among the gods, and acquired everlafting fame, had there been no cruel tyrants, that ravaged mankind like furious tygers, to conquer and extirpate. Nor could an Orpheus have done the moft glorious work that can fall to the fhare of mere mortal, by civi- lizing a people, and bringing in wholfome laws, philofophy, arts, and good taite among them, had he not found a nation that was yet living like the wild beafls, and quite a ftranger to all the high en- joyments of well polifhed humanity. All this is as evident, as that fupplying fuppofcs wants, and deli- vering fuppofes diftrefs. They, therefore, reafon moil abfurdly, who would have human life diftin- guifhed by glorious virtues, and yet thofe virtues not have fubjects, materials and occafions to exert and prove themfelves upon. II. But in the fecond place, if objectors attend to Every fate of human nature, to the nice bailance and dependence f!1? bodX P°- of human affections, and to the natural tendency ^ ^J- ^body and courfe of things, they will plainly fee an abfur- natural, is in- dity in many of their complaints againft human na- cident to par- ture, on account of the vices to which it is liable, tlc"lar dlf; unlels they think that mankind ought not to form themfelves into focieties, and endeavour to make the bodies 334 ^ PRINCIPLES Chap. II. bodies into which they form themfelves, great, o- pulent and powerful, by encouraging manufactures, trade, and the polite arts. If they think that man- kind ought not to do ib, but would be happier in fmall bodies, without any arts, but fuch as are ne- ceflary to mere iubfiftence \ or by foregoing all worldly power and grandeur for fimplicity and quiet, or rather indolence. It is fufficient to anfwer, that men may do fo if they pleaie : they are made for fociety, and they may chufe for themfelves* their end and form in contriving fociety. Though they cannot attain to any end by any means, no more than a machine can be well formed for a certain end, without a fabric adjuited to that end •, yet they may chufe their end, and the means to that end, if they will but content themfelves with that end, and expect no advantages from it, but what it is fitted iri the nature of things to produce. But, to expect the advantages and benefits which arife from large bodies, who let themfelves by pro- per means to make a great, an opulent and polite fociety, from fmall bodies that have no fuch aim, and do not therefore take the ways and means to at- tain to it •, or to expect to avoid the inconveni- ences which naturally arife from this or the other manner of combination, or from the purfuit of this or the other end by its proper means, is as abfurd as to eat our cake and cry for it. .ices III. But having premifed this general anfwer, in to which the order to be convinced of the abfurdity of complaints e againft our make, on account of the many vices mankind are obnoxious to* when formed into great fbcieties, whc.e end is wealth] power and politenefs ; I woukl defire the reader to attend to the following vy evident maxims. i. On the one hand, worldly wealth, power, greatnefs, when attained, ncaifarily give more oc- cafions to the affections to take a ftrong turn and bent of Moral Philosophy. 33a >ent towards the purfirit of external gratifications, Chap.IL han their contraries, indigence, weaknefs, and ob- curity do. Affections and appetites muft neceflarily x ftrongly follicited by objects and means proper to gratify them, if thefe are continually prefent to the nind -, and affections much follicited, much called jpon, and frequently indulged, mud grow flronger ind ftronger as they are fo. Whence it follows, ;hat according to the nature of things, inordinate appetites and affections towards external goods, muff be very prevalent in opulent, powerful and great Hates. It is unavoidable. 2. On the other hand, worldly power, wealth and greatnefs, cannot be obtained by a flate, but by the purfuits of the individuals; for what elfe is a date but an affemblage of many individuals •, or its goods, but the lum or aggregate of the goods ob- tained by the purfuits of the individuals ? But it is impoffible that external advantages can be obtained, if they are not very keenly purfued ; or be keenly purfued, if they are not highly valued. And it is extremely difficult for individuals to value fo highly as to purfue keenly, any external goods, and ftill preferve their affections from all the inordinacies and irregularities, to which keen and ffrong affec- tions towards external goods are liable, and which would prove the ruin of fociety, if they were not retrained to a certain degree by right policy. 3. On the one hand, as riches and plenty cannot be obtained without induftry •, fo without very great confumption induftry cannot be encouraged or main- tained: but whatever contributes to confumption, muft, as fuch, conduce to promote and encourage induftry : and there will neceffarily be moft encou- ragement to induftry, where there is moft con- fumption ; but there will be moft confumption of external goods, where there is moft fenfual gratifica- tion, and confequently there will be moft encou- ragement to induftry, where there is more affection to 22r PRINCIPLES to fenfual gratification, than where there is lef The pains taken to procure goods will be in propor tion to the demand for them. 4. But on the other hand* as it is certain tha wealth and greatnefs cannot be procured by a ftate unlefs they are fought and purfued ; fo it is certain that opulence and plenty when procured, by afford ing for a time the means of fenfual gratification, t( a very great degree of voluptuoufnefs> tend to maki men averfe to the toils and hardfhips, to the labou and afliduity, by which alone continual confumptioi can be fupplied and reinforced with frehh ftores, it order to the continuance of opulence and plenty The temper and fpirit necefTary to acquire them i loft by great indulgence in the enjoyment of them So that as a nation cannot be opulent, unlefs then be the confumption by fenfual gratifications, necefTa ry to maintain the induftry requifite to procure them ; fo opulence and plenty cannot long fubfift. unlefs, notwithftanding the indulgences neceflary tc confumption, the fpirit of induftry be kept up a- midft that indulgence and confumption. 5. From thele politions it follows, that the for* mation and maintenance of a fociety, which fhal. purfue and attain to wealth and grandeur, requires the niceft adminiftration, a very curious adjuftment, many counterpoiiing regulations, and with all, the mod watchful, delicate attention and interpofition. (#) Such a ibciety muft, in the nature of things, be a {x) Ut in fidibus, ac tibiis, atque cantu ipfo, ac vocibus con- ccntus eit quidam tcnendus ex diftin&is fonis, quern immuta- tum, ac difcrcpantem aurcs eruditac ftne non poflint, ifque con- centus ex dimmillimarum vocum moderatione concors tamen eflicitur & coogrmens : fie ex funtmis & infimis, & mediis inter- jtctis ordinibos, ut fonis moderata rationc, auftus conicniu dif- iimillimorum concinit, & qua: harmonia a muficis dicitur in can- tu, ea ell in civitatc concordia ar&iffimum atque optimum omni in rcpub. vinculum mcolumitatis ; quae fine jullitia nullo paclc eflepotcft. Cicirtdt ref 1 2 Ex /Jug. daivit. da. \. 2. c. 21, Statue /Moral Philosophy. 337 a compofition of contrary qualities, from which har- Chap. II, mony and general good are to be educed -, which muft require very fkilful management, very accurate- ly contrived laws, and a very dextrous adminiftration. But, 6. That fuch an adjuftment and adminiftra- tion of fociety is poflible, our own conftitution, to go no further, is a fufficient proof; fince were but a few things changed, it would necefiarily produce the continuance of great opulence and power, great in- duftry and noble arts, glorious virtues, and great general happinefs: it would produce confumption neceflary to the maintenance and encouragement of induftry, without the decreafe of the induftrious fpi- rit, which is, and muft be the great fecret, in or- der to the getting and preferving of opulence and greatnefs. It would not be free from vices ; but all vices being duly curbed and reftrained, out of the vices that did prevail would be educed great goods by the virtues to which fuch a conftitution would na- turally give due vigour and force. IV. This reafoning is certainly true, but if it is fo, Men may then it inevitably follows, that all objections againft chufe their man, on account of the vices his nature is liable to in ^' ft^e certain combinations of men and things are abfurd. hath its natu- For mankind muft certainly be well made, " fince ral and ne- ceffary confe- Statuo effe optirni conftitutam rempublicam quae ex tribus ge- ^i^11^5' neribus illis regali, optimo, & populari confufa modice, nee pu- niendo irritet animum immanem ac ferum, nee omnia prseter mittendo, licentia cives deterrores reddat. Cicero de repub. 1. 2. Refp. res eft populi, cum bene ac juite geritur, five ab uno rege, five a paucis optimatibus, five ab univerfo populo. Cum vero injuftus eft rex, quern tyrannum voco: aut injufti optimates, quorum confenfus fadlio eft : aut injuftus ipfi populus, cui nomen ufitatum nullum reperio, nifi ut etiam ipfurn tyrannum appellem : non jam vitiofa, led omnino nulla refp. eft ; quoniam non eft res populi, cum tyrannus earn, factiove capefTat : nee ipfe populus eft, fi fit injuftus, qnoniam non eft multitudo juris confenfu, & utilitatis communione fociata. Cicero de rep. frag. Ex Aug. 1. 2. C- 21. de cinjitat. dei. Debet enim conjlituta fie effe civitas, nt seterna fit, Ibid. Z we The PRINCIPLES we are made capable of puriuing various ends, and of forming ourfelves into different combinations for attaining various ends with forefight and choice M ; " fince bad conftitutions of fociety, or unnatural combinations, not proper to attain to any good end, muft be miferable and cannot long fubfift, but muff diffolve like a difeafed body , " " and fince by means of good government, focieties may be ex- tremely happy, not only notwithftanding any excef- fes or degeneracies, to which the affections im- planted in us, or that can be ingrafted upon us, are liable -, but in great mealure, at leaft, even in con- fequence of the inordinate affections and concupif- t:ences which are neceffary to the procuring worldly wealth and greatnefs, or which they naturally tend to engender ; thefe being counter-poifed or counter- worked by the virtues, a good conftitution of fociety as naturally tends to produce, as any well contrived machine works to its effect, while all its fprings and wheels are in due order." This being the cafe, no objection can be made againft our make and frame, which does not terminate in alking, either why we are made: to arrive at any confiderable end by uniting our forces in the focial way, which is to object again it our being focial creatures, and made for fellow fhip, communication and participation ;or, in afking, why our forces muff be rightly combined and exerted in order to gain a certain good end, which is indeed to afk, why means are requifite to an end ; or why an effect mutt be produced by its caufes, than which there cannot be a greater abfurdity in phyfics or in morals ; or, laftly, in alking, why the goods of any combination of qualities in order to attain them, may not be effects of another calculated to attain other goods, which is likewife abfurd. For it is no Icfs impoffible, that the advantages of a fimple ftate of mankind without arts only aiming at quiet- nefs, and mere iubfiftence, can belong to a ftatc calculated to advance in opulence and greatnefs, by the of Moral Philosophy. 33/ the arts and means requifite to that end \ than 'tis Chap. II. impoflible, that fire mould have at the fame time, the properties of fire and of water. Men are ca- pable of both dates and conditions, but they cannot have the goods of both at the fame time. Each hath its peculiar advantages and difad vantages, which muft go together, (y ) As (y) See an excellent paper on this fubjeft, Vol. VL No. 3J.64. that is concluded with a very pretty alegory, which is wrought into a play by Arijlopbanes, the Greek Comedian. It feems originally defigned as a fatyr upon the rich, though in fome parts of it, it is like the foregoing difcoiirfe, a kind of comparifon between wealth and poverty. Chremylus, who was an old and a good man, and withal ex- ceeding poor; b£ing defirous to leave lome riches to his fon, con- fults the Oracle of Apollo upon the fubject : The Oracle bids him follow the nrft man he mould fee upon his going out of the temple. The perfon he chanced to fee, was to appearance, an old fordid blind man, but upon his following him from place to place, he at laft found by his own confeflion, that he was Plu- tus, the God of riches, and that he was juft come out of the houfe of a mifer. Plutus further told him, that when he was a boy, he ufed to declare, that as foon as he came to age, he would diftribute wealth to none but virtuous and juft men ; up- on which, Jupiter, confidering the confequences of fuch a refolu- tion, took his fight away from him, and left him toftrOle about the world, in the blind condition wherein Chremylus beheld him. With much ado, Chremylus prevailed upon him to go to his houfe^ where he met an old woman with a tatter' d raiment, who had been his gueft for many years, and whofe name was Poverty* The old woman refufing to turn out fo eafily as he would have her, he threatened to banifh her, not only out of his houfe, but out of all Greece, if (he made any more words upon the matter. Poverty, ort this occafion, pleads her caufe very notably, and reprefents to her old landlord,; chat ffoould file be driven out cf the country, all their trades, arts and fciences would be driven but with her ; and that if every one was rich, they would never be fupplicd with thefe pompous ornaments and conveniencies of life, which made riches deiirable. She likewife reprefented to him the feveral advantages which Hie bellowed upon her vota- ries in regard to their health, their fhape, and their activity, by preferving them from gouts, dropfies,unwieldinefs and intem- perance. But whatever me had to fay for herfelf, fhe was at laft forced to troop oft*. Chremylus immediately conlidered hr^ he might fellore Plutus to his fight ; and, in order to it, 2 7, conveyed The PRINCIPLES As the natural fo the political body hath its in- fancy, childhood, manhood and decline; and in both equally each of theie ftages, as it hath its pecu- liar advantages and pleafures, io it hath its peculiar difeafes. Nay, as every habit of the natural body is incident to certain particular diforders •, the corpu- lent to one fort, for inftance, and the meager to another •, fo every form of fociety and government hath its peculiar evils as well as goods naturally growing out of it. The rich and opulent (late hath its evils. But the poor mean one hath likewife it* no Ids pernicious or difagreeabie ones. It belongs therefore to man to chufe. He cannot al- ter the nature of things, but ought to direct his conduct according to them. And to defire that his Creator fhould have made him capable of chufing forhimfelf and conducting himfelf, and yet not have made variety of better and worfe for the exerciie of his thouo-htand choice ; is it not to defire matter of choice without any difference in things ? Nay, to demand that all connexions of things fhould be equally beautiful and conveyed him to the temple of I who was famous for cures and miracles of this nature. Bj this menus the deity re- covered his fight, and begun to make a right ufe of it, by en- ijching every one that was diftinguiihed for piety towards the god , and juftice towards men ; and at the fame time, by tak- ing away his gift* from the impious and undeferving. Thifj produces feveral merry incidents, till in the lalt, Mercu . ids with great complaints from the gods, that fince the \yod men were grown rich, they had received D , which is confirmed by a priefl of Jupite r, who enters with a remonftrancej that fince this late innovation, he was reduced to a ilarving con- dition, and could not live upon his office. Ch \.hoin ginning of the religious in hit poverty, con- it with a propofal, which was reliflied by all ihe good re i iv j rown rich, as well as himfelf, that they .any Plutm in a folemn proceffion to the temple, and in- ilal him in the place of Jupiter, 'This allegory inftrucled the n two points : fill, a. it vindicated the coneucfc of nary diflributions of wealth ; and, in the -icxc ] •' i 11 . sat tendency oi' richer to corrupt ic BioraL oi thofe who pofleiTed them, good* g/* Moral Philosophy. ^41 good, it is not only to take away from a rational crea- Ch a p. II. ture all fubjecls of choice, but it is to demand, that all t different things, and combinations of things Ihould have precifely the fame relations, qualities and ef- fects : A phyfical abfurdity too grofs not to be per- ceived by the mod ordinary underftanding. Thus then it is vifible, that when we trace objections againft the make and frame of man, and the con- nexions he (lands in, to the bottom, they end in contradictory demands. But the objections brought againfl mankind, on account of the vices they are liable to, be- ing chiefly fetched from the vices which prevail in great and opulent dates: it is not improper, before I leave this head, to add two or three remarks upon them. I. The complaints which are made againfl fuch Several thin^ dates, in the general confufed way of declaiming are mifrepre- againft luxury, have many of them no meaning at *~ented » |ux~ all, or a very abfurd one. For luxury is often taken flance^""^ by thofe declaimers in fuch a vague, indeterminate claimed a- ienfe, that, in reality, every thing which agrandizes a gainft in a nation, may be laid to be luxury, and in fuch a }!ei7 va£ue fenfe, not only poetry, painting, ftatuary, iculp- ene' ture, architecture, gardening, mufic, and all the fine arts, even philoibphy itfelf are voluptuous pur- fuits, and encouraging them is luxury ; but trade al~ fo, and all its imports, are a nufance, a plague. Now to put an end to fuch confufed raiiery or morality, let it be called which you will, I would onlyafk thofe who have any underftanding of human affairs, 1. Whether under a wife adminiftration, a people may not only enjoy all the polite arts in great perfection, but even enjoy all the goods of other countries which their own product can pur- chafe, without being impoverifhed by it ? If they would have no trade, then let us live upon the pro- duct of our fpot : for fure, if they would have Y 5 trade 342 The PRINCIPLES Chap. II. trade encouraged, they would have foreign goods u-~y— mj imported in exchange for our own product ; and would they have them imported and not enjoyed ? And as for the polite arts, what do they do, but em- ploy the wealth of a nation to the beft purpofes in The fine arts the beft tafte, or with the greateft elegance ? What minateeffe" m^cc^ ls wealth without thefe, muft it not be a nufonce ? 2. I would afk, whether under a wife ad- miniftration, where military affairs are duly taken care of, or where a fpirit of bravery and fkill in military difcipline are kept up by proper methods -, a wealthy nation may not livejn all the eafe and plenty imaginable, and in many parts of it fhew as much But other arts PornP anc* elegance, and delicacy of tafte, as human muft be united w^ can invent, and at the fame be formidable to. with them to their neighbours ? Is there indeed no way of becom- make a brave jng brave and mafculine, without being poor, with- poliic people out abandoning trade and all polite arts, and giving ' ourfelves up entirely to martial exercifes, and be- coming a nation of mere foldiers ? Here lure there is a medium, which fevcral nations have hit upon, other- wife there would never have been a nation at once, weal- thy, polite and brave. It is indeed coi imonly faid, that the polite arts foften and enervate a people, but if that be abfolutely true, (z) is it noi as certain, on the other [z) Seethe different effects of arts defcribed by Plato, toge- ith the gyrnnaftical exercifes, 'which make a truly liberal : on. De Rep. Lib. 3. Nonne animidvertis inquam, ut animura afficiant, qui gymnafticam per ojnnera vitani exer- ccnt, muncam non attingunt, vel qui contra faciunt ? Qua de re, inquit loqueris? De feritatc inquam & ruftica quadam duritie, Sc contra molitie & mollitatc & comitate. Novi cquidem eos inquit, qui mera fimplicique utuntur mufica plus :equo agreftio- idere. Qui contra muhca duntaxa: molliorcs, quam quod fit ill!.-, decorum. Atqui vis ipfa aggrcftis ad iracundae natUTSB animofitatem, granditatemque pertinet qua; in recta educations rtitudinem abit : fin autem prceter id quod decct litur atque excrefcit, ferooc, ut confentancum eft, ac dura ; Quid vero r Nonne philofbphicn natura vim habet qusn* tiam mitcm atque comem, qua fi nixnium remifla fucrit, plus a quo of Moral Philosophy. 343 other hand, that without thefe arts, human life is very Chap. II. rude, favage, unpohflied, and hardly one remove above that of the brutes which juft breath, eat and drink ? Were it indeed a dilemma, one part of which muft be the cafe, who would hefitate which to chufe ♦, whether to be as the fierce favage Lacedemonians , or as the intelligent polite Athenians ? But there is far from being any dilemma in the cafe, for were not the Athenians as brave as they were polite ? However, not to enter into hiftorical dilcuffions which would lead us too far from our point ; who ever dreamed, that men could maiatain a mafculine, hardy, mar- tial fpirit, or have the courage and fkill war re- quires, without any care taken upon them to nou~ rifh and keep up that fpirit *, and to exercife them for that effecT: in the arts and difcipline of war ? But why may not the qualities, refulting from the polite arts be united with thofe which refultfrom war- aequo mollior redditur : fin praeclare educata atque inftituta, pra?- clarum aliquod modeiliae & comitatis exemplum folet exiilere, Nonne igitur oportet Mas inter fe aptas confpirare atque conlentire ? Ejufque animus qui hoc temperamento aptatus eft: atque affe&us temperans eft atque fortis.— — Quicunque igitur finit muficac cantus perpetuo circumfonare animo fuo, eamque per aures veluti per infundibulum, concentibus illis quos fupra dulces, molles appellavimus perfundit. Tandem- que liquat & difTolvit animum, donee omnis i!la animofitas contabuerit penitus, eamque veluti nervos ex animo exciderit, fegnemque bellatorem effecerit. Quod fi quis gymnafti- ces vi&ui fe totum tradat muiicse & philofophise itudiis neglectis, primo quidem nrmum corporis habitum confecutus, animos m- mit, & granditate feipfum replet ipfeque feipfo fortior evadit. Quid vero ? Quandoquidem nihil aliud agit, neque illi quicquam cum mufis es commune, neque ullum difcendi lludium in ipiiu , animo ineft quippe qui ne fupremis labris quidem ullam difcipli- nam gullarit. — Neque ullam aliam muficac partem, innrmitas quasdam, & vifus, & auditus hebitudo dominatur : quum ipiius fenfus neque ex fufcitentur, neque nutriantur, neque ullo modo expurgentur : Hifpidus quidem & importunus homo, omnis eru- ditionis ac comitatis expers mihi videtur, &c. See Arijiot. Polit, Lib. 8. 3, 4, 5, 6, C3V. where the character of the Lacedemo- nians is fhewn to be the natural efFett of their education. Z 4 like The PRINCIPLES like exercifes -, may not the two be conjoined ; is it not the conjunction of the two feemingly oppofite qualities, viz. the foft and the mafculine, that we admire in the Athenians ? Is it not this conjunction that makes the truly amiable hero ? It was this made a Scipio. And it is this that will make a peo- ple, at the fame time brave and polite, humane, fecial, generous, tender, and bold, formidable, inconquerable. To produce which great and love- ly character, a rightly model'd education in a ftate, otherwife well conftituted and governed, would be as infallibly effectual, as any means in the natural world are to produce and effectuate their end. It is virtue a- II. Another obfervation I would make is, that as lone that is it is virtue alone that can make any particular per- focieCemem °f ^on truty happy •, fo it is virtue alone that can be called the bafis and cement of fociety, or that makes it happy. For tho' vanity, prodigality, debauchery, and other vices, promote consumption, and confe- quently trade, yet they tend to deftroy the fpirit of induilry : they would effectually diffipate and wai!e opulence and the means of worldly grandeur and power, were they not counterpoifed by other vices on the oppolite extreme, iuch as avarice, fuperflitious ., . . ab-temioufnefs, and exceffivc contempt of all fennble Jt is virtue -r • j -re- - i and political gratification : no goods can ariie trom vices, with- wtfdom that out the aids of public wifdom and many virtues ; and educes good if not restrained within certain bounds, they would outoi evil, effectually ruin and deftroy all fociety. Private vices are therefore really to fociety, what ordure and filth is to land •, they are equally abominable and naufeous in themfelves ; and, like it, are only made ufeful by fkilful, fagacious and induftrious management. They are the excrements of what is really ufeful, and can only be turned into ufc as natural ones are. cerements of the one kind as well as the other, will abound moft in opulent places where there is plentiful coi m ; and in this alio are they both alike, that they ai mlelves of a poifonous, peftilential nature 0/ Moral Philosophy. nature, and tend to produce plagues, which would loon deftroy mankind, or make them very mifer- able : In great quantities they are pernicious to good foil, and choak the good feeds thrown into it, bringing forth naufeous weeds in greater plenty than ufeful grains : without fkilful tillage and hufbandry, and found wholefome feed, they would never pro- duce any good at all : and, in line, as manure is chiefly necefliiry to poor, barren or exhaufted foil, fo vanity, prodigality, debauchery, and other vices only can ferve as a counterbal lance to fuch vices of the oppofite extreme, || as avarice or penurioufnefs in all its branches and modifications, which, like poor ground, would but fwallow up the feed thrown into it, and yield no crop. The fimilitude holds exactly in all thefe inflances. And if that be the cafe, then can vices, in no proper fenfe, be faid to be beneficial to fociety, though goods may be educed from them by virtue and political wifdom -, unlefs it can be faid, that a good crop is owing to excrements chiefly, and not to good feed and right hufbandry \ which can- Excrements not be faid even with refpect to foil that requires may be made manure to change its barren nature, and render it ufeful, and fq. fertile. But if it be really fo with regard to vice and may vices" virtue, then there can be no doubt about the truth I am now endeavouring to eftablifh : for then our ar- gument Hands thus. " All the vices of men are but the corruptions, the degeneracies and perverfions of affections implanted in our nature for moft excel- lent purpofes,and without which, as they are grafted in us to be managed by our reafon, we could not be capable of any fhare of that dignity and perfection to which we now can by that means raife and ad- vance ourfelves. But even thefe vices, by good ma- nagement in the public, and the counter-working of many virtues exerting themfelves to that effect. Extremes in nature equal good produce, Extremes in man concur to general ufe. Etb. Ep.l. z.Ep.<$. IS, The PRINCIPLES r tic may be converted into benefits -, infomuch, that lb- cieties, notwithflanding all the vices human nature is liable to in any circumftances, may be rendered very happy, very great and powerful, by good government and adminiftration." Now this defence of human nature muft be ad- mitted to be good, if what we have often laid of the abfurdity of objecting againft the dependence of thej happineis of fociety upon a right form of govenv ment be called to mind, viz. that it is objecting ling vi- againft our being made focial creatures. But, ces to be ne- lleinge- ^- Let lt De j11^ added on this article, that fu i ov.Cof poling it to be granted that vices are neceflary in th Them, the moral world, in the fame fenfe that excrements an ^urj^vo-H C *n t^ie ot^ier ' e9ua^y unavoidable, or if you will, me- 'viilftandon chanical effects ; what will follow from this concefli- rhe fame foot- on, but that, as fuch is the conftitution of the mate- mg as rhe Y'l3\ world, that the excrements which are unavoid- SSk ably ncccfiary or mechanically fo, that would poifor or corrupt the air, and produce difeafes were they not carried off, may by fkill be rendered ufeful ir manuring the ground ; fo fuch is the conftitution oi the moral world, that the evils which are abfolutely unavoidable in confequence of the human make, thai are in themfelves plagues and miferies, may be con- verted by fkill and good management into goods. This, I fay, is all that could be inferred upon grants ing that vices are neceflary in the fame fenfe that animal excrements are neceflary -, and therefore good order would ftill ftand upon the fame footing with refpccl to the moral world, as it does with re- c to the material, where an objection taken from filth that can thus be turned into profit, would be iuftly ililcd filly and ridiculous : there would ftill, even according to that way of reafoning, be the pu( lame difference between virtue and vice, as between in no propel excrements and good feed, and right hufbandry. fenfe mccna- »; lL wn;U hath been iuppofed cannot be granted meal el li ° jl of Moral Philosophy. 347 he fimilitude between vice and excrement fails in Chap. II. :his refpect. The former is abfolutely a mecha- nical effect, whereas the other depends, as we feel Dy experience, upon ourfelves •, it being in every man's power to govern his affections, and to pre- sent them from running into enormities and irregula- rities. In the one cafe, it only depends upon us to prevent the bad effects, or to turn into good ; in the other, it depends upon us to prevent our affections, from being extravagant, and to manage them well ; and it likewife depends upon us, by joining in right fociety, to turn the bad actions of the wicked and vi- cious into good ufes, or to reftrain them within cer- tain bounds. We have therefore in the laft cafe a dou- ble power, or there is a double dependence on our- felves. And for that reafon, whatever neceffity there may be for evils in order to goods, no evil can be faid to be neceffary, in a fenle that implies any neceffity upon any perfon pot to act right, or not to go- vern his affections well. We are not more fure that certain effects in nature, within and without our bodies, are abfolutely independent upon our will, than we are fure, each of us for ourfelves, that the government of our affections and actions depends upon ourfelves : this is a difference between things that mufl remain, while our nature and the prefent conftitution of things exifts, that fome things are not in our power, and that others are : it cannot be altered. And fo plainly is that difference felt in mo- ral things, that whatever objections may be made a- gainft providence, and the human make, all objectors find that they cannot chufe but blame themfelves, and think they fuffer juftly, when they act amifs. We may arraign nature as much as we pleafe, in order to throw a fhare of our own faults upon nature, provi- dence, or fomething external to us and independent of us, but when we have done all we can thus to extenuate our guilt in doing wrong, to ourfelves we are ftill confcious that the guilt lies at our own door. CHAR 343 ?be PRINCIPLES Chap. III. CHAP. III. Objections phyfical *^[ "^ TE ma^ now confider the objections tak( evils, \/\/ ^rom t'ie Pny^ical ev*k which prevail ▼ ▼ the world y the various diftreffes and lamities that vex human life, and what is called unequal diftribution of external goods, fuch as rich( power, &c. Now I think the following obfervations will fui ciently evince the abfurdity or unreafonablenefs all fuch complaints againft providence in the goven ment of mankind, and mew that there is no reaic to object againft the pains and troubles of hums life, or the diftribution of external goods ♦, but the contrary, good ground to approve the exccllenl laws, according to which all is brought about ; or conclude that all is brought about according to mof ufeful general laws, none of which can be changed, but to the worfe. But let it be remembered, fore we go further, that it is impoffible to confide the laws of the material world, and thofe of the mc ral icparately. Man being indeed, as lb me ph-ilofo phers have well expreffed it, Nexus utriufque mundi or it being a nice blending and interweaving of m tural and moral connexions and their effects, that conftitutcs our prefent ftate, or makes us what we really are. If this be kept in mind, the reader will eafily fee that repetitions upon tins iubject are una-. ►idable, fince we muft ever be having recourfe to the lame laws and principles in our nature, whatever tfre difficulty, queition or objection about man may be, This being premifed, to prevent cavilling at repetitions, which, however, I lhall endeavour to avoid as much as the nature of the Iubject admits ; 1 would obferve, that in order to treat diftinctly and clearly o/Moral Philosophy. 349 ;learly of the miferies and vexations complained of Chap. III. n human life, it is neceflary to feparate or diftin- ^^^y0mmmJ gpifh three forts of them. I. Such as totally arife from the laws of matter Thefe ev»k md motion ; or in other words, the laws of the fen- c - e fible world, fuch as earthquakes, ftorms, 65V. II. Such as arife from focial connexions. Of which kind are all fufferings on account of diforders in the fociety we belong to ; or fuch as arife partly from our focial connexions, and partly from the laws of matter and motion •, of which fort are, for inftance, difeafes and misfortunes defcending from parents to their children. And, III. Such as fpring partly from our own follies and vices, and partly from the laws of the corporeal world. Of this kind are difeafes brought upon our- felves by intemperance, &c. I mail therefore treat of thefe three clafTes of evils feparately, yet not fo as to confine myfelf fo ftridtly to any of them, as not at the fame time to take no- tice under each of them, of certain evils, which though they do not ftrictly belong to that clafs, yet may be accounted for from the fame principles as thofe which are properly of it. I. With refpect to evils of all forts in general, or to Unlefc there thofe which flow from the fteady and uniform opera- ^L^and tion of the general laws of the fenfible world, in particu- tv-1\i there Iar, let not a principle already mentioned be forgot, can be no namely, connexions producive of evils are neceflary, prudence or in order to our having matter of forefight and c°n„0Jt [,eere choice : for if all connexions produced equal goods, g00d and bad we would have no occafion for ftudying nature, no choice. ufe for forefight, no matter of deliberation and choice. It would be all one to us what happened, we "The PRINCIPLES Phyfical evils are ab- folutely ne- ceflary, if being:, have particular textures, and are fubjecr to general af- cerrainable taws. , we might fold our arms, and let things take theii courfe. If it is fit there mould be creatures whole goods and enjoyments are to be in any mea- fure of their own procurance, it is abfolutely necef fary, with regard to fuch beings, that there fhould be fome things to be avoided, as well as fome things to be defired and fought after ; matter of bad as wel. as of good choice ; actions which tend to bring pain, as well as methods of acting which tend to bring plea- fure and happinefs. In fine, unlefs it can be doubted whether it is worth while to be endowed with the power/ of ftudying nature's laws and connexions, and to have happinefs dependent in any degree on one's felf ; it cannot be doubted ; but it mult be fit that choices and actions mould have different con- fluences, fome producing good, and others evil ; and to defire that there fhould be any fuch be- ings exifling as we are, capable of chufing and acting, and whofe happinefs is dependent in a great meafure on our choices and purfuits, where there isj nothing evil to be avoided, is really to demand a flate, in which there fhall be beings capable of chuf- ing, without any matter or fubjecl of choice in that flate. 2. With regard to phyfical evils, or fuch as flow from the laws of the fenfibie world in particular, to ob- ject againfl our flate becaufe there are fuch evils in it, involves this abfurdity in it : it is to demand our bo- dies were fo made, that every object,- whatever its texture is (for every particular object muft have its own particular one) might be congruous to their flructure or organization. Now let objectors ex- plain, if they can, how any body can affect another agreeably, without being proportioned and ad ju lied to it, without tallying with it, fo to fpeak ; for their objections fuppofe that to be poflible. It is certain that phyfical goods ought to be produced according fome general law, or in fome fixed, unvarying or- der: and this is found by rxperience to be the gene- ra! o/'Moral Philosophy. 351 al law with regard to us (and to all animals that fail Chap. Ill, within our obfervation) that whatever external objects rend, by any application, any effluvia, or in what- foever way, to hurt our bodily contexture, alarms us by a fenfe of pain (a) ♦, and the fenfe of pleafure is produced by influences of external objects which fuit our organization, or no wife tend to deftroy or hurt it. Now to afk why we mould have any fenfe of I pain, when external objects are really prejudicial to us, or tend to deftroy our bodies, is to afk, why nature gives us warning what to avoid ? And to afk, j why any external objects are hurtful to our bodies, is : either to afk why we have a particular organization, ; or why there is any variety of external objects ? Nay, k is to demand, that even the fame external object, applied to the fame bodily organization, at whatever diitance, with whatever force, or in one word, in whatever manner, fhould always be congruous to it, and never tend to hurt it in any degree. The. ob- jection really refults in demanding, that iehfi- ble pleafures fhould not be produced in us by ex- ternal objects which have a certain aptitude to our organization, which aptitude may be found out by ftudying our ftructure, and the various textures of bodies ; for if there be fuch a thing as aptitude or congruity, there muft be likewife fuch a thing as inaptitude and incongruity: it really refults in demanding that fenfible pleafures fhould be pro- duced in us in no order or method, by no inter- mediate fteps, progrefs or means : for if they are produced in lb me order or method fteadily, each recefs from or contrariety to that order, muft una- voidably produce an effect different from or contrary to what is produced by the order tending to give pleafure. One order cannot be another order. One (a) Quicunque igitur motus funt qui naturam excedunt, do- lorem pariunt : quicunque vero ad ipiam reftituuntur voluptates nominantur, &c. Timaus hats de anima mundi, train 352 Chap. III. We muft think we have quite exhauiied natural know- ledge, before we can fay that feveral evils are ab- solutely una- voidable by prudence and art. The greater the variety of trade and manufactures, the more operofe they are, and the more they are] divided in many branches, the greater numbers may be contained in a ibciety, without being in one ano- Cher's of Moral Philosophy. 35- ther's way, and the more eafily they may be ren- Ch a p. III. dered a rich, potent and flouri filing people. Few virtues employ any hands, and therefore they may render a fmall nation good, but they can never make a. great one. To be itrong and laborious, patient in difficulties, and affiduous in all bufinefTes, are commendable qualities ; but as they do their own work, fo they are their own reward, and neither art or induftry have ever paid their compliments to them : whereas the excellency of human thought and contrivance has been, and is yet, no where more confpicuous, than in the variety of tools and in ftru men ts of workmen and artificers, and the mul- tiplicity of engines, that were all invented, either to |fiift the weaknels of man, to correct his many im- perfections, to gratify his lazinefs, or to obviate his impatience. It is in morality as it is in nature : there is no- thing fo perfectly good in creatures, that it cannot be hurtful to any one of the fociety, nor any thing fo entirely evil, but it may prove beneficial to fome part or other of the creation. So that things are only good and evil in reference to fomething elk, and according to the light and pofition they are placed in. And thus, faith he9 what we call evil in this world, moral as well as natural, is the grand princi- ple that makes us lociable creatures, the folid bafis, the life and fupport of all trades and employments ; without exception, there we muft look for the true origine of all arts and fciences •, and the moment evil ceafes, the fociety muft be fpoiled, if not total- ly diffolved. This author brings a very proper inftance to it luftrate this, from the advantages and different be- nefits that accrue to a nation on account of (hipping and navigation, compared with the manifold mil- chiefs and variety of evils, moral as well as natural, that befal nations on the fcore of fea-faring, and A a 3 their fk PRINCIPLES their commerce with flrangers, and that are the very foundation of trade and commerce -, which the reader may confult at his leifure (||), Uluftration. There are feveral other reafonings and examples in this author, which might very well be applied to our prefent purpofe, to fliew what is the reiiilt upon the whole, of the mixture of pains, that is fo great- ly murmured at in human life, and how abfurd fuch murmuring is, when we take a large view of the connexions and dependencies of things. But as for the main end that author had in view, which was to Drove, " that there is nothing focial in our na- ture, and that it is direful neceffity only that makes us fociable creatures *, and that all the fo much ex- alted moral virtues, are nothing elfe but the offspring of political flattery, begot upon pride •," I need not flay here to refute them, fmce in the former part of this effay, we have fully proved the very contrary to be true, or that we are focial by nature, and have a principle of benevolence very deeply inlaid into our nature, and likewife a moral fenfe of the beauty and deformity of affe&ions, actions and characters. Cicero hath long ago, in feveral parts of his philofophical works, charmingly proved the abfurd ity and falfhood of fuch corrupt doctrines con- cerning human nature, and the rife of fociety, to- wards the end, in particular, of his firft book of Offices, Where he borrows a very apt fimilitude from the bees. My lord Shaft sbury hath fhewn us what we ought to think of this kind of philofophers, and how we ought to deal with them, in the pafiage a- bove quoted. And a little after he more particu- larly examines this philofophy, tracing it through all its fubtle refinements •, a piece of excellent reafon- ing, that well defcrves our clofeit attention. " You have heard it (my friend) as a common faying, that Inter eft governs the world. But I. believe, whoever, looks narrowly into the affairs of it, will find that paffion, humour, caprice, zeal , faction, and a tliou- 1 Me of the bees, *and of Moral Philosophy. 359 land other fprings, which are counter to felf-intereft, Chap. III. have as considerable a part in the movements of this *— -^v — —' machine. There are more wheels and counterpoifes 7he^ Y^on~ in this engine than are eafily imagined. It is of too ^cefikry con- complex a kind to fill under one fimple view, or be nexion with explained thus briefly in a word or two. The flu- the principles diers of this mechanifm muft have a very partial ° tlle author 1 ti 1 ■ 1 V «" 1 * r c from whom eye, to overlook all other motions beiides thole or t]ley are ta_ the loweft and narrowed compafs. It is hard, that ken. in the plan or defcription of this clock-work, no wheel or bal lance mould be allowed on the fide of the better and more enlarged affections •, that no- thing mould be underflood to be done in kindnefs or generofity, nothing in pure good-nature or friend- ship, or through any focial or natural affection of any kind : when perhaps the main fprings of this ma- chine will be found to be, either thefe very natural affections themfclves, or a compound kind derived from them, and retaining more than one half of their nature. But here (my friend) you muft not expect that I mould draw you a formal fcheme of the paffions, or pretend to ihew you their genealogy and relation, how they are interwoven with one another, or inter- fere with our happinefs or intereft. It would be out of the genius and compafs of fuch a letter as this, to frame a juft plan or model, by which you might, „ - , with an accurate view, obferve what proportion the principles friendly and natural affections feem to bear in this ought to be order of architecture. refuted. Modern projectors, I know* would willingly rid their hands of thefe natural materials, and would fain build after a more uniform way. They would new frame the human heart \ and have a mighty- fancy to reduce all its motions, ballances and weights to that one principle and foundation, of a cool and deliberate felhfhnefs. Men, it feems, are unwilling to think they can be fo outwitted and impofed on by nature, as to be made to ferve her purpofes, rather A a 4 than 360 The PRINCIPLES Chap. III. ^an their own. They are afhamed to be drawn thus out of themfelves, and forced from what they efteem their true intereft. There has been, in all times, a fort of narrow- minded philoibphers, who have thought to fet this difference to rights, by conquering nature in them- felves. A primitive father and founder among thefe, faw well this power of nature, and underftood it lb far, that he earnestly exhorted his followers, neither to beget children, nor ferve their country. There was no dealing with nature, it feems, while thefe aluring objects (land in the way. Relations, friends, countrymen, laws, 'politic conftitutions, the beauty of order and government, and the true in- tereft of fociety, and mankind, were objects which he well faw would naturally raife a ftronger affection, than any which was grounded upon the bottom of merefelf. His advice, therefore, not to marry, nor en- gage at all in the public, was wife and fuitable to his defign. There was no way to be truly a diiciple of this philofophy, but to leave family, friends, country, and fociety to cleave to it. — And, in good earned, who would not, if it were happinefs to da fo ? — The philofopher, however, was kind in tel- ling us his thought. 5Tis was a token of his fatherly love of mankind. Tu pater £s? rerum inventor ! tu patria nobis Suppeditas pracepta ! But the revivers of this philofbpy in later days, appear to be of a lower genius. They feem to have underftood lefs of this force of nature, and thought to alter the thing, by ihifting a name. They would fo explain all the focial paffions and natural affecti- ons, as to denominate them of the felfifh kind. , civility, hofpitality, humanity towards ftran- gcrs, or people in diftrefs, is only a more deliberate felfiflutefi. An honed heart is only a more cunning- one j of Moral Philosophy. ^gj one •, and honefty and good nature, a more delibe- rate, or better regulated felf-love. The loveof kin- ^^ dred, children, and poderity, is purely love of felf, and of one's immediate blood; as if, by this reckon- ing all mankind were not included ; all being of one blood, and joined by intermarriages and alliances, as they have been tranfplanted in collonies, and mix- ed one with another. And thus, love of one's coun- try, and love of mankind, muft alfo be felf-love. Magnanimity and courage, no doubt, are modifica- tions of this univerfal felf-love 1 For courage, (fays Our modern philofopher) is conflant anger. And all men (fays a witty poet) would be cowards if they durft. That the poet and the philofopher both were cow- ards, may be yielded perhaps without difpute. They may have fpoken the beft of their know- ledge. But for true courage, it has fo little to do with anger, that there lies always the ftronged fut picion againft it, where this paffion is highefb. The true courage is the cool and calm. The braved of men have the leaft of a brutal bullying infolence ; and in the very time of danger, are found the moll ferene, pleafant and free. Rage, we know, can make a coward forget himfelf and fight : but what is done in fury or anger, can never be placed to the account of courage. Were it otherwife, womankind might claim to be the flouted fex : for their hatred and anger have ever been allowed the ftronged and mod lading. Other authors there have been of a yet inferior kind : a fort of diftributersand petty retailers of this wit; who have run changes and divifions, without end, upon this article of felf-love. You have the very fame thought fpun out a hundred ways, and drawn into motto's and devices to fet forth this rid- dle ; " that aft as generoufly or diiinterededly as you pleafe, felf dill is at the bottom, and nothing elfe." Now if thefe gentlemen, who delight fo much. 362 The PRINCIPLES Chap. III. much in the play of words, but are cautious hov, they grapple clofly with definitions, would tell u< only whatfelf-love was, and determine happinefs and good, there would be an end of this enigmatica wit. For in this we mould all agree, that happinefs was to be purfued, and, in fact, was always fought after : but whether found in following nature, and giving way to common affection -, or, in fuppref fing it, and turning every paffion towards private advantage, a narrow felf-end, or the prefervation o mere life •, this would be the matter in debate be tween us. The queftion would not be, " whe lov'd himfelf, or who not-, " but, " wholov'danc ierv'd himfelf the righted, and after the trued man ner." 'Tis the height of wifdom, no doubt, to b< rightly felfrfh. And to value life, as tar as life i good, belongs as much to courage as to difcretion B.it a wretched life is no wife man's wifli. To b without honedy, is, in effect, to be without natu ral affection, or fociablenefs of any kind. And it life without natural affection, friend fliip, or fociable nefs, would be found to be a wretched one, were i to be try'd. *Tis as theie feelings and affections ar intrinfically valuable, and worthy, that felf-intereft to be rated and eiteemed. A man isbynothi: much himfelf, as by his temper, and the characte of his paffions and affections. If he lofes what i manly and worthy in thefe, he is as much loft t himfelf, as when he lofes his memory and under Handing. The lead dep into villany or bafencf changes the character and value of a life. He wh would preferve life at any rate, mud abufe himfc more than any one clfe can abufe him. And lift be not a dear tiling indeed, he who has refufe to live a villain, and has preferred death to a ba action, has been a gainer by the bargain (||)'\ fl|) CbaradcnjVuh, T. I. II. Bi; are 5/M0RAL Philosophy. ^63 II. But I proceed to confider a fecond clafs of Chap.IIL evils in human life objected againft ; thole which <— — y~— *' arife from our focial connexions, or partly from s IcJl evils as them, and partly from the laws of the fenfible J^| £™£ _ world. Now upon this head I need not infill long, dence fince evils, as far as they are refolvable into the goods, connexions of things, which make the fenfible world, or the laws of matter and motion, have been already confidered. And as for our fuffering in confequence of our focial relations and dependen- cies •, as by the misfortunes of others, their want of health, infirmity, death, or their external loffes by bad weather, florins, fhipwrecks, and other phyfi- cal caufes, it is plainly the refult of our reciprocal union and connexion ; that is, of our being made for fociety, and by confequence mutually de- pendent : Can a finger ake or be hurt, and the whole body to which it belongs not fuffer ? If there- fore it is not unfit that we mould be one kind, made *for participation and communication, it cannot be un- fit that we fhould be linked and cemented together, by the flrongefl: ties, by mutual wants and indigen- cies •, or that we mould make one body. For to de- mand fociety, focial pleafures, focial happinefs, with- out that clofs and intimate dependence which makes us one body, is indeed to defire fociety without foci- ety. And it being as impoffible, that a certain number of men mould be congregated together in a certain form politic, called a ftate or conftituiion^ without certain effects refulting from it \ as that any number of bodies mould be mixed, without pro- ducing certain effects ; nature is juftly deemed very kind to us, fince it prompts, directs, and points us, by our generous affections, and our in- ward fenfe and love of public order and good, to affociate ourfelves in the way and manner, by which alone, in the nature of things, general good, beauty and happinefs can be attained. For this is all that could be done confidently with the dependence of our 364 The PRINCIPLES Chap. III. our happinefs on ourfelves, to put us into the road to ^-V^-—' true happinefs. III. In the third place therefore, it remains to confider thofe evils which flow from follies and vices of whatever kind •, whether the laws of matter and mo- tion have any fhare in the effect, as they plainly have in the difeafes brought upon us by exceffes in eat- ing, drinking, and other external indulgences ; or whether our focial connexions have any fhare in the effect, as they likewife muff have in many cafes ; fince 'tis impoffible, for example, man can have the advantages of good reputation and conduct in foci- ety, without having, at leaft, the femblance of the qualities that deferve it -9 and fince, whatever lets or in a bad fituation with regard to the favour and love of mankind, mult impair our happinefs : Or whether, in the laft place, they are wholly mental, and fpring from the natural ballance and dependence of our affections, in confequence of the anatomy, fo to fpeak, of the mind •, as many plainly are : for what are the difeafes of the mind, the worft of all difeafes, fuch as choler, envy, peevifhnefs, madnefs, &c. but diforders naturally introduced into the mind, in confequence of its fabric, by exceffive paffions, and wrong affociations of ideas. Now with regard to all theft evils, I would obferve, that it mult be themfelvesac- highly unreaibnabk to complain of them, unlefs it cording to the be abfolutcly unfit that vice lhould be its own puniflv i\ courfe merit, or bring its own chaftifement, either along •f things. ^vith it, or after it in any degree; or unlefs it be un- fit, that there mould be fuch a thing as prudence . i imprudence, wifdom and folly, right and wrong conduct. For what can theft mean, if differ rent pailions and actions have not different confe- queni (b) On gf Moral Philosophy. 365 (b) On the one hand, it is abfurd to object againft Chap. III. providence, or the government of the world, be- v-^-v- -J caufe fome goods fall to the mare of the vicious. For perfons guilty of many vices, may yet have fe- veral excellent qualities, and do feveral prudent, nay good actions. Very few, if any are totally vicious, or quite deprived of every good quality. And good actions and qualities will be good actions and quali- ties with whatever vices they are mixed. But is it a Goods fall to bad conftitution of things in which acts of prudence, [he viciousa* induilry and virtue have their good effects ? Nay, cording to the on the contrary, is it not a moft excellent general excellent ge- law, that prudence and induftry mould be in the ne!.al |*aws of (b) There is an excellent treatife of Plutarch, \De his qui fero a numine puniuntur, well worth our attention, in which he gives feveral anfwers to this important queftion, Why the wicked are not immediately and vifibly punifhed in this life, but often fuf< fered to flourifh. Firft, he quotes Plato, Plato in nobis vifum a natura fuiffe accenfum dicit, ut fpe&andis admirandifque ccelefii- um corporum motibus anima noitra ampledti condccefadla deco- rum & ordinem odium conciperet incompofitorum & vagorum motuum, temeritatemque & cafui fidentem levitatem fugeret tan- quam omnis vitii & erroris originem. Non eft enim major alius frudlus quern ex Deo capere poflit homo, quam quod imitatione pulchrorum & bonorum quae divinas naturae infunt, virtute potia- tur. Propterea Deus malis interpofita mora ac tarde pcenas in- fiigit, non quod vereatur, ne accelerando fupplicio erret aut committat cujus pcenetentia aiiquando ducatur. Sed ut in vindi- candis aliorum peccatis faevitiam & vehementiam nobis hoc ex- emplo fuo eximat. Caute in hoc genere verfari & man- fuetudinem graviumque laefionum tolerantiam pro divina habere virtutis parte, quam Deus nobis demonftrat, puniendo, paucos emendantem, tarde puniendo multos juvantem atque eorrigentem, &c. The other reafons he adds Teem very nearly to coincide with what our Saviour fays in anfwer to this queftion, Wilt thou then that nve go and gather up the tares ? But he /aid, Nay, left nubile you gather up the tares, you root up alfo the wheat from the prefent ftate of things to prove a future ftate, the arguments whjcn have been often repeated by divines and phi- fcte from lofophers, and I ftiall not therefore now infift upon prefent ine- them. Two cautions, however, with regard to quality with fomc fuch arguments are not unneceflary, fince, in tuePanVv **' ^l<^' many aie *ec* ^ tnem *nt0 m'ftakes. The rirft thing I would obferve on this head is, that in the warmth of fome realbnings on this fubjecl, feveral good men are often led to reprefent the cafe of vir- tue here as very deplorable, and the adminiftration ol things as very diforderly ; and thus to magnify the diftrefles and evils of human life, and to under- value its bleffings and advantages, in order to prove the necefllty of reparation, or jufter diftribution in h future ftate. But Purely future order cannot be in- ferred from utter prefent dilbrdcr and confufion. 2. In the warmth of fuch realbnings, feveral ex- pressions are uled, which are liable to be mifcon- ftrucled p/'Moral Philosophy. 381 ftriKled into an opinion of future rewards, diflinft Chap. III. from rational pleasures, nay, contrary to the exer- ^^Y^-1 cifes of virtue, and of the fenfual kind. But furely nothing can be more excellent, or more great than virtue \ and what is inferior, not to fay repugnant to it, cannot be its reward. I do not make thefe obfervations, which greatly merit our attention, with any view of derogating from any writer, far lefs with an intention to fug- geft that the reafonings taken from the prefent flourifhing of vice, and fuffering of virtue, to prove a future ftate, are not conclufive; but merely to prevent any one's being mifled by inaccuracies of language or rhetorical arguments, into opinions very contrary to truth, and to the fenfe of thofe writers themfelves who have laid the great flrefs of the evidence for a future ftate upon what they have called an inequality with regard to virtue and vice in this life. When providence and the prefent ftate of mankind are fairly reprefented, the argument for a future ftate ftands thus, and is unan- fwerable. We are fo conftituted, that the exercifes of virtue, and the confeience of it, are our higheft: (/) enjoyment ; and vice, whatever pleafure it may The true afford of the fenfual kind, always creates bitter re- ftats of tlie morfe, and almoft always great bodily diforder : ^j^01" arg:1" but fuch a conftitution muft be the workmanfhip of fuch (/) See a fine fentence of Cicero to this purpofe preferved by Laflantius, Lib. 5. cap. 19. Vult plane virtus honorem : nee eft virtutis ulla alia merces, quam tamen ilia accipit facile, non exigit acerbe. Sed fi aut ingrati univerfi, aut invidi multi, ant inimici potentes fuis virtutem praemiis fpolianf, nas ilia fe tamen multis folatiis obleclat, maximeque fuo decore feipfam fuftentat. With' regard to vice, there is another fragment of Cicero pre- ferved by the fame author, Lib. 6. cap. 8. which is exceedingly- beautiful. Eft quidem vera lex, recta ratio, natura? congruens, diflufa in omneis, conftans, fempiterna Unufque erit com- munis quafi magifter, et imperator omnium Deus, ille legis hu jus inventor, diiceptator, la tor : cui qui non parebit, ipfe fe fu- giet, The PRINCIPLES ilich a perfectly virtuous and good Creator, as all the other parts of nature prove its Author to be, in proportion as we advance in the knowledge of it. And therefore we have juft reafon to think, that be- ings capable of improvements in virtue, are not made merely to exift in a Hate, which, though it be very fit for the trial and formation of virtue, yet cannot be thought to be contrived for any other pur- pofe, but to be a firft ftate of trial and formation. Were a ftate of trial and formation the only ftate in which moral beings exift, nature would be but a very imperfect* nay, a bad fyftem i but as it cannot be fuch, if the Author of nature be infinitely good and perfect, which all the other parts of nature, as for as we can fearch into them, proclaim him to be ; ib there is no reafon to apprehend it to be fuch, from any fuch appearances as are by no means fymp- toms of imperfect adminiftration, but upon fuppo- f ition that this is the only ftate of mankind : for to infer fo, purely on that account, is to conclude that there is no future ftate, merely becaufe the firft ftate looks to be what a firft ftate ought to be, namely, a ftate of trial and formation -, which is abfurd. If we do not exceedingly depretiate virtuous en- joyments, and excefTively magnify external gratifi- cations, we mull own fome care about virtue here ; a care proper to its ftate of education and difcipline i but if we do, it is reafonable to expect, future care and concern about it. If feparately, from the con- lideration of certain goods which fall to the fhare of vice, and of certain evils which fometimes fall to the fhare of virtue here, we have very good reafon ( naturam hominis afpernabkur, atque hoc ipfo luet pcrnas maximas, etiainiii csetera fupplicia, quae putantur, eftugcrit. i harming defcription of virtue, arid the happinefs it brings r, in ftrvet '/v Prayer, Satyre 18. Sec what he puni/hment of vice by ttfelf, Satyre 13. And there are n- I ; irpole in V lato, par- b 1 . of Moral Philosophy. 383 to think well of nature, or that all befpeaks a good Chap. lit. Author and Governor •, then, either there muft be a future ftate of mankind, to which this is a well adjufted prelude ; or it muft be proved, that fuch is the fate of virtue and vice here, that this ftate hath not at all any appearance of being a- proper firft ftate, but is fo irregular, and contrary to good order, that whatever all other things may feem to prove, confidered feparately, yet when this is taken into the account, all the other figns of wifdom and goodnefs prove nothing, and the prefent ftate of virtue and vice clearly evidences fuch utter confufion, irregularity, and hatred of virtue, that from it no future good can reafonably be hoped for. Either this muft be proved, or a future ftate is certain. But who can think fo harfhly of nature, if he but opens his eyes to the manifold inftances of wifdom, benevolence, and love of virtue, which every where appear throughout its adminiftration ? The prefent queftion chiefly turns upon this fingle point, Whether, fince it is reafonable to think that the firft ftate of rational beings mould be a ftate of formation and difcipline, there is not, all things con- fidered, more reafon to think that this our prefent ftate is but a firft ftate of trial and formation, than to think it is our whole exiftence ? Now if it be true, that all the evils in this ftate are not only proper to a firft ftate of trial and formation, but do arife from general laws, the fteady operation of which is abfolutely fit, and which produce much greater goods than evils, goods of the higheft and nobleft kind : and if it be true, that the further we look into any parts of na- ture, and into the connexions and dependencies of things relative to man in particular, the more reafon we find to think well of nature, and confequently of its Author: if all this, I fay, be true, as I think we have fufficiently proved it to be, what then can be concluded, with any mew of reafon, but that, as there ought to be a firft ftate of rational beings, fo this The PRINCIPLES this is our firfl (late, and not the whole of our ex- iftence : and that, as the progrefs of things, or the icheme of government advances, fo in proportion, fhall all perplexing difficulties with regard to nature open to us, be cleared up and unravelled ? If the drama be not compleated here, then we fee but a part : and if we fee but a part, it is no wonder if we are confiderably in the dark. But do we not fee enough of order, and goodnefs, and excellent con- duct, to perfuade us that we are only in the dark, becaufc it is but a part that we can fee ? For mult not virtue be formed before it can be perfect ? And mult it not be perfe£t, before it can reap the fruits of its perfection ? Can the effect precede or take place without the caufe ; or the end prevent the means ? CHAP. IV. ■ II A P. IV A complex- view of the objeel ion- made againft human na- ture, and of the abfurdi- ries refuiting from them, or in which rhcy ncceflH- rily termi- nate. BUT to go through more objections feparate- ly would but oblige me to repeat very often the lame principles, from which the folutions given to thofe that have been mentioned are brought the principles fully explained in the ntft part of thi< enquiry. I (hall now, therefore, take as complet a view of the human date as I am able, and cndei vour to fliew, that no change can be demanded which is not cither impoffible or unrealizable; thj is to lay, for the worfe. J^et us, I fay, take as full a view of our nature we can, and impartially enquire, what it is in 01 conllitution and frame we would have altered ftrictly examine the tendency and meaning of 01 ( aons and demands, whether they do not necc (arily terminate, when they are clofely purfued t< their of Moral Philosophy. 385 thefe kind of affections to ballance one another ; or Ch a p. IV. their laft refult, in requiring fomething very abfurd, or very inconvenient and difadvantageous. Would he who is not pleafed with our prefent make have no gradation of perfection in nature ? Gr would he have a gradation in nature from the lowed to the higheft fpecies of created perfection with- out man ? Would he have nature as full of life* perfe- ction and happinefs as may be ; and yet fuch a fpecies as man wanting ? Or would he have mankind to exift, and to make a proper fpecies in the rifing fcale of existence, that fills nature and makes it co- herent, and yet not be that very fpecies necefTary to fuch gradation and fullnefs ? Why does not man de- fer ve his place in being ? Or in what refpect is he wrong placed ? Would he have earth without inha- bitants, or would he have no earth in our mundan fyftem ? Or can we alter that mundan fyflem in any refpect, without altering it entirely^ that is, without making quite another fyftem, and corifequently without allowing this one a place in nature ? This no perfon, who has any tincture of natural philofo- phy, will propofe. Would the objector have man a merely pafilve without any power, dominion or fphere of activity rotted to him ; only impelled by appe cites and affections, fucceeding to one another in their turns, independently of his own choice and direction j and driving him irrefiftibly to ends he cannot fore- fee, or forefeeing, cannot prevent or avoid ? Would he have man to have been made only capable of cer- tain pafTive gratifications, without any power of judging, willing, enuring, deliberating and ruling ; without any thing committed to his charge and ma- nagement ; without any objects or fubjects to regu- late, work upon, and command ? Would he have man to have been created incapable of acquiring and prociiring goods to himfelf or others, incapable of reflecting upon himfelf* as one able to be ufeful or hurtful to his kind as he pleafesj incapable of diftin- C e guiming tte PRINCIPLES guifhing between good and evil, beneficial or hurt- ful, and of approving or disapproving his conduct ? Continued. Would he have man formed without a moral SenSe, without the capacity of perceiving fitnefs and unfit- nefs in affections, actions, and characters -9 and with- out the capacity of receiving pleaibre from the con- fcioufnefs of having acted a fit and becoming part ? Or can there be a ienSe of right and wrong, fitnefs, and unfitnefs, unlefs there be effential differences 6f things as to right and wrong, fit and unfit ? Can objects co-exiit, without having certain relations to one another ? Or a mind defigned for chilling and acting, and to whom a certain fphere of activity is afiigned, ought it not to be capable of dilcerning the relations and differences of objects, moral ones in particular ? Would we have been more perfect without any power, without any dominion ? Or can there be power and dominion without Subjects ? Ought our power to extend only to natural objects and not to moral, or to moral and not to natural ones ? Is it too large ? Or is it too Small, becaule we are not omnipotent ? Hardly will it be Said it is too large. Yet to Say, that there muff be a gradation in nature, and no inSerior as well as Superior Species to us, is manifeltly abSurd. But how are intelligent be- ings Superior to others, but in knowledge, power and dominion, or an intelligent Sphere of activity ? Nor is it lefs abfurd to Say, that any Species can ex- ift without having its determinate nature, capacity and extent or power. The only queftion thereSore is, whether our Sphere of activity has not an extent that conftitutes a very noble (pedes of being, worthy, as Such, of a place in the lcale of exigence ? Let us therefore examine a little its reach and extent. Is not progrefs in knowledge to infinity, or beyond any afiignable bounds dependent upon ourSelves ; that is, is it not in our power to be continually ad- vancing in a field of Science, which is absolutely ex- hauftleis? And does notour dominion in nature en- creaft ^ Moral Philosophy. 387 icreafewith our knowledge of nature-, our domini- Chap. IV* on over material objects with the knowledge of the u— -\— -^ material creation, or of the laws and properties of bodies candour dominion over moral objects with the knowledge of ourfelves, or of the nature and ballance of our affections,and of the qualities of the objects fuited to them ? What known property of bodies has not been made fubfervient to fome ufe by fcience and arts ? Practical arts, which are all imitations of na- ture, advance with real knowledge. And thus our dominion in nature is enlarged, and is continually enlargeable by ourfelves. And as for our affections and appetites, is it not in our own power to regulate them according to our reafon and moral confcience, or conformably to the natural agreements and difa- Continued, greements of things ? For thefe two ways mufl mean the fame thing. Now, would the objector have us capable of acquiring dominion, either natu- ral or moral, previoufly to knowledge ; or know- ledge not to be dependent on, or acquirable by our- felves 5 but have judgments to fpring up in the mind, without our knowing whence they proceed, how they are formed, or why they are right, and may be relied upon ; or, in one word, without our having the pleafure of attaining to fcience by our own diligence, by our ov/n application to get it, by the voluntary right ufe of our faculties? Sure no objector againfc the imperfection of our make would have us more perfect, and yet not active. But can we otherwife be active, than by moving, exerting and employing our faculties by choice ? Far leis furs would any objector have man fo formed, that he could not arrive at perfection or improvement of any fort by all his repeated labour ; but that he mould always be obliged to begin anew, and never acquire any facility^ readinefs or perfection in fciences or actions, by all the repeated exercifes of his powers. Would he have man incapable of attaining to the deliberative habit j or to the habit of thinking well Gc2 before 388 T/je PRINCIPLES Ch a p.I V. before he determines? Or would he have him to \~*~\~*-J attain to it, without repeated acts, without endea- vours to acquire it ? Would he have man formed without affections •, and fo have no fprings to move him, no motives to action, and no capacity of pleafure ? But how can we have pleafure without affections *, or what buta {enk of plealure and pain can flir us to action and choice ? Or would he have us formed with affections and appetites, without objects fuitcdto them ; would he have man capable of pleafures, without fenfes of plea- sures and appetites after plcafures ; or would he have us indued with appetites and fenfes, and no objects fitted to gratify them ? Or would he have objects fitted to gratify them, and yet thefe objects have no con- gruity with one another ; or have congruity without having particular determinate natures; or have par- ticular determinate natures, and not operate ac- cording to them •, or operate according to their determinate natures, without operating with- in certain fixed limits and boundaries *, or can ob- jects and appetites have determinate natures and _, . . operate according to them, only within certain Continued. u r , . j i i • \ j . boundaries, and yet there be, with regard to per- ceiving beingc, no tranfitions from pleafure to pain, and alternately from pain to pleafure •, no ftated rule* with regard to agreeable and diiagreeable ienfations and perceptions, no blending of good and ill, or bordering of the one upon the other ? Is it not this to demand, that an object may be determined and yet undetermined, congruous and incongruous in the feme refbc&s ? Is it not to demand, that white may be alio black, that a triangle may be a circle ? Would the objector agarnft man, have him form- ed without private affections, without felf-love and the .other appetites neceffary to felf-prefervation ; or without thole which regard others, and knit us to fociety, and merely with the few narrow contracted ones which terminate in ourfelves ?• Would he have man capable of fenfible and private pleafure, and likewife capable of fbcial happineis, without both thefe kinds of af lections to ballancc one another ? Or of of Moral Philosophy. 389 of which of thefe kinds of happinefs would he have Ch a p. IV. us incapable ? Would he have the foundnefs of v*-^-v-*— «l a mind indued with thefe kinds of affections not to depend upon the juft ballance of them ; or the ballance to be neceflary to happinefs, and yet not to depend upon our own regulation of our affecti- ons ; or would he have the ballance impaired or in- croached upon, and that diminution or encroach- ment not felt by fenfation, but merely perceived by reflexion, without any uneafinefs ; whilft the ef- fect of each rightly governed and ballanced affection is pleafmt in itfelf, by way of fenfation ? Or would he have us perceive affections operate within us without any fenfation of pleafureor pain? One or other of thefe he mud demand •, or our affpctions muff continue to work as they do. But to demand the lad, is to require that affections ihould not at all affect us, or be perceived by us. And to demand the other, is to require that, an affection in its due proportion mould be pleafant, and yet not be difa- greeable when it is out of that due proportionate itate ; which is to require, that things mould be proportionate and difproportionate at the fame time in the fame refpect ; congruous and incongruous to the fame thing ; tally and not tally with it? Would he have our frame of body or mind to be difordered, or threatened with hurt, and we have no warning of our danger -, or would he have all things to have the fame relation to, the fame agreement with the fame texture ? Would he have every man fo framed, as to have no relation to other men, no dependence upon the reft of his kind ? Would he have men to conflitute one kind, without a common flock, a common rntereit ? Or would he have a common de- pendence, without reciprocal ties and affections ? CQ1*tinued, Would he have m zn fo framed as to be related to one another, and mutually connected and depen- dent, and yet their common happinefs not be de- pendent upon good union and joint endeavours C c 3 rightly; 390 The PRINCIPLES Ch a p. IV. rightly directed and governed ? Or would he have the common happinefs of mankind to be dependent, and yet the happinefs of individuals not to be de- pendent in any mcafure upon right union and duly confederated force ? Would he have one kind of uni- on as fit to promote the common happinefs as any other ; difunion as fit as union ? Would he have ends gained without means, or all means to be equal- ly fit for accomplishing and effectuating any end whatfoever ? Would he have mankind to conftitute one kind, without being like to one another in the fa- bric and temperature of their minds, as well as in that of their bodies ? Or would he have mankind confti- tute one fpecies, whofe greateft good and perfecti- on fhould depend on focial, virtuous union, and yet there be no differences amongft men in talents, difpo- fitions, genius's and abilities ? Would he have all men precifely the fame in every refpect; all of them placed in one point of time, place and fight, alto- gether equal, as fo many pieces of matter of the lame magnitude, form, fizeand weight ? Can there be a whole without parts ? Can there be unity and harmonyof defign without variety, either in the natu- ral or in the moral world ? Or is it only in the natural world, that diverfity of parts and qualities can fhew power and wifdom, or that uniformity amid ft vari- ety can produce beauty and good, and fo evidence wife and good defign ? Would any objector have man begin to be, and not fet out •, to be a progref- five creature, and not begin and proceed ? Would he have man to attain to perfection gradually, and yet nor to aim at it, advance towards it, and arrive at it by intermediate fteps •, attain to it without means, by any fort of means, or by contrary means ? Would he have man to be formed to attain to moral perfection, without moral powers, or without exert- ing thefc | ; that is, acquire otherwife than by acquiring : For is not moral perfection, a perfecti- on and happinefs that is acquired by moral beings themfelves ? • of Moral Philosophy. 391 themfelves ? In fine, let any objector take a juft and Chap. IV. full view of the natural aptitude and tendency of all W— y-"W all our faculties, as fenfitive, as underftanding, as moral, as focial beings,and fay, whether all thefe are not fitted together to attain to an excellent end ; a very confiderable portion of fenfitive and of ratio- Contlnue<*° nal, moral and focial happinefs. Let us but imagine mankind, with their common wants and indigen- cies, and their different talents and difpofitions, act- ing with regard to themfelves and others, as far as their mutual power and influence reaches, conform- ably to their reafon and moral fenfe, in all their purfuits, employments and exercifes \ and then let us fay, whether mankind in fuch a fituation, would not ihew a very beautiful variety of moral perfecti- on and happinefs •, or make a very "orderly, beauti- ful and happy kind ? Let us confider, how orderly, beautiful and happy, any confociation of mankind is in proportion as it approaches to fuch a ftate *, and then let us fay, where the blame is to be laid, if man- kind be not a very happy, orderly and beautiful fyftem. The queftion, as far as the end of our make deiigned by our Author is concerned, is, what we are capable of being in this ftate, what we are fuffici- ently framed and provided for •, and confequently what is the natural aptitude and tendency of all the inferior parts of our frame, confidered as commit- ed to the guidance and management of our reflect-; ing powers, to be directed according to our moral fenfe of right and wrong. This is the only fair way of judging or pronouncing fentence concerning mankind, the end of our being, and the intention of our Author \ becaufe this is the only fair way of judging of any whole, or of any author and contri- ver. Would it not be abfurd to fay, a watch is not a good watch becaufe it is not a fhip, or a fire-engine*, or is only fitted for what it is fitted ? And would it not be abfurd, in like manner, to fay, a watch is not well contrived becaufe it can be broken and diforder- ed ? But it is no lefs abfurd to fay, mankind is not a C c 4 good 392 Tie PRINCIPLES Chap. IV. good fyftem becaufe it is not another fyftem ; or that mankind is not well conftituted for its end, be- caufe men may difappoint that end : the very end for which we were made, being a certain degree of perfection and happinefs to be acquired by our proper care to attain to it. That only can be called natural to any intelligent being to which its nature regularly tends •, and by deviating, from which, proportion nable diforder and unhappinefs are produced. Let us therefore confider by what deviations it is, that diforder and unhappinefs are produced among man- kind *, and then, fay, if virtue, if moral perfecti- on be not our natural end. But how clofly we are pufhed and prompted by nature, to purfue that end, and not to deviate from it in any degree, will fuffi- ciently appear to every one, if he will but afk his own heart, whether he is ever diflicuked to find out his duty, and what it becomes him to do, if he but confults his moral confcience, looks within himfelf, and ferioufly enquires about it. Notwithstanding all attempts to filence moral confcience, and bear it down or impofe upon it, it often, uncalled upon, bears teftimony for truth •, for right, and againft wrong, even in the mod corrupted mind, to its great diiquietment. And this moral confcience is never confulted or called upon, but it immediately gives fentence againft vice and folly, and clearly points out truth, Titnefs and goodnefs. Let the mofl aban- doned, hardened, callous debauchee, retire but a moment within his own breaft, and tell himfelf, if he dare, that it does not. '-This light and darkneis in our chaos join* a\ Whatjhall divide ? The God within the inind. Tho9 each, by turns the other's bounds invade, As in feme well wrought piolure, light and Jhade, slad oft fo mix'd the difference is too nice, Where ends the virtue, or begins the vice . Fools ! Who from hence into the notion fall, That vice or virtue there is none at all. of Moral Philosophy. 393 If white and black, blend, /often, and unite, Chap. IV. A thoufand ways, is there no black and white ? ^~v-— ' Afk your own heart, and nothing is fo plain ; 'tis to miftake them cofts the time and pain. pffay on man, Ep. 4. Can our duty, our dignity, our happinefs be more clearly or more flrongly pointed out to us ? Or can we indeed make any wrong ftep without blaming ourfelves, without being confcious it is our own fault I And is not virtue our fupreme happinefs? Where elfe can we find it ? And is not this happinefs within our power, within every one's reach ? Is not virtue moft glorious, mofl lovely, when it is moft feverely tried ; and is not trial necefTary to its formation, necefTary to its education, and to difplaying all its charms, beauty and force ? Can there be trial and for- mation, without means, occafions and fubjecls ? Oris it not fit, nay, necefTary to the being of virtue, that it be fchooled, proved and feverely fearched ? Ought not rational beings to be placed in fuch a ftate ? And does not fuch a one naturally forebode ano- ther more perfect flate of formed and improyed vir- tue to fucceed it ? Muft immortal moral powers ne- cefTarily perifh when the firfl means and objects of their exercifes ceafe ? Qr is there ought in nature that gives ground to apprehend, that this firfl flate of our exiftence is our only one ? Are we formed to acquire virtue, and yet hardly have time with all pur diligence to make great advances in it till we are utterly deflroyed ? Or is it a good reafon to Conunu8^« think no other flate fucceeds to this, becaufe this hath all the appearances and fymptoms of fuch a flate of trial and formation, as our firfl flate ought to be ? Is it a good reafon to think, that it is the whole of pur being* faecaufe feme things appear as dark to us, as they mutt neceflarily do, if this be but a part of our being? Whence could we have ideas of vir- tue, a fenfe of its beauty, a ftrong attachment to it, if 394 We PRINCIPLES Chap. IV. if our Author had no ideas of it, no perception of its beauty, no attachment to it ? Or what is there in nature we underftand, that does not clearly evidence the goodnefs, the perfect goodnefs of its Author ? But if he be good, what have the virtuous to fear, here or hereafter ? All things muft work together for the good of the virtuous, for their good is the chief object worthy the Author of nature's care and concern ; he can love or approve them only. But that all things may work to their good, to this Rate of trial, another ftate muft iucceed, fo fitted to beings, who have pafTed through their firft ftate of trial, as will beft conduce to the general happi- nefs of all moral beings •, to the happinefs of the virtuous, or of fuch as are at due pains to improve in the moral perfection their nature is capable of. That there is order, and wifdom, and goodnefs pre- vailing in nature, all nature cries aloud : And if there be, the Author of nature muft love and purfue the general order, happinefs and perfection of his fyftem. But if he does fo, what hath his own image to dread ? And furely well improved reafon and vir- tue is fuch. If we are not to fubfift hereafter, it muft be becaufe there can be no provifion, no en- tertainment for us after our commerce with this fen- iible world is at an end ; or becaufe, tho' there can be, yet the Author of nature is not difpofed to make any other provifion for thofe excellent powers with which he hath furnifhed and adorned us. But what reafon have we to imagine fo cruelly of him who hath fo well provided for us here ? If we have none other but the mixture of pains and evils with goods in this ftate, we have none at all -9 for the goods are by far fuperior to the evils ; the evils all How from principles and laws necefTary to the high- eft goods and enjoyments •, and a mixture of evils is abfolutcly neceflary to the forming, fchooling, proving, and perfectionating reafon and virtue. Can of Moral Philosophy. 395 Can the full fruits of virtue take place till virtue Chap. IV. is become perfect ? Can the happinefs which refults <*-*-v— —J from a greatly improved mind, from ripened and well formed powers and good habits, exift before powers are duly formed and improved, and good habits are contracted and eftablifhed I Can an effect precede or prevent its caufe ? Can harveft be before fpring ? Or mud there not be a moral fpring be- fore a moral harveft, as well as a natural fpring be- fore a natural harveft ? Whatever may be fa id of the order in which natural effects are produced, it is certain, that moral powers cannot come to their full maturity, or confequently bring forth their fruits, and have their full effect, till they are duly cultivated and improved. To fuppofe it, is a down- right contradiction. What elfe then can any one, who impartially confiders things, conclude, but with Socrates, " Nee continued. enim cuiquam bono malt quidquam evenire poteft, nee vivo, nee mortuo, nee imqnam ejus res a diis immortali- bus negliguntur." In all the reafoning hitherto, I think I have not fuppofed the Being of a God, and a divine pro- vidence proved from any arguments a priori : but if I have, let fuch fuppofitions be entirely laid afide, as they ought to be in an attempt to prove divine pro- vidence a pofieriori, or from the ftate and condition of things -, and let every one afk himfelf, what it is moft natural to conclude concerning man from the account that has been given of the human nature ; what it is moft reafonable to conclude concerning a being fo furnifhed for progrefs in knowledge as man is, fo fitted for fociety and happinefs in the way of participation and communion ; a being with fuch an extent of dominion and power in the natural and in the moral world, and fo capable of delighting in order, wifdom, truth of defign, and general good: whether it is more likely that he is the workmanfhip of a wife and good Creator, and 396 The PRINCIPLES Chap. IV. and under a perfectly wife and good providence and adminiftration, than otherwife ; and whether, in fine, it is more natural to imagine, that this prefent ftate of mankind is our whole exiftence, or that it is but our firft ftate of formation and trial ; fince all appearances are very accountable upon that fuppofi- tion. For the queftion comes to this, " Whether all the parts of our complex frame, and all the laws relative to it, are really fo good as we have fhewn ; that is, whether they do not really produce exceed- ing great goods, and no evils for the fake of evil ? j And to that queftion the firft part of this efiay is defigned to be an anfwer. " CONCLUSION. TH E excellent poet we have fo often quoted, hath clearly fhewn, in one of Yu&Etbic Epi- ftles (;»), how difficult it is to judge of the motives by which men are influenced to act, from the actions \ becaufe the fame actions may proceed from contrary motives, and the fame motives may influence contrary actions: and therefore to form characters, we can only take the ftrongeft acti- ons of a man's life, and try to make them agree, in which there mult be great uncertainty, from na- ture itfelf, and from policy. But whatever difficulty or uncertainty there may be, in judging of the fprings of particular actions, human nature and its Author are fufficiently vindi- cated, when it appears, that all the powers of man, and all the fprings which move him, are given him for excellent purpofes : and that all the variety of Elhn Epjfllfl, Book II. Kpift. i. to Lord Cobbam. characters o/Moral Philosophy. 397 characters among men muft be refolved into certain Concl us; mixtures or blendings of appetites and affections, which are all of them of the greateft ufe in our frame, and which all operate, or are operated upon, mix and combine, grow and improve, or contrariwife degenerate and corrupt, according to mod excellent general laws. We have not attempted in this efifay to draw or paint particular characters, or to account for any particular characters, by ana- lyfmg them into the original ingredients of which they aTe compounded ; becaufe it was enough to our purpofe, to point out the conftituent parts, by the various combinations of which, all different, nay oppofite characters are compofed ; and to fhew, that not only all thefe are very ufeful particles in our con- stitution, but that they cannot mingle and blend, be ftrengthened or diminifhed, improve or degenerate, otherwife than according to certain rules or laws, which are very fitly eftablifhed. But let any one take any character in Homer, Virgily Horace, Terence, in any epic poem, in any tragedy or comedy, in hiftory, or in natural, that is, probable fiction, and try whether all the ingredients in it are not refolva- ble into thofe powers and affections belonging to human nature, treated of in this enquiry ; and the particular mixture forming that character into the operations of the general laws, by which all the va- rious modifications of human powers and affections are brought about, which have likewife been here explained and vindicated. In other words, the defign of this enquiry being to vindicate the ways of God to man, by accounting for moral as for natural things, we cannot help thinking it is accompiifhed, if we have proved that all the inftincts, appetites, affections and powers given to man, are fo placed, that they have proper materials, occafions, means and objects for their ex-* ercife and gratification •, and that all the laws relative to their growth and improvement, or degeneracy and 3q3 Tfa J^KiNCIPLES Conclus. and corruption, to their ftrengthening or diminu- their intermingling or jarring; and confe- quently all the laws relative to our pain or enjoy- ments, to happinefs or mifery, to virtue or vice, are excellent general laws, none of which can be changed but for theworfe. For thence it follows, that Order is kept in man as well as in nature: or, that in both, the univerfal intereft is -fteadily purlued by general laws, beyond all exception, good. Now this, we think, is done ; becaule, though all the particular appetites and paflioris, or rather all their particular workings j are not particularly fpecified and defined, yet the capital fources whence all the diverfity in J$ human life proceeds, are pointed out, and the final toc caufes of thefe powers and affections are difcovered to be exceeding good or beneficial. On !i[e*s vaft ocean diverfly we fail, Reafon the card, but paffwn is the gale : Nor GOD alone in ihe ft ill calm we find % ]Jt He mounts the form, and walks upon the wind; Paffjons, like elements, though born to fight, ;[v Tel m/x'd andfoftned, in his work unite : Theft, 'tis enough to temper and employ, But what compoftes man can man deftroy ? Suffice that reafon keep to nature' s road, Subjecl, compound them, follow her and G O D. Love, hope, and joy, fair pleafure's fmiling trainl j Hate, fear, and grief, the family of pain, Theft mix'd with art, and to due bounds confined, Make, and maintain, the ballance of the mind : The lights and [hades, whofe well-accorded ftrife Gives all the ftrength and colour of our life. Eftayon man, Ep. 2, Every virtue (as an excellent author hath ob- ferved (»), hath fome vice nearly allied to it, ot (//) Cicero de lire en. Rhel. Lib. II. No 55. £d. Scbrivelii. fprinrn ofMoRAL Philosophy. *gn fpringing, as it were, from the fame root: for every Concl us. vice is fome ufeful affection mifguided or mifplaced, But there is no mifguidance, abufe or corruption in the human mind, whatever its evil effects and confequences may be, which does not happen ac- cording to fome law of our nature, which, did it not take place, we could have no dignity, no ex- cellence, no freedom, no power, no virtue, no mo- ; ral happinefs. Man, therefore, is well conftituted and well placed here at prefent. And fhall not the work advance as it begins ? If order prevail now, fhall it not prevail for ever ? Univerfal good is now I purfued, and will therefore for ever be purfued. To conclude otherwife, is indeed to forfake all rea- fon •, for it is wilfully to reafon contrary to all ap- pearances of things, or to the whole analogy of na- ture. As in the material world, while one hath no no- tion of reducing effects to general laws, he cannot but be loft, bewildered and amazed, amidft a chaos of feemingly odd and whimfical, independent ef- fects : fo muft it likewife happen with refpect to the moral world* For regularity and order can never be apprehended, but in proportion as effects are re- duced to general laws ♦, or when they are confidered as the effects of fuch. When one objects againft eclipfes, meteors, comets, earthquakes, vulcano's, and a thoufand other phenomena, which indeed ap- pear very uncouth, while confidered by themfelves nngly, as arbitrary effects, produced without any rule ; or while one merely reflects on the mifchiefs they produce; what does the philofopher, what ought he to do, or what indeed can he do, to re- move fuch objections againft nature, but fhew, if he can, the general laws whence thefe feemingly evil effects proceed, and the fitnefs of thefe general laws : or, if he cannot do that, fhew that we can trace nature, in fo many inflances, to operation, by excellent general laws, that there is good ground to think 4oo The PRINCIPLES Concl us. think nature works univerfalJy by good general laws, and never by partial arbitrary wills. And in the fame manner* when one objects agaihft particular j appearances in the moral world, the philofopher certainly gives a fatisfying anfwer, when he mews, that we can trace the far greater part of the appear- ances in the moral world to powers, and genera! laws of powers, wifely and fitly choferi and efta- blifhed, in order to promote the general good of the human fyftem. It will not be eafy to name any effects which may not be reduced to one or other of the general laws here defended. But if fome appearances mould be inexplicable, that is, if the general laws from which fome particular phenome- na arifej ihould not be afcertainable ; yet feeing in j very many, or rather almoft all inftanceS, general laws can be affigned which are unexcrptionably good, it is highly realbnably to conclude, that nature works throughout all by good general laws ; and confe- quently, that even the appearances which cannot be explained, becaufe their general laws are not known, j mud be the effects of good general laws. For to conclude otherwife, is to argue in downright oppo- fition to analogy, or to all rules of judging concern- ing any fyftem or whole. In other words, whatever diforder and confufion there may appear to be in the material world, whilft j one flops at particular effects, or confiders them as (ingle, unconnected incidents ; yet all mud appear very orderly, when one reprelen'ts to himfelf the neceffity of its being governed by general laws, and accordingly is able to reprefent to himfelf all its ef- fects, as proceeding from fuch general laws, as gra- vity, centrifugal force, attraction, elafticity, electri- city, &V. For in proportion as he comes thus to fee effects, fcemingly evil, whilft they are confidered as the effects of particular wills, to be in reality good, as being the eflects of operation by good ge- neral laws, he mufl in proportion begin to chink wdl . of Moral Philosophy. 401 ell of nature, and perfuade himfelf that all effects Conclus in it are owing to good general laws, and muft therefore be all, for that very reafon, good effects. Bat if this way of reafoning, with refpect to the material world, be jufl: it muft likewife be good reafoning with regard to the moral world, to con- clude in like manner concerning it, that all its ef- fects proceed from good general laws, provided in many inftances we can trace its effects to good ge- neral laws. And accordingly, let any one, inflead of fuffering his mind to wander through the vari- ous appearances in the moral wrorld, from phenome- na to phenomena, as fingle, detached, unconnect- ed parts, reprefent to himfeif the powers and af- fections belonging to human nature, and the laws relative to the different operations, influences and effects of thefe powers, as one whole ; and then, Jet him fay, whether it is not a fyftem formed to produce a quantity of good, that well defer ves its place in nature. It is to help one to take fuch a re- view of the moral world, that the general laws of our nature have been pointed out in this enquiry. For that being done, it only remains to every one to remove himfeif, as it were, at a diftance from it, and to confider it as a whole, governed by thefe ge- neral laws, in like manner as we may and ought to do, in order to have a juft idea of our material fyf- tern ; to conftruct it to himfeif in his imagination, and thus making a whole of it, confider the general laws by which it is governed. Ic requires but a very fmall degree of reflexion to find out that there is no other way of judging concerning either. And who- ever carefully attends to what hath been laid of the general laws relating to our powers, and their ope- rations, muft foon fee, 1. That all the laws of matter and motion, or of the material world, are either neceffary, or very proper to afford fuitablc materials, means, occafions and objects, to the ex- ercife, employment and gratification of our powers Dd and 402 The PRINCIPLES Contcl us. and affections; and confequently, that no circum- ftances happen in confequence of the general opera- tion and prevalence of thefe laws, which are evils, absolutely confidered. And, 2. That as our powers and affections themfelves are necefiary to our happi- nefs and dignity, fo all the laws relative to their various operations, and all their changes, modifica* tions, influences and confequences, are likewife ne- ceflary to our dignity, happinefs and perfection. But what elfe is there to be accounted for, with re- gard to mankind, but the affections and powers be- longing to our compofition, and their operations in various circumftances •, and the variety of circum- ftances which excite or bring them forth into action, according to fixed laws in certain manners. "Whatever powers creatures have, they muff be powers which operate, or are operated upon, ac- cording to certain fixed methods. But if the powers be good, and all the laws according to which they work, or are worked upon, be good, the fyftem com poled by thefe powers, and laws of powers, mud be a good fyftem. If therefore the laws rela- tive to our external circumftances, that is, the laws of the fenfible world •, and the laws relative to our moral faculties, to our advancement in knowledge, in power and liberty, to aifociation of ideas and ha- bits, to virtue, to private and lbcial happinefs, that is, all the laws relative to our moral perfection ; if all thefe laws be good, be well adjufted to one ano- ther, and none of them can be altered without fink- ing and degrading the rank and condition of man, or without diminiihing his capacity of happinefs and perfection, then is the human fyftem a good fyftem. Or it mult be faid, that the human fyftem, ;h contrived and formed very fitly to produce a very good whole, ought not to take place in na- ture, becaufc other powers placed in other circum- ftances, would make, not indeed the human fyftem, but a comparatively better fyftem. To which I know of Moral Philosophy. 405 know no anfwer can be given, but this one, That Con clus, there is a very good reafon why there fhould exift in ' nature every kind of fyftem which makes a good whole % for thus alone can nature be full and coherent ; thus alone can infinite benevolence exert itfelf, and be happy> by communicating happinefs in the am- pler! or the moil unbounded manner. If a fyftem be the contrivance and production of a perfect mind, it muft be a perfect work. There can be no evil in it. We may clearly fee* on that fuppofition* how it comes about in fuch a fyftem, that thole who know but a part* are not able to ac- count for every phenomenon ; or why fome things may appear to iuch, imperfections, nay, diforderly and evil effects. For that muft needs be the cafe, with regard to thofe who have only a partial view of a fyftem. Bat in fuch a whole there can be no real evil, or abfolute imperfection 1 that is, there can be nothing that is not neceflary to the general order, perfection and good of the whole fyftem, Wherefore* if the Author of the fyftem of which We are a part, be perfectly good, that fyftem muft be perfectly good. But fince we can fee but a part* it is not ftrange that fome things fhould appear to us imperfect or unaccountable. Nay, it is impoffible in fuch a fituation that fome things fhould not ap- pear to us to be fuch. What then ought thofe who are perfuaded of the being of a God, and of a per- fect over-ruling providence, by arguments brought a priori to prove it ; what ought they to conclude, but that if we had a larger view of our fyftem^ we fhould fee more order and perfection in it, than we can poflibly perceive in a limited view of it. The goods we perceive in it, we may be fure, were intended by the Author of nature ; and the caufes, means, or laws which produce them, may likewife produce other greater goods, which we cannot dif- tern, till we have a more full and comprehenfive knowledge of the fyftem. But the feeming evils for D d a which 4c4 "The PRINCIPLES Conclus. which we cannot account, becaufe we do not com- prehend enough of the fyftem to be able to account for them, cannot be real evils, but mud be, with refpect to the whole, good, if the Author be perfect in wifdom, goodneis and power. For what is pro- duced by fuch a mind, muft be good in the whole. This is the conclufion which neceftarily follows from the arguments brought a priori for a divine all-per- fect providence. Now how compleat, how full, muft our conviction of this truth be, when we find by enquiring into our fyftem, that the farther we are able to carry or extend our refearches into it, the more marks and evidences we difcover of wif- dom and good order prevailing throughout all in man as well as in nature, agreeably to what the arguments fetched a priori prove, muft needs be the cafe. The arguments a priori have been fet in fo ma- ny various lights by excellent writers, Dr. Samuel Clarke and Mr. Woolafton particularly, that I need not now infift upon them, in an effay merely in- tended to reafon a pofteriori. Let me, however, juit obferve, that thefe arguments are far from being jb intricate as fome are pleafed to reprefent them. They, on the contrary, muft be very obvious to every one, who but underftands what power and effect of power, contrivance and production, whole and part mean. For thofe ideas to which the con- (ideration of any animate or inanimate being, or in- deed any artificial machine, naturally leads us, being diftindlly conceived, all the reaibning a priori (as it is called) to eftablifh the being of a God, and the reality of an all-perfect providence, turns upon the few following felt-evident principles. i. That whatever is contrived is contrived by fome contriver-, and whatever is produced is pro- duced by ibme producer, pol of power fuffi- cient to produce it. 2. That of Moral Philosophy. 405 2. That all power, not only of contriving, butCoNCLUs. of producing, all power belonging to mind •, or no- v_- — /■"*—■' thing being active but mind by its will, it is a mind Oblervatlons only that can contrive and produce (0). mUte ljE£ 3. That nothing can be an original ultimate fource on. of derived power, but a mind whofe power is not derived. 4. A mind which produces by power not derived, produces by power eternal and uncreated, between the exertion of which and its effects, there is an e£ fential, neceffary, independent, immutable connec- tion i a connexion not eftablifhed by the will of any other being, but which cannot but take place. 5. One fyftem is one effect, but one effect can have but one caufe or producer \ it cannot be totally produced by two caufes. 6. There muff be fome likenefs, proportion or parity, between the manner in which a being exifts, and its effence, or all its qualities and attributes. And confequently, a being which exifts in an indepen- , dent and unlimited manner, mud be in every re- fpect independent and unlimited: or, in other words, a being which exifts in the moil perfect manner, muft be in every refpect effentially and abfolutely re-*- mote from all imperfection, that is, perfect. To corroborate this laft propofition, involving in it an ablblute neceflity for the effential moral per- fection of an independent mind, it is juftly added, 1 . That there can be no malice but where inte« refts are oppofite. But a firfb univerfal mind can ' have no intereft oppofite to that of its own work^ manfhip, and therefore can have no malice. " If there (p) be a General Mind, it can have no parti- (0) See this important truth fully and clearly explained by Mr. Locke, in his chapter on power. EJfay on human under- Jlanding* [f) This reafoning often occurs in the Meditations of Marcus. Antoninus Pbilofopbus. See it explained, Characlerijlicks, T. I .. EJay on enthufiafm. D d g culajr The PRINCIPLES ticular intereft ; but the general good, or the goc£ of the whole, and its own private happinefs, muft of neceffity be the fame. It can intend nothing bcT fide, nor aim at any thing beyond, nor be provoked to any thing contrary \ fo that we have only to con- fider, whether there be really fuch a thing as a mind which has relation (q) to the whole or not. For if unhappily there be no mind, we may comfort our- feives, however, that nature has no malice. But if there really be a mind, we may reft fatisfied, that it is the beft-natured, the beft-difpofed, the moft be-, nevolent one in the world." II. It may be added, that there cannot be a di£ pofition in creatures more perfect than the difpofition of their Maker. If therefore, there is fuch a thing in our nature as delight in univerfal good, there muft be fuch a difpofition belonging to our Maker : He muft have it in its moft perfect degree, unalloyed and incorruptible. Now all thefe propofitions being very evident, we have thus a very clear evidence before we enter inta a particular examination of effects, that the one e- ternal mind, the Author of the fyftem of which we arc a part, muft be perfect in wifdom and good, nefs, as well as in power. And by the preceeding enquiry into the human make and fituation, man is found to be fuch a being, that the further we are able to carry our refearches into his frame and ftate, the more reafon have we to be fatisfied with refpect ro the wifdom and good intention of his Maker. Thus therefore we have arguments, a priori and & pojleriorii exactly tallying together to confirm be- yond all exception that moft comfortable truth, 4C That there is an infinitely perfect: God, who. (7) That there mult be a mind which has relatkm to the whole, is evident, becaufc a w^ole mult be contrived and pro- duced. of Moral Philosophy. 407 rftade and rules his whole creation, of which we are Conclus. a parr, in the moft perfect manner, whom it therefore our duty to love, adore and imitate". But as this is the doctrine of reafon, fo it is the doctrine of the chriflian religion, confirmed to us by another kind of truly philofophical evidence. For Jesus Christ gave a proper and full proof by his works, of a far more comprehenfive know- ledge of the univerfe in all its parts, that is, of God's providence and government of the world, natural and moral, than we can attain to •, and at the the lame time, full evidence of his integrity and good intention- But fuch information or teftimony hath all the qualities necefiary to create truft, or render it credible. The truth of the teftimony of Jesus Christ concerning a divine providence, immor- tality and a future flate, (which yet does not en- croach upon reafon, but leaves furHcient room for all philofophical refearches into nature, and leaves the proper evidence of every other kind of reafoning en- tire) depends upon a nolefs fimplefelf-evident maxim than this, " That famples of knowledge are famples of knowledge, and famples of integrity are famples of integrity ; that thefe two evidence an honefl and well qualified informer, and that a well qualified ho- nefl informer ought to be credited and relied up- on" (r). Reafon therefore, and revelation concur to affure us, that we are made by, and are under the di-, rection of an infinitely perfect Author, who loveth virtue, and who will make it happy : that man is framed by him to make immortal progrefs in virtue, in proportion to his diligence to improve in it. And that virtue or moral perfection, when it is brought by proper exercife and culture to due ma- turity and vigour, mail then be rendered complete- [r) See this fully handled in my philofophical enquiry concern- ing the connexions between the doHrines and works of J ejus Chrijl. D d 4 ly 4c8 The PRINCIPLES Conclus, ly happy by thofe higher employments for which it i— —v***^ cannot before that be qualified : the capacity for. great moral happinefs muft firft be formed or ac- quired before that happinefs can be enjoyed : but when the capacity is acquired, then ihall the happinefs for which it is fitted, be attained. It is ufual in treatifes of this nature and length to conclude with a brief recapitulution of the whole. But the contents Ihall be dio;efted into a regular fummary to ferve that purpofe ; and becaufe of the momentuoufnefs of the iubjecl, I rather chufe tofinifh this vindication of human nature, or of the ways of God to man, by giving in a few proportions fuch an united view of the human flate, as will immediate- ly be perceived by every intelligent reader to make a very coherent and comfortable fyftem, and to car- ry (not to fey any more of it) a much greater de- gree of probability along with it, than the contrary to it, and that by itfelf, or independently of any other confiderations. Another view I. As a material world can only be good or bad, of the human that is, ufeful or hurtful with refped to beings made ftate. capable of perceiving it, and of being affected by, it •, or is really to all intents and purpofes, nothing, while it is confidered as abiblutely unperceived : fo it is obvious to every one, who can think at all, that the material world, with which mankind and other perceptive beings are fo cloQy and intimately united in this prefent ftate of things wherein we exift, muft be confidered as making one whole ; or a fy- ftem, all the parts of which have a mutual connexion and dependence. This connexion and dependence is very manifeft wherefoever we caft our eyes. And the parts which have this coherence may very pro- perly be divided in general, into moral and natural parts, that is, perceptive beings, and their powers, capacities and affedions, and material objeds per- ceived by perceptive beings, and varioudy afteding them. II. Now of Moral Philosophy^ 409 II. Now where parts have mutual refpects, and Conclus. are fo connected, as evidently to make one fyftem, if general laws are found by induction to prevail in many inftances in that fyftem, the preemption muft be, that general laws prevail throughout all the parts of it, or throughout the whole fyftem. If they are found to prevail in many inftances in the material part, that is, in the effects of the material part upon perceptive beings •, it is prefumable, not only that they prevail univerfally with regard to the material part, but uruverfally with regafd to all the parts of the fame fyftem. But the preemption that all is governed by general laws, muft: be yet flronger, if general laws are found in any confider- able number of inftances to prevail alfo in the moral part, that is, with refpect to other effects diftinct from thofe of the material kind, fuch as the^ im- provements of underftanding, reafon, temper, &V. and the pleafures and pains arifing from thefe and {he like fources, III. By parity of reafon, if the general laws, to which effects are reducible, as far as we are able to go in tracing or deducing them, be good, the pre- fumption muft be that all is governed by good ge- neral laws. If we may not reafon in this manner concerning effects, there is an end to all enquiries into effects : there is, there can be no fuch thing as knowledge. In reality, unlefs effects proceed from general laws, and may be traced to them, we cannot pofllbly under ftand them, or form any rules of conduct to ourfelves from them : there is no order ; and fcience is a vain abfurd attempt. But, on the other hand, jf we find general laws prevailing and afcertainable in any inftances, then we have encouragement to go on in our enquiries : and if in going on, we find good general laws prevailing as far as we go, then may we moft reafonably prefumea that we may ad- vance 4io The PRINCIPLES Conclus. vance further by due diligence in finding out good general laws ; and that in proportion as we advance in this knowledge, the more goodnefs and wifdom v/e mall find in the conftitution and government of things. IV. And accordingly, philofophers have found by their enquiries into the material part, as far as they have been able to carry their refearches, order, beauty, and general good, arifing from the general laws by which it is governed •, or according to which appearances in it are produced. They have not on- ly been able to alcertain feveral general laws, by operating conformably to which, or in imitation of which many very ufeful arts have been invented to the great advantage of human life : but they have found the general good of perceptive beings to be purfued and effected, and therefore intended by the operation of thefe general laws -, the good of man- kind more particularly. Since the knowledge of the material world hath been brought to fuch great per- fection by Sir Ifaac Newton^ many excellent treatifes (/) have been written to prove, that the material part is governed by excellent general laws, or gene- ral laws admirably adjufted to produce the greater!: general conveniency or advantage with fefpect to the perceptive beings, which inhabiting it are capa- ble of receiving pleafures from it. The refill t of his and all other refearches into the material fyftem, (commonly called nature) carried on in the fame way of induction from experiments, and of refo- lution (/) of appearances into laws deduced from experience, is, that the Author of nature does no- thing in vain, but works by the feweff, that is, the fimpleft means, fteadily and uniformly, or always (/) Many of the difcourfes at Mr. Boyle's lefture arc of this kind. TKofe'of Dr. Jooh Clark in particular . ( t ) Anahfis and by dtkefis. analogoufly of MotAL Philosophy, 411 iinalogoufly for the general good and perfection of Con cl us. (he whole. V. Now this being the refult of all proper methods of enquiry into nature, we have not only great en- couragement to go on in our refearches into the ma- terial part, but we have likewife great encourage- ment to go on as Sir Ifaac Newton (u) propofes, and to enquire in the fame manner into the moral part, or the appearances which properly relate to our mo- ral powers, that is, to improvements, as beings ca- pable of reflexion, reafoning, acting, and of unit- ing in fociety for the advancement of our common happinefsand perfection. That we have reafon, and the power of acting and chufing, and certain moral affections belonging to our nature, cannot be called into queftion : Nor can it be doubted, that powers and affections of whatever fort, fenfitive or moral, mud: have their various degrees of perfection and imper- fection ; and that a power is intended to be advan- ced to the higheft degree of perfection to which it can be. But, in order to the advancement of any power to its perfection, there muft be certain means and methods of advancing it to its perfect^, on : and if there be certain means and methods, by which a power may be advanced to its perfection, there muft neceflarily, on the other hand, be certain means and methods, by which a power cannot but degenerate and corrupt, or become depraved : for the means and methods contrary to the perfecting means will be fuch. Our bufinefs therefore is to en- quire into thefe fixed means, or general laws relative to our powers and affections, according to which they' may be raifed to their perfection, and into their contraries producing oppofite effects, in order to know them, and fee whether, as in the material part, fd likewife in the moral part, all the laws, as far as we can trace them, be notcontributive to the (a) In his optics towards the ertlvm& an account of a future ftate, that idigion, cannot polftbly be given to us, unlefs our intelli- gence could reach further than our ideas, or our ideas extend beyond experience, and analogy to our experience. 1 need not tell philofophers, that a great part of what is called fcience is but negative knowledge. It is fuhicient to the prefent purpofe to remark, that the few pofitive and many more negative declarations relative to a future ftate in the goipels and epiftles, if they were carefully collected together under their proper heads, would be found to amount to fuch a difcovery of the nature of a fu- ture ftate, as well defer ves the mod ferious attenti- on of all who have juft notions of God, and of the dignity of human nature. 2. I would obferve, that according to the fcripture doctrine concerning the happinefs of a future ftate, it arifes from moral perfection fuitably exercifed and employed. It is ddcrjbed to be the natural and proper effect, fruit ©r liar veil (in confequence of the laws of God's moral pf Moral Philosophy. 427 pioral providence and government) of highly im- Conclus. proved virtues, good habits, or a well formed and pure mind, and its fuitable exercifes about objects adequate to its capacity and difpofition •, it is (aid to be the confequence of having fown to the fpirit, that is, of having laid a foundation by the im- provement of our moral powers and affections for fpiritual employments, and the happinefs refiilting from them ; as the mifery of the vicious is, on the other hand, reprefented to b* the natural effect, har- veft and fruit of a vitiated and depraved mind, or of degenerated corrupted powers and bad habits, or of having fown to the fiefh and corruption. A great part of the happinefs of a future ftate is faid to arife from more perfect knowledge •, that is, from lar- ger, jufter, and more clear and comprehenfive views of the divine wifdom and goodnefs in the go- vernment of rational beings, than we can now at- tain to in our prefent fituation, or till the great fcheme of providence is advanced to that period j and from thofe devout and pious affections, which ifuch knowledge mull excite towards the all-perfect Creator and Governor of the univerfe. Yet the whole of the felicity of that date is not reprefented as confiding in contemplation and pious adoration j but it is defcribedas an active ftate, a Hate of fervice to God, and of mutual fervice to one another: for it is reprefented to be a city, a ftate of high and no- ble activity ; a ftate of active benevolence ; a ftate of rule, truft, power and dominion. And indeed the happinefs of the fuperior orders of beings to man mentioned in the facred writings, is likewife fet forth there, as chiefly refulting from their being miniftering fpirits, employed in carrying on fome noble, generous1 ends, in the adminiftration of God, for the univerfal good of all rational beings. But it is not my prefent bufinefs to enquire more particu- larly into the chriftian doctrine concerning a fu- ture ftate. I have only mentioned thefe few things. 428 rbe PRINCIPLES Conclus. in order to fhew the confiftency between what is faid of it in revelation, and what reafon naturally leads to conceive concerning it. In the fcripture, it is exprefly affirmed, that this is the unchangeable law of God in his government of all rational beings, of mankind in particular, that " as they fow fo mall they reap." And this we find, by enquiring into the conftitution of man, and into the nature and means of all the acquifitions he is found capable of making, to be the rule. It is the rule here, and will be the rule for ever ; and that rule being obferved in the adminiftration of moral beings, it muft be right, juft, good, reafonable adminiftration: the ways of God towards man are perfect. The chief thing aimed at in this effay, is to prove from the confideration of our affections, and powers, and of the laws relative to them, natural •and moral, which conftitute our prefent ftate, that man is made by an infinitely wife and good being for immortal progrefs in moral perfection and hap- pinefs. But in the marginal notes feveral remark- able paflages of ancient authors are quoted, or re- ferred to, not to make an often tation of reading ; but to fhew, that the way in which human nature is confidered in this enquiry, and the inferences dedu- ced from it are very ancient •, becaufe fome late writers have contended, that among the ancients, no good reafonings are to be found about divine providence, the end of man's creation, and a future -ftate ; and to fhew the contrary is not merely to do juftice to ancient philofophers •, it is doing juftice to truth and to human nature. For had even the mod thinking and enquiring part of mankind, for many 4ges, never been able to form a juft idea of the end qr perfection for which man is made ; of his relati- on to a fupreme Author and Governor of infinite excellence \ and of our duties and interefts refulting from our moral powers, and their relations, conne- xions, and tendency or aptitude, mankind muft certainly O/MORAL P H ILOSOPHY. 429 certainly have been all that time in a moft forlorn, Con curs, dark and miferable fituation •, as incapable of at- taining to their true end, as if they had been crea- ted for no fuch end. We are exceedingly indebted* on many important accounts, to divine revelation in all its different periods and difpenfation:, which will be found by every careful, impartial obferver, to make a very beautiful, progreflive part in the fyftem of providence ; or one continued connexion and feries, one uniform defign and analogy carried on for many ages, to its completion in the appear- ance of Jesus Christ in the world, very confift- ent with all the laws of the moral world. Bat fure- ly, to affert that without revelation, men have no law, rule or guide \ or which is to all intents and purpofes the fame thing, are unable to difco- ver any law, rule or guide, to direct them in the purfuit of their proper end, perfection and happi- neis, is to affirm, that men, without a revelation, are incapable of attaining to that knowledge, which alone can enable them to judge rightly of a revela- tion when it is given to them. As well may a houfe ftand m the air without a foundation, as revelation be fuppofed not to be built upon fome certain principles of reafon or natu- ral religion, clearly difcernible by their own intrin- fic light and evidence. But becaufe it will be faid, that this queftion is limply about fact, that is, whe- ther previoufly to revelation, or without its afTiftance, enquirers into nature had been able to reafon well concerning the being of God, a future ftate and human duties : I have therefore taken care, as I have gone on in this enquiry concerning man, to point out feveral paffages from ancient authors, where the nature of man, of divine providence, and of human perfection and happinefs, are not only well defined, but acurately deduced from folid principles in a truly or ftrictly philofophical man- ner. It The PRINCIPLES It is a very confiderable fatisfaction to a weH-diC pofed mind, to imagine that good fenfe hath always been very univerfal in the world: Nay, iri truth, it is hardly pofiible to vindicate moral providence, or the ways of God to man (in the perfualich of the equity and goodnefs of which all the comfort 6f a thinking perlbn is bound up) upon thecontrary fuppo- fition. And, in fact, there have almoft never been wanting fome among mankind, who, in the main, had juft notions of human dignity and perfection ; and who, actuated by a due fenfe of it, laid them- felves out with all diligence to inftruct others in that important knowledge. It does riot appear that there were more fcepticks, who took pleafure in puzzling and perplexing clear truths, in ancient than in later times ; or that fuch were then looked upon by the* wifer part of mankind with lefs contempt, or rather pity, than they now are, on account of the illiberal call of mind, from which alone a zealous propaga- tion of doctrines tending to difcbufage virtue, and throw a moft gloomy damp upon all truly noble and generous ambition, can proceed. And what though Speculative men in former ages had recourfe to va- rious hypotheies •, and in purfuing forne particular one, which, as all falfe fnppofitions when they are purfued far mull do, led them into odd fubtilties to avoid glaring contradiction, reafoned fometimes very weakly and childifhly •, can it be inferred from thence, (as, I think, a late author does in exprefi terms) that thefe philofophers never reafoned well,' or were abfolutely incapable of reafoning well, about the very firft principles of natural religion and mo- rality ? I cannot help thinking, that it would be very bad logic to fay, that the great defign of revelation cannot even now be difcovered, becaufe many pur- fuing fi range hypothefes, reafori, even now, very wildly and incoherently about it: of that, even now,* morality is not capable of being let in a clear light, fc very different, not to fay repugnant, me-' thodl* o/Moral Philosophy. 431 thods are even now taken, in order to explain it; Con cl us. and among many writers very uncouth fuppofitions are ftill admitted and reafoned from. It might ea- fily be ihewn, that there is no hypothefis made ufe of by any ancient moralift, in order to account for providence, and the prefent ftate of mankind, which hath not been adopted, nay, purfued very far, and had great ftrefs laid upon it, by fome very mo- dern writer. But what would that prove ? Surely, to bring it as an argument that, even now, mora- lity is quite darknefs and uncertainty, would juftly be reckoned very childifh and filly. And yet, if fuch reafoning be not true now, it can never be in any cafe, that is, with refpect to any time, good reafoning. If any thing be clear, this muft be fo : That good reafonings are good reafonings, though, not only at the time they were produced others rea- foned weakly and foolifhly about the fame things, but even the very fame perfons did, on other occa- fions, admit and pufh far fome odd hypothefes, and fo reafoned very wildly and fooliihly about the fame matters, concerning which they at other times exprefs very juft fentiments, with great clearnels, propriety, elegance, and force of argument. So flxangely do fome ftill go to work in their defences of a caufe, which ftandeth indeed upon a very plain, as well as fure foundation ; that I could not chufe but fay thus much in behalf, not merely of ancient philofophy, but of the clearnefs and certainty of ra- tional morality, that is, morality eafily deducible from obvious principles of reafon and common fenfe. Nay, I cannot but add, that, fo fully and clearly are all the principles and doctrines of morality explained in the v/ritings of ancient moralifts, that there is no conclufion, and almoft no reafoning, in any of the belt modern writers upon morality and natural ieligion, that is not to be found in fome an- cient philoiopher, if not in all of them. None who are acquainted with Puffendorf and Grotius, and their com men* ft* fhr PRINCIPLES ■ c* — — authors arc on every occafion quoted. What is principiihr aimed to call upon ring -.". r::. ::. .-"..■ :..r vM-j ;: ;-;_;: :r;^: m in moral af&ir .1 is the lame late philo- of as* and in acco. far them* as the : 'edge of : nerva- tions in this treatife, concennng human nature, and Ac ways of God to man, arc taken from ancient _. : \;-i :: t-.-j ;v :..:--. ;- :v ~:;ii.— . ;.:.::> -a ho have rendered juftice to them, that I was led to t :;. .f :: r.iv- ::::.-r::;: :: .:.■./•: - -•—;.- i~::z:\: ;> ::r:i::.i ^::~. r/^'^.r.i :.-.::: :~:. -:::.\;_z- :-. j-ro : .-.;- :::;- :ha: r.ar. n. rh./: :yr.;-5. a:":e: Si: I sac I kmtmtt follow, in accounting for material pheno* method. It is in the Knowledge of the nar world that we iurpafs the ancients. And if it ma : :::■._.-.: .: _":.:.-..-_: :;: gtr.enl ..: - ■ ' zr.t :::i::":^ :v::t~. but imagined it almoft impofiable to attain to any certainty in phifiology, t very jut notions of moral providence, orof the a of and accounted for moral cfT: -educing them to powers and their laws, or manners of operation, which they perceived to be o: ::.:.-.::-:y--..:. 1.". :>...::..-. . ::..■ : -.:-.:- rz_! reafon be jaffiy wondered, that modern phiTofo- phers, and fo remarkably the advan- :e of tracing materia. ^ers and gene- ers, fhould not think of c on their enquiries into moral phenomena in the . reaJonwhy. phyfi- o/Moral Philosophy. 433 pfhifiology of his time, was becaufe it did not re- duce effects to general laws, and fliew the wifdom, fitnefs or goodnefs of thofe general laws, from whicli effects proceed. And thofe who will take the trou- ble to look into his philofophy, as it is delivered to us by his fcholars, muff foon fee, that his way of reafoning concerning human duties, confided in pointing out the perfections to which our feveral moral powers are capable of being advanced, ac- cording to the laws of our nature ; and that his way of vindicating moral providence, or the ways of heaven to man, was by reducing effects in the mo- ral world to good powers, and excellent laws of thefe powers, constituting the human capacity of moral perfection and happinefs. But after all that hath been faid of the perfection of moral philofophy among the ancients, I think the following truths, with refpect to its farther im- provement, in order to carry on right education to the beft advantage, very obvioufly follow, from the fketch of its defign and aim, and fundamental prin- ciples, which hath been delineated in this enquiry; and they may therefore be added to it, as fo many Corofaries. COROLARY I. From the idea of moral philofophy delineated in[ this enquiry, it plainly appears that phyfiology and moral philofophy are (as the ancients have often ob- ferved) in the nature of things, quite infeparablc' The material world was certainly created for the fake of the moral world •, they make one ftrictly,; connected fyftem. And indeed, the material world, confidered apart from its effects upon perceptive be- ings, hath no exiffence, or at leaff, cannot be faid to merit exiffence •, it is neither good nor bad, beauti- ful nor deformed, ufeful nor hurtful ; it cannot be F i faid The PRINCIPLES faid to have any properties, but bare exigence* which, by confequence, would, in that cafe, be thrown away upon it. Now hence it follows, that enquiries into the beauty, order and goodnefs of the material world, can only mean, enquiries into the effects, material laws and connexions have, by the appointment of the Author of nature, upon percep- tive beings, and the good final ends anfwered by ilich effects. But in this fenfe, not only is natural philoibphy a part of moral, but a very efTential part of it, in order to form a juft judgment of our Creator, and his difpofition towards us ; or, at leaft, to have a full and fatisfadtory idea of his wifdom and goodnefs. COROLARY II. Not only is this true in general, but we are fo united in our prefent flate with the material world, that we may juftly be laid to be a kind of being conftituted by a'certain blending and intermingling, or mutual dependence of moral powers and laws of matter and motion. This we plainly feel to be our prefent Rate and rank. And therefore the know- ledge of ourfelves mud be perfect or imperfect, in proportion to the juftnefs and adequatenefs of the ideas we have of that mutual dependence, and of the parts lb blended and connected : This muft be true of what is called moral knowledge with refpect to us, or the knowledge of human nature ; becaufe it is obvioufly true in general. " That to know any frame* constitution, or whole, of whatever fort, is to know its parts, and thofe mutual refpects of its' parts, which make it one whole adapted to a certain end or ends" COROLA RY e/* Moral Philosophy. CoftOLARY III. u It is therefore very much to be defired, that phi- lofophers would carry on their refearches into human nature, as a being compoied by the mutual refpects of moral and material parts, ■ And while thefe re- fearches are purii1ed5.it would be of great ufe to youth, if the more important obfervations and rea- ionings from obfervations, which have hitherto been rhade concerning the human nature, and the mate- rial world with which it is united, fo as to make one fyftem, were ranged into fuch order, as would beft ferve at once to give them early right notions of man's great end, or of the chief perfection and happineis for which he is intended and made ; and of the care of God, the Father of all rational be- ings, about mankind ; and to put them into the right road of purfuing fuch important enquiries for the further advancement of true knowledge. Such a fyftem of moral philofophy for the instruction of ; youth, would certainly be of the greatefl ufe. The I great happinefs of every man, depends upon his I being early convinced, by good and folid reafoning, I of his being under the care of an infinitely wife , and good providence, and made to purfue, by pro- per culture, the moral perfection' of which : his na- ture is capable, in order to complete happinefs. Without fuch early infir action, all other fcience is comparatively vain and unprofitable. The proper ftudy of mankind is man. And a fyftem of this, knowledge proper for youth is greatly need- ed. The necefTary materials are not wanting : the work is well worth the labour of fome genius ade~ ' quate to it : and feveral noble fteps have been made towards it i but a preat deal remains to be done, to ac- fcomplifh fuch a body of moral knowledge, as would 1 fully arifwef the ends which have been mentioned. F f i COROL ARV Tbe PRINCIPLES COROLARY IV. It is very evident from what hath been found to be true concerning human nature •, and indeed, it is ob- vious to every one who thinks at all, that mere inftru- ction of the beft kind is not fufficient to effectuate the great end of education •, but together with it, early and uninterrupted, right ufage or accuftomance is abfolutely necefTary. For the deliberative temper, or a fixed unalterable difpofition to act with judg- ment, and after due deliberation, can only be ac- quired or eftablifhed in the mind, like all other ha- bits, by ufe, cuftom, or often repeated acts. And yet until this temper or habitual power of acting de- liberately and judicioufly be formed, one acts pre- cipitantly or blindly, and is not matter of himfelf and his actions : he is really not a reafonable agent. Education ought therefore to be contrived, and cal- culated to produce betimes this felf-command, this freedom and mafterihip of the mind. But tho* it be abfolutely neceffary, that by proper inftruction, young minds mould early be richly repleniffied with juft opinions and judgments concerning all the pleafures and pains in human life, or which may attend hu- man actions •, and concerning what is fit and unfit, true, juft and good, or contrariwife in every vari- ous kind of conduct in allcircumttances : yet of how little ufe will thefe judgments laid up in the mind be, unlefs from the moment one is capable of imbibing any of them by any methods of inftruction, he is likewife inured to have recourfe to them to direct him in his choices and determinations. It is only by the laft method, that theoretic principles can be- come practical ones •, and that the deliberative ha- bit can be formed in the mind ; which being form- ed, it would almott be impoflible to err, i'o ftrong- ly doth pure unUcbauched nature point out to every one of Moral Philosophy. 437 one in every cafe what is fit and becoming •, or, at Cor. V. leaft, what is bafe and unworthy. How defective education commonly is in this refpecl: is but too evi- dent. And how much of the vicioufnefs and mife- ry of mankind is owing to its being fo, will ap- pear by confidering the fame part of human nature in another light. COROLARY V. . For how is it, according to the preceeding ana- lyfis of human nature, that we are guided in our actions ; or how are our affections varioufly moved, ftrengthened or diminifhed ? Is it not by our opinions of things, or by the affociations of ideas which prevail in our minds ? And how do falfo ones become fo flrong and fixed, that they can hardly be altered, but by allowing them to operate upon us very long without examination or con- troul ? If our happinefs chiefly depends upon our opinions of things, and the affociations of ideas, which excite our affections, it muft be of the laft importance to accuflom youth by right education and difcipline, often to examine their opinions of things, and call their affociations of ideas to a ftricl: account ; to break them into pieces, or refolve them into their conftituent parts, and impartially to confi- der how thefe parts come to be united together into one idea, opinion or judgment ; upon what founda- tion, or for what reafon, that is, whether juftly or un-* juflly. For thus alone can one acquire, or having acquired, maintain the ruling power of reafon over I his opinions and affociations -> or be fure of not be- coming a mere dupe and flave to any the moil fool- ifh unaccountable fancy. But that our happinefs, as far as it depends on ourfelves, chiefly depends upon our opinions of things, and the affociations. of ideas which rule in our minds, is evident j for F f 1 tho* 438 Me PRINCIPLES Cor. V. tho5 we cannot alter natural qualities and connexions 1 tho5 pleafures and pains are fixed and immutable things, yet there are almoft no pains human • life is incident to, which we may not very confiderably alleviate by diflbciating from the ideas of them, fe- veral opinions connected with them by aflbciation, contrary to reafon and truth, which greatly aggra- vate them. Nor are there any pleafures which truly deferve to be purfued with very great afteclion, which may not, on the one hand, be very much diminished in our opinion, by fome falfe and unreafonable aflbcia- tion -, or, on the other hand, very much heightened, by a true and juft or well founded opinion ofr them, or by uniting with them, by frequent aflbciation, fuch complete ideas of them, that is, of their influ- ences, tendencies, confequences and connexions, as properly belong to the account, in a fair and true ef.imution of their full value. Nothing can be more true, than that our affections are excited by and correfpondent to the complicated appearances of things to our minds. And it is certainly true, that a very large fhare of the vexation and mifery, as well as folly and v/ickednefs of mankind, is owing to want of a full and ftrong view of the dignity and excellence of fleady confident virtuous conduct -, or of juit and complete aflbciations of ideas with refpect to right actions; and to the very falfe opinions of the plea- fures arifing from certain mere vanities, in confe- quence of falfe ideas of good connected or aflb- tiated with them. To lead youth therefore, to right opinions, and to form and fix in their minds juft and true aflbciations of ideas,jsthe great bufinefs of education ; the principal part of which end is accomplifhed by inuring them often to examine their opinions and aflbciations of ideas ; and, in ge- neral, to let no idea of happinefs or mifery enter, or, at leail, fettle in their mind, till it hath been foundly examined •, for, notwithstanding the preva- lency of falfe opinions in the world about happinefs, were of Moral Philosophy. were the examining temper early eftablifhed by- right practice, fo powerful is nature and truth •, fo powerful is the language of genuine, uncorrupted nature, that juft ideas of pleafures and pains would as it were fpontaneoufly prefent themfelves to the mind : The truth of this appears plainly, if we but reflect how unavoidably the true notions of virtue and vice haunt even the moil vicious to their great dis- quiet. In vain do they chafe them away, fly from them, or endeavour to keep them out. Here the maxim holds true, Naturam licet expellas, £sfr. The many artifices men contrive to put fome fair fhew to themfelves upon their vices, are clear proofs, that thefenfe of virtue and vice is natural and hardly eradicable : every vice is originally fo hateful to e- very man, that he naturally thinks himfelf at firfl: ab- folutely incapable of ever yielding to it : it is by flow degrees, not without violent ftruggling, and by means of many deceitful artifices to palliate things, or give them falfe colours, that any man ever be- comes reconciled to vice in any degree: But if a perfon once fuffers himfelf to lifteri to the fubtle language of falfe pleafure, and to be deluded by its guileful devices into precipitant compliance, inftead of calling upon his reafon and moral conference, to exert their proper authority, who can tell where fuch a one may ftop ! 3Tis for this realbn, that all, good moralifls fpeak fo ferioufly of the deceitfulnefs of fin , and warn us with fo much warmth, to guard with the utmofl: watchfulnefs againfl: yielding or in- dulging in any cafe, till we are fure there is no de- ceit, but that all is ftri&ly agreeable to. honour, virtue and integrity. F f 4 " VicA ,pidura tacenUl <.a quoqtic cum doccamus quod pic tarn e^MoRAL Philosophy. 443 Cor.VIIL COROLARI VIII. Early inftru&ionin the true beauty and perfection of poetry, and its fifter-arts, is not only necefTary to render liberal education complete, becaufe a right tafte of them adds greatly to human happinefs, and becaufe that is the only proper method of prevent- ing the bad effects, which thefe arts, being mifap- plied, have upon the morals of youth : But befides, right inftruction in the foundation and rules of thefe arts, and the proper ends they ought to purfue, and cannot arrive to their beauty and perfection without purfuing, muft really terminate in a very- full examination or analyfis of human nature. For whence elfe can the effects of thefe arts be dedu- ced, but from nature ? This is acknowledged, as of- tarn lacertam aut fimiam, aut Therftas faciem videntis delec- tamur, miramurque non pulc.hritudinis fed fimilitudinis caufa. Suapte enim natura fieri id quod turpe eft pulchrum non poteft : imitatio, five pulchrae, five turpis rei fimilitudinem exprimatfeu- datur : eademque rurfm,fi pulchram turpis corporis imaginem effingat, decorum non fervaverit. Pingunt etiam quidam adtio- hes abfurdas ■ in his adolefcens eft maxime afluefacien- 4us ut difcat rem qua? imitatione expreiTa eft, non laudari : fed artem qua* id quod propofitum erat, recle reprefentaverit. Quando igitur poetica ars idcirco eum admonebimus, in- cHgnum efte, fi honeftatis pulchrique ftudiofus, & non hoc, fed doctrine capienda* caufa poemata legens obiter negligenterque percipiat quae ad fortitudinem, temperantiam aut juftitiam de^ clamantur in iis qualia funt, videre hominem pruden- timmum in mortis periculo cum tota multitudine communi con- ftitutum, non mortis fed turpitudinis metu duci, animo adolef. centis ad virtutis ftudium motum afFeret. ■ Jfter many virtuous lejfons from the poets, he adds, Nonne haec demonftra- tionem habent eoram qua; de devitiis & externis bonis tradunt philofophi, ea fine virtute nihil poifeflbribus prodeffe ? — « ■ He concludes, Itaque cum propter ha:c, turn praediclorum caufa omnium, adolefcenti in leclione poetarum bona opus eft guber- natione ; ne finiftra fufpicione occupatus, fed praecedente potius inftitutione formatus, placidus ita familiarifque & amicus a poefi ad philofopkiam deducatur, ten 444 *l* PRINCIPLES Cor. IX. ten as the conduct of a good poem or of a good pic- ture is pronounced to be juft and beautiful, becaufe it is natural. And, in fact, the pieces left us by the ancients upon poetry and rhetoric, and feveral juftly eiteemed difcourfes of the fame kind by mo- derns, are indeed truly moral treatifes, and afford very great infight into human nature. But having fufficiently confidered this matter in my treatife on ancient paintings I mail go on to another remark, which may be inferred from this introduction to moral philofnphy. COROLARY IX. In explaining moral duties, in the various circum- ftances of human life, in thofe which more fre- quently occur in particular, the neceftity of bring- ing examples from hi (lory, or probable fictions, in which actions and characters are naturally reprefented, from the former more efpecially, will be readily acknowledged by all who have duly attended to the power and efficacy of example upon the human mind, or our natural flrong difpofition toward imitation. Examples of the virtues and vices, beau- tifully exprefTed or pointed out by being oppofed to one another, do, like contraft in a picture, wonder- fully flrengthen, heighten and fet off a moral lef- fon : it is thus the beauty of virtue, and the defor- mity of vice appear in the molt confpicuous mining light. And as examples take a firmer hold of the imagination and memory than bare precepts (b) ; {"/•) Hence thefe and fucb like fayings fo frequent among the ami en ts, Nihil recle docetur fine exemplo. Columella. Faciliusquid imitandum vitandumve fit docemur exemplis. Longum iter eft per pra:cepta, breve & efflcax per exempla. Seneca. fo 0/~Moral Philosophy*. 44$ fo inftances of good and praife-worthy conduct laid Cor. X. up in the memory, are ready at hand* not only to point out duty to us in a ftronger and clearer lan- guage, than a general rule, without particular exem- plifications of it* can pcflibly do ; but likewife to work immediately upon our imitative difpofition, exciting a truly noble and laudable emulation in us. For the fame reafons, it would be a very ufeful exer- cife for youth, to employ them in frequently giv- ing their judgment of particular actions recorded in hiftory, with reafons to fupport their opinion : and alfo to accuftom them to determine what virtue re- quires to be done in certain given cafes, which ought always to be fuch as have, or may occur in real life ; and at firft ought to be fuch as more frequently oc- cur in, and are moll fuited to their own age and its common incidents, much in the manner Xenophov defcribes in hfs account of the education of Cyrus. COROLARY X. As moral inftru&ion ought to be carried on very gradually, by proceeding from fimpler to more and more complex cafes ; fo certainly, in the education of thofe of the higher ranks in life more efpecial- ly, it ought to advance to the moil complex and difficult of fciences, politicks. I do not merely mean, that part of it which treats of the general duties of magiftrates, and the duties and rights of fubje&s •, nor even that which treats of the duties of feparate independent ftates, one to another , but that ftill more complex part, which enquires into the nature and effe&s of different confutations and forms of government, and compares them toge- ther. It is not more abfurd to affert, that different mixtures and combinations of fenfible qualities have not each its peculiar effects, in confequence of the properties of bodies, and the laws of matter and motion * The PRINCIPLES motion ; than it is to affert, that different mixtures and combinations of moral qualities or caufes, have not each its peculiar effects, in confequence of the nature of mo- ral caufes and their laws. Both affertions do equally terminate in affirming, that what refults from a cer- tain combination of qualities or caufes, happens by chance, and is not the natural effect of the combi- nation of qualities and caufes. And if that affirma- tion be abfurd with refpect to phyfical qualities, or caufes, and their combinations, it muft likewife be abfurd with refpect to moral qualities* or caufes, and their combinations. For quality is in no other fenfe a quality, but as it hath fixed, certain influences in certain cafes. The wor,ds natural and: moral, can make no difference in that refpect. As a natural quality muft mean a property of a body,- which hath certain effects,' fo a moral quality mult mean fome quality of a mind which hath certain effects. If combinations of moral qualities or caufes hath not their natural effects, as well as combinations of phy- fical qualities, then there Could be no politi- cal fcience, iince that only means a collection of juft conclufions concerning the natural effects arifing from certain moral caufes : even as there could be no phyfical fcience. did not phyfical caufes or qualities produce certain effects ; fince that only means a collection of juft conclufions concerning the operati- ons of phyfical qualities in various circum fiances or combinations. Better or worfe, more or lefs incon- venient, cannot be acknowledged, or indeed have any meaning with refpect to civil conltitutions, but upon fuppofition that different internal prin- ciples of government (as they are very properly called by political writers) have naturally different effects. But if they have, and therefore there really befuch a fcience as politicks, it ought certain- ly to make a principal part in the education of youth, of the more diltinguifhcd ranks in life, who are, as it were, born, to be public guardians ; that is/ they o/Moral Philosophy. they ought early to be directed into the proper me- thod of making right judgments about different con- ftkutions, and the various effects they are liable to, in confequence of the natural effects of their inter- nal principles in various circumftances •, and of flu- dying hiftory in that view : and to prepare them for fuch ftudy, they ought early to be made ac- quainted with the authors who have reafoned beft upon thefe fubjects. And indeed the more I have looked into hiftory, and into fuch authors, the more reafon have I found to conclude, all the effects pro- duced by different internal principles of government or civil polity, to be proofs of the wifdom of the laws, which conftitute and govern the moral world : and, at the fame time, the more reafon have I found to conclude, that a great deal more is owing to the natural operation of internal principles than is com- monly imagined. It is pity, that hiftorical regifters of natural phenomena have not been carefully kept from the beginning of the world, in all times and countries. Had that been done, it is reafonable to think, na- tural knowledge muft have been long ago brought to very great perfection •, and, by confequence, man would have been, long before this time, that mafter of the world he was certainly intended to be by fci- ence, and can only be in that manner. But tho* that method of enlarging human dominion and hap- pinefs be yet exceedingly neglected, notwithstanding all the pains Lord Verulam, and other great genius's have taken to recommend and chalk it out to us ; tho3 it be not fet on foot as it ought, even now when it is univerfally acknowledged by all philofophers to be the only method, and an infallible one, of getting at the knowledge of nature, of the advan- tages of which to us no one can doubt : tho* this is really matter of regret, yet it is a great happinefs to mankind, that the hiftory of moral affairs from the moit ancient times is fo exactly tranfmitted to us 443 art, till the nature of human feciety, the end of government and laws, and the various tendencies of different moral combinations in fecial refpecls, or with regard to publick happinefs, are thoroughly weighed and under flood. But it mud begin at confidering man in the abflracl:, or his natural 'late and conflitution \ fmce to deduce any moral duty, or to know the perfection or imperfection of any creature whatever, it is requifite firfl of all to under- ftand what condition and relation it is placed in^ G g and 45o Tbe PRINCIPLES Cor. XI. and what is the proper end and purpofe of its being. CORoLARY XL If any one mould ask, what is the propereft way and time of beginning in the inftruction of youth ? The anfwer feems obvious from the pre- ceeding account of human nature. It may be de- layed too long, but it cannot be attempted too foon (c). For the fooner our faculties are invited by proper methods to difclofe themfelves, the fooner they begin to operate, and by proper working, they quickly gain coniiderable ftrength, and arrive to great maturity : our moral fenfe, together with our delight in analogy and iimilitude, foon difco- ver themfelves, if they are duly tried. And one of the propereft means of improving both thefe faculties, or rather determinations of our nature, is very early to convey into young minds the more fimple and obvious moral truths, by appofitc fables and allegories. Here poetry is of admirable life; for whatever principles, maxims, or precepts can tc) Quintilian gives a Very important advice to this purpofe, founded on a very true obfer-vation. Igitur nato Alio,- pater fpcm de illo primum quam optimam capiat, ita diligentior a princi- piis net. Falfa enim ell querela paucillimis hominibus vim per-, cipiendi qua? traduntur efle conceffam ; plerofque vcro laborcm ac tempora tarditatc ingenii pcrdere. Nam contra, plures repe rias, & faciles in excogirando, & ad dircendum proniptos : quip- pe id clt homini naturalc. Ac ficut aves ad volandum, equi ad CUrfum, ad f-Lvitiam ferae gignuntur : ita nobi^ propria eft men- tis agitatio atque folertia, unde origo animi cceleftis creditur. Hebetcs vcro Sc indocile5, non magis fecundum naturam hominis eduntur quam prodigiofa corpora, & monltris infignia. $cd hi \ ici admodum iucrunt. Argumcntum quod in pueris elucct fpes plurunorum, qua: cum emoritur a-ilate manifeilum eft, non naturam defecifTe fed ciinini. Praeftat tamrn ingenio alius alium coin'" o : fed ut phis efticiat aut minus. Nemo tamen rcperitur, *•//. read inftead of contains^ contemns, p. 150. /. 27. inftead of r/;//ft/i read pleafures and /;#/«*. /?. 1 80. /. 12. inftead of and read £«/. //. 201. /. pen. {or and read c/\ p. 213. in the notes, /. 1. read inftead of obfer- vantur, obverfmtur. p. 259. /. 35. for gratifications read qualifications, p. 2JJ. I. 29. read of creating, p. 3 16. laft ////?, read rW to attain to, inftead of every ?nb?iys attaining. p. 321, /. 1 6. read fo much cultivated as it cught. p. 327. in the notes, fecund paragraph, /. 3, in- ftead of dilatory read defuliory. p. 364. /. 15. inftead of or9 read us. p. 372. the reference (gj is mifplaced, it belongs to the preceeding page. p. 373/- 24. inftead of conjiant read ineonftemU p. 380. /. 4. inftead of any read the* p. 410. in the notes read inftead of Athejis, Synthc/is* p. 411. /. 10, to our improvements, p. 413. /. 10. for r read perfect. 416. /. 3, read eminent foi excellent. CONTENTS Digefted into a Regular Summary, part I. INTRODUCTION. 'fn^HO' natural philofophy be diftinguifhed fronj moral philofophy, yet every enquiry into any ■ part of nature is an enquiry into facl: : an en- quiry concerning the human mind, its powers, and af- fections, and their operations, is as much an enquiry into fact, as an enquiry concerning the texture of the hu- . man body. Pages i, a Natural philofophy is an enquiry into the general laws, according to which all the appearances in the material or fenfible world are produced : and into the fitnefs or goodneis of thefe laws. p. 2, 3 // proceeds upon thefe few following fundamental principles. I. That the corporeal world cannot be an orderly, regu- lar fyftem, nor by confequence the object of fcience and imitation, unlefs it be governed by general laws, 4 P- 2> 3> 4 II. Thofe •" juftly concluded to be general laws in the material world, which are obferved to prevail and operate uniformly in it ; and regularly to produce like . . appearances. P- 4> 5? 6 III. Thofe general laws of the material world are good general laws, which by their Leady, uniform operati- on, produce its good, beauty and perfection in the $M£ , . p. 6 H h Corolary The CONTENTS. Corolary I. No effects of fuch laws are abfolutely evil. p. 6, 7 II. Such effects as are reduced to general laws, are ac- counted for phyfically. p. 6 III. They are alfo accounted for morally^ if the laws be fhewn to be good. p. y IV. Natural philofophy, when it proceeds fo far as to ac- count morally for appearances in the material world, co- incides with moral philofophy. p. 8 When it does not proceed fo far, it falls fhort of its prin- ' cipal ufe. />. 8, 9 Moral philofophy is an enquiry into the texture and oeco- nomy of the human mind, its powers, and affections, and the laws according to which thefe operate or are operated upon : and into the fitnefs, and goodnefs of thefe powers, and affections, and their laws. p. 9 It muft prefuppofe and proceed upon the fame fundamen- tal principles as natural philofophy. p. 9 Indeed thofe principles which have been mentioned as the fundamental principles, or the bafts of natural philofo- phy, are in their nature univerfal truths or principles. p. 10 And therefore of every fyftem, material or moral, it muft be true. 1. That unlefs it be conftituted and govern- ed by general laws, it cannot be regular : and confe- quently it muft be abfolutcly unintelligible, p. 10, 15 II. Thofe muft be received as general laws in a moral as well as a material fyftem, which are found by experi- ence to operate uniformly or invariably in it. p. 11 III. Thofe are good general laws in a fyftem, moral as well as material, which are conducive by their gene- ral operation to the greater good of that fyftem. p. 11 Corolary. I. No effects of fuch laws are abfolutely evil, but good. p. 12 II. Thofe effects are accounted for phyfically which are re- duced to general laws. p. 12 III. They are accounted for morally by (hewing the laws to be good. p. 12 Hence we fee how moral philofophy ought to be carried on, and what is its end and bufinefs. p. 13 It is a miftake to imagine, that natural philofophy only can be carried on in that manner : or that it is a material fyftem only which can be governed by general laws. Moral powers T The CONTENTS. powers, and their exercifes, necefTarily fuppofe genera! laws eftabliftied with regard to them. p. 13, 14, We are as fureas we can be of any thing by experience and confcioufnefs^ that we have a certain fphere of power, activity or dominion. p. 14, J5 But a fphere of activity cannot take place but where ge- neral laws obtain, p. 1$ Here fome few remarks are made upon the difputes about liberty and neceffity : the doctrine of neceffity was very properly called by the ancients, the doftrine of inacti- vity, p. 15, 16, 17 The enquiry in which man is chiefly concerned, is the ex- tent of his power or fphere of dominion : accordingly the defign of this treatife is to enquire into the powers and affections belonging to human nature, and the laws relative to them. pi 18, igi This enquiry is carried on in the fame way with natural philofophy. p. 19 Accordingly as the one, fo the other may proceed in the double manner of analyfis and fynthefis. p. 20 Hypothefes are not admitted in either, any further than as queftions, into the truth or reality of which it is worth while to enquire. p. 20, 21 As natural philofophy proceeds from caufes to effects, or from effects to caufes, and fo is compounded of experi- ments and reafonings from experience, fo moral philo- fophy in like manner, &c. p. 21, 22, 23 The following treatife therefore confijis of obfervations or experiments, and reafonings from experiments about the human mind, in order to give a fatisfyinganfwer to this queftion, " Are all the effects and appear- ances relative to the conftitution of the human mind, effects of faculties, powers, difpofitions and affections, which with all the laws and con- nexions belonging to them, tend to produce goodj order, beauty and perfection in the whole ? " CHAR I. The firft general law relative to mankind, is one that extends to, or runs thro' the whole of our conftitution and circumftances. It may be called the law of our H h 2 power* The CONTENTS. right method of teaching any language, would at the fame time teach us this beautiful and exceeding ufeful analogy. p. 54, 55 Moreover, it is by our fancy that our paffionate part is touched : truths cannot find their way to the heart but thro' the imagination. p. 56 We are fo conftituted for very good and wife reafons. p. 56 Imagination is not an ingovepnable faculty, as is commonly imagined — but it is much neglected in education. p- 56, 57 The ether faculty of our minds that remains to be conii- dered is invention. p. 58 A hiftory of this faculty, and of the phenomena belong- ing to it is much wanted — Mean time, it is obvious, that invention is the faculty of finding out truths quickly, by ranging or difpofmg ideas in proper juxta-poiitions for difcovering their relations — Every new juxta-pofition of ideas difcovers fome unknown truth — New truths cannot be any other way difcovered — It is therefore by excrcife that invention is improved. p. 59, 60 in the Iaft place, it becomes eafier to make progrefs in knowledge, in proportion as we make advances in it : and by the help of that fcience, whofe object is fcience and evidence, properly called the art of reafoning, much neglected fince Plato's time, tho' clearly delineated and flrongly recommended by the great Verulam p. 60, 61 General ccncluiion concerning our furniture for know- ledge -3 it i-; very large and noble. p. 61 CHAP. II. A (econd chfs of laws, thofe relative to our embodied irate, and our connexion with a material world by means of our bodies. p. 62 Communication with the material world neceiTarily fup- pofes dependence on its laws — And natural philosophers have proved thefe laws to be good. p. 62, 63 A material world without being perceived could be of no ufe p. 63 Without beings capable of enjoying a material world, na- ture would not be full nor coherent. p. 64 And by our commerce with the material world, we receive a great many pleasures of the fenfitive kind, which well defer ve their place. />. 64 Our The CONTENTS. Our fenfes are admirably adjufted to one another, and to our whole frame. p. 65 But this is not all ; our fenfes are inftruments or means, by which we are capable of many noble fciences and arts, — of natural philofophy. p. 65 And of many ingenious imitative sarts. p. 66 Nor is this all ; they are the means, or afford the fubjecls andoccafions of many virtuous exercifes, — of many fa- cial virtues — And which is principal, they afford our reafon and moral confcience fubjects to govern and keep in due order — And thus we have a noble dominion to acquire. p. 6yr 68 But this fuppofes a moral fenfe in our mind, which fhall be considered in another chapter. p. 69 Senfible pains, whence they arife — The law with regard to them is fhewn to be good. p. 69, 70 Pains are proper and ufeful monitors. p. ji The only proper ones for us — Nay, v/e can have no other confiftently with the laws relative to knowledge, p. 72 But from the neceffity there is that bodily appetites mould be attended with uneafy fenfations arifes the neceility of all the other uneafy fenfations accompanying our defires, which are called paffions p. 73, 74 The law of matter makes an infant ftate of body neceffary • — And the law of progreflive knowledge and power or perfection, makes infant minds neceffary — And fuch bodies and minds are proper mates. p. 74 There is a great variety among mankind in refpecr. of men- tal powers — And this very confiderably depends on phy- fical caufes, — ■ • as is generally owned — It is well worth while to enquire more fully into this phenomenon than hath been yet done. p. 75, 76, 77 Mean time, it is evident, that fuch a dependence is invol- ved in the very idea of union between mind and body. p. 78 And it hath very good effects, p, 79, True morality, therefore, mult confider man as a compound creature, neither merely fenfitive nor purely moral, — ? but, as he really is, Nexus utriufque mundi. p. 79, 8q All the obfervations made by naturalifts upon the animal oeconomy of the human body, and of other animals, might be inferted here — But the preceeding remarks wilt prepare every intelligent reader for making a proper ufe of fuch3as they occur to them in their reading and Sadies. H h 4 The The CONTENTS. The laws relative to our communion with a material world are therefore very fitly chofen. " p. 8* G H A P. III. Another clafs of laws. Thefe relative to the aflbciation of ideas and habits. p. 81, 82 Both thefe effects take their rife, from one principle. — And thev are infeparable, or muft go together ; if the one take place, the other muft likewife take place. The forma- tion of habits fuppofes aflbciation of ideas ; and where afTociation of ideas takes place, habits muft be con- tracted, p. 82, 83 But whether thefe effects are reduced to one principle in our nature or not, they do really take place, /'. e. ideas are aflbciated, and habits are formed by us. And both proceed from a moft ufeful principle in our na- ture, p. 83 Which is really the law of improvement to perfection : for by means of it only do we, or can we arrive at per- fection of any kind. p. 84 But, in order to treat more fully of {o ufeful and exten- ' five a law of our nature, an aflbciated idea is defined and exemplified, in order to diftinguifh it from a complex idea. p. 85 From the very definition, it is plain, that almoft all our ideas have fomething in them of the aflbciated kind. p. 86 This is the neceflary effect: of a world, governed by gene- ral laws, upon minds which have theaflbciating quality,, or are capable of forming habits. p. 86, 87 Accordingly, \vl ) ve come to philofophize, natural phi- lofcphy confifts, in a great meafure, in feparating ideas, which r.ie order of nature hath aflbciated in our mind. p.S7 And It is one great bufinefs, if not the chief in moral phi- lofophy, to break or feparate aflbciations. p. 88 Many aflbciations are made by ourfelves. But many are inevitably formed in confequence of the order of nature, or the methods in which ideas are independently of us conveyed into our mind. p. 89 What hath been faid is no objection ngainft the law of af- fociation. For, in general, it is the law of improve- ment to perfection. />• 9° Several The CONTENTS." Several good effects arifefrom it— Without it we could ne- ver become acquainted with the courfe of nature ; every thing would for ever be new to us. p, 9 1 Unraveling or feparating ideas of ailbciations is a very a- greeable, rational employment. p. 91 It is in confequence of the law of aflbciation, that we are capable of ftrengthening or diminifhing our deflres, or of adding to our pleafures, and of alleviating our pains. A 92 Becaufe defires are excited by ideas, and our power ove* our ideas lies chiefly in affociating and feparating. p. 92, 93 Another circumfhnce with refpect to aflbciation merits attention — Like ideas are very eafily aflbciated. Wit conftfts in affociating — Judgment in feparating — Both fuppofe the law of aflbciation to take place — It is therefore in confequence of the law of aflbciation, in a great meafure, that there are different genius's among mankind— The fame law gives rife to an equal diverfity of moral characters. p. 93, 94 But fo far as temper depends on aflbciation of ideas, it der pends on ourfelves. p. 95 Wit and its inftruments, metaphor and Jimile, are aflbclati- ons — Philofophy is feparating work— Both may run into extravagances. p. 96 Practical philofophy, or the government of our affections, confifts in the afliduous examination of our ideas, fancies and opinions — The chief bufinefs of education is to efta? blifh early%the habit of felf-examination. p. 97 Aflbciations cannot be broken by mere refutation of falfe opinions, but by contrary practice — Were it not fo, the law of aflbciation would not have its effect. p. 98 I proceed next to conilder active habits, properly fo called, —from our power of contracting habits, proceed me- mory,— habitual knowledge, tafte of every kind, — >. and perfection of whatever faculty. p. 99 Inftruction and education prefuppofe the power" of habit — How memory may be improved in confequence of this law — We are imitative creatures, but it is in confe- quence of the law of habits that imitation hath its effect, or example its influence. p. 100, 101 Habit renders that agreeable which was at nrft difagree- ble. p. 102 It ballances our natural defire after novelty, p. 103 The CONTENTS. By the law of habit, pafHve impreflions grow weaker in proportion as practical habits are ftrengthened — inftan- ces. />. 103 It is in confequence of the law of habits that temper is formed — In confequence of it, we are able to eftablifh, in our mind the deliberative habit, — which is felf-com- mand, and true moral liberty. p. ioj It is therefore this law which renders us capable of liberty, or of being free agents. p. 106 The laws relating to aflbciation of ideas and habits, are therefore good general laws, — an ufeful corolary. p. 107 CHAP. IV. Another clafs of laws relative to our guiding principle and our moral conduct. — Our excellence confifts in our having reafon and a moral fenfe to guide our con- duct. />. 107 It is by our reafon, that wc rife above merely perceptive beings in the fcale of life — It is all our force, or, at lcaft, our chief one p. 108 Reafon is our guiding principle, and ought to be exerted as fuch. p. 109, no There are two things to be confidered with refpect to our guiding principle and our rule of conduct — Our fenfe of right and wrong, — and our fenfe of happinefs — That thtfc two do not difagree, (hall be fhewn afterwards. p. no But firft let us confider our fenfe of right and wrong — ■ whether we have fuch a fenfe or not is a queftion of fact— But that we have it is plain, for we are not only capable of electing, but of approving — Thefe two are very diffe- rent operations. p. ill If wc have an approving and difapproving fenfe, we have a moral fenfe, or a fenfe of right and wrong. p. 112 What are the qualities which excite approbation or dif- approbation — Actions muft be done with affection, free- dom and reflexion, to excite approbation or condemna- tion, p. 112 Of fuch actions, veracity, candor, benevolence, ISc* ex- cite our approbation, and tlieir contraries our difappro- bation. p, 113, 114 Several The CONTENTS. Several arguments to prove we have a moral fenfe — from analogy, — for we have a fenfe of beauty in material forms. />. H5> Il6> JI7 —From languages, for they fuppofe it. p. 118, 119 — From the polite arts, oratory, poetry, painting, &c. for they fuppofe it. />. H9> I2° Without fuppofing it, to account for feveral phenomena, we muff, haverecourfe to very fubtle reflexions of which the mind is not capable^and for which it hath not time. p. 121, 122 We can no more be bribed to approve an action,than to af- fent to a proportion. p I23 Further reflexions on a moral fenfe — It is not worth while to difpute about a name, if the thing be owned. p. 124, 125 And it muff be owned by all who acknowledge moral dif- ferences of actions and characters. p> 125 However, it is proper, nay, necefTary to give this fenfe or faculty in our nature a diftingu idling name — This is no lefs necefTary than it is to give diftinguifhing names to our other fenfes and faculties. p. 126,127 That we are determined by pleafure and pain in all our mo- tions, is true in a certain fenfe — But this general propo- rtion is of little ufe in philofophy, till our pleafures are diftinguifhed and clafTed. p. 12S And our moral fenfe renders us capable of a peculiar fet of them, the higheft we are fufceptible of, or can conceive. p. 129 The cautioufnefs of the ancient moralifts in ufing the words good and evil very commendable. />. 130, 131, 132 If we have no moral fenfe, then we are only capable of computing our external intereft or advantage. p. 133 But if we have a moral fenfe, we are capable of rifing higher, and taking in what is worthy and laudable in itfelf into the account. p. 133, 134 If we would but try ourfelves by proper queftions, we fhould foon feel, that we have indeed a moral fenfe — And it is abfurd to fuppofe a moral {en(Q9 not to be from nature. Art cannot create. p. 134, 135, 136, 137 A moral fenfe does not fuppofe innate ideas — But moral ideas are continually haunting our mind — Nature there- fore hath not left us quite indifferent to virtue and vice — But our moral fenfe, like all our other faculties, muft depend on cur care to improve it, p, 138, 139, 140 Hitherto Hie CONTENTS. Hitherto then wc have ound our nature to be admirably well co ftituted with regard to virrue and vice — But, mai I i be enquired, how intereft and virtue agree g to the conftkution and laws of our nature. p. I4I CHAP. V. otl er clafs of laws. Thofe relative to intereft, or pri- vate and publick good. » p. 141 Firfl of all, the feveral enquiries about morals are clafled. p. 142, 143 Next, it is to be obferved, that beauty is infeparably con- nected with utility throughout all nature — It is fo in all the imitative arts — Becaufe it is fo in nature the ftandard of truth. p. 144, It is fo in our'mundan fyftem — and with regard to the bo- dies of all animals, p. 145 It is fo, and mult be fo with refpect to the fabric of the human mind, affections, actions, and characters, and their effects. p. 146 The proof of this muft be fetched from the anatomy or texture of the mind — Lord Shaft sbury's reafoning to prove it, is taken notice of as an example how enquiries into the human mind ought to be carried on. p. 147, 148, 149, 150 Another train of reafoning to prove that virtue is private interefl — and univerfally acknowledged to be fo. p. 151, . .J52> J53. Some obfervations on Cicero's way of afcertaining human perfection and duty, — and then of proving that virtue is in all refpects our truelt intereft. ^.153,154, 155, 156, 157 An obfervation upon other ancient arguments to prove that virtue is private good, — we are not made forfenfual plea- fures, but for thofe of the mind, or rational ones. p. 158, 159 Man is made for cxercife, and to acquire dominion over his mind, and all its appetites — In this our natural grcat- nefsof mind confiffs, and virtue alone can content this natural defire of power, and inclination to extend our capacity. Several obfervations to illuftratc this. p. 160, 161, 162 Some The CONTENTS. Some other confide rat ions taken from ancient authors ta prove, that virtue is man's fupreme, nay, his only hap- pinefs,— and that virtue alone can be the reward of vir- tue, p. 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, I'g Virtue is therefore private intereft or good />. 170, 17 r This chapter concludes with fome reflexions on the debates among philofophers about the meaning of obligation. p. 171, 172, 173 And then fums up all in a conclufion from the foregoing confiderations concerning human nature and its maker, in Lord Shaft jbury's words. p. 174 CHAP. VI. Another clafs of laws. Thofe relative to fociety, or the dependence of human perfection and happinefs on focial union, and rightly confederated abilities and powers. A general view of our focial make — Man is in as proper a fenfe made for fociety as any machine is for its end. The fundamental error of Hobbs confifts in his conficer- ing the defire of power, which is natural to man, as his only natural appetite or inffinct. p. 177 But our natural defire of power, as it is conjoined in our frame with other equally natural defires, is a rnoft noble and ufeful inftinct. p. 178, 179, 180, 18 r All our affections, not only the publick ones, but even the private, have a refpect to ibciety, and are formed with a view to it. p. 181, 182 Society or variety of focial happinefs. ^.183, 184 Requires variety of talents and characters. p. 184 The exigences of cur animal life require great diverfity of powers and talents. p. 185 Moral happinefs requires the fame diverfity — A variety of different tempers and characters is requifite to various re- flexions or modifications of focial happinefs ; in like manner, as various textures of bodies are neceffary to the different reflexions, refractions, and tranfmiifionsof light and heat, in which the beauty of the vifible world confifts. p. 186,187 All focial virtues fuppofe mutual dependencies and wants, for they may be all reduced to giving and receiving. p. 187, 188 Natural The CONTENTS. CHAP. VIII. Here is given a table of the chief phenomena, good arid bad belonging to the human fyftem ; or refulting from itsjeontexture and fituation. p. 21 j, 216, 217 All thefe phenomena are reducible to the excellent general laws which have been delineated, bv which man is fitted and qualified for a very noble end and happinefs. ^.217 Wherefore there are no evils, abfolutely eoniidered, arifing from our frame. p. 218 If we judge in this cafe as we do in other like ones, we muft conclude, that all our powers are given us for a very perfect and noble end. p. 218 Indeed our moral fenfe cannot poflibly be given us for any other reafon, but to guide us to the right ufe of all our powers. p. 218, 219 Our whole frame therefore is good — For all effects reduci- ble to the laws of knowledge, to the laws of our focial make, or to any other of the laws of our nature abov6 explained, — muft be fufficiently accounted for, if ex- plication of phenomena hath any meaning at all. p. 220 For all the preceeding reafonings about the fitnefs of laws go on in the fame way that is admitted to be good in every other cafe, — in natural philofophy — The preceed- ing account of human nature is therefore ftrictlv philo- fophical. p. 220, 22t A brief recapitulation to prove this. p. 221, 222; General conclufion concerning human nature, that tho* we are not the top of the creation, but are made lower than angels, yet we are crowned with glory and honour, and have a very noble dominion allotted to us, natural and moral. p. 223 Man therefore is made for virtue, whether he is made to laft for a fhort time or for ever — But before we proceed to enquirt concerning his duration, it is proper to op- pofe to the preceeding account of man, fuch a ftate of mankind, as it is reafonable to fuppofe muft have been the product of a malignant Creator, who had no fenfe of nor regard, to virtue, or the proper good and perfec- tion of moral beings. p. 224, 225, 226 CHAP. The CONTENTS. CHAP. IX. Let us now enquire what judgment ought to be formed concerning death — The phenomenon fairly ftated— - Futurity wifely hid from us p. 227, 228 Yet we have reafon to infer, that death is not a diflblution of our moral powers — It is not analogous to our make to fuppofe that it is p. 229 But it is proper to confider this matter very fully and accu- rately— Our prefent connexion with a fenfible or ma- terial world, by means of our bodies, is arbitrary, not neceflary p. 230, 231 tVe may therefore furvive fuch a connexion, — our perifn- ing totally with our bodies, muft be the effecT: of an ar- bitrary appointment that it mail be fo p. 232 But there is no reafon to apprehend fuch an annihilating or deftroying humour in nature — The deftruclion of un- thinking matter is not properly deftrudion— Where- fore the deftruclion of a perceiving being cannot be in- ferred from the deftruclion of matter p. 233 But' there is no ground to think any particle of matter is ever deftroyed : what we call fo, is really but change of form — a fortiori , there is no reafon to think any perceiving being is deftroyed p. 234 All that can be inferred from death is, That a particular order, in which certain fenfations are now conveyed in- to our minds, then ceafes — Whence a deftruction of all thinking powers cannot be deduced p. 234. There i's no likenefs, no parity between death and total deftrucfcion of our being, whatever view we take of it P- 235 The Objections of Lucretius and Pliny againft immortaji- ty, abfurdly fuppofe, that matter can think, or that we are wholly body — The facls only prove a prefent de- pendence of our body and mind according to certain laws of nature p 237 But further, let us confider this is a very good firft ftate for fuch a progreflive being as man — And a firft ftate cannot laft always, but muft give way to another p. 23? It is therefore reafonable to think, that this ftate only ceafes as the firft ftate of progreflive beings ought to da p. 239 I i That The CONTENTS. That our death is attended with pain, only proves, that the laws of union with body continue to operate till the union is quite difTolved. p. 239 There is a plain reafon why there fhould be fuch a being in the fcale of life — But there is no reafon to think it proper, that our prefent union with a material world, mould always continue, or be the only ftate in which our moral powers are placed p. 240 Nay, it is evident, that union with body and a material world cannot always lafr. />> 241, 24a Hence, it is reafonable to conclude, that our moral powers, naturally capable of lafting for ever without wearing out, are only united with bodies for a time, in order to the fulnefs of nature, and becaufe it is a very proper firft ftate for our powers to be formed and impro- ved in. p. 242 Men muft live upon earth by fucceiTive generations — Our earth could not be rendered more capaeious without al- tering our whole mundan fyftem — When our mundan fyfteih is able to hold out no longer, there is reafon from analogy to think it fnall be fucceeded by another proper to fucceed to it, perhaps rifing out of its ruins p. 243 But if fo, we have yet better reafon to think this is but our firft ftate, which fhall be fucceeded by one very proper to follow it p. 244 If mankind cwSe to be at death, there will necelTarily bea void, a chafm in nature — But we have reafon to con- clude from experience and analogy, that fulnefs and co- herence is. the end of nature p. 245 Tin's idea of the univerfe is natural to the mind ; it great- ly delights iri it — Wherefore it muft be true — fulnefs in nature can only mean a progiefs toward fulnefs, with- out any interruption or breach — which cannot be the cafe if man is not immortal p. 246, 247 Hitherto we have onlv enquired what ought to be inferred from the courfe of nature by analogy But this courfe proves the Author of nature to be perfectly well difpofed. p. 247, 248 Let us therefore confider how the argument will ftand, when inftead ol nature, 01 the courfe of things-, we fay, the wife and good Author of nature — Then the argu- ment in the weakeft ftate mull itand thus , all looks well, /D dippofitton that death is only a period to i firft ftate, The CONTENTS. ftate, but it may be nothing elfe, nay, it looks like no- thing elfe, and therefore it is probably nothing elfe. p. 249 Several confederations add ftrength to this argument — We can only infer confufion and diforder, fromdiforder and confufion — But our prefent ftate is an excellent firffc ftate confidered as fuch : it therefore befpeaks a good orderly future ftate to fucceed it. p. 250, 25 1 It is no objection againft this reafoning that death comes upon men at all ages For as this is the necefTary ef- fect of good prefent laws, fo it may alfo be requifite to general good in a future ftate. p. 252, 253 To imagine we are deftroyed at death, is to think worfe of the Author of nature than we can of any rational creature, p. 253, 254 The greater good of the whole cannot make it necefTary — 'Tis in vain to fay, we who know but a fmall part cannot be judge of the whole. p. 254 For we are able clearly to decide feveral truths with re- gard to right ad mini ft rat ion of a moral whole — As that the world or nature, muft, in order to be perfect, be governed by good general laws p. 255 That no effects of good general laws are evils — That a whole cannot be perfect if any greater quantity of happi- nefs could take place in it — That the good of a moral fy- ftem ought to be preferred to the good of a merely animal fyftem p. 256 The greater happinefs of moral beings cannot require the deftruction of moral powers, — or the difcouragementof virtue in a future ftate, — far lefs the abfolute mifery of virtue — Nay, the general good of a moral fyftem muft make it necefTary, that tried and improved virtue be promoted ^,257, 258 It cannot require that the prefent connexions of things mould be changed in favour of vice — It cannot require that moral agents fhould become not fuch — And far lefs can it require, that moral agents well difpofed and greatly improved, mould be pufhed backwards, ind placed in difadvanta^eous circumftances for moral exer-- cifes, or virtuous improvements, and the enjoyments re- fulting from them. />. 2^9 All thefe reafonings muft bold good, if there be order in what we fee at prefent, in that part chiefly wherein vir- I i 2 tu? The CONTENTS. tue is concerned — And if this ftate really be, as it is, a very proper firft ftate for moral improvement, p. 260 It may be objected, how can a prefent ftate be a fchool to form us for a quite different ftate — -And therefore to clear up all difficulties, a few confiderations are added to (hew, that our prefent ftate is a very proper fchool for our for- mation, culture and discipline with regard to any ftate into which we may pafs ; however new it may be, or. different from the prefent, and that with refpect to our underftanding or our will ; with refpect to fcience or temper ; knowledge or virtue ; our rational faculties, or our appetites, affections and paflions p. 261, 262, 263, 264 To ask, why is not virtue completely happy here, or fince it is not, why we ought from analogy to conclude a fuccecding ftate of virtue fhall be completely happy, is' to ask, why the end does not precede the means, or the effect its caufe ; why education muft precede perfection, or fpring, harveft. The law here is, that we reap as we fow. And that it is reafonable to think is theuniverfal law throughout moral fyftems — — The law with re- gard to our future ftate — And where this law obtains the adminiftration isjuft,itis perfect/*. 265, 266, 267, 268, 269 Add to all this our natural defire and pre-fentiment of a fu- tute ftate For there is no inftance in nature of any merely animal appetite, or inftinct made in vain, or to be difappointcd. p. 270, 27 X CONCLUSION. Man therefore is made (as all the better ancients ever be- lieved and taught) for eternal progrefs in moral perfecti- on and happinefs, proportionally to his care and dili- gence to improve in it />. 272 The End of the First Part. THE. CONTENTS Digefted into a Regular Summary. ■ '■ ' " '' ' ' .i- PART II. INTRODUCTION. HO W it is propofed to anfwer all objections. Page 275 All objections which terminate in demanding an impoflibility, are abfurd. p. 276 What the ancients meant by the inhability or obliquity of a fubject, or necefiity of nature. p. 276 Such an inhability or neceflity does not fuppofe any limi* tation upon the divine, creating power. p. 277 All objections which terminate in demanding a change to the worfe, are abfurd — They do ultimately terminate in demanding an impoflibility. p. 278, 279 C H A P. I. Some objections againft man, are really objections againfl his perfection, — for all our powers, difpofitions and af- fections are fo many capacities of perfection and hap- pinefs. p. 280 So are all the laws relative to their improvement or dege- neracy— The law of habits in particular, which is fo extenfwe. p. 281 I i 3 The The CONTENTS. The objections againft man's imperfections are no lefs ab- furd, — they know no flop. p. 282, 283 They really demand a phyfical impofiibility. />. 284 Hence we may fee, that the only queftion concerning man muft be, " Whether being naturally qualified for a very noble end, he does not defcrve his place in the ri- fing fcafc of life and perfection r " p. 285 Which he certainly does, — or plainly appears to do, in whatever light we confider his powers and affections. p. 286, 287, 288, 289 CHAP. II. The objection taken from the prevalence of vice confider- cd — Not fo much vice in the world as is generally ima- gined, p. 290 In confcquence of the excellent laws of our nature, fome vices (morally fpeaking) are abfolutely unavoidable, — becaufc narrow views and wrong affections of ideas, arc hardly avoidable. p. 291, 292 But if vice once enters it muft fpread. />, 292, 293, 294 No objection can be brought from hence which does not terminate in an abiuidity. p. 294, 295 IHuftration. p. 296, 297 V ices arc really but the corruptions, degeneracies, or abu- fes of good and ufciul affections. p. 298 Some are mifguidances of felf-love, which is a very necef- fary principle in our frame. /». 299 This was the opinion of the bed ancient moralifts. p. 29Q — Who fet us an excellent example of the befl: manner of confutation, even in qucflions of the greateft impor- tance, p. 30Q As docs Lord Shaft sbury in feveral inftances well worthy our confederation and imitation. p. 301 Jiut more vices are the mifguidances or degeneracies of be- ncvolent affections themfelves — Enhances from Shafts- to prove this. p. 302, 303, 304, 305 Nature con!! not poflibly have done more to preferve us from degeneracy and corruption, or vice, than it has done, — (of the original forces of affections itand right in u . p. 306, 307 IHuAration p. 308, 309, 310 And nature hath i_rivi.i us a guiding principle, — which ac- quif*cs ftrength in the pi manner, p. 311, 312 IUuftration. ' p. \\ < " If The CONTENTS. If it be a perfection to have natural freedom and power, it muft be a perfection to have moral freedom and power — But none call the firft into queftion. p. 313, 3X4> 3J5 Reafon, as fuch, muft depend upon culture, p. 316, 317, 3i8 We may as well pretend to infer from vices, which prevail among mankind, that there is no fuch thing as a prin- ciple of felf-love in our nature, as that there is no fuch thing as a principle of benevolence in it — But none do the firft p. 319 This reafoning applied to ignorance— of the natural — and of the moral world. p. 320, 321: This reafoning applied to tyranny, p. 322 . and to fuperftition, which is found to go hand in hand with tyranny. 323, 324 Without a mixture of good and evil, there could be no place or room for prudence,-— that is, for good and bac( choice. p. 325, 326 Hence we fee the neceflity of evils, — or, at leaft, of plea- sures far inferior to other pleafures, and fo comparative- ly evils p. 327, 328 Several virtues prcfuppofe not only phyfical but moral evils ] p. 329, 330, 331, 332 Every flate of the body politic, as well as of the natural body, is incident to particular difeafes or vices, p. 333 Some reflexions on the vices to which an opulent ■flouriih- ing ftate is fubject p. 334, 335, 336, 337 Men may chufe their (late, but every one hath its natural, necelTary attendants and confequences. p. 338, 339, 34° Yet in declaiming againft thefe vices feveral things are mifreprefented — Luxury, for example, is declaimed againft in a very vague manner p. 341 The polite arts are no part of luxury, — and they do not effeminate a people. — But other arts mufl: be united with them to render a nation equally brave and polite. A 342, 343 Upon the whole, it is virtue alone that is the cement of: ibciety — 'Tis virtue, and political v/ifdom, which educe good out of mor.il evil. p. 344 Even as excrements may be rendered ufeful. p. 345 Suppofing vices to be neceftary, yet fince good may be edu- ced out of them by virtue and political wifdom, the I i 4 wifdom The CONTENTS. wifdom of the moral world will ftand on the fame foot-* ing as the wifdom of the natural world. p. 346 But vices are in no proper fenfe mechanical effects, but of a very different nature. p. 347 CHAP. III. The objections taken from* phyfical evils confidered. Thefe evils claiTed. p. 348, 349 Unlefs there be a mixture of good and evil, there can be no room for right and wrong conduct, prudent and im- prudent choice. p. 350 Phyfical evils cannot but take place in a world filled with variety of beings, if each being muft have its particular ftru£f,ure fubjecr. to general afcertainable laws. p. 35 1 We muft be able to fay with aiTurance, that we have quite exhaufted the fcience of nature, before we can af- firm, that feveral evils we complain of, are abfolutely unavoidable by prudence and art. p. 352 But which is of principal confideration, all phyfical evils proceed from the uniform operation of good general laws. p. 353 Illuftration. p. 354 £,et thofe who object: againft phyfical evils, as abfolut* evils, well confider the excellent concatenation of things natural and moral, or how all things hang together in nature. p. 355, 356 An illuftration of this taken from an author, — whofe prin- ciples have no ncceftary connexion with that kind of reafonmg. p. 357, 358, 359 Mv Lord Shaft sbury mews us how fuch principles ought to be refuted — And his refutation is here infcrted, becaufe it is oi' great moment to my argument, or to prove the foeiallty of our make. p. 360, 361, 362 .Such evils as refulc from focial dependence and union, are really goods. p. 363 punifti themfelves according to the natural courfeof thin />. 364 feveral goods muft fall to the fhareof the vicious, accord- to the excellent general law of power and induftry. 365 (fieri The C O N T E N T S. ■ {Here in the marginal notes \ a treatife of Plutarch h referred to, where this queftion is fully handledy 372 External goods depend in general on the law of induftry, which is an excellent inftitution of nature. — But they a- lone, or without virtue, cannot make man happy — Such is his frame. # p. 373, 374, 375 The punifhment of vice, as well as the reward of virtue, is wifely left in fome nieafure to fociety. p. 375, 376 Unlefs we fuppofe a mixture of goods and evils dependent on other caufes than virtue, — or if we fuppofe external motives to virtue beftowed in a diftinguiming, remark- able manner,* Virtue could not be tried as it ought to be in its firft ftate of education and difcipline, and pure love of virtue for its own fake could not be ac- quired,— for which end we are framed and placed as we are- . A 377> 37s The evils which happen to the virtuous, at the fame time that they only happen in confequence of excellent general laws, afford occasions and materials of great virtues, — which are their own reward. p, 379, 380 Some reflexions on the arguments for a future ftate from what is called prefent inequality with refpecl to virtue and vice, p, 381 The argument ftated in its true light, — and it is indeed de- monftrative. p% 382, 383 CHAP. The CONTENTS. CHAP. IV. A complex view of the objections made againfr. our frame and iituation, in which all the parts of our conftitution are fhewn to be admirably adjufted one to another, — And that no change can be propofed or imagined, which is not either phyfically abfurd, — or morally fo, tend- ing to introduce an alteration much to the worfe. p> 3&5> 386> 3873 388, 3890 390> 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396 CONCLUSION. A review of the manner in which we have proceeded in this enquiry Why we hare not entered into the ex- amination of particular characters. />, 397, 398 Jt is enough for our purpofe to have accounted for all the powers and affections of which all the different cha- racters among mankind are formed, — and for all the laws according to which our affections are varioufly mixed and compounded, &c. p. 399 As in the material world, it is fufficient to delineate the general laws from which phenomena refult, fo here. p. 400 And as, in the one cafe, fo in the other, fo foonas we are able to confider phenomena, as refulting from general laws, which make a whole, we are no more ftartled at any particular appearances, — but immediately difcern order. p. 401 — 'Tis to help one to take fuch an united view of mankind, that is, of the frame and conftitution of human nature, that the principal powers and laws of powers belonging to it have been delineated in this Eflay. For this all is accounted for that is to be accounted for ; namely, the powers and their laws conftituting man, and the circumftances calling them forth into action ; or, af- fording them means, fubjects, materials, and occaiions of exciting and gratifying thcmfelves. />. 402 U the contriver and productor of a fyftem be perfect, the fvitem mud: be perfect — But many arguments a priori, prove the Author of the univcrfe to be an. all- perfect mind. />. 4°3 Some The C O N T E N T S. Some obfervations upon thefe arguments to {hew they are not (o abftrufe as is faid by fome, but that they are eafy confequences neceflarily following from a few felf-evi- dent principles. p. 404, 405 Arguments therefore a priori and a pojleriori^ exactly a- grce or tally together, to prove the univerfal fyftem, of which we are a part, to be perfectly well conftituted, and under an infinitely wife and good adminiftration. p. 406 Revelation concurs with them, and is attended with a truly philofophical evidence that proves its truth, — and it makes no encroachment upon the province or exer- cifes of reafon. . p. 407 Inftead of a recapitulation, the Contents being digefted into a regular fummary to ferve that purpofe ; another view of human nature is laid before the reader, in twelve proportions, which fets the fame truths that have been already proved in a light fomewhat new. p. 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, '413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422 An excellent hymn in praife of the creation quoted from an ancient writer. p. 423 A beautiful reafoning about immortality quoted from ano- ther, p. 424, 425 Some obfervations on the account given us of a future ftate by the chriftian religion. p. 426, 427 The defign of this eftay being in the text to prove the truth of this proportion, " That man is well made for immortal progrek in virtue, which is excellently well taken care of and provided for here, and from thence to infer a future happy ftate for the virtuous" — And by the marginal notes to " prove the antiquity and jniver- fality of this perfuafion" ; fome reflexions are made on the opinion of thofe who afTert the ancients were not able to know any thing diftinctly of God or a future ftate ; or, at leaft, have produced no conclufive arguments on thefe iubjects. p. 428, 429, 430, 431, 432 Some Corolaries are added relating to the improvements of moral philofophy and right education, which obvioufiy follow from the sketch of moral philofophy delineated in this eftay,and well deferve the ferious attention of all who have the befc interefts of mankind ferioufly at heart. /?, 433 to the end. The The CONTEXTS. ~ir. .-::: ;.;j:. : . F I X I S. ADVERTISEMENT. So fooQ 2S Ae Autkoi's Health per: will be puhHfhed, Christi ax Philosophy : or, The Christian Doctrine caaurmag Provi- dence, Virtue, aid :: : : : 7 z , pro- ved to be perfectly agreeable to the Principles of Moral Philosophy. Id a D&ourfc given by Sc PsmL, mf tbeOnau Moral Government, in rhefr Words : Bt mat deemed^ Gad is wot wmdtm\